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Preface to the Second Edition 
 
 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self has always had a curious history; 
indeed, 34 years’ worth to completion. But those were relatively uneventful, 
compared to its publication history, which has only grown curiouser and 
curiouser. This fifth publication anniversary, marked by a reformatted and 
redesigned second edition, is an opportune moment to review and take stock. 
When Cynthia Read first solicited Rationality and the Structure of the Self 
for Oxford University Press in the early 1980s, it was a longish, one-volume 
manuscript that – as I predicted at the time – promised to grow. She apprised 
me of OUP’s traditional sympathy for multi-volume projects (by Frances 
Myrna Kamm, Bimal Krishna Matilal, Alexander Murray, Werner Jaeger, 
Wayne Waxman, Terence Irwin and Derek Parfit, to name a few recent 
examples). So in the late 1990s, I kept my promise to get back in touch when it 
was close to completion. By then it had grown to four volumes. Peter 
Momtchiloff insisted that I cut it down to two. I did that. Then he insisted that 
I cut it down to one. I refused, and withdrew.  
Terry Moore of Cambridge University Press solicited Rationality and the 
Structure of the Self in the early 1990s. I brought it to CUP in the early 2000s, 
and stated at the outset my refusal to cut it any further. I worked with 
Beatrice Rehl. She was the best editor I could have wished. She understood 
and respected the interconnection of both volumes, the impossibility of 
marketing each as a completely independent work, and even my stubborn 
refusal to further reduce the size of either one.  
But Beatrice was even better than that. Because Volume I: The Humean 
Conception is very critical of a conception of the self that virtually everyone, 
both in philosophy and in the social sciences, takes for granted, it was 
extremely difficult to find reliable readers for this volume. More than thirty 
people simply refused to read it, and Beatrice refused to countenance the 
impertinent poster I designed in order to exploit the marketing potential of 
this remarkable fact (see Figure 1, next page). A few of my colleagues wrote 
reader’s reports that were so mad-dog, chewing-up-the-rug savage that they 
subverted their own credibility. For example, one fulminated against its 
purported failings at very great length, without bothering in any instance to 
cite the text. Another fabricated objectionable text against which to fulminate, 
in the apparent certitude that Beatrice had not bothered to familiarize herself 
with the text I actually wrote. A third, so thinly disguised as not to have 
needed to bother with the pretense of anonymity, objected to my having 
neglected to discuss her recent book.  
Any other editor would have used such reports as a convenient excuse to 
get rid of Volume I entirely, and demand that I publish Volume II: A Kantian  
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Figure 1. Proposed Promotional Poster (2007) 
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Conception either separately or not at all. Beatrice could have done that, but 
she did not. Instead she spent a great deal of time and money finding readers 
for both volumes whose word, though critical, could be trusted. Both 
volumes are very much improved for the rigorous, constructive criticism and 
encouragement her chosen readers finally supplied. My debt to her and to 
them is very great. It was a privilege to work with an editor of this calibre. 
But CUP’s review procedure is unusual in requiring yet a further round 
of vetting: Each volume also had to be independently read and approved by 
the Cambridge University Press Syndicate, a group of eighteen Cambridge 
University professors from different disciplines who pass judgment on each 
manuscript which CUP’s editors submit for publication. That both volumes of 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self survived this highly ramified gauntlet of 
specialized professional evaluation reinforces my belief in its worth.  
After both volumes had been fully and formally approved for publication 
by academic scholars professionally trained to make such judgments, CUP’s 
marketing department then demanded that I cut 100 pages – any 100 pages – 
from each volume, in order to sell them more easily. Beatrice had agreed in 
writing not to require this. But it is CUP’s marketing department, not its 
editors or syndicate of scholars, that finally determines what CUP publishes 
and in what form. Of course the resulting books would not have been the ones 
that the CUP Syndicate had approved. I refused, withdrew, and published 
both volumes at my website.  
This is what happens when you break a promise to a Kantian. 
Although CUP’s vetting procedure is unusually demanding, its ultimate 
deferral to the financial bottom line is not unusual at all. The reality is that the 
economic climate for all print publishers, but particularly for academic print 
publishers, has been extremely difficult and getting steadily worse over the 
last decade. Pig-headed authors such as myself do not help the situation. 
Some publishers are forthright and transparent about these limitations. Others 
try to make a virtue of necessity, and to convince their authors that these 
limitations are, indeed, a virtue. As I accept only those limitations dictated by 
the imperatives of the work itself, I have sought virtues elsewhere. 
I did not write Rationality and the Structure of the Self in order to make a 
profit. But I have derived very great profit indeed from its instant accessibility 
to anyone beset by even a momentary flicker of curiosity about its contents. 
Electronic, open-access self-publication has also done much more to bring it to 
public attention than a traditional print publisher’s contract would have 
allowed. Full-page advertisements in The Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, The Journal of Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, Mind, 
Ethics, Political Theory, The European Journal of Philosophy, and Economics and 
Philosophy have secured its place in the historical record. And advertising it on 
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the Philosophy in Europe E-List1 has inadvertently generated some very 
heated debate about having done so.  
Granted: disagreements with the actual arguments of Rationality and the 
Structure of the Self have not been “aired where they should be, in the arena of 
scholarly debate,” as one of its anonymous readers had expected. Indeed to 
my knowledge, it has not received a single mention, much less a review, in 
any academic forum, conference, journal or book in the five years since its 
first publication; and it may well have to wait for many people to die, 
including me, before it gets one. I can live with that.2 For in the end, we all 
die. Then all that is left is the work, and all that matters is its quality.  
But in the meantime, this over-my-dead-body collective public disregard 
has enlivened a thriving private interest in both volumes at my website. Off-
the-record magnanimous comments have also provided cardiopulmonary life 
support. And a proliferation in recent years of talk, conference, journal, and 
edited collection topics concerning the self, self-deception, desire, reasons, 
rationality, and the Humean model of motivation has had an equally pleasant 
resuscitating effect. Perhaps I will rise from the grave. In any case, these 
developments at least embalm the project in a regenerative admixture of 
edginess and scholarly significance.  
Rationality and the Structure of the Self also has manifested a different kind 
of significance. In effect, it has been functioning as a litmus test of the theory 
of professional power dynamics introduced in Chapter I. Formulated in 1998, 
that theory best explained the data of my experience and observations in the 
field of academic philosophy: 
It is because rational philosophical dialogue recognizes no professional 
hierarchy that other, extra-philosophical or even anti-philosophical 
measures must be invoked to maintain it under circumstances in which 
hierarchical status is the surest index of professional survival. … In this 
traditional hierarchy, with few exceptions, … novices, newcomers, 
                                                       
1See Adrian Piper, “Re.: Self-Advertisements,” posted by Philosophy in Europe 
PHILOS-L@liverpool.ac.uk on Saturday October 4, 2008, at 15:01. Archived at 
http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/philos-l.html. With over 7,000 subscribers in 57 
countries, plus duplication to several additional global redistribution lists, the 
Philosophy in Europe e-list is the largest philosophy mailing list in the world. 
2I argue in Volume II that when most people want to do something, they find a reason 
to do it; whereas when they want not to, they find a reason not to. So the deafening 
silence has not moved me to seek explanations for it. But some have been pressed upon 
me nevertheless. Impromptu public remarks about the project include “pretentious,” 
“presumptuous,” and the opinion that Rationality and the Structure of the Self spans too 
many different areas of specialization for any one person to review it. So it would seem 
that the one person who wrote it actually must have comprised several different ghosts 
in the machine, each ghostwriting a different chapter. Or perhaps she is in reality just an 
oversized Swiss army knife, presuming to dissect any fodder on the chopping block. 
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provisional members, and interlopers tend to rank among the lowest 
subordinates of all. Accordingly, the more they diverge – in thought, 
appearance or pedigree – from the tradition, the closer to the bottom of 
the hierarchy they are likely to be found, and the more blatant the 
exercises of power that keep them there.3 
But as of that writing, I had not yet been gently eased out of the United States, 
nor gently eased out of my tenured full professorship, nor gently eased out of 
my retirement benefits, nor gently eased out of my agreement with CUP, nor 
gently eased out of any remaining status in that professional hierarchy. This 
gentle and easy sequence of events attests to the predictive power of the 
theory developed in Chapter I, legitimates its aspiration to truth, and secures 
my role as experimental guinea pig of my own theory. For that reason, among 
others, I have made no revisions of content, aside from minor corrective line-
edits, in the main text of this second edition. Perhaps the passage of time will 
gradually disclose the predictive power of theories developed in subsequent 
chapters of the project as well. 
Socrates reminds us that a hierarchy of status is not the same as a 
hierarchy of quality. I recurred to this useful advice each time I was forced to 
choose between them, by refusing repeatedly, under institutional pressure, to 
publish Rationality and the Structure of the Self prematurely or in butchered 
form. I have never regretted my decision to pay any price necessary in order 
to publish this work at the highest standard of philosophical achievement of 
which I am capable. Of course the price of doing the very best philosophical 
work I had it in me to do should not have been that expensive. But it has been 
more than repaid by the insights it has yielded into the de facto workings of 
the profession.  
The most important of these insights may be worth sharing: Whether 
your work is blacklisted, ignored, or simply overlooked by your colleagues 
does not necessarily undermine, and may even aid and abet your ability to 
produce the best work you possibly can. If you are lucky enough to have 
access to a laptop and a library,4 no one can stop you from doing that work 
unless you let them. Document and archive it properly, and you will get your 
15 minutes eventually. We all do. Write for that audience, not this one. 
These insights have yielded a freedom to say and do and write what I 
want that my previous investment in the institutional hierarchy of academic 
                                                       
3Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project: 
The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics, 21 (both volumes), below. 
4 – and perhaps some sense of kinship with the many artists who choose to moonlight 
alongside day jobs that pay the bills. Philosophy is much cheaper to finance and just as 
easy to feed. Teaching philosophy of course should be much more than that. But if its 
proffered working conditions effectively thwart any such activity worth the name, then 
it is much less; and may offer much less food for thought than other available day jobs 
such as managing an office or driving a cab. 
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philosophy had not returned. Having been gently eased out of the profession, 
I can now indulge without guilt the luxury of devoting myself to the 
discipline; and of doing even more of the very best work I possibly can, 
regardless of whom it offends.5 The anonymous acclaim collected at the back 
of these volumes lends empirical support to these insights, while minimizing 
the professional dangers that public exposure of the culprits would bring. My 
choices have turned me into a walking institutional critique; and I find I enjoy 
this new persona very much.6  
Recently a very eminent colleague of long standing, almost exactly my 
age and the recipient of a named chair at a top-ranked university, invited me 
to lunch and inquired as to how things were going with Rationality and the 
Structure of the Self. I reported to him what I have reported to other curious 
bystanders, and what I have now reported here, once and for all, in this 
Preface. He questioned whether “getting kicked out of the field” was an 
accurate description of my experience. He inquired into the events and 
personalities at the academic institution that had delivered the boot. And he 
described with relish his review of another mutual colleague’s recent two-
volume work. He offered to send me both the review, published a year after 
the appearance of both volumes, and the volumes themselves. I appreciated 
the opportunity to make some useful comparisons. My colleague had read the 
text carefully, annotating key passages in the margins and indexing them on 
the flyleaves. His review was fair, thorough, attentive to the argument, and 
appropriately respectful of the author’s diligent efforts and exalted 
professional status. It regretfully concluded that the work under review was 
deeply misguided and historically worthless.  
My efforts in Rationality and the Structure and the Self were only slightly 
less diligent (a measly 1,212 total printed pages for my two volumes to 1,365 
for his). But my professional status is considerably less exalted. In fact, it is so 
microscopically Tom Thumb-diminutive that Rationality and the Structure of the 
Self offers no professional incentive whatsoever, aside from unattributed use 
of its ideas, to read it. There is no legitimate professional end to which 
attention to this project is a means. Neither academic standing, nor peer 
recognition, nor professorial approval, nor enhanced professional 
connections, nor powerful patronage, nor job offers, nor tenure, nor journal 
publication, nor external research funding, nor any other professional rewards 
will accrue for publicly disclosing one’s acquaintance with or interest in this 
work. Indeed, any such attention spent must debit and justify the time, 
                                                       
5 After all, what are any offended parties going to do about it? Kick me out of the field? 
6 However, I am no match for Gene Roddenberry’s Borg, the uncontested winners of the 
Pink Floyd Lifetime Achievement Award for institutional critique in the peripatetic 
tradition. 
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attention and energy thereby lost to other endeavors more conducive to 
professional flourishing.  
As for its worth, the only reasons to read Rationality and the Structure of the 
Self (in private, of course, or else concealed in a plain brown paper bag) are 
stubborn curiosity about that very question: Was it, in fact, really worth it? – 
plus whatever historical worth its curiouser and curiouser history has 
inadvertently conferred. I am glad it has caught the attention of the curious, 
and I value their curiosity.  
I hope your curiosity will be slaked by what you find in the following 
pages; that they will answer that question, both to your satisfaction and to 
mine; and that the answer you find there will have been worth the trouble of 
seeking it out.  
 
 
Adrian M. S. Piper 
Berlin, 24 January 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is much more honorable and much easier 
not to suppress others, but to make yourselves as good as you can.7 
                                                       
7 Plato, Apology XXX, in Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Trans. F. J. Church and Robert D. 
Cumming (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956) 
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My first inkling that there was something amiss with the Humean 
conception of the self came before I knew enough Western philosophy to call 
it that. I am grateful to Allen Ginsberg, Timothy Leary, Edward Sullivan and 
Swami Vishnudevananda for urging me to read the Upanishads, Bhagavad Gita 
and Yoga Sutras in 1965. I am grateful most of all to Phillip Zohn for his 
willingness to argue with me at length about the import of these texts, and for 
introducing me to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in 1969, after reading an art 
text of mine on space and time (“Hypothesis”) that inadvertently echoed its 
doctrine of transcendental idealism. The influence of all of these works on my 
thinking has informed my (you will pardon the pun) critical and skeptical 
approach to the Humean conception from the beginning. 
This project has been in production for a very long time. The ancestor of 
the concept of pseudorationality introduced in Chapter VII of Volume II was 
my undergraduate Social Sciences Phi Beta Kappa Medal Honors Thesis, 
“Deception and Self-Deception” (City College of New York, 1974). I am 
grateful to Martin Tamny, Arthur Collins and David Weissman for their 
guidance and input at that stage. The ancestor of the analysis of cyclical and 
genuine preference in Chapter IV of Volume I and Chapter III of Volume II 
was Chapter II of my Second-Year Paper, “A Theory of Rational Agency” 
(Harvard University, 1976), for advice and comments on which I am indebted 
to John Rawls. Both ancestors liased in revised form in my dissertation, “A 
New Model of Rationality” (Harvard University, 1981) under John Rawls and 
Roderick Firth, in whose debt I permanently remain. Professor Firth provided 
the sounding board, the detailed and rigorous criticism, and the personal 
encouragement that has helped preserve my faith in the value of this project. I 
am deeply grateful for his involvement with it, and to have known him as a 
teacher and colleague.  
My animated discussions with Professor John Rawls, both about my 
work and about the role of the utility-maximizing model in his work, were 
absolutely crucial to my conviction that I was on to something. His example 
as a scholar and teacher, the breadth and depth of his learning, and his 
magisterial achievement in A Theory of Justice have remained an inspiration to 
me in all of my work. I rank Rawls’s achievement as a theory-builder – a 
philosopher who constructs substantive theories – with those of the middle 
and late Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant, and Habermas. A critic, by contrast, is 
a philosopher who mostly criticizes, improves upon, or demolishes theory-
builders’ theories. The quintessential critic would be the slice-‘em-and-dice-
‘em Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues. But some might also count St. 
Thomas Aquinas, Sidgwick, the later Wittgenstein, and Ryle among the 
philosophical critics, for different reasons. Philosophers may reasonably 
disagree about how some of these examples are to be classified, and most 
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philosophers evince both theory-building and critical inclinations to varying 
degrees. But the distinction is nevertheless useful, because training in analytic 
philosophy is by default training in how to be a critic: We study the views of 
famous philosophers, learn how to detect areas of inconsistency or fault or 
lack, and then learn how to correct, supplement or level them. There is no 
way to teach theory-building, except by encouraging students to have 
confidence in their intuitions. So if we happen to incline toward theory-
building, we are pretty much on our own, because there are no ground rules 
about how to proceed. In developing the theory defended in this project, I was 
fortunate from the very beginning to receive good advice about how to 
proceed, from another theory-builder who had already been there and done 
that. The ground rules Rawls taught me were three:  
 
(1) Anchor your theory in relation to identifiable current problem(s) 
or controversies. Describe the problems, analyze some recent arguments 
that purport to solve them, and explain the ways in which these 
arguments fail. Then briefly sketch how your theory avoids these failures, 
so that your readers will be able to locate your theory on their own map 
of philosophical issues in a way that confers meaning and importance on 
it for them.  
(2) Anchor your theory relative to the views, with which you 
disagree, of other philosophers who have worked on the problem and 
have received attention for their efforts. Discuss those views, explain 
what’s wrong with them, and describe how your theory avoids the 
criticisms you make of their views. Refer to these opposing views in 
developing your own, in order to bring your theory into connection with 
a larger, ongoing philosophical discussion among your peers.  
(3) Avoid cooking up a straw man to attack. Show that you take your 
opponents’ views seriously, by making the best and most sympathetic 
case for them you possibly can, before showing how they disappoint 
despite your best efforts. The worst that can happen is that really 
understanding your opponents’ views will convince you to modify your 
own. 
 
In this project I have tried to honor Rawls’s ground rules as best I can, in 
order to honor him as my teacher and their author, and also all of those others 
from whom I have learned so much by disputing their views in the following 
pages. 
I have also benefited by teaching and discussing extensive portions of 
both volumes of this project with several generations of graduate students at 
the University of Michigan, Stanford, Georgetown and USCD – particularly 
Richard Dees, Jeffrey Kahn, Brian Leiter, Alan Madry, Minerva San Juan 
McGraw, David Reed-Maxfield, Joel Richeimer, Laura Shanner, Cristel 
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Steinvorth, and Sigrun Svavarsdottir; and fifteen years’ worth of brilliant and 
feisty undergraduates at Wellesley College.  
Chapter I of both volumes, “General Introduction to the Project: The 
Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics,” was drafted during an unpaid leave of 
absence from Wellesley College during early 1998 and funded by an NEH 
College Teachers’ Research Fellowship. The NEH support came at a crucial 
moment and I am deeply grateful for it. This chapter incorporates and 
modifies some passages and sections of my "Two Conceptions of the Self," 
published in Philosophical Studies 48, 2 (September l985), 173-197 and reprinted 
in The Philosopher's Annual VIII (1985), 222-246. The discussion of Anglo-
American philosophical practice that appears in Sections I.2 and I.3 benefited 
from comments by Anita Allen, Houston Baker, Paul Boghossian, Ann 
Congleton, Joyce Carol Oates, Ruth Anna Putnam and Kenneth Winkler, as 
well as by members of the audience to the 1994 Greater Philadelphia 
Philosophy Consortium symposium, "Philosophy as Performance" at which 
these remarks were originally presented. The chapter received its near-final 
form during my tenure as a Research Scholar at the Getty Research Institute 
during the academic years 1998-1999. For providing me with all of the 
conditions I requested – some very idiosyncratic – as necessary for me to 
make substantial progress on this and many other parts of this project, my 
gratitude to the Institute knows no bounds. My debt of thanks to Brian Davis, 
Larry Hertzberg, Karen Joseph, Michael Roth, and Sabine Schlosser is 
particularly great. While there I also benefited a great deal from discussion of 
these and related topics with Reinhart Meyer-Kalkus. I would also like to 
thank Naomi Zack for her interest and willingness to publish an earlier 
version of this chapter, despite its length, in her edited collection, Women of 
Color and Philosophy (New York: Blackwell, 2000).  
Chapter II, “The Belief-Desire Model of Motivation,” was first drafted in 
1981, while I was an Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan. I 
learned much from discussing the issues with Richard Brandt, William 
Frankena, Allan Gibbard, Jaegwon Kim, David Velleman, Nicholas White, 
and Stephen White, however much we in the end agreed to disagree. The 
chapter was redrafted in 1985, after having spent two wonderful and 
productive years at the Stanford University Philosophy Department on an 
Andrew Mellon Post-Doctoral Fellowship from 1982 to 1984. While there I 
benefited from discussing action theory with Michael Bratman and 
philosophy of science with John Duprés. Not until my year at the Getty 
Research Institute in 1998 was I able to return to this part of the project. The 
enthusiasm and dedication of the Getty staff in putting at my disposal all of 
the research and administrative assistance I needed, and more, to update and 
revise it in light of more recent discussions helped me to believe in the 
importance of doing so. 
Work on Chapters III and IV was partially supported by the Mellon Post-
Doctoral Fellowship, a Georgetown University Faculty Research Grant in 
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1988, and a Woodrow Wilson International Scholars' Fellowship in 1988-1989. 
At Georgetown I profited from discussions with Wayne Davis, Terry Pinkard 
and Henry Richardson. I also spent many, very fruitful hours discussing this 
material with colleagues at the University of Michigan, all Humeans to a man. 
To them I am most grateful of all for pulling no punches in their attempts to 
dissuade me from my views, from these chapters, and not least of all from this 
project. Had they not put those views to the test by resorting to every possible 
tactic of dissuasion, I would have had no proof that my views could 
withstand them. To have that proof – to know that my philosophical position 
was able to survive the gauntlets devised by some of the very best minds in 
the field – is the invaluable gift that I owe to them. I should particularly like to 
thank Allan Gibbard and David Velleman for conversation. Many other 
individuals have helped me in the writing of these two chapters, including 
Glenn Loury, Michael Slote, Robert Audi, David Levy, and especially Ned 
McClennen for extensive comments on earlier drafts. I was honored by the 
opportunity to present both to a group of trained economists at the Economics 
and Rhetoric Seminar, held at the Academia Vitae in Deventer, The 
Netherlands, in June 2006. I am particularly grateful to Arjo Klamer, Dierdre 
McCloskey and P. W. Zuidhof for beneficial discussion that has improved 
their final form. 
I was helped by discussion of the first draft of Chapter V at a University 
of Michigan Faculty Seminar, and particularly by comments from Richard 
Brandt, Arthur Burks, Allan Gibbard, Louis Loeb, Peter Railton, Nicholas 
White, and Stephen White. An earlier version was published under the title, 
"A Distinction Without a Difference," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy VII: 
Social and Political Philosophy  (1982), 403-435. Chapter VI was completed and 
delivered to the Scholars’ Seminar at the Getty Research Institute in 
November 1998, and to the Philosophy Department at the University of 
Minnesota in October 1999.  I am grateful to both audiences for constructive 
comments and suggestions for improvement. Chapter VII is the outcome of 
over two decades of intense and satisfying – and, aside from Paul Coppock’s 
insightful comments, largely solitary – labor on Thomas Nagel’s The Possibility 
of Altruism. This part of the project taught me much more about patience and 
persistence than I ever could have expected when, after completing the 
chapter to my satisfaction a first time, I then allowed it to be irretrievably 
misplaced and had to reconstitute it from scratch (a scholar’s worst nightmare 
in the pre-computer era). I am deeply grateful to the Woodrow Wilson 
International Research Center of the Smithsonian Institution for extending my 
International Scholars’ Fellowship for a second year, 1989-90, so that I could 
do this. 
Earlier versions of parts of Chapter VIII were published under the 
following titles: "Two Conceptions of the Self," Philosophical Studies 48, 2 
(September l985), 173-197, reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual VIII (1985), 
222-246; "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," The Journal of Philosophy 
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LXXXIV, 2 (February 1987), 102-118; and “Michael Slote's Goods and Virtues,” 
reviewed for The Journal of Philosophy LXXXIII, 8 (August 1986), 468-73. Work 
on this chapter was supported by the Mellon Fellowship. Earlier versions of 
the discussions of Frankfurt and Watson were presented to the Philosophy 
and Anthropology Group and the Department of Philosophy, both at the 
University of Michigan; and the Departments of Philosophy at Stanford, U. C. 
Berkeley, the University of Minnesota, and the University of Pennsylvania. I 
learned much from comments received on those occasions, and from detailed 
criticism and feedback by Michael Bratman, Jeffrey Evans and Allan Gibbard. 
I am equally grateful to Akeel Bilgrami, Jeffrey Evans and members of the 
Philosophy Department audiences at Wayne State University, Penn State, 
Georgetown, the University of California at San Diego, North Carolina State, 
Wesleyan, Memphis State, and the University of Minnesota for comments and 
criticism of my discussion of Williams. 
Section 1 of Chapter IX was delivered in a slightly different form to the 
American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Convention in March 
1995 in an Author Meets Critics session on Elizabeth Anderson’s Value in 
Ethics and Economics; and later published under the title, "Making Sense of 
Value," in Ethics 106, 2 (April 1996), 525-537. An earlier version of Section 4 
was delivered to the Moral Philosophy Colloquium at the American 
Philosophical Association Pacific Division Convention, Los Angeles, 
California in March 1986; and published under the title, "Instrumentalism, 
Objectivity, and Moral Justification," in American Philosophical Quarterly 23, 4 
(October 1986), 373-381.  
Chapter X originated in September 1976 as a paper, “Continuing Persons 
and the Original Position,” for John Rawls’s graduate seminar in Moral 
Psychology, and I am grateful for his comments on it. A lecture by Joshua 
Cohen on Social Contract Theory in the Fall of 1978 at MIT had a salutary 
effect on Section IX.2. I have also benefited from criticisms of an earlier draft 
of this chapter by Peter Dalton.  Parts were published under the title, 
"Personal Continuity and Instrumental Rationality in Rawls' Theory of 
Justice," in Social Theory and Practice 13, 1 (Spring 1987), 49-76. Work on this 
chapter was supported by a University of Michigan Rackham Faculty 
Fellowship and the Mellon Fellowship. The final draft was completed during 
my year at the Getty, as was the final draft of Chapter XI. Chapter XII, 
originally my term paper for John Rawls’s Moral and Political Philosophy 
course at Harvard in the Spring of 1975, was also revised and completed 
during my wonderful and productive year at the Getty. I am grateful to 
Rawls, David Auerbach and Warner Wick for helpful criticisms of earlier 
drafts.  An earlier version was published under the title, “Utility, Publicity 
and Manipulation,” in Ethics 88, 3 (April 1978), 189-206. 
For criticisms of an earlier draft of Chapter XIII I would like to thank 
Anita Allen, Annette Baier, Margaret Carroll, John Deigh, Michael Stocker, 
and Judith Jarvis Thomson. A protodraft of Chapter XIV originally formed the 
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Appendix to my dissertation. I am grateful to Rawls for persuading me of the 
importance of dealing with Hume straight off, and for his criticisms and 
encouragement throughout. I also would like to thank Marcia Baron for 
comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. A more recent version was 
published under the title, "Hume on Rational Final Ends," in Philosophy 
Research Archives XIV (1988-89), 193-228. Robert Audi’s comments and 
criticisms, and that of an unidentified referee, improved that version 
immensely. Chapter XV is entirely my own doing, and I have no one to blame 
but myself. 
There is no way for me to express my gratitude and indebtedness to the 
very few individuals who provided encouragement and support during the 
final stretch of time in which I brought this project to completion. During two 
years of unpaid and extremely stressful medical leave from Wellesley College 
from Winter 2001 to Fall 2002, Bill Cain, Joe Feagin, Terry Irwin, Mark Kaplan, 
James Kodera, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Julie Matthaei, Reinhart Meyer-Kalkus, 
Susan Neiman, Robert Rubinowitz, Stephen Schiffer, Hedwig Saxenhuber, 
Georg Schöllhammer, Ann Stephens, and Joan Weiner extended themselves 
beyond the bounds of collegial or moral obligation by letting me know, each 
in their own way, the importance and value to them that I do so. Their 
encouragement was crucial. My debt to Ruth Barcan Marcus for her steadfast 
friendship is beyond measure. The research and administrative help 
provided, under less than ideal conditions and great generosity of spirit, by 
Robert Del Principe was invaluable. His patience, resourcefulness, persistence 
and good humor in obtaining the sources I needed under the most stressful 
conditions, and tolerating without complaint twelve years’ worth of my 
unending incipient hysteria has manifested both heroism and martyrdom of 
the highest order. My debt to him is incalculable. Without the moral support 
of all of these good people this project would not have been possible. The final 
draft was begun under conditions of extreme personal hardship, in virtually 
complete solitude during the long, hot summer of 2003; and received its final 
form in the sheltering anonymity and safety of the city of Berlin in early 2008. 
I am profoundly grateful that it is there, and that I am there. For the unique 
opportunity to live and test the values defended in this project, I would like to 
thank the faculty and administration of Wellesley College; I commend this 
work in exile to them. For the strength, the solace and the sanctuary I have 
been blessed to find in reading, writing and teaching philosophy I am grateful 
most of all. 
 
 
Chapter I. General Introduction to the Project:  
The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics 
 
 
 Buffeted and bruised by the currents of desire and longing for once to 
ride the wave, we may cast about for some buoyant device from which to 
chart a rational course; and, finding none, ask ourselves these questions: 
 Do we at least have the capacity ever to do anything beyond what is 
comfortable, convenient, profitable, or gratifying?   
 Can our conscious explanations for what we do ever be anything 
more than opportunistic ex post facto rationalizations for satisfying these 
familiar egocentric desires?  
 If so, are we capable of distinguishing in ourselves those moments 
when we are in fact heeding the requirements of rationality, from those 
when we are merely rationalizing the temptations of opportunity?  
I am cautiously optimistic about the existence of a buoyant device – namely 
reason itself – that offers encouraging answers to all three questions. Without 
hard-wired, principled rational dispositions – to consistency, coherence, 
impartiality, impersonality, intellectual discrimination, foresight, 
deliberation, self-reflection, and self-control – that enable us to transcend the 
overwhelming attractions of comfort, convenience, profit, gratification … and 
self-deception, we would be incapable of acting even on these lesser motives. 
Or so I argue in this project. I take it as my main task to spell out in detail the 
ways in which these hard-wired, principled dispositions rationally structure 
the self; in effect, outfit human beings with high-caliber cognitive equipment 
we are not yet able to fully exploit. 
 This task thus depends on a distinction between two different but related 
aspects of rationality. I describe as egocentric rationality action guided by 
considerations of comfort, convenience, profit, or gratification – in short, by 
principles spelled out in what I call the Humean conception of the self. In 
Volume I, I define, dissect and criticize in detail this desire-centered 
conception as formulated in late-twentieth century Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy. Chapter VI of Volume I defends the claim that “egocentric” is the 
correct description of this conception, against objections from its advocates. 
Although Volume I very often catalogues the shortcomings of this widely 
held view, it ultimately argues that the strengths of the Humean conception 
can be fully exploited only by situating it as a special case within a larger 
context.  
 This larger context is given by principles of what I call transpersonal 
rationality, i.e. principles governing the hard-wired rational dispositions listed 
above. In Volume II, I analyze these principles as constitutive of what I call 
the Kantian conception of the self. I describe these principles as “transpersonal” 
because they direct our attention beyond the preoccupations and interests of 
the ego-self, including its particular, defining set of moral and theoretical 
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convictions; and apply in equal measure to oneself and others. Transpersonal 
principles thus often require us to transcend considerations – even principled 
considerations – of personal comfort, convenience, profit, or gratification, 
whether acting on our own behalf or on behalf of another. Chapter VIII of 
Volume I contains discussion of the more familiar notions of impersonal and 
impartial principles, which each relate to transpersonal principles as instance 
to concept. Chapter V of Volume II contains an extended account of what it 
would be like for us to guide all of our behavior by transpersonal principles, 
whether self- or other-directed; and Chapters VII through XI an account of 
how and why we compulsively try but usually fail to do so. 
 Thus my distinction between transpersonal and egocentric rationality 
cuts across the traditional distinction between theoretical and practical 
reason. Transpersonal principles include so-called theoretical ones of 
coherence and logical consistency, as well as so-called practical principles of 
foresight and self-control. Similarly, egocentric principles may include so-
called theoretical ones relating cause to effect of the sort that are to be found 
in Machiavelli, as well as so-called practical principles that govern the 
maximization of personal gratification. I use the slightly pejorative locution 
“so-called,” because I believe that this distinction has been made to carry 
much more weight than it can bear, pace Kant, and in the end does not come 
to much. In Volume II I defend this opinion at length. 
 Sections 1 through 6, following, of this General Introduction to the 
Project elaborate the intuitive distinction between egocentric and 
transpersonal rationality through its application to the particular case that 
most personally motivates this project for me, and that I hope will also 
motivate the reader to patiently but persistently follow its single line of 
argument through two large volumes, one section at a time. That particular 
case is current philosophical practice itself. I choose to discuss this case, first, 
because it is the one that most urgently compels me to address the three 
questions with which I began this Introduction; and second, because I do not 
find widespread recognition in the field that philosophers’ virtually universal 
obsession with the topic of rationality – with defining it, critiquing it, 
defending it, rejecting it, elaborating alternatives to it – is implicitly an 
activity of professional self-definition, self-critique, self-defense, self-rejection, 
and self-elaboration of the methodological foundations on which the practice 
of philosophy itself rests. The resulting failure to apply self-consciously to the 
practice of philosophy the principles of rationality that philosophy itself 
champions has bad consequences both for theory and for practice; and, I 
believe, leads us to underestimate the necessity of clarifying in what our 
actual relation to rationality consists, even as we continue to be obsessed by 
it. By directing the above three questions in the first instance specifically to 
philosophical practice, I hope to find consensus among philosopher-readers 
of this Introduction on the importance of trying self-consciously to answer 
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them, even if not on the importance of the particular answers I myself offer in 
this project. I recur often to this particular test case in the two-volume 
argument that follows. 
 
1. Transpersonal Rationality and Power 
 In order to actualize the potential for transpersonal rationality, one must 
first genuinely value it. That is, one must value both rational behavior that 
transcends the personal and egocentric, and also the character dispositions 
which that behavior expresses. According to Nietzsche, the capacity for 
reason becomes a value when it is valorized by a "slave morality" that assigns 
highest priority to the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality and 
the spirit at the expense of natural human instincts. Like a good Untertan, I 
intend to do exactly that in this project: not argue for the value of 
transpersonal rationality, but rather presuppose its value, and argue for our 
innate ability to turn it into a fact – what Kant optimistically calls the fact of 
reason. 
 Thus I am going to presuppose that if a person's freedom to act on her 
impulses and gratify her desires is constrained by the existence of equally or 
more powerful others' conflicting impulses and desires, then she will need 
the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality to survive; and will 
assign them value accordingly. The more circumscribed her freedom and 
power, the more essential to survival and flourishing the character 
dispositions of transpersonal rationality become. And to the extent that such a 
person's power to achieve her ends is limited by a distribution of scarce social 
or material resources often less than fair or favorable to herself, she will to 
that extent, at least, value the character dispositions of transpersonal 
rationality as a needed source of strength and solace. Genuinely valuing the 
capacity for reason, then, proceeds from concrete experience of its power. 
 On these assumptions, the valorization of the character dispositions of 
transpersonal rationality that typify a "slave morality" does not express mere 
sour grapes, as Nietzsche sometimes suggests in his more contemptuous 
moments. Nor does it merely make a virtue of necessity, although it does at 
least do that. It recognizes an intrinsic good whose value may be less evident 
to those for whom it is less necessary as an instrument of survival: 
How long will you wait to think yourself worthy of the highest and 
transgress in nothing the clear pronouncement of reason? ... Therefore 
resolve before it is too late to live as one who is mature and proficient, 
and let all that seems best to you be a law that you cannot transgress. ... 
This was how Socrates attained perfection, attending to nothing but 
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reason in all that he encountered.  And if you are not yet Socrates, yet 
you ought to live as one who would wish to be a Socrates.1 
Think of these injunctions as conjointly constitutive of the Socratic ideal. As the 
product of biographical fact, Epictetus' loyalty to the Socratic ideal, and in 
particular his injunctions to "transgress in nothing the clear pronouncement 
of reason," and to "atten[d] to nothing but reason in all that [we] encounte[r]" 
are an expression of wisdom borne of the personal experience of 
enslavement. They attest to the valuation and cultivation of transpersonal 
rationality as the weapon of choice for the unempowered to use on their own 
behalf. They both underwrite Nietzsche's analysis of reason and the spirit as 
central values of a "slave morality," and demonstrate how that "slave 
morality" may have a kind of dignity that übermenschlichen views lack.   
 For if a person's freedom and power to gratify his impulses is greater, 
then he may well find the egocentric indulgence of emotion, spontaneity, 
instinct, and the manipulation of power more attractive; and development of 
the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality correspondingly less 
necessary, interesting, or valuable. After all, such individuals have at hand 
other reserves – of wealth, status, influence and coercion – on which to draw 
to achieve their ends. The unique quality of ends that the character 
dispositions of transpersonal rationality themselves inspire therefore may be 
accorded correspondingly less importance, if they are noticed in the first 
place. For such individuals, the Socratic ideal is no ideal at all; and 
perfunctory lip service to the value of rational decision-making is merely one 
dispensable strategy among others for facilitating the ongoing indulgence of 
impulse. 
 Philosophy as an intellectual discipline is fundamentally defined and 
distinguished from other intellectual disciplines by its de facto loyalty to the 
character dispositions of transpersonal rationality, and so to the Socratic 
ideal. Anglo-American analytic philosophy is committed to these values with 
a particularly high degree of self-consciousness. Whatever the content of the 
philosophical view in question, the norms of transpersonal rationality define 
its standards of philosophical exposition: clarity, structure, coherence, 
consistency, subtlety of intellectual discrimination. And as a professional and 
pedagogical practice, philosophy is ideally defined by its adherence to the 
norms of rational discourse and criticism. In philosophy the appeal is to the 
other's rationality, irrespective of her personal, emotional or professional 
investments, with the purpose of convincing her of the veracity of one's own 
                                                
1Epictetus, Enchiridion LI. I have consulted two translations: P.E. Matheson (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press), reprinted in Jason L. Saunders, Ed. Greek and Roman Philosophy after 
Aristotle (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 147; and George Long (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery Co., 1956), 202-203. 
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point of view. It is presumed that this purpose has been achieved if the 
other's subsequent behavior changes accordingly.  
 This presumption is fueled by philosophy's unsupervised influence in 
the political sphere – of Rousseau on the French Revolution, Locke on the 
American Revolution, Marx on Communism, Nietzsche on the Second World 
War, Rawls's Difference Principle on Reaganomics. In the private and social 
sphere, rational analysis and dialogue may just as easily give way to 
unsupervised imbalances in power and freedom, paternalistic or coercive 
relationships, or exploitative transactions. But even here it is not impossible 
for philosophy to have its influence: in turning another aside from an 
unethical or imprudent course of action, or requiring him to revise his views 
in light of certain objections, or altering his attitudes toward oneself, or 
influencing others to accommodate the importance of certain philosophical 
considerations through compromise, tolerance, or mutual agreement. 
 In both spheres, then, the attempt rationally to persuade and to conduct 
oneself rationally toward others is an expression of respect, not only for their 
rational capacity, but thereby for the alternative resources of power – 
coercion, bribery, retaliation, influence – they are perceived as free to use in 
its stead. Toward one who is perceived to lack these alternative resources, no 
such respect need be shown, and raw power may be displayed and exercised 
more freely, without the limiting constraints of rational justification. For, as 
Hobbes reminds us,  
[h]onourable is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument 
or sign of power.  ...  And therefore to be honoured, loved, or feared of 
many, is honourable; as arguments of power.  ...  To speak to another 
with consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is 
to honour him; as signs of fear to offend.  To speak to him rashly, to do 
any thing before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to dishonour.2 
Hobbes is wrong to think that treating another with respect is nothing but an 
expression of fear of the other's power. But he is surely right to think that it is 
at least that. On Nietzsche's refinement of Hobbes' analysis, the appeal to 
reason expresses respect for another's rational autonomy to just and only that 
extent to which it simultaneously expresses fear of the alternative, 
nonrational ways in which that autonomy may be exercised. On Nietzsche's 
analysis of rational conduct, Hobbes and Kant may both be right. 
 So philosophy's traditional commitment to the Socratic ideal is one 
quintessential expression of a "slave morality" that acknowledges the danger 
of unrestrained instinct and the egocentric use of power in its service, by to 
varying degrees constraining and sublimating instinct, impulse, and the 
manipulation of power into a rational exercise of intellect and will that brings 
its own fulfillments:   
                                                
2Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier, 1977), 75, 74. 
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The ignorant man's position and character is this: he never looks to 
himself for benefit or harm, but to the world outside him. The 
philosopher's position and character is that he always looks to himself for 
benefit and harm. The signs of one who is making progress are: he 
blames none, praises none, complains of none, accuses none, never 
speaks of himself as if he were somebody, or as if he knew anything. 
When he is hindered, he blames himself.  ... He has got rid of desire, and 
his aversion is directed no longer to what is beyond our power [i.e. the 
body, property, reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not 
our own doing] but only to what is in our power [i.e. thought, impulse, 
desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything that is our own doing] and 
contrary to nature. In all things he exercises his will temperately.3 
The philosopher, according to Epictetus, foregoes the egocentric gratification 
of desire and acquisition of external goods and power for the sake of 
cultivating the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality. Seeing that 
these two alternatives frequently conflict, she "atten[ds] to nothing but reason 
in all that [she] encounter[s]." The centrality and universality of the character 
dispositions of transpersonal rationality to the discipline of philosophy, 
enduring over nineteen centuries, may explain why almost all philosophers, 
regardless of their express philosophical views on the value of rationality, try 
to muster the resources of rational argumentation, analysis, and criticism to 
defend those views. The consistency and sincerity with which they try to live 
up to the Socratic ideal bespeaks the seriousness of their intent to avoid the 
dormant alternatives.  
 
2. Transpersonal Rationality as Philosophical Virtue 
 The priority accorded to the character dispositions of transpersonal 
rationality in the practice of philosophy receives a more contemporary 
formulation in the following Anglo-American analytic version of the Socratic 
ideal: 
[G. E.] Moore ... invented and propagated a style of philosophical talking 
which has become one of the most useful and attractive models of 
rationality that we have, and which is still a prop to liberal values, 
having penetrated far beyond philosophical circles and far beyond 
Bloomsbury circles; it is also a source of continuing enjoyment, once one 
has acquired the habit among friends who have a passion for slow 
argument on both abstract and personal topics. When I look back to the 
Thirties and call on memories, it even seems that Moore invented a new 
moral virtue, a virtue of high civilization admittedly, which has its 
ancestor in Socrates' famous following of an argument wherever it may 
lead, but still with a quite distinctive modern and Moorean accent. Open-
                                                
3op. cit. Note 1, XLVIII; also see I. 
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mindedness in discussion is to be associated with extreme literal clarity, 
with no rhetoric and the least possible use of metaphor, with an 
avoidance of technical terms wherever possible, and with extreme 
patience in step-by-step unfolding of the reasons that support any 
assertion made, together with all the qualifications that need to be added 
to preserve literal truth, however commonplace and disappointing the 
outcome. It is a style and a discipline that wring philosophical insights 
from the English language, pressed hard and repeatedly; as far as I 
know, the style has no counterpart in French or German. As Nietzsche 
suggested, cultivated caution and modesty in assertion are incompatible 
with the bold egotism of most German philosophy after Kant. This style 
of talking, particularly when applied to emotionally charged personal 
issues, was a gift to the world, not only to Bloomsbury, and it is still 
useful a long way from Cambridge.4 
The writer is Stuart Hampshire, and in this passage he describes as an 
historical fact a more recent ideal of philosophical practice that speaks to 
some of the motives and impulses that attract many into the field. The essence 
of the ideal remains Socratic: clarity and truth as a goal, with patience, 
persistence, precision, and a nonjudgmental openness to discussion and 
contention as the means.   
 Hampshire is right to describe this ideal as a "new moral virtue ... of high 
civilization." It is a moral virtue because it imposes on one the obligation to 
subordinate the egocentric desires to prevail in argument, to shine in 
conversation, or to one-up one's opponent to the disinterested ethical 
requirements of impartiality, objectivity and transpersonal rationality in 
discussion. And it is a virtue of high civilization because it is not possible to 
achieve this virtue – or even to recognize it as a virtue – without already 
having cultivated and brought to fruition certain civilized dispositions of 
character, tastes and values that override the desire to prevail. Thus this 
moral virtue stands at the very center of a "slave morality" that sublimates the 
desire to prevail to the imperatives of reason and the spirit. These 
imperatives, in turn, find expression in what Mill calls the higher pleasures of 
the intellect and moral and aesthetic sensibility. They presuppose the victory 
of "slave morality" in subjugating instinct and the egocentric exercise of 
power to the rule of reason and its attendant ethical values of fairness and 
impartiality in thought and action. This virtue of high civilization, then, 
presupposes both its participants' transpersonal rationality and also their 
achievement of a mutually equitable balance of power – however the material 
and social instruments of power may be distributed. 
                                                
4Stuart Hampshire, "Liberator, Up to a Point," The New York Review of Books XXXIV, 5 
(March 26, 1987), 37-39. 
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 Thus this ideal can have meaning only for someone for whom basic 
psychological and spiritual needs for self-worth, and moral needs for the 
affirmation of self-rectitude are not so pressing that every dialectical 
encounter with others – whether written or conversational – is mined for its 
potential to satisfy them. So when we say of such a person that he is civilized, 
we may mean, among other things, that in conversation he is disposed to be 
generous in according credibility to his opponent's view, gracious in 
acknowledging its significance, patient in drawing forth its implications, and 
graceful in accepting its criticism of his own. Someone who has mastered this 
new moral virtue of high civilization is someone for whom philosophical 
practice expresses an ideal of personal civility; a civility made possible only by 
the control and sublimation of instinct, impulse, desire, and emotion. 
 The higher pleasure of doing philosophy in the style Hampshire 
describes is then the disinterested pleasure of thinking, considering, learning 
and knowing as ends in themselves, and of giving these pleasures to and 
receiving them from others involved in the same enterprise, in acts of 
communication. Plato was surely right to suggest that we are driven to seek 
erotic pleasure from others by the futile desire to merge, to become one with 
them. Erotic desire is ultimately futile for reasons of simple physics: we are 
each stuck in our own physical bodies, and you cannot achieve the desired 
unity by knocking two separate physical entities together, no matter how 
closely and repeatedly, and no matter how much fun it is to do the knocking.  
 Intellectual unity with another is a different matter altogether, however; 
and the kind Hampshire describes is particularly satisfying because it does 
not require either partner to submerge or abnegate herself in the will or 
convictions of the other. It does not require sharing the same opinions, or 
suppressing one's own worldview, or deferring or genuflecting to the other in 
order to achieve agreement with him. Rather, the enterprise is a collaborative 
one between equals who pool their philosophical resources. By contributing 
questions, amendments, refinements, criticisms, objections, examples, 
counterexamples, or elaborations in response to the other's philosophical 
assertions, we each extend and enrich both of our philosophical imaginations 
past their individual limits and into the other's domain. There are few 
intellectual pleasures more intense than the Aha-Erlebnis of finally 
understanding, after long and careful dialogue, what another person actually 
means – unless it is that of being understood oneself in this way. 
 The ground rules for succeeding in this enterprise are ethical ones. By 
making such assertions as clearly as I can, I extend to you an invitation to 
intellectual engagement; and I express trust, vulnerability and respect for 
your opinion in performing that act. I thereby challenge you to exercise your 
trained philosophical character dispositions – for impartiality, objectivity, and 
hence transpersonal rationality – in examining my assertions; and to 
demonstrate your mastery of the enterprise in the act of engaging in it. This is 
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the challenge to perform, in the practice of dialogue and conversation, at the 
ethical level made possible by our basic human capacities for language, logic 
and abstraction; and to bring those capacities themselves under the purview 
and guidance of our conception of right conduct. By engaging in the 
enterprise of philosophical dialogue, we challenge each other to observe the 
ethical and intellectual obligations of philosophical practice.  
 In this enterprise, I have failed if you feel crestfallen at having to concede 
a point, rather than inspired to elaborate upon it; or ashamed at having 
missed a point, rather than driven to persist in untangling it; or self-important 
for having made a point, rather than keen to test its soundness. After all, the 
goal of the enterprise is to inspire both of us with the force of the ideas we are 
examining, not to make either of us feel unequal to considering them, or 
smug for having introduced them. Too often we conceive of moral virtue as 
having to do only with such things as helping the needy, keeping promises, 
or loyalty in friendship – as though performing well in these areas relieved us 
of the obligation to refrain from making another person feel stupid, ashamed 
or crazy for voicing her thoughts; or ourselves feel superior for undermining 
them. When teachers fail to impart a love of philosophy to their 
undergraduate students, or drive graduate students, traumatized, out of their 
classes and out of the field, it is often because these elemental guidelines for 
conducting the enterprise – guidelines that express the simple truth that a 
love of philosophy is incompatible with feeling humiliated or trounced or 
arrogant or self-congratulatory for one's contributions to it – have been 
ignored. So this enterprise presupposes a basic and reciprocal respect for the 
minds, ideas and words of one's discussants, a respect that is expressed in 
attention to and interest in what they have to say.  
 Kant's concept of Achtung captures the intellectual attitude involved in 
this moral virtue of high civilization. The term is usually translated, in Kant's 
writings, as "respect"; and the object of Achtung is usually assumed to be 
exclusively the moral law. But Kant's account of reason in the first Critique 
makes quite clear that the moral law is not separate from the workings of 
theoretical reason more generally, but rather an application of it to the special 
case of first-personal action. On Kant’s view, we feel Achtung toward all the 
ways in which reason regulates our activity, both mental and physical. 
Moreover, in the Groundwork Kant makes it equally clear that he is not 
diverging from an important common, vernacular meaning of the term, 
which is closer to something like "respectful attention." When you and I are 
trying to get clear about the implications of a statement one of us has made – 
when we are fully engaged in the activity of "wring[ing] philosophical 
insights from the English language, pressed hard and repeatedly," Achtung is 
what we feel for the intellectual process in which we are engaged and the 
insights we thereby bring forth. 
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 And when Kant says that Achtung "impairs [Abbruch tut] self-love," he 
does not mean that Achtung crushes our egos or makes us feel ashamed of 
being the self-absorbed worms we know we are. He means, rather, that the 
value, significance, and power of the thing that compels our attention 
compels it so completely that we momentarily forget the constantly clamoring 
needs, demands and egocentric absorptions of the self; the object of our 
respectful attention overwhelms and silences them. For that moment we are 
mutually absorbed in the object of contemplation, or in actively responding to 
it – by acting, or by articulating it, or by evaluating its implications, or by 
reformulating or defending it – rather than trying to mine the discussion for 
transient satisfactions of our psychological cravings for self-aggrandizement. 
Achtung is an active, conative response to an abstract idea that overrides and 
outcompetes our subjective psychological needs as an object worthy of our 
attention. 
 These are the rare moments of intellectual self-transcendence in which 
together, through "extreme literal clarity, with no rhetoric and the least 
possible use of metaphor, with an avoidance of technical terms wherever 
possible, and with extreme patience in the step-by-step unfolding of the 
reasons that support any assertion made, together with all the qualifications 
that need to be added to preserve literal truth," we succeed in fashioning an 
idiolect subtle and flexible enough to satisfy and encompass all of the 
linguistic nuances we each bring to the project of verbally communicating our 
thoughts to each other. It is then that we achieve the only genuine unity with 
another of which we are capable. Alcibiades' drunken and complaining 
encomium to Socrates was also a eulogy to his own transient victory in 
achieving – even momentarily – the intellectual self-transcendence Socrates 
demanded. 
 
3. Philosophical Rationality: Transpersonal or Egocentric? 
 Now I said that Hampshire described this Anglo-American update on 
the Socratic ideal as itself an historical fact. But is it?  Here is a competing 
description of the same historical circumstance, from a rather different and 
less high-minded perspective: 
Victory was with those who could speak with the greatest appearance of 
clear, undoubting conviction and could best use the accents of 
infallibility. Moore ... was a great master of this method – greeting one's 
remarks with a gasp of incredulity – Do you really think that, an 
expression of face as if to hear such a thing said reduced him to a state of 
wonder verging on imbecility, with his mouth wide open and wagging 
his head in the negative so violently that his hair shook. "Oh!" he would 
say, goggling at you as if either you or he must be mad; and no reply was 
possible. Strachey's methods were different; grim silence as if such a 
dreadful observation was beyond comment and the less said about it the 
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better .... [Woolf] was better at producing the effect that it was useless to 
argue with him than at crushing you .... In practice it was a kind of 
combat in which strength of character was really much more valuable 
than subtlety of mind.5 
Here the writer is John Maynard Keynes. Where Hampshire saw the 
character dispositions of transpersonal rationality in full flourishing, Keynes 
sees psychological and emotional intimidation. Where Hampshire saw the 
flowering of a moral virtue of high civilization – the flowering, in Nietzsche's 
terms, of "slave morality," Keynes sees little more than a less-than-subtle 
power struggle among Übermenschen, driven by the instinct to win social 
status, even at the cost of philosophical integrity. Where Hampshire saw self-
transcendence, Keynes sees egocentric rationality in full force. Who saw more 
clearly?   
 The answer is important for answering the question as to whether the 
character dispositions of transpersonal rationality are as central to 
philosophical practice as they are purported to be; and so, more generally, 
whether the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality can be as 
central to the structure of the self as I, in this project, argue they are. The 
answer to this more general question bears on the import and implications of 
my thesis. If philosophical practice is about the exercise of transpersonal 
rationality, as Hampshire suggests, and transpersonal rationality is central in 
the structure of the self, then philosophical practice exercises the capacity that 
centrally structures the self; and we cultivate and strengthen the rational 
dispositions of the self through philosophical practice. This confers on the 
philosophically inclined not special moral knowledge, but rather the special 
moral responsibilities of cultivating those capacities wisely and exercising 
them judiciously – i.e. the moral responsibilities of Plato’s philosopher-king. 
 If, on the other hand, philosophical practice has nothing to do with 
transpersonal rationality and everything to do with the egocentric rationality 
of mutual intimidation, as Keynes seems to argue, then philosophical practice 
is little more than a struggle for power; and the branches of philosophy we 
practice are mere means to that end – no better, nobler or more indispensable 
than any other. Determining the type and strength of rationality in the 
structure of the self sheds light on the extent of our capacity for rationality in 
our philosophical practice, and on the legitimacy of its claim to be the “queen 
of the disciplines,” providing method, wisdom and guidance for the process 
of reflection on any subject. Both of these familiar, aristocratic descriptions of 
philosophy convey the traditional understanding of philosophy as a noble 
pursuit, and impose on philosophers the moral burden of noblesse oblige. 
                                                
5John Maynard Keynes, "My Early Beliefs," in Two Memoirs (New York: Augustus M. 
Kelley, 1949), 85 and 88; quoted in Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 121. 
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 There can be little doubt that Hampshire's version of the Socratic ideal of 
philosophical dialogue requires of us a standard of intellectual and moral 
conduct to which we are, most of the time, intellectually and morally 
inadequate; and so that the ideal of transpersonal rationality so valorized by a 
"slave morality" may be – for us – little more than that. Here the moral 
inadequacy exacerbates the intellectual inadequacy. It is difficult enough to 
keep in mind at one time more than a few steps in an extended and complex 
philosophical argument, or fully appreciate the two opposing views that must 
be reconciled, or grasp the point of your opponent's criticism as he is voicing 
it while you are mentally both formulating your refutation of it and refining 
your view so as to accommodate it. But these purely intellectual limitations 
are made so much worse by what Kant calls "certain impulsions" of "the dear 
self" that obscure or interfere with the clarity and sure-footedness of the 
reasoning process:  the need to be right or amusing at another's expense, the 
need to prove one's intelligence, the need to triumph, or to secure one's 
authority, or to prove one's superiority, or mark one's territory; or, more 
viciously, the need to intimidate one's opponent, to attack and crush her, shut 
her up, express one's contempt for her, exact revenge, teach her a lesson, or 
force her out of the dialogue. All of these needs exist on an ethical continuum, 
from the merely regrettable or pathetic at one end to the brutal or sadistic at 
the other. The essence of our moral inadequacy to Hampshire's Socratic ideal 
of philosophical conduct is our temptation to use even the limited skills of 
philosophical dialogue we have as a tool of self-aggrandizement or a weapon 
to bludgeon our opponent, rather than to arrive at recognizable truths we can 
both embrace. 
 This temptation vies with our longing for wisdom, imagination and 
kindness – and sometimes loses the struggle. And then it finds vivid 
expression in certain familiar philosophical styles most of us have 
encountered – or deployed – at one time or another. For example, we have all 
at some point surely met – or been – the Bulldozer. The Bulldozer talks at you, 
at very great length, rather than to you; and seems to understand by 
"philosophical dialogue" what most people understand by "lecture." Indeed, 
Bulldozers may make excellent lecturers, and lecturing is an excellent training 
ground for bulldozing. The Bulldozer expounds at length his view, its 
historical antecedents, and its implications; anticipates your objections to it, 
enumerates each one, complete with examples, and refutes them; explains the 
views of his opponents and critiques them; and no doubt does much, much 
more than this, long after you have excused yourself and backed away with a 
muttered apology about needing to make a phone call. Sometimes the 
Bulldozer seems almost to induce in himself a trance state by the sound of his 
own words, and seems impervious to your ineffectual attempts to get a word 
in edgewise. And should you momentarily succeed in getting a word in 
edgewise, rest assured that there will not be many of those. For any one of 
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them may set off a further volcanic eruption of speech in the Bulldozer, a 
shower of philosophical associations that must be pursued at that moment 
and to the fullest extent, relentlessly, wherever they may lead.  
 There is something alarmingly aimless and indiscriminate behind the 
compulsiveness of this performance, as though it were a senate filibuster 
without a motion on the floor; as though the Bulldozer's greatest defeat 
would be to cede even the tiniest corner of verbal territory to someone else. 
Of course the experience of "conversing with" a Bulldozer is extremely 
irritating and oppressive, since one is being continually stymied in one's 
efforts to join the issues under scrutiny and make intellectual contact with 
one's discussant. But I think it is not difficult for any of us to imagine how it 
feels to be a Bulldozer, to feel compelled to surround oneself stereophonically 
with the ongoing verbal demonstration of one's knowledge; to blanket every 
single square inch of the conceptual terrain, up to the horizon and beyond, 
with one's view of things; to fend off alien doubts, questions, and interjections 
of data into one's conceptual system by erecting around oneself a permanent 
screen of words and sounds so dense and wide that nothing and no one can 
penetrate it. Of course the Bulldozer himself may not think he is thwarting 
philosophical contact with others but instead enabling it; and may believe, 
even more tragically, that if he just says enough, he will surely command 
agreement in the end. Those many philosophers who reject the temptation to 
bulldoze create the necessary conditions for philosophical contact, and may 
even inspire agape – if not agreement – in their discussants. 
 Whereas the Bulldozer performs primarily for the sake of self-defense, 
the Bully performs more aggressively, in order to compel others' silent 
acquiescence; and thereby betrays her anticipation that they will speak up 
against her. She may deploy familiar locutions designed to forestall objections 
or questions before they are raised:  "Surely it is obvious that ..." or "It is 
perfectly clear that ..." or "Well, I take it that ..."  The message here is that 
anyone who would display such ignorance and lack of insight as to call these 
self-evident truths into question is too philosophically challenged to take 
seriously; and the intended effect is to intimidate the misguided into silence.  
 For example, I resorted to some of these bullying techniques earlier, in 
my discussion of Kant. "Kant's account of reason in the first Critique MAKES 
QUITE CLEAR that the moral law is not separate from the workings of 
theoretical reason more generally," I claimed; and "in the Groundwork Kant 
MAKES IT EQUALLY CLEAR that he is not diverging from an important 
common, vernacular meaning of the term Achtung." In both of these cases, I 
tried to double the barrage of intimidation, by brazenly combining claims of 
self-evidence with an appeal to authority. Why?  Because even though I know 
these views to be controversial, I wanted you to swallow them on faith, for 
the moment, without questioning me, so I could go on and build on those 
assumptions the further points I wanted to make. Elsewhere I do argue that a 
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careful and unbiased look at the texts will support them. But I did not want to 
have to defend them here, or allow this General Introduction to the Project to 
turn into the exercise in Kant exegesis that I elsewhere undertake in earnest. 
So instead I finessed them through an attempt at intimidation; by insinuating, 
in effect, that ANYONE WHO'D TAKEN THE TIME TO STUDY THE TEXTS 
CAREFULLY could not fail to agree with my interpretation; and that any 
dissent from it would reveal only the dissenter's own scholarly turpitude. 
This is not philosophy. This is verbal abuse. 
 This kind of bullying may have many causes. It may result from a 
dispositional deficiency of self-control, i.e. of "extreme patience in step-by-
step unfolding of the reasons that support any assertion made." For 
Hampshire does not notice that this moral virtue of high civilization may be 
best suited to a mild, placid, even phlegmatic temperament; and may be 
largely unattainable for those of us who tend toward excitability, irritability, 
or an impatient desire to cut to the chase. But this does not excuse the 
indulgence of these tendencies at your expense. After all, part of the point of 
philosophical training is to learn, not merely a prescribed set of texts and 
skills of reasoning, but also the discipline of philosophy. We are required to 
discipline our dispositions of attitude and motivation as well as of mind in its 
service. This is no more and no less than cultivation of the character 
dispositions of transpersonal rationality requires. 
 Philosophical bullying may also result from a negligence encouraged by 
the structural demands of professionalism, i.e. from a failure of intellectual 
discrimination. Excelling in any of the various branches of philosophy 
demands specialization. This may lead us to underestimate the importance of 
securely grounding with "step-by-step unfolding of the reasons that support" 
those parts of our views that lead us into other philosophical subspecialties – 
as, for example, political philosophy may lead into philosophy of social 
science, logic may lead into philosophy of language, epistemology may lead 
into philosophy of science, metaethics may lead into philosophical 
psychology, or any of these may lead into metaphysics or the history of 
philosophy. And since the scarcity of jobs and limited professional resources 
often places us in a competitive rather than a collaborative relationship with 
our colleagues in other subspecialties, we may be tempted, on occasion, 
simply to ignore, dismiss or bully our way out of the kind of careful attention 
to foundations that Hampshire recommends. 
 Furthermore, most of us entered this field because we needed to make a 
living doing something (true Untertanen that we are), and enjoyed doing 
philosophy enough to want to make a living doing it. As with any job on 
which our economic survival depends, we often have to balance the quality of 
our output against the time or space we have in which to produce it. We are 
here to ply our trade, to speak authoritatively to the designated issues. And if 
what we have to say depends on unfounded or insufficiently argued 
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assumptions, then (at least for the time being) so much the worse for those 
assumptions, and for those innocents who, not understanding the implicit 
rules of the game – the allotted speaker time, the maximum acceptable article 
length, or the limited market demand for fat, ponderous books such as this 
one – would attempt to exercise quality control by calling those assumptions 
into question. 
 The Bully becomes a morally objectionable Überbully with the choice of 
more insulting or hurtful terms of evaluation, and with the shouting, 
stamping of feet, or even throwing of objects that sometimes accompanies his 
attempts to drive home a point. This mere failure of impartiality, self-
reflection and self-control shades into unadorned wrongdoing when these 
tactics of verbal intimidation include insinuated threats of professional 
retaliation or clear verbal harassment. Suggestions that holding a certain 
philosophical position is not conducive to tenure or reappointment, or that 
one will be dropped from a project for challenging received wisdom, or that 
raising objections to a senior colleague's view is offensive and inappropriate; 
as well as familiar locutions such as "Any idiot can see that ..." or, "That is the 
most ridiculous argument I've ever heard;" or, "What a deeply uninteresting 
claim;" or, "How can anyone be so dense as to believe that ...?" are all among 
the Überbully's arsenal of verbal ammunition. Philosophers have been 
publicly and professionally humiliated for having argued a view that, in their 
critic's eyes, marked them as dim-witted, ill-read, poorly educated, lazy, 
devious, evasive, superficial, dull, ridiculous, dishonest, manipulative, or any 
combination of the above. Whereas the Bulldozer prevents you from 
contributing to the dialogue, the Überbully uses you and your philosophical 
contributions as a punching bag, trying to knock the stuffing out of them and 
scatter their remains to the wind.  
 It is tempting to explain this grade of lethal verbal aggression as an 
expression of arrogance or boorishness. It is better understood as an 
expression of fear. Like the Bully, the Überbully attempts to demolish you 
through verbal harassment, not rational philosophical analysis – in clear 
violation of the canonical rules of philosophical discourse. All we need to ask 
is why either brand of bully feels the need to resort to these thuggish tactics 
when the canonical ones are available, in order to understand their brutal 
performances as an exhibition of felt philosophical inadequacy that expresses 
fear of professional humiliation. The frequency with which shame and fear 
emerge in these forms interrogates the suitability of the practice of 
philosophy to stand as a testimonial to our achievement of the 
Socratic/Hampshirean "moral virtue of high civilization," thereby as a 
testimonial to the victory of "slave morality," and thereby as a testimonial to 
the centrality of reason in the structure of the self. And it explains why my 
optimism about our rational capacity to transcend the merely comfortable, 
convenient, profitable, or gratifying is cautious at best. 
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 The philosophical style we may describe as the Bull probably originates 
in the exhilarating discovery of esoteric knowledge that induction into any 
field of specialization brings. This tactic works best on students, or on 
colleagues who work in a different subspecialty than oneself. Like the 
Bulldozer and the Bullies, the Bull discourages questioning or dialogue, and 
silence dissent. The Bull may spew forth, with a great and rapid show of 
bombast, a torrent of technical or esoteric terminology, or inflated five-
syllable abstractions. Or she may issue – again with no apology and much 
pomp – several incoherent, inconsistent, or mutually irrelevant assertions, 
and appear surprised at any suggestion of paradox. Or she may answer your 
pointed questions with a barrage of vague philosophical generalities that 
seem not to engage the issues at all. And the Bull may borrow some tactics 
from the Bully, in suggesting that any failure to grasp the overarching point 
of these turgid non sequiturs is merely a distressing symptom of your own 
philosophical incompetence. In this way the Bull uses the specialized tools of 
her trade to exclude you from participation in the private club to which she 
lets you know she belongs. The not-so-subtle message the Bull intends to 
communicate is: No Trespassers. Unlike the Bull's other philosophical 
utterances, this one is clear, easily grasped, and usually elicits compliance. 
For it is not easy to remain involved in a discussion in which the suspicion 
quickly grows that one's discussant is talking nonsense. Philosophers who 
eschew the temptations of the Bull for unvarnished clarity of exposition 
express the intellectual virtue of courage – the courage to expose their ideas to 
scrutiny without the protective pretense of intellectual superiority. 
 The Bullfinch, by contrast, simply flies away home. The Bullfinch avoids 
philosophical dialogue altogether, by declining to subject his own views to 
philosophical scrutiny or provide it to others’. Convinced of the veracity of 
his own views yet concerned to preserve their inviolability, the Bullfinch 
withdraws from philosophical engagement with unconverted others.  Rather 
than argue his views, the Bullfinch at most will explain where he stands, 
ignoring retorts, criticisms or opposing views by declining to acknowledge 
their philosophical worth. The Bullfinch is more likely to view his own beliefs 
as so self-evidently true that it is beneath him to have to articulate or expose 
them to unconverted others in any form; and his opponent's beliefs as 
dangerous enough to justify getting rid of her at any cost. Thus the Bullfinch 
defends the sanctity of his convictions by refusing to defend them at all, 
instead retreating into silence, backhanded Machiavellian maneuvers, or 
flight. Or he may resort to cruder tools of psychological intimidation – of the 
sort Keynes describes – as more appropriate to his opponent. By refusing to 
engage in rational dialogue even as a weapon of intimidation, the Bullfinch 
thus approaches most nearly the explicit conduct of Nietzsche's Übermensch, 
for whom unvarnished displays of egocentric power completely replace the 
Socratic ideal of transpersonal rationality, and so express most clearly his 
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unqualified contempt for his philosophical opponents. As contempt never 
trumps compassion or curiosity as an intellectual virtue, the Bullfinch thereby 
merely confesses his felt disinclination – or inadequacy – to meet the 
standards of engagement that rational dialogue requires. 
 
4. Philosophy, Power, and Historical Circumstance 
 These brief character sketches provide a practical counterpoint to the 
Socratic ideal that Hampshire describes – an ideal that finds only partial 
realization at best. They do not exhaust the styles and strategies of 
intimidating philosophical practice, and there are more lethal ones than these: 
to treat philosophical contributions from others as though they had not been 
made; or as though they had been made by someone of higher professional 
status; or as autobiographical rather than philosophical in import; or as 
symptoms of mental illness; as well as the more subtle variants Keynes 
describes. The common motive that underlies all of these styles of dialogue is 
an egocentric desire to establish and maintain hierarchical übermenschlichen 
superiority, by silencing philosophical exchange rather than inviting it. This 
motive is not entirely foreign to any of us. But it is meant to stifle the exercise 
of transpersonal rationality that seduced most working philosophers into the 
field to begin with, and that virtually all, with varying degrees of success, 
genuinely strive to practice. As such, it is, in effect, an effort to obliterate the 
point and practice of philosophical dialogue altogether – dialogue that indeed 
very often does begin with the best of intentions, reflective of the Socratic 
ideal which virtually all of us learned to revere as undergraduates. 
Philosophers who manage to persevere in the patience, generosity of spirit, 
and thickness of skin necessary for withstanding these assaults on the core of 
the practice without stooping to respond in kind are often singled out and 
revered for the philosophical paragon they offer to the rest of us. It is worth 
asking what it is about the practice or profession of philosophy in general that 
kindles the impulse to obliterate it; and how it is that this impulse can co-exist 
within the same field of inquiry as those successful practitioners of 
Hampshire's Socratic ideal. For this impulse does not signal merely our moral 
and intellectual inadequacy to the ideal. It expresses the lethal and ultimately 
suicidal desire to eradicate it.  
 We have certain external procedural devices for cloaking this suicidal 
impulse. There is the authoritarian device, of supplying spoken discussion 
with a strong-willed moderator; and the democratic device, of scrupulously 
invoking Robert's Rules of Order to govern every verbal contribution; and the 
juridical, testimony-cross-rebuttal-jury deliberation device, of the standard 
colloquium format. But if we were all as civilized as Hampshire's description 
supposes, we would not need any of these external devices. We would not 
need a moderator to end filibusters or umpire foul balls because no one 
would be tempted to hog the allotted time or hit below the belt. We would 
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not need Robert's Rules of Order because no one would be tempted to disrupt 
or exploit it. And we would not need the standard colloquium format because 
that format formalizes a dialectical procedure to which we would all adhere 
naturally and spontaneously, as do Aristotle's temperate men to the mean 
and Kant's perfectly rational beings to the moral law. These devices are 
muzzles and restraining leashes designed to rein us in, not merely from 
expressing our philosophical enthusiasms too vehemently or at excessive 
length; but rather from too obviously lunging for the jugular under the guise 
of philosophical critique.6 Sometimes it is as though in our serious 
philosophical activity we needed to be monitored and cued from the wings 
by an instructor in the basics of philosophical etiquette. It is as though there 
were no internalized voice of intellectual conscience to guide and subdue our 
egocentric philosophical behavior at all. 
 How is this lack of philosophical self-discipline to be understood? How 
are we to understand the frequent identification of personal and professional 
wellbeing with having at least temporarily obliterated one's philosophical 
enemies, and of personal and professional failure with having lost the war? 
And how are we to understand our own self-deception and lack of insight 
into the egocentric motives and meaning of such philosophical behavior – as 
though a punishing philosophical work-over that verbally dices one's 
opponent into bite-size chunks were cognitively indistinguishable from the 
"cultivated caution and modesty in assertion" that Hampshire rightly 
applauds? Should we say that if we are incapable of practicing rational self-
restraint and self-scrutiny in the circumscribed and rarified arena of 
philosophical dialogue, there is small hope for doing so in more complex 
fields of social interaction? Or should we say, rather, that it is because the 
philosophical arena is so small and morally insignificant that we have 
devoted so little attention to habituating ourselves to proceed in a temperate 
and civilized manner; and that our übermenschlichen barbarity here has no 
practical implications for our rational moral potential elsewhere? 
 The latter response is inadequate on several counts. First, the concept of 
rational philosophical dialogue as establishing metaethical conditions for 
comprehensive normative theory is too central to the moral and political 
views of too many major philosophers – Rawls, Habermas, Hare, Rorty, and 
Dworkin among them – to be dismissed as morally insignificant. If we cannot 
even succeed in discussing, in a rational and civilized manner, what we ought 
to do, it is not likely that we will succeed in figuring out what we ought to do, 
much less actually doing it. Second, talk is cheap; talk is the easy part of 
moral rectitude. If we can ever hold our tongue, choose our words, and exert 
ourselves to understand another and communicate successfully with her 
when our egocentric interests are at stake, then we have what it takes to 
                                                
6So much for Hampshire's injunctions against metaphor. 
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cultivate the transpersonally rational character dispositions to do those 
things. The question then becomes whether we are less inclined to cultivate 
them when it is our purely philosophical interests that are at stake; and what 
that might reveal about the ability of philosophy – and so transpersonal 
rationality – to give point and form to our lives. Certainly there are those for 
whom philosophy is merely an intellectual game. 
 Third, philosophy as the transpersonally rational discipline par 
excellence has fashioned its own identity through the centrality of its 
involvement in the most elemental and universal ideals of human life – ideals 
of the good, the true and the beautiful; of equality, rationality and grace. 
These are the ideals that inspire the young to study philosophy, and that 
often sustain our allegiance to it as we grow older. That the intellectual skills 
with which we pursue research into these ideals can be so easily perverted by 
the Bulldozer, the Bullies, the Bull, and the Bullfinch in the service of the bad, 
the false and the ugly is no minor matter. How a profession self-defined by its 
transpersonal rationality and its idealism can generate suicidally self-
repressive and self-abasing styles of professional behavior in any of its 
practitioners demands explanation. 
 Earlier I suggested that part of the explanation is to be found in the 
economic conditions that have come to characterize the profession of 
academic philosophy over the last half-century. These conditions have 
encouraged a possessive and authoritarian attitude toward philosophical 
ideas that is incompatible with the obligations of philosophical practice as 
Hampshire enumerates them. We have seen that these include a commitment 
to clarity, precision and care in the development of an argument or view; and 
a methodological caution that eschews easy answers for the sake of a 
coherent thesis that is fully cognizant of significant objections and alternatives 
to the view being defended. But these obligations must compete with the 
mounting difficulty of finding long-term or permanent jobs in the field.  
 Up to the early 1960s philosophy was a small, homogeneous, 
economically secure academic enclave. As would befit a community of 
Übermenschen, Stevenson's Emotivism vied with Ross's and Pritchard's 
Intuitionism and Moore's Non-Naturalism as the metaethical views of choice. 
Kantian, rationality-based metaethical views were not in the competition. 
With Johnson's Great Society programs of the mid-1960s, American 
philosophy began to open its doors to the ethnic, gender and class diversity 
among younger scholars that has always been representative of the 
population of the United States. But those programs in higher education 
funded this expanded academic population only briefly. Since then, and up 
through the turn of the century, the resulting scarcity of jobs has become an 
increasingly serious problem for younger philosophers, newcomers and 
legatees alike. It has been a central professional fact of life for over three 
decades. Those of us who entered the professional side of the field as 
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graduate students in the mid-1970s had studied, benefited from, and taken as 
role models philosophical writings that uniformly predated this dearth of 
professional opportunities. But we had also received a letter from the 
American Philosophical Association, routinely sent to all aspiring graduate 
students, advising them that very few jobs were likely to be available upon 
receipt of the Ph.D. Under these circumstances, such aspiring graduate 
students have had three choices: (1) ignore the letter; (2) ignore those aspects 
of one's previous philosophical training that conflict with it; or (3) try to adapt 
to both in ways that will allow one to compete successfully in the field. 
Clearly, the student who is both rationally self-interested and committed to 
philosophy will choose (3), and most who have survived professionally have 
done so. 
 For the most part the results have not been auspicious for the health of 
the field. The methodological caution that is essential to doing good 
philosophical work has been too often supplanted by an intellectual and 
philosophical timidity that is the antithesis of it. Understandably concerned to 
ensure their ability to continue and succeed professionally in the discipline to 
which they are committed, many younger philosophers in the past few 
decades have grown increasingly reluctant to fulfill the demands of the 
Oedipal drama that is essential to the flourishing of any intellectual 
discipline. In order to break new ground, younger thinkers must strive to 
study, absorb, elaborate, and then criticize and improve upon or replace the 
authoritative teachings on which their training is based. Otherwise they fail to 
achieve the critical independence and psychological and intellectual maturity 
that enable them to innovate new, stronger, and more comprehensively 
authoritative paradigms in their turn. Strawson's early critique of Russell's 
theory of descriptions, for example, or Rawls's rejection and displacement, as 
a young man in his early thirties, of Moore's philosophy of language-based 
metaethics, or Barcan Marcus' and Kripke's early repudiation of Quine's 
constraints on quantificational logic, or Kuhn's displacement of Popper's 
philosophy of science in the early 1960s are only a few of the available 
contemporary role models for playing out this drama in philosophy. 
 The obligations of philosophical practice as Epictetus and Hampshire 
enumerate them – and as Socrates exemplifies them – create an ideal context 
of transpersonal rationality within which all of the characters in this drama 
can thrive. In attending only to the quality of philosophical contributions and 
not to the hierarchical position of those who make them, the "style of 
philosophical talking" Hampshire describes is designed to call forth the best 
philosophical efforts of all parties, regardless of rank or stature. Careful, 
patient and rational philosophical discussion is the great equalizer among 
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discussants, the great leveler of professional hierarchy.7 This is a context in 
which younger philosophers can feel secure in the conviction that in 
subjecting the views of their elders to searching scrutiny and possible 
refutation, they are only doing what the obligations of philosophical practice 
demand. 
 This transpersonal ideal of equality in rational dialogue comes into direct 
conflict with a reality in which professional survival is a scarce commodity 
doled out as reward in a zero-sum game among egocentrically motivated 
combatants. Where philosophical error translates as professional failure, the 
avoidance of professional failure requires the concealment of philosophical 
error at all costs. Under these circumstances there can be little place for the 
rational criticism and analysis of views, and so little place for unconstrained 
give-and-take among rational equals. These practices must be replaced by a 
system of patronage of the unempowered by the empowered, and mutual 
aggrandizement of the empowered by one another. It is because rational 
philosophical dialogue recognizes no professional hierarchy that other, extra-
philosophical or even anti-philosophical measures must be invoked to 
maintain it under circumstances in which hierarchical status is the surest 
index of professional survival.  
 Philosophy as an academic discipline is correspondingly unusual in the 
obsessiveness and rigidity with which the character and composition of its 
traditional professional hierarchy has been guarded in recent decades. In this 
traditional hierarchy, with few exceptions, criticism from peers is received as 
an honor, whereas criticism from subordinates is resisted as insubordination; 
and novices, newcomers, provisional members, and interlopers tend to rank 
among the lowest subordinates of all. Accordingly, the more they diverge – in 
thought, appearance or pedigree – from the tradition, the closer to the bottom 
of the hierarchy they are likely to be found, and the more blatant the exercises 
of power that keep them there. Correspondingly more attention has been 
given to Kantian, rationality-based metaethical views in recent decades, and 
many newcomers, provisional members, and interlopers – including 
particularly large numbers of women – are to be found among their 
proponents. 
 Younger thinkers who choose to diverge or defect rather than conform 
philosophically embark on a dangerous Oedipal drama in which they must 
                                                
7Indeed, there are few other fields in which the intellectual activity that centrally defines 
the discipline is so thoroughly inimical to professional hierarchy. Even in the natural 
sciences, such a hierarchy is justified to some extent by the training, experience and 
accumulation of information and methodological resources required in order to ascend 
to its pinnacle. Only in philosophy (and perhaps mathematics) is it possible for some 
unschooled pipsqueak upstart to initiate a revolution in the field with an offhand, 
"Here's a thought!" issued from the safe haven of the armchair. Kripke's early work in 
modal logic would be an example; Parfit's on personal identity would be another. 
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confront and face down the wrath and resistance of their elders in order to 
prevail. By finally rejecting the views of those whom they have studied and 
by whom they may have been mentored and protected in the beginning 
stages of their career, younger scholars will often provoke disapproval, 
rejection or punitive professional retaliation from those who feel betrayed by 
their defection. They may risk their professional survival, advancement, and 
the powerful professional networks that the authoritative support of their 
mentors has supplied. This is of course an exceedingly painful and 
intimidating prospect for all concerned, elders and prodigal sons8 alike. It is 
nevertheless necessary in order to advance the dialogue and ensure the 
intellectual health of the discipline. This requires that the egocentric urge to 
professional self-preservation at all costs be subordinated to the demands of 
transpersonal rationality. 
 The elders will survive this defection with their stature intact – as did 
Russell, Moore, Quine and Popper; and eventually come to recognize their 
own example in that of their defectors. After all, they, too, were once 
defectors, and took the terrible risks of transpersonal rationality they now 
discourage their own disciples from taking. Thus those disciples need to 
demonstrate their respect for their elders, and the depth of their influence as 
role models, by similarly having the attachment and commitment to their 
own ideas, the energy and courage to probe their deepest implications, and a 
confidence in their value firm enough to impel them to this confrontation, 
despite the clear dangers to their professional self-interest. Otherwise these 
ideas become little more than disposable vehicles for promoting professional 
self-interest, of questionable value in themselves. 
 One might argue that this brand of naive intellectual bravado is in 
mercifully short supply under the best and most professionally secure of 
circumstances. But nerve fails all the more quickly as the threat of 
professional extinction becomes more real; and this failure of intellectual 
nerve has by now so completely pervaded the field of philosophy that it has 
generated its own set of professional conventions – a virtual culture of 
genuflection, relative to which merely to embark on the confrontation with 
one's elders is a serious and sometimes fatal breach of etiquette. So, to take a 
few examples, when I was a junior faculty member, a very senior and very 
eminent colleague reprimanded my efforts to defend the position developed 
in this project by informing me that it was "not [my] place to have views." I 
lost the support of a leading senior philosopher, and thereby a peer-reviewed 
                                                
8I use this expression advisedly, since those who survive the confrontation are 
overwhelmingly male. The field numbers approximately 10,000 members. At last count, 
women occupied eight percent, and African-American women .003 percent, of all 
tenured positions. The punishments inflicted for their philosophical insubordination are 
correspondingly more virulent. 
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publication, by refusing to delete an example that mentioned race in a paper 
she had offered to recommend for publication. I once had a paper accepted 
for publication on the sole condition that I excise my critique of a major figure 
in the field; and had one rejected because a single negative referee's report, 
although acknowledged by the editor to be incoherent and self-contradictory, 
came from an important personage. Rather than take on the major thinkers, 
many have been encouraged or coerced by such tactics to avoid the Oedipal 
confrontation altogether, and diverted instead into harmless and insignificant 
wheel-spinning. The great, ongoing contentious debates that extended from 
Plato through Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer and on to the Vienna Circle, 
Russell, Wittgenstein, and Habermas seem to have been all but silenced by 
the repressive dictates of professionalism. 
 These genuflective norms of etiquette undergird the recommendations of 
professional self-interest, by encouraging and rewarding excessive deference 
to philosophical authority, by discouraging forthright argumentation and 
critique, and by undermining the intellectual and professional confidence of 
younger philosophers in their ability to develop their own views 
independently and survive confrontation with their elders. They thereby 
infantilize the powerful, by insulating their views from honest critique and 
thus inadvertently perpetuating the illusions of philosophical invulnerability 
and professional entitlement. And they infantilize the unempowered as well, 
by stripping them of the very resources most essential, in the long term, to 
their own survival and flourishing: the character dispositions of transpersonal 
rationality. It then would be unsurprising to discover that, when the 
unempowered were rewarded for their obedience with professional 
empowerment, the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality were 
given both less exercise and less philosophical weight. 
 These norms of genuflection, necessitated by economic imperatives, 
create the authoritarian conditions under which the Bulldozer, the Bullies, the 
Bull, and the Bullfinch can flourish. Like other artifacts of the culture of 
genuflection, they function to protect canonical or insecure philosophical 
territory using anti-philosophical weaponry, when pure philosophical 
dialogue itself is too subversive of established hierarchy or received 
interpretation to be tolerated. And through practice, repetition, and 
professional reward, these repressive philosophical styles are transmitted as 
role models from one generation of graduate students to the next, as 
legitimate modes of philosophical discourse. Ultimately they supplant the 
legitimate and civilized modes of philosophical discourse Hampshire 
describes with self-aggrandizing displays of power and domination, and 
corrupt the quality of philosophical ideas accordingly. In replacing the 
transpersonal obligations of philosophical practice with the egocentric 
imperatives of professional survival, these styles bespeak more than our self-
centeredness. They bespeak our inability to transcend structural conflicts 
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between the democratic prerequisites of a genuine philosophical meritocracy 
and the inequitable consequences of a market economy.  
 
5. Philosophy as Exemplar of Transpersonal Rationality 
 Western philosophy has always found its source of value in its 
identification with transpersonal rationality, originally the systematic rational 
inquiry practiced by Socrates. But as other disciplines – the natural sciences, 
psychology, sociology, political theory, anthropology – have gradually 
seceded from the formal discipline of philosophy and formulated their own 
rational methodologies, philosophy has repeatedly sought outside itself for 
its defining exemplar of rationality, and so for its source of intrinsic value. Up 
through the nineteenth century, Anglo-American analytic philosophy ignored 
the defection of the natural and social sciences and identified rationality with 
empirical rational inquiry, i.e. with scientific methodology. Traditional 
epistemology began to be upstaged by the newly emerging subspecialty of 
philosophy of science. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the melding 
of logic and mathematics in Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica 
provided philosophy with another exemplar of transpersonal rationality with 
which to identify: one of logical rigor, symbol and system. Traditional 
speculative metaphysics received a corresponding boost in status at the same 
time that it took a drubbing from Logical Positivism. After the Second World 
War, philosophy turned to Frege, Wittgenstein and Chomsky for yet another 
exemplar of rational philosophical method as linguistic analysis. Linguistic 
anthropology and sociology received correspondingly more attention from 
philosophers of language. And over the last two decades of the twentieth 
century, philosophy increasingly turned back to the sciences – this time to the 
emerging field of cognitive science – for its exemplar of rational 
methodology. The philosophy of mind and theory of action have flourished 
accordingly. Trade relations have thus run in both directions: the discipline of 
philosophy has exported and diversified its early conception of transpersonal 
rationality as systematic Socratic inquiry into newly emerging research 
disciplines; and these, in turn, import back into the discipline of philosophy 
more highly specialized conceptions of their own.  
 The more the discipline of philosophy has succumbed to the political, 
economic, and professional pressures just described, the more stridently it 
has insisted upon these externally imported exemplars – sometimes singly, 
sometimes in tandem – as centrally definitive of the field and the practice of 
philosophy. And the more the discipline of philosophy as the practice of 
transpersonal rationality par excellence has been threatened from any and all 
directions, and the more the specialized conceptions of rational methodology 
have proliferated, the more tenaciously philosophy has held onto its self-
identification with transpersonal rationality as such, adjusting its source of 
value according to how in particular transpersonal rationality is conceived.  
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 In the end, however, it is only philosophy's original identification with 
the systematic rational inquiry of Socrates – Epictetus' injunction to  
transgress in nothing the clear pronouncement of reason ... to live as one 
who is mature and proficient, and let all that seems best to you be a law 
that you cannot transgress. ... [to] attend to nothing but reason in all that 
[you] encounte[r]. ... to live as one who would wish to be a Socrates9 
that remains impervious to defection, attack, or nonrational alternatives. It is 
impervious to defection because emerging fields that have defected have 
taken rational Socratic inquiry with them as their minimal foundations. It is 
impervious to attack because any such attack must presuppose its methods in 
order to be rationally intelligible. And it is impervious to nonrational 
alternatives because no such alternative competes with it on its own ground. 
Philosophy's greatest challenge, then, is to live up to its traditional, Socratic 
self-conception: conduct in all spheres that accords centrality to the character 
dispositions of transpersonal rationality. 
 Under the historical circumstances earlier described, it is impossible to 
avoid calling into question the present-day adequacy of philosophy to meet 
this challenge, and so its right to insist on its self-definition as an exemplar of 
transpersonal rationality. Hence it is impossible to avoid questioning whether 
the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality can be as central to the 
structure of the self as they seemed to have been for Socrates and Epictetus. 
The problem would seem to be not that we so often violate Epictetus' 
injunction to "transgress in nothing the clear pronouncement of reason;" but 
rather that we so often transgress that clear pronouncement in precisely those 
areas of conduct in which reason is purported to reign supreme. One 
explanation would be Keynesian: that philosophers have been guilty of self-
serving pretensions to rationality all along; and that philosophical practice 
has never consisted in anything more than psychological intimidation and the 
flouting of power imbalances under the guise of rational dialogue. According 
to this view, Epictetus' entreaties would be addressed precisely to those in 
need of transpersonal rationality as an inspiring ideal by which to moderate 
largely egocentric behavior.  
 But another possibility is that we must rather take special care now, at 
the turn of the twenty-first century, to defend the centrality to philosophy of 
those character dispositions of transpersonal rationality the exercise of which 
have been so traditionally definitive of its practice. It might be that these 
dispositions, and so the traditional practice of philosophy itself – and so its 
adequacy as an exemplar of transpersonal rationality – are now under 
particularly severe attack, from both inside and outside the discipline, by 
concerted attempts to defend traditional power relations against the radically 
destabilizing effects of rational Socratic interrogation. The displacement of 
                                                
9Op. cit. Footnote 1. 
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transpersonal rationality from a central functional and valuational role in the 
way the structure of the self is conceived signals a move away from the "slave 
morality" that valorizes the character dispositions of transpersonal rationality 
as essentially constitutive of human survival and flourishing. This 
displacement also signals a move toward alternative, übermenschlichen norms 
of egocentric behavior that implicitly condone freer and more blatant 
exercises of power in the service of desire, instinct and emotion. It is no 
accident that this Gestalt shift occurs at an historical juncture when such 
exercises and displays of power are increasingly necessary to defend 
conventional social arrangements – both inside and outside the academy – 
against rational Socratic interrogation by individuals and communities 
traditionally disempowered by them; and are valorized by unconstrained 
market forces that dismantle the democratic underpinnings of the social 
contract. But it is then doubly ironical that the character dispositions of 
transpersonal rationality themselves should be marshaled by some 
philosophers to justify them. 
 The philosophical use of reason to justify unreason then obliges those 
philosophers who explicitly value reason, rational interrogation, and the 
character dispositions of transpersonal rationality more generally as intrinsic 
goods to defend them in turn. It requires us to reaffirm and protect these 
intrinsic goods as essential and definitive of philosophical practice, regardless 
of the express philosophical views on which they are honed. It requires us as 
well to realize these values in our philosophical practice, regardless of 
professional repercussions. And it requires us to disregard those 
repercussions as secondary to the preservation of rational integrity. That is, 
the philosophical task is to demonstrate the deeply entrenched necessity of 
transpersonal rationality to coherent thought and action, independently of the 
express metaethical views or valuation of rationality any particular 
philosopher might hold. That is my task in this project. 
 
6. The Enterprise of Socratic Metaethics 
 In ethics we distinguish between a normative and a metaethical theory. 
A normative moral theory tells us what we ought to do, and why. Thus it 
traditionally utilizes such prescriptive terms as "ought," "should, "good," 
"right," "valuable," or "desirable." I offer an analysis of such terms in Volume 
II. This is the practical part of a normative theory, also known as casuistry. 
Such a theory also contains a value-theoretic component that enlists certain 
states, conditions, or events that explain what is good, right, or desirable: 
friendship, for example; or love, or reason, or integrity. Value theories differ 
with respect to both content and structure; I say more about these distinctions 
in Chapter V of Volume I.  
 By contrast, a metaethical theory seeks to unpack the metaphysical 
presuppositions of a normative theory: to what sorts of entities, if any, its 
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prescriptive terms refer; whether it can be objectively true or not; what its 
scope of application might be; what conception of the agent, rationality, or 
human psychology it presupposes. Thus a metaethical theory is descriptive 
and analytical where a normative one is prescriptive and hortatory. 
 By comparison with the putative centrality of transpersonal rationality to 
the practice of philosophy itself, the metaethical views philosophers expressly 
defend show a much wider range of variation in the role each assigns to 
rationality in the structure of the self. Here the value and function of reason 
ranges from the central to the peripheral, and the prominence of nonrational 
elements in the view’s conception of the self varies accordingly. At one 
extreme, consider Subjectivism. Subjectivism is a radically Anti-Rationalist 
view that essentially rejects truth and objectivity as possible goals for 
intellectual discourse on any subject. But any judgment in the categorical 
indicative mood implies – whether rightly or wrongly – the truth and 
objectivity of the judgment, including the judgment that truth and objectivity 
are impossible. So if that judgment, that truth and objectivity are impossible, 
is itself true and objectively valid, then it is false and objectively invalid. If it 
is false, then its negation, i.e. that truth and objectivity are not impossible, is 
true. So the truth of Subjectivism implies its falsity. If, on the other hand, 
Subjectivism is neither true nor false, then it refers to nothing and expresses at 
best the speaker's emotional despair about the possibility of communication – 
a condition treated better in psychotherapy than in intellectual discourse. If 
this paradox of judgment strikes you as in any way troubling, or as detracting 
from the intelligibility of Subjectivism, then you have already accepted 
intellectual criteria of rational consistency that imply an aspiration to 
objective validity and truth. Only when these criteria are presupposed can 
meaningful or coherent discussion, on any topic whatsoever, proceed. 
 A fortiori, any judgment of specifically moral value aspires to be more 
than a mere emotive expression of the speaker's momentary feelings. It 
aspires to objective validity, and we signal this by stating our views publicly, 
defending them with evidence or reasoning, and subjecting them to critical 
analysis in light of standards of rationality and truth we implicitly accept. So, 
for example, suppose someone walks up to you and punches you in the nose. 
Your verbal reaction will surely include the statements that he had no right to 
do that, that his behavior was unwarranted and inappropriate, and that you 
did nothing to deserve it. It is not likely that you will then go on to add that of 
course these are just your opinions which have no objective validity and that 
there is no final truth of the matter. Rather, you express your beliefs in 
categorical indicative judgments, which you of course presume to be true, 
and which you can defend by appeal to facts you take to be obvious and 
values you take to be equally obvious. Of course some of your presumptive 
judgments may be mistaken or false. But this does not entail that there is no 
fact of the matter as to whether they are or not. 
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 The project of moral communication has not only to do with letting 
others know what we think, but also trying to command their 
acknowledgement that we are right. Those of us committed to the Socratic 
ideal prefer to command this acknowledgment through rational dialogue 
rather than emotional rhetoric, dissimulation, psychological manipulation, or 
threats of professional or social rewards withheld or punishments inflicted 
for dissenting. That is, we do our best to "live as one who would wish to be 
Socrates," rather than as a Bulldozer, Bully, Überbully, Bull, or Bullfinch. By 
relying on the force of rational dialogue to win agreement with our moral 
convictions, we try to command not only others' assent, but also their 
intellectual respect. In rational discussion, analysis and argument, we reach 
beyond the circle of the converted to try and convert the unconvinced. We 
express respect for the transpersonally rational capacity of the unconverted 
by appealing to it, rather than to their emotional, psychological or social 
vulnerabilities, to convince them. And we receive the best confirmation of the 
truth of our moral convictions when others are rationally convinced, rather 
than manipulated or coerced or deceived, into adopting them. Call this the 
enterprise of Socratic metaethics.  Socratic metaethics grounds moral 
convictions and judgments in the Socratic ideal of rational dialogue as a 
means for arriving at moral truth. 
 Within the enterprise of Socratic metaethics, there are many ways to 
proceed. One that has a long historical pedigree is what I shall call Humean 
Anti-Rationalism, because it takes its inspiration from the authoritative status 
Hume assigns to desire and the passions in justifying moral action.10 In earlier 
historical periods this approach emerged variously in normative theories 
such as Intuitionism or the Moral Sentiment Theory of the British Moralists. 
(Similarly, Virtue Theory claims allegiance to Aristotle, but on extremely 
shaky exegetical grounds). As developed in the early twentieth century 
philosophy of Sir David Ross, Intuitionism stipulates the existence of an 
innate faculty of moral intuition, consultation of which tells us what moral 
principles we ought to follow in action.11 Prominent late twentieth century 
Humean Anti-Rationalists such as Annette Baier, Lawrence Blum, Michael 
Stocker, or Susan Wolf harken back to British Moralists such as Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson, or directly to the Hume of Book III of the Treatise, by repudiating 
the governing role of moral principle and instead appealing to moral emotion 
or sentiment to guide action.12 Similarly, the Noncognitivism of Allan 
                                                
10This is Thomas Nagel's term to characterize variants on the same group of views I 
discuss here. See his The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 
8. I devote Chapter VII in Volume I to study of this work. 
11Sir David Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938). 
12Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); 
Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1980); Michael Stocker, Valuing Emotions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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Gibbard, Joseph Raz, and Elizabeth Anderson rejects the rationality of moral 
principle – but then resurrects rationality as a prescriptive criterion for moral 
emotions and attitudes. In all of these cases, moral guidance is given by a 
nonrational component of the self: We ought to perform those actions we 
intuitively know to be right, or, respectively, feel most deeply. No consistent 
Humean Anti-Rationalist normative view can have a developed practical or 
casuistical component, because what any particular individual ought to do 
depends on their particular intuitions, feelings, or desires – not on impartially 
conceived principles. Nevertheless, the value-theoretic parts of these views 
are articulated and developed within the impartial normative constraints of 
Socratic metaethics. 
 Volume I will contain much, and Volume II a slight bit more, on the 
failings of late twentieth century Humean Anti-Rationalism. Here I call 
attention to just one reason why it is unpalatable in practice to anyone 
seriously interested in the enterprise of Socratic metaethics as a distinctive 
philosophical methodology. This is that it appeals to the authority of a first-
personal, interpersonally inaccessible experience in judging, not only what 
one should do, but what should be done simpliciter under particular 
circumstances. In consulting only one's moral emotions or intuitions about 
how to resolve some hypothetical or actual moral problem that need bear no 
obvious or articulable relation to one's own circumstances, one presumes to 
legislate how others should behave or feel on the basis of a moral foundation 
which is cognitively inaccessible to them, and therefore inaccessible to their 
evaluation.  
 Suppose, for example, that I discover that my best friend is dealing drugs 
to minors and decide, on the basis of my feelings about him, to protect our 
friendship rather than betray it by turning him in to the police. There is a 
great deal you and I may discuss about such a case. But without knowing, 
and without being able to experience directly the particular nature and 
quality of my feelings for this person, you may find my behavior simply 
indefensible. You may acknowledge and sympathize with the deep bonds of 
friendship and loyalty I am feeling, but find it nevertheless impossible to 
condone my claim that I just could not bring myself to destroy them by 
turning him in. You may think that no friendship, no matter how deep or 
meaningful, should count for so much that it outweighs the right of minors to 
be shielded from drug addiction before they are mature enough to make a 
rational choice. And since I cannot convey to you the direct quality of the 
                                                                                                     
1996); Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," The Journal of Philosophy 79, 8 (1982); First Earl of 
Shaftesbury, “Selections,” in The British Moralists: 1650 – 1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1969); Francis Hutcheson, Illustrations of the Moral Sense, Ed. Bernard Peach (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1971); Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 
Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), Book III. 
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experience of my friend on which my feelings are based, there is little I can 
say to defend my decision. Perhaps I may expect your pity or sympathy for 
my dilemma, but I cannot expect your respect or agreement. So unless you 
find me particularly compelling as a role model on nonrational grounds (say, 
my crucial presence in your upbringing; or my charisma, or broad sphere of 
social or professional influence; or your desire to stay in my good graces), I 
can provide you with no reason why the principles on which I acted (and 
even Humean Anti-Rationalists act on principles, even if they don't think 
about or formulate them) should govern your behavior under similar 
circumstances. 
 This is not a peculiarly Kantian objection. Unless a principle on which I 
act is formulated partially, i.e. with indexical operators, proper names or 
definite descriptions, we presume it to apply impartially; that is the way 
language works. Terms and principles have general application to the scope 
of referents they denote, unless their scopes are restricted explicitly by 
stipulation or fiat or context. So, for example, if I tell you that dogs are 
susceptible to gastric tortion, I am either mistaken or else using the term 
"dog" in an idiosyncratically restricted sense, to refer specifically to large dogs 
with cylindrical stomachs. Similarly, if I tell you I feel that friendship should 
come before social welfare, you will naturally take me to be doing more than 
merely emoting my personal feelings about this particular friend. You will 
naturally take me to be expressing a judgment that applies not only to my 
own behavior in this case, but to anyone's who must weigh the relative 
priority of friendship and social welfare. But since I am merely telling you 
what I feel, and since what I feel is not directly available to you, I offer you no 
available justificatory basis for evaluating the applicability of this principle to 
your behavior. Unless you have some special reason to be impressed with my 
feelings, you have no reason to be impressed with the principles on which I 
act. Late twentieth century Humean Anti-Rationalism, then, subverts in 
practice the enterprise of Socratic metaethics on which it relies in theory, by 
appealing to interpersonally inaccessible moral states to justify its moral 
judgments. 
 Ross's Intuitionism was couched in a metaethics that attempted to avoid 
this outcome, and more recent Humean Anti-Rationalists may adopt a similar 
strategy. Ross argued that the principles we morally intuit as the outcome of 
careful and considered reflection on the circumstances in question were 
objectively valid, in the same way that mathematical intuitionists argue that 
the objects of mathematical intuition, such as the basic truths of arithmetic, 
are objectively valid. But this makes intuition, as well as its objects, even more 
cryptic and cognitively inaccessible than before: What if we have different 
moral intuitions about the same case? What if yours puts social welfare ahead 
of friendship? How do we determine which one of us is morally defective, 
and in what respect? The difficulty Intuitionists face in claiming an 
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objectively valid status for the moral judgments they make is that 
intersubjective agreement can provide the only evidence for the mysterious 
mental capacities required to make them; and this, of course, makes the 
enterprise of Socratic metaethics itself unnecessary. Where rational dialogue 
becomes necessary to addressing the unconverted that lie outside one's circle 
of sympathizers, Intuitionism has nothing to say. 
 Some late twentieth century Humean Anti-Rationalists have adopted a 
similar strategy, by claiming a certain veracity for moral emotions, based on 
their authenticity as a forthright expression of a person's most centrally 
defining values and projects. This resolves Humean Anti-Rationalism into a 
species of Subjectivism: If a certain judgment authentically expresses my 
centrally defining values and projects, it is true, at least for me. I do not think 
this is an interesting use of the term "true," and will not pause to rehearse any 
more of the elementary objections to Subjectivism. Suffice it to raise the 
obvious problem, analogous to that faced by the Intuitionist, of how to 
dispose of the authentic feelings and judgments of the unconverted; or of a 
storm trooper or lynch mob. Otherwise the basic objection stands: late 
twentieth century Humean Anti-Rationalism appeals for its persuasive power 
on interpersonally inaccessible moral states, and thereby sabotages the 
enterprise of Socratic metaethics on which it relies. 
 By contrast, Rationalism takes the enterprise of Socratic metaethics 
seriously as a methodological presupposition of all metaethics. The method of 
Rationalism is to try to justify a moral theory or principle by appeal to reason 
and argument as the currency of interpersonal communication. A Rationalist 
seeks to lead her reader or listener from weak and mutually acceptable 
premises to a substantive conclusion as to the most convincing substantive 
moral theory or principle, by way of argument, analysis, critique, and 
example interpersonally accessible to both. A Rationalist may appeal to 
imagination, personal experience, or certain feelings or perceptions or 
intuitions as reasons for or against a particular view; but she views reason – 
not the feelings or perceptions or intuitions or other responses invoked as 
reasons – as the final arbiter of rational dialogue.  
 In this undertaking, Rationalism is neither broadly democratic nor 
narrowly fascistic. A Rationalist does not try to gain adherents for her view 
by oversimplifying the theory or the arguments, or by obfuscating them with 
neologisms or inflated prose or verbal abuse or grim silence in order to 
intimidate others into accepting it. In appealing to reason, Rationalism 
addresses itself only to those who are willing to exercise theirs. It does, 
however, assume that all competent adults can do so, regardless of culture or 
environment. In this it is more democratic than Humean Anti-Rationalism, 
which demands intersubjective concurrence in substantive moral judgment as 
the only convincing evidence of the truth of those judgments, when in fact 
there is no necessary connection between intersubjective concurrence and 
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truth at all. For these among other reasons, Rationalism defines the critical 
methodology adopted in this project. The argument proceeds by appeal to 
reasons and critical analysis, and most of the philosophers discussed here 
proceed similarly in defending their views – regardless of the substantive 
content of those views.  
 
7. Rationality and the Structure of the Self 
 The main focus of discussion in this project is with two competing 
branches of Rationalism, prevalent in mid- to late twentieth century Anglo-
American analytic philosophy, that differ with respect to the role each assigns 
to rationality in the structure of the self. Both branches agree upon the 
Socratic metaethical enterprise as a philosophical methodology. Both agree, 
as well, on the necessity of providing a metaethical conception of the subject 
as agent, as a foundation for making normative claims about what subjects as 
agents should do. And both agree upon the necessity of explaining what they 
think moves subjects as agents to act, and in what they think acting rationally 
consists. But each branch deploys different models of human motivation and 
rationality as the shared, weak metaethical premises on the basis of which to 
argue for these normative moral claims. The first branch is what I call the 
Humean conception of the self, the second the Kantian. Thus both Humean and 
Kantian conceptions in fact count as varieties of Rationalism according to this 
taxonomy, regardless of the Anti-Rationalist content some Humean views 
may have. 
 
7.1. Two Conceptions of the Self 
 By a conception of the self, I mean an explanatory theoretical model of the 
self that describes its dynamics and structure. A conception of the self is to be 
distinguished from a self-conception, which is the same as a "personal self-
image." The latter expresses the way or ways in which an individual thinks of 
himself, for example, as nice, well-intentioned, grumpy, loyal, fastidious, etc. 
It typically plays a normative role in individual psychology: We try to live up 
to the ideal individual we conceive ourselves to be, and regard negative 
attributes as flaws or deviations from that ideal. Thus a self-conception is part 
of one's normative moral theory. By contrast, a conception of the self plays a 
descriptive, metaethical role in moral theory: It identifies and describes the 
kind of individual to whom the theory purports to apply. For example, a 
normative moral theory that urges general conformity to the Golden Rule on 
the metaethical grounds that it best enables each individual to promote her 
self-interest implicitly identifies those individuals to whom the theory is 
addressed as desiring to promote their self-interest. Similarly, a normative 
moral theory that recommends actions governed by the dictates of reason 
metaethically presupposes reason as a significant motivational factor in the 
relevant agents.  
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 Traditionally, moral philosophers who write systematically and 
discursively always begin by describing their conception of human subjects 
as agents before they tell us what they think those agents ought to do. That is, 
they preface their normative claims with a metaethical conception of the self 
to which those claims are intended to apply. If they did not, we would have 
no way of gauging whether or not we ourselves were intended subjects of the 
theory. A conception of the self, then, provides a metaethical account of the 
psychological facts about human agents considered as subjects of normative 
moral principles.  
 My question in this project is not that of which normative moral theory is 
uniquely correct. It is the more foundational question of which metaethical 
conception of the self underlying normative moral theories provides the most 
accurate account of the psychological facts. If a moral theory's underlying 
conception of the self is fallacious or largely inaccurate regarding the 
psychology of human nature, the question of the theory's validity for human 
beings can scarcely arise. 
 A conception of the self as I define it comprises two parts: First, it 
includes a motivational model. This explains what causes the self to act, and 
how. It identifies those events and states within the subject that constitute its 
capacity for agency; and it explains how, under certain specified conditions, 
those capacities are realized in agency. So the motivational model in a 
conception of the self is an explanatory and causal model. The motivational 
model with which we are most familiar and comfortable is the Humean, 
belief-desire model of motivation, according to which we perform those 
actions we believe best satisfy the desires that move us.  
 Second, a conception of the self includes a structural model. This describes 
and charts the conditions of rational coherence and equilibrium within the 
self. It depicts that state of the self in which it functions as a unified 
psychological entity, and maintains psychological balance and integrity 
among its cognitive and conative components. Again the structural model we 
largely take for granted is the Humean, utility-maximizing model of 
rationality, according to which all of our actions aim to maximize satisfaction 
of our desires; I described this earlier as egocentric rationality. Taken 
together, the structural and the motivational models of a conception of the 
self explain what a unified subject is and how it is transformed into 
responsible agency.  
 The Humean and the Kantian conceptions of the self are each grounded 
to some extent, although not entirely, in the writings of Hume and Kant 
respectively. The first has been the prevailing conception within Anglo-
American analytic philosophy at least since Sidgwick: Humean premises 
concerning motivation and rationality are now widely accepted in such 
disparate fields as psychology, economics, decision theory, political theory, 
sociology, and, of course, philosophy. The Humean conception is engendered 
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by, but is not identical to, Hume's own conception of the self. Nor is it 
embraced in its entirety by any one of its adherents. Rather, different facets of 
it are pressed into service to do different philosophical jobs: to explain 
behavior, for example; or predict preferences; or to analyze moral motivation, 
or freedom of the will. Thus the picture I sketch in Volume I is a composite 
one, drawn from many different sources in mid- to late twentieth century 
philosophy. This conception has been refined and elaborated to a high degree 
of detail in decision theory and the philosophy of mind, and its theoretical 
simplicity and apparent explanatory potency is attractive. These are serious 
and impressive achievements with which any sustained critique of the 
Humean conception must directly engage. But it has resulted in simplistic 
approaches to the understanding of human behavior in the social sciences, 
and it has generated enormous problems for moral philosophy. – This, 
shortly put, is the critical view I defend in Volume I. I offer arguments that 
systematically unpack some of the major internal and functional defects of the 
prevailing Humean conception of the self, with an eye to later highlighting 
the superior comprehensiveness, explanatory force, and suitability for moral 
theory of its proposed rival. 
 The second branch of Rationalism in moral philosophy is less popular: 
Kantian premises regarding motivation and rationality are accepted in some 
areas of moral philosophy, social theory, and cognitive psychology, but are 
not widely shared outside them. I believe that the full power of this 
conception of the self has not been sufficiently explored or exploited, and in 
Volume II I try to begin to remedy this. Relative to the enterprise of Socratic 
metaethics, my fundamental – but not my only – objection to the Humean 
conception of the self, and consequent allegiance to the Kantian, can be 
summarized quite simply: By insisting on desire as the sole cause of human 
action, the Humean conception of the self limits our capacity for action to the 
comfortable, convenient, profitable, or gratifying; and correspondingly limits 
our rational capacities to the instrumental roles of facilitating and 
rationalizing those egocentric pursuits. The Humean conception thereby 
diminishes our conception of ourselves as rational agents, by failing to 
recognize or respect the ability of transpersonally rational analysis and 
dialogue, as described above, to causally influence our behavior, even as it 
deploys and depends on them in philosophical discourse. This immediately 
raises the question, unanswerable within the traditional framework of 
metaethics itself, of what Humean moral philosophers take themselves to be 
accomplishing by discursively and rationally elaborating their views in print. 
If transpersonal rationality is incapable of changing minds or motivating 
action, as Humeans frequently claim, what is the point of deploying it to 
defend their views in books, articles and symposia? Or is the point merely to 
get tenure and attract disciples motivated similarly by careerist 
considerations to adopt and promulgate those views? Whereas Humean Anti-
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Rationalism subverts the enterprise of Socratic metaethics in practice while 
relying on it in theory, the Humean conception of the self subverts Socratic 
metaethics in theory while relying on it in practice. If the Humean conception 
of the self is right, then the practice of philosophy is little more than an 
übermenschliches power game. But if that conception is wrong or incomplete, 
then Humeans are ignoring the larger arena in which these little games are 
played out.  
 
7.2. Volume I: The Humean Conception 
 Essentially, Volume I of this project complains about other people’s 
views, including, of course, Hume’s own. It nevertheless expresses Achtung 
for these views, and for the thought and hard work that went into them, by 
treating each in depth rather than in passing. Its critical arguments are 
intended to motivate us to rethink our commitment to the prevailing Humean 
paradigm, first by pointing out defects in its twentieth century formulation 
and use in metaethical justification; and second, by scrutinizing the extent to 
which we may validly appeal to the authority of history and tradition in 
support of that formulation. I try on the one hand to acknowledge the 
technical sophistication and practical power of the Humean conception, and 
on the other to call attention to certain formal and theoretical limitations that I 
believe require the detailed treatment that I try to give them. I suggest that 
this conception is in fact a special case of an alternative, transpersonal 
conception of the role of reason – the Kantian conception that I elaborate in 
detail in Volume II – that is broader in scope, more firmly ensconced in the 
traditional canon, and more radical in its implications for practice. 
 
7.2.1. The Two Models 
 Taken together, the belief-desire model of motivation and the utility-
maximizing model of rationality constitute the Humean conception of the self 
as driven by desire to maximize the satisfaction of desire under all 
circumstances. I begin by considering separately each of the two models that 
comprise the Humean conception: first the belief-desire model of motivation 
in Chapter II, then the utility-maximizing model of rationality in Chapters III 
and IV. Here my focus is on the internal, structural defects of these models 
themselves, irrespective of their deployment in any particular moral theory. I 
base my formulation of the belief-desire model on the classic discussions of 
Brandt and Kim, Goldman, and Lewis; revise and refine it in light of certain 
problems that arise within that classical formulation; and elaborate some of 
the further problems, both structural and metaethical, that even that 
sympathetic reformulation cannot avoid. In Chapters III and IV I give the 
same detailed attention to the utility-maximizing model of rationality, and 
argue in Chapter IV that even the sophisticated mid-century reformulations 
and formal elaborations of this model undertaken by Von Neumann-
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Morgenstern, Allais, Ramsey, Savage, and others do not avoid its intrinsic 
structural defects. I conclude that the structural defects of the Humean 
conception of the self more generally can be avoided only by resituating it as 
a special case within the more comprehensive, Kantian conception of the self 
discussed in Volume II. 
 By scrutinizing the problems and flaws inherent in the Humean 
conception itself, Chapters II through IV prepare the ground for the criticisms 
in Chapters V through XIV, of some of the myriad ways in which this 
conception of the self has been pressed into service to provide formally 
sophisticated and scientifically reliable foundations for a wide variety of 
twentieth century normative moral theories. I begin this survey in Chapter V, 
by dislodging my subsequent examination of these theories from the 
straitjacket into which Anscombe’s influential distinction between 
consequentialist and deontological theories has forced them. I argue that this 
distinction obscures rather than illuminates the complex structure of a fully 
developed normative theory; and that so-called consequentialist moral 
theories are in fact merely Humean exemplars in disguise. I reject 
Anscombe’s obfuscating distinction in order to focus more sharply, in the rest 
of Volume I, on the actual, detailed structure and content of some of those 
leading late twentieth century moral theories that – regardless of their stated 
allegiance – depend on Humean metaethics, without the benefit of Kantian 
presuppositions. All, whether they identify themselves as Humeans, 
Kantians, New Kantians, Anti-Rationalists or Noncognitivists, make use of 
the Humean models of motivation and rationality as foundational 
justificatory premises for their normative moral theories. I argue that all such 
theories founder on the inadequacy of these models to the task.  
 
7.2.2. Three Metaethical Problems 
 Late twentieth century normative moral theories that invoke the Humean 
conception of the self as a justificatory foundation thereby engender three 
fundamental metaethical problems that each one of these theories then tries 
to solve, and that are insoluble within its own confines: 
 (1) First there is the problem of moral motivation: Can moral 
considerations alone move us to act in others' interests? The belief-desire 
model of motivation implies that they cannot; for that model stipulates that 
all action is motivated by the pursuit of desire-satisfaction, and only desires 
have causal influence on action. This means that rational appeals, argument 
and dialogue by themselves are in theory insufficient to reform, change minds, 
create desires, or inspire action. Hence on the Humean conception of the self, 
specifically philosophical dialogue alone is equally impotent to reform the 
culpable. Chapter VI defends this conclusion, as well as this formulation of 
the problem of moral motivation, against Humeans who declare that there is 
no such problem because the belief-desire model of motivation is compatible 
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with moral motivation as that term is ordinarily understood. Chapter VII then 
examines in depth Thomas Nagel’s classic effort to substantiate this 
declaration by grafting a Kantian account of moral motivation onto a 
Humean foundation. Nagel’s is not the only attempt to demonstrate the 
compatibility of this odd couple; but it was the first, the most thorough and 
the most original. All later efforts take their cue from Nagel’s resourceful 
analysis. I argue that it fails to reconcile them, but succeeds in laying the 
groundwork for an alternative, truly Kantian solution to the problem of 
moral motivation.  
 (2) The problem of rational final ends is connected with (1): Can reason 
identify any alternative final ends independent of desire-satisfaction – for 
example, altruistic or transpersonal moral ones, that it would be rational for 
us to adopt? According to the utility-maximizing model of rationality, it 
cannot; only desire can play this role, and reason has a merely instrumental 
function. Hence philosophical reasoning is incapable of articulating viable 
alternative visions of the good – of virtuous character, for example, or of a 
good life – that diverge from those we have been conditioned or hard-wired 
to accept. Chapter VIII defends this conclusion by criticizing four 
interconnected, prominent late twentieth century Humean and Anti-
Rationalist attempts to solve the problem of rational final ends within the 
constraints of the Humean conception. I argue that neither Frankfurt nor 
Watson offer viable solutions to the infinite regress of higher-order desires 
that threatens a Humean account of self-evaluation. And neither Williams nor 
Slote offer convincing accounts of personally inviolable ground projects, in 
the absence of transpersonally rational criteria for identifying and evaluating 
those final ends. However, all four call attention to important dimensions of 
personal ethics that an adequate solution to the problem of rational final ends 
must accommodate. 
 (3) The problem of moral justification is, in turn, a special case of (2): In 
propounding a particular moral theory using the familiar philosophical tools 
of discursive reasoning, moral philosophers undertake to demonstrate the 
transpersonal rationality of a particular end or value or vision of the good, i.e. 
that value-theoretic set of social arrangements or principles of action 
prescribed by their theory. Moral justification stands at the intersection 
between normative ethics and metaethics. For just as a theory’s practical part 
tells us what we ought to do and its value-theoretic part explains why so 
doing is worthwhile, similarly its moral justification is meant to rationally 
convince us to adopt the values that confer worth on the actions thus 
prescribed. It thus appeals to metaethical considerations of transpersonal 
rationality that may require us to transcend the valued arrangements and 
ends with which we already may be comfortable, in order grasp the value of 
others which may be unfamiliar. But if reason itself can neither motivate us to 
adopt the valued arrangements prescribed by such a theory as an alternative 
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final end, nor justify our doing so, then either these arrangements must be 
justified instrumentally, as in some sense a means to desire-satisfaction; or 
else they cannot be rationally justified at all – in which case the enterprise of 
substantive moral philosophy, and the acknowledged standards of 
transpersonal rationality that guide it, are futile.  
 Chapter IX criticizes three Humean varieties of metaethical justification 
that wrestle with this dilemma: Noncognitivism, Deductivism, and 
Instrumentalism. I argue that Anderson’s Noncognitivist theory of value 
reduces to a conformist and socially conservative, Rawlsian conception of 
interpersonal validation; that Gewirth’s ambitious and comprehensive 
Deductivist justification of his Principle of Generic Consistency is subverted 
by his allegiance to the belief-desire model of motivation; and that the utility-
maximizing strategy of Instrumentalist justification deployed by Rawls, 
Brandt, Gauthier, Harsanyi and others is inherently self-defeating. Chapters X 
and XI then examine two of the most prominent Instrumentalists – Rawls and 
Brandt – in depth. I show, first, that the Humean structural similarities 
between their attempts at justification override their contrasting ideological 
allegiances; second, that both founder on exactly the same Humean 
vulnerabilities; and third, that both thereby illuminate some of the pitfalls 
that a satisfactory solution to the problem of moral justification must avoid. 
 Chapter XII then applies these conclusions to the most quintessentially 
Humean normative moral theory. Classical Utilitarianism presupposes the 
belief-desire model of motivation in its conception of human agency, and the 
utility-maximizing model of rationality in its Instrumentalist metaethical 
justification. This theory received its most rigorous formulation from 
Sidgwick at the turn of the twentieth century, and its most significant mid- to 
late century refinements from Hodgson, Gibbard, and Lewis. But the 
insolubility of the Free Rider problem within these constraints demonstrates 
that Humean Instrumentalism is no more conceptually coherent at the level 
of normative moral theory than it is at the level of metaethical justification. I 
argue that each one of the above normative moral theories contains much to 
recommend it. But all of them come to grief over their Humean assumptions 
about justification. 
 Thus I conclude that the above three problems – of moral motivation, 
rational final ends, and moral justification – can be solved only by replacing 
the unreconstructed Humean conception with a more comprehensive, 
Kantian conception of the self which the Humean conception, suitably 
reconstructed, implicitly presupposes. So my approach to refuting Humeans 
is in the end the same as Kant’s to refuting Hume: essentially to accept much 
of what Hume said, but then to articulate the necessary foundational 
presuppositions that enabled him to say it. 
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7.2.3. Hume Himself 
 Attempts are often made to counter the above objections to the Humean 
conception of the self by appeal to Hume's own authority. In particular, it is 
sometimes suggested that, despite superficial textual appearances to the 
contrary, Hume's model of rationality does not imply that rational action 
consists simply in satisfying one's desires as efficiently as possible, whatever 
they may be; and hence that the Humean model does not have the further 
counterintuitive consequence of identifying as rational actions that show a 
clear degree of irresponsibility or psychological instability. Rather, it is 
maintained that Hume did supply an account of rational final ends in his 
discussion of the calm passions and "steady and general view" that corrects 
the biases and contingencies of an individual's desires and perceptions; and 
that contemporary Humeans often implicitly presuppose this account. If true, 
this would mean that it was consistent with the Humean conception to 
impose special motivational restrictions on rational choosers in order to 
justify a moral theory, so long as these were compatible with such a steady 
and general view; hence that the above objections to the motivational and 
structural models of the Humean conception were directed against a straw 
man. Volume I therefore concludes with an examination of the original source 
of the Humean conception, and considers whether close attention to Hume’s 
own writings – whether by his most able proponent or by me – deflects the 
above criticisms. Chapter XIII examines Annette Baier's thoroughgoing 
defense and exegetical revision of Hume. I show that, just as Kant 
incorporated Hume's insights into a yet broader and more subtle conception 
of the self, Baier's own defense of Hume similarly presupposes the very 
Kantian conception of the self she purports to reject. Chapter XIV then argues 
that a direct and detailed reconstruction of Hume's own views on these 
matters that considers all the relevant passages does not support the claim 
that he supplied an account of rational final ends. Instead, they undermine it. 
Hence the counterintuitive implications of Hume's own metaethics remain, as 
do the above objections to its use in justifying a normative moral theory. 
Finally Chapter XV summarizes and tracks the interconnections among the 
many Humean dogmas that have shaped the landscape of late twentieth 
century Anglo-American analytic philosophy, and thereby sets the stage for 
their refutation in Volume II. 
 
7.3. Volume II: A Kantian Conception 
 Volume II contends that after having devoted two and a half centuries of 
attention to the Humean conception, it is now time to move on to a sustained 
consideration of the historically more recent, philosophically more 
sophisticated conception of the self that Kant proposed in response to these 
problems (which he, unlike we, saw right away). This conception offers a 
solution to the above three problems that incorporates the prevailing 
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Humean conception as a special case, but supercedes it as an independent 
explanatory and prescriptive model. The proposed Kantian conception 
consists not in two separate models, one of motivation and one of egocentric 
rationality; but rather of a single model, of transpersonal rationality, that has 
both motivational and structural functions in the self. This model comprises 
the familiar, canonical principles of theoretical reason that govern the 
dispositions of transpersonal rationality. So at least on the face of it, this 
alternative conception of the self is prettier, simpler, weaker, and more 
comprehensive than the Humean conception. I try to show that it is also more 
predictively powerful, more formally sophisticated, more entrenched 
canonically, and truer to the empirical facts about human agents.  
 Relative to the indubitable achievements of the Humean lineage in the 
twentieth century, a Kantian may seem to be at a disadvantage in this pursuit. 
Because Kant himself was out of favor in Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy until well after the Second World War, there is no longstanding 
canonical tradition, comparable to that of the Humean Utilitarian tradition in 
contemporary moral philosophy, of an extensively developed terminology or 
set of highly refined concepts, principles, formalizations, or theoretical 
structures on which Kantians can rely for a background frame of reference 
relative to which the analysis is situated. Some have raised serious questions 
about those that have been proposed.13 However, this absence of a developed 
canonical framework is proving to be tremendously fertile and stimulating 
for the groundbreaking work in moral philosophy that already has brought 
Kant’s views into the context of contemporary philosophical debate. Under 
the tutelage of John Rawls’s lectures on Kant, 14 many of his students and 
advocates have ably and amply demonstrated the potential of Kant’s 
program for contemporary moral philosophy. I join this glacial process of 
collaborative refinement and elaboration of the Kantian alternative that has 
already begun, not only in moral philosophy but also in certain branches of 
cognitive psychology and social theory as well.  
 
                                                
13 Elijah Millgram, “Does the Categorical Imperative Give Rise to a Contradiction in the 
Will?” The Philosophical Review 112, 4 (October 2003), 525 – 560.  
14 Edited by Barbara Herman and reprinted in Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral 
Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000). As it happens, my main 
contact with Rawls’ reading of Kant was in the abbreviated form in which he presented 
it in his Social and Political Philosophy course, which I first took and then taught as a 
teaching assistant. My own Kantian educational influences – Phillip Zohn, Michael 
Levin, Arthur Collins, Dieter Henrich – all focused on scholarly exegesis of the Critique 
of Pure Reason. This may account for the difference in my approach to Kant in the 
context of contemporary moral philosophy. 
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7.3.1. A First Critique Analysis of Transpersonal Rationality 
 My approach in the second volume of this project differs from those of 
other contemporary Kantian moral views, in several respects. First, as 
indicated above, I reject the thoroughgoing distinction between theoretical 
and practical reason that other such views take for granted. Second, therefore, 
I do not assume that a proposed Kantian conception of the self might be 
developed upon the foundations of Kant's moral writings alone. Rather, I 
believe that Kant intended these subsequent writings to presuppose the fully 
articulated conceptions of the self and rationality he first developed in depth 
in The Critique of Pure Reason. Third, therefore, like Kant's own conception of 
the self, my contemporary refinement of it gives priority to the canons of 
classical logic as providing the underlying structure by which the 
psychological coherence and conative power of the self and intellect can be 
evaluated. I try to clarify some of the potentials and limitations of the Kantian 
conception of transpersonal rationality – for example, its capacity for 
establishing cognitive and psychological coherence on the one hand, and for 
fostering self-deception, particularly about moral action, on the other.  
 Thus the discussion is divided into two Parts – Ideals and Realities – in 
order first to elaborate in detail what the unimpeded functioning of such a 
self would look like; and then to use that ideal as a criterion of performance 
against which the malfunctions of actual selves can be explained as 
deviations. Just as Chapter V of Volume I had to dislodge the Humean 
conception of the self from the death-grip of the consequentialist-
deontological distinction in ethics in order to take a fresh look at its 
metaethical function in twentieth century moral philosophy, Chapter II of 
Volume II similarly must begin by rescuing the proposed Kantian conception 
of the self from the clutches of the inferentialist-representationalist debate in 
the philosophy of language. This clears the way for a defense of the thesis 
that transpersonal principles of theoretical rationality are much more deeply 
embedded in the structure of the self than the Humean conception 
acknowledges; and that satisfaction of these principles is a necessary 
condition of psychological integrity, consistent experience, and unified 
agency. I propose two constraints that encapsulate these requirements: 
horizontal and vertical consistency; and certain modifications in classical 
predicate logic notation needed in order to symbolize them subsententially. 
Chapter III applies these modifications to rational choice notation, and 
thereby generates a variable term calculus that formally exposes the 
intensionality and logical inconsistency of a cyclical preference ordering; 
defines a genuinely rational preference; and so shows how standard decision 
theory, and the Humean utility-maximizing model of rationality more 
generally, can be fully integrated into this more comprehensive Kantian 
model as a special case. Chapter IV provides a test case for this conclusion in 
examination of a contemporary, self-described Humean decision theory. 
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Contrasting my approach to rational choice with Edward McClennen’s, I 
argue that his analysis of resolute choice in fact does not depend on the 
Humean conception to which he professes allegiance. On the contrary, it 
expresses a deeper, basically Kantian conception of transpersonal rationality. 
 Chapter V then addresses the problem of moral motivation, and shows 
how the transpersonal principles of rationality developed in Chapters II and 
III directly cause action without any necessary intervention of desire; how 
they function descriptively as explanatory and predictive principles for a 
fully rational agent of the sort described by Kant’s normative moral theory; 
and finally contrasts the psychology of an agent motivated by egocentric 
rationality with that of an agent motivated by transpersonal rationality. 
Chapter VI then applies this account of transpersonal motivation to an 
analysis of the moral emotion of compassion, and argues that far from 
excluding impartiality, as Humean Anti-Rationalists such as Lawrence Blum 
claim, true compassion presupposes it. 
 
7.3.2. A First Critique Analysis of Pseudorationality 
 Part II of Volume II addresses the ways in which we systematically 
deviate from the ideal of transpersonal rationality described in Part I. Here, 
too, Kant’s account of the synthetic unity of apperception in the first Critique’s 
Transcendental Deduction is the inspiration. For if a necessary condition of 
unified selfhood is its internal horizontal and vertical consistency, then the 
self is disposed to preserve that consistency – i.e. is disposed to literal self-
preservation – against anything that threatens it. And then anomalous data 
that defies conceptualization in terms of our familiar categories of thought 
truly must be for us “nothing but a blind play of representations, that is, less 
even than a dream,” as Kant claims at A 112. In that case the gap between 
what we actually perceive, feel and do on the one hand, and how we conceive 
of those events on the other is bridged only when those events can be made 
horizontally and vertically consistent with our conceptions, and not 
otherwise.  
 In Chapters VII and VIII I focus particularly on the case – basically 
Aristotle’s intemperate character – in which the motivational efficacy of the 
intellect is overridden by stronger forces, and the agent’s will intellectually 
reconfigured to accommodate them, producing pseudorational apologia and 
ideologies that excuse these deviations from rationality to self, to conscience 
and to others. The concept of pseudorationality introduced in Chapter VII 
refers to the ways in which we systematically and ruthlessly force those 
events into the Procrustean bed of our preconceptions, ignoring or butchering 
or distorting them to fit the requirements of literal self-preservation. Chapter 
VIII applies this analysis of pseudorationality to the case of greatest interest 
for moral theory: that in which the anomalous events in question are our 
own, first-personal desires, emotions and actions. Chapter VIII also offers a 
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solution to the problem of rational final ends that subjects all such ends to the 
transpersonal requirements of horizontal and vertical consistency, and rejects 
as irrational those which violate them. By thus tempering and qualifying the 
account of moral motivation proposed in Chapter V, these two chapters serve 
as the foundation for the analyses in the chapters to come, of how we wrestle 
with the practical applications of normative moral theory. 
 Chapter IX addresses the problem of moral justification, by showing that 
Kant’s analyses of commands, imperatives, and the moral “ought” reveals the 
psychologically and morally ambivalent relationship we bear to normative 
moral theory; and hence that moral justification is equivalent to causal 
explanation only so long as we have reason to preserve the self-conception a 
moral theory such as Kant’s enshrines. To the extent that we do not, the 
project of moral justification itself becomes both more urgent and more futile. 
Chapters X and XI then extend this analysis of pseudorationality to the third-
personal case, in which the moral anomaly – hence the threat to literal self-
preservation – is not oneself but rather another. Chapter X considers the 
problem of moral interpretation, i.e. how the demands of literal self-
preservation may combine with the tendency to pseudorationality to distort 
and constrict the scope of one’s favored moral theory and thus produce 
xenophobic and politically discriminatory moral judgments of another’s 
behavior; and suggests some further practical criteria any such theory must 
meet in order to restore its proper scope of inclusiveness. Although the 
analysis here does not furnish a metaethical justification for any one 
particular moral theory, it does imply that only a Kantian-type moral theory 
satisfies all of these criteria. Finally, Chapter XI presses our pathological 
motives for thus distorting the scope of our normative moral theories to their 
foundation, in considerations of literal self-preservation and the threats that 
theoretically anomalous agents represent to it; and suggests some ways in 
which we might restore moral inclusiveness consistently with protecting 
rational intelligibility.  
 
7.3.3. Some Advantages and Limitations of the Kantian Alternative 
 In a nutshell, the formal difference between the Kantian conception of the 
self I defend in Volume II and the Humean conception criticized in Volume I 
is that the latter, having overlooked the traditional strengths and resources of 
classical predicate logic, reduces to tautology when it reaches for universality. 
The former, by contrast, exploits those strengths and resources to propose a 
way in which the latter, when properly contextualized, might partake of the 
nonvacuous universalization to which it aspires. The Kantian conception is 
thus both an alternative to and also more comprehensive than the prevailing 
Humean one, because it both recognizes and incorporates the data the 
Humean conception excludes, and also preserves its aspiration to rational 
intelligibility, i.e. to explanatory theoretical completeness, despite this. It 
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shows, first, how transpersonal rationality can be motivationally effective in 
action, hence that the belief-desire model of motivation is incomplete; second, 
that transpersonal rationality does imply substantive constraints on final ends 
that differentiate rational from irrational ones, hence that the utility-
maximizing model of rationality is incomplete; and third, that transpersonal 
rationality can therefore justify a certain range of moral theories as rational 
final ends, and can motivate us to adopt them.  
 Fourth, however, reason cannot demonstrate any one of these moral 
theories to be uniquely rational, nor to be implied by the requirements of 
transpersonal rationality itself. Rather, the appeal to reason, on which we as 
philosophers implicitly rely, presupposes a view of ourselves as socialized 
moral agents who are transpersonally rational and therefore morally 
responsible. This view, in turn, finally presupposes a Kantian conception of 
the self as motivated and structured by the requirements of transpersonal 
rationality, to which each of the moral theories within this range implicitly 
subscribes.  
 This conception of the self opposes not only the Humean dictum that 
transpersonal rationality is impotent to determine the ends we seek. It also 
opposes the Humean Anti-Rationalist stance that treats transpersonal 
rationality in action as an impediment to personal authenticity. I give 
particular attention to whistleblowers, from Socrates forward to the 
contemporary context, who have marshaled the reserves of transpersonal 
rationality to transcend the egocentric pursuits of self-interest, the 
gratification of desire, and the expression of instinct and emotion, in the 
service of an inclusive understanding of the good in the realization of which 
all can cooperate. It is here that Kant joins Hobbes in rejecting Nietzsche's 
Übermensch. A social order (however well serviced by Untertanen blinded by 
"slave morality") in which all fully empowered citizens were free to wield 
power in the service of their instincts and desires would be no viable social 
order at all. 
 These substantive arguments are intended to present an alternative way 
of conceptualizing our own behavior and conscious life as better suited not 
only to our aims in moral philosophy, but to explanation of the psychological 
facts as well. The claim is, then, that our de facto commitment to this view of 
moral agency, plus the descriptive Kantian conception of the self that 
encapsulates it, jointly explain our actual behavior, including our reflective 
philosophical behavior, better than the prevailing, unreconstructed Humean 
alternative; and therefore provides a more realistic and appropriate 
justificatory foundation for moral theory.  
 For of course Humean moral philosophers have other reasons for 
rationally defending their views in books and articles besides getting tenure 
and attracting disciples. Like Kantians, and like most philosophers, they 
appeal to rational argument to convince us because they believe in the 
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rationality of their views. Rational considerations can cause a change not only 
of mind or heart. They also can cause a change in behavior as well. They can 
change what we teach, what we say, how we comport ourselves, and – at the 
very least, for whom we vote. A Kantian conception of the self acknowledges 
the motivational influence of rational argument on action from the outset. In 
speech and writing, Kantian moral philosophers exploit rationality 
unapologetically, through appeals to conscience and reason, and reminders of 
who and what we are and where our responsibilities as rational agents lie. 
The challenge Kantian metaethics faces is then to articulate convincingly the 
metaethical conception of the self, rationality, and motivation that best 
explains its practical import. Volume II attempts to meet this challenge. 
 I do not expect that any of these lines of argument will necessarily 
compel all, or perhaps even most, Humeans and Humean Anti-Rationalists to 
see the error of their ways or reform them accordingly. For in the end these 
arguments presuppose the value of transpersonal rationality as the defining 
element in the structure and conation of the self. They presuppose that one is 
prepared, not only to recognize transpersonal rationality as definitive, but 
also to valorize its character dispositions, as a "slave morality" does. As in any 
philosophical disagreement, philosophical opponents may ascribe to the same 
rational consideration very different weights, and what is a conclusive reason 
to one may be an irrelevant non sequitur to another:  
 
THE KANTIAN: THE ANTI-
RATIONALIST: 
THE HUMEAN: 
But X is irrational!  
But X is irrational!  But X is irrational! 
But Y is 
counterintuitive! 
But Y is 
counterintuitive! 
But Y is counterintuitive! 
 
But Z is unsatisfying!  But Z is unsatisfying! 
But Z is 
unsatisfying! 
 
So even if I succeed in making a plausible case that reason has this centrality 
in the structure of the self, I have still relied on and presupposed the value of 
the very capacity I mean in my argument to valorize. A real Humean Anti-
Rationalist who disparages the value of transpersonal rationality will 
therefore accord little value to my transpersonally rational arguments that 
transpersonal rationality has value. Indeed, I will have trouble getting her to 
read this project. If my reader is a real Humean Rationalist, for whom 
transpersonal rationality has value but no motivational efficacy, my 
arguments will then provide him no motivation to rethink his values, no 
matter how persuasive those arguments may be. Perhaps only Hobbes' astute 
– and rationally persuasive – observations on the necessary transience and 
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instability of accumulated power might lead him to reconsider the value of 
the Socratic ideal. 
One final caveat. Volume II covers a great deal of territory. Some readers 
may experience it as a free fall off a steep cliff; a plunge from the metaethical 
paradise of philosophy of language, logic, and decision theory with which I 
begin into the casuistical netherworld of xenophobia and political 
discrimination with which I conclude. I try to maximize the reader’s attention 
to the connections and continuities between these extremes, so as to minimize 
the bumpiness of the ride down. But such readers are advised to fasten their 
seatbelts nevertheless. 
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Chapter II. The Belief-Desire Model of Motivation 
 
 
Both the motivational and the structural models, and so the Humean 
conception more generally, assume the concept of a desire as a value-neutral 
foundation, on the basis of which an equally value-neutral explanatory 
paradigm can be constructed. The belief-desire model of motivation is 
deployed in a variety of late twentieth century, foundational projects in action 
theory and philosophy of mind; but it is not well-defined. This chapter begins 
by taking Humean desire theorists at their word, with respect both to their 
analysis of desire and to their varying and sometimes conflicting accounts of 
how it functions in motivation and in explanation. Section 1.1 takes Brandt 
and Kim’s pioneering account to task for achieving vacuity rather than the 
universality at which it aims. I show that regardless of whether the concept of 
desire is construed experientially or theoretically, the belief-desire model of 
motivation conceived universalistically is either false or vacuous. Section 1.2 
discusses Alvin Goldman’s A Theory of Human Action, which invokes this 
model in explicating the nomological connection between intentional 
behavior and its causes. However, I contend that because this model identifies 
actions in terms of the desires they are intended to satisfy, it provides us with 
no resources for identifying the motivationally effective desire independently 
of the action it is presumed to cause. Therefore it cannot explain action 
because it fails to preserve the distinction between explanandum and explanans. 
Section 1.3 then examines David Lewis’ argument in "Radical Interpretation," 
which invokes the belief-desire model of motivation in order to explain how 
we can understand an agents' beliefs, desires, and meanings as he would 
express them in his language and as we would express them in ours, given 
the physical facts about that agent. But because Lewis assumes the 
universality of the model at the outset, i.e. that we interpret the agent as 
maximizing utility in his physical behavior in the same way and under the 
same conditions that we would in ours, no independent understanding of that 
agent's beliefs, desires, and meanings, as he would express them in his 
language, can be achieved. In all three of these cases, I argue, the problem is 
the same: Either a desire is just one motivational variable among many other 
possible ones, in which case it cannot provide a comprehensive explanatory 
model; or else it is a fully comprehensive and tautological "theoretical 
construct," in which case it fails to explain any action independently at all. 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2 offer a representational theory of desire that attempts 
to redress these problems, within the constraints of the Humean conception. I 
show that this one avoids tautology and retains explanatory potency by 
forsaking the claim to universality, and more accurately characterizes the 
conception of desire that underpins the Humean conception of the self. On 
this alternative analysis, it is the exclusion from the self of the object of desire 
that gives the desirings of the self their motivational and structural 
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importance for the Humean conception. We are moved to action, on this view, 
and to regard our internal and external resources instrumentally, not because 
of what we are and have, but because of what we conceive ourselves literally 
to want, i.e. lack.  
However, in Sections 2.3 through 3 I show that this more detailed account 
of the structure and dynamics of desire shapes a necessarily theory-laden and 
morally egocentric psychology. The moral psychology of desire casts human 
agents as driven by dissatisfaction, insecurity, and deep feelings of inferiority 
in all of their actions; as permanently trapped in unrealizable fantasies of 
future fulfillment; and as incapable of such basic human cognitive 
achievements as impersonality, impartiality, or self-reflection. Section 4 
considers briefly the likelihood that the resulting profile will be familiar and 
depressing in several respects. Those who recognize themselves in it may be 
tempted to conclude to its practical accuracy, and therefore to the veracity of 
the Humean model of motivation. Those who do not, or who find it deficient 
or incomplete in its portrayal of the reality and potential of human motivation 
may rightly conclude that the belief-desire model of motivation is inadequate 
to the psychological facts, makes false predictions about human behavior, and 
hence is badly in need of repair. So there is some reason to doubt whether the 
Humean conception can be, not only adequate to the complexity of human 
behavior, but whether, indeed, it can function as an adequate explanatory 
paradigm at all.  
A terminological point (with a familiar Kantian ring): To describe the self 
as having desires may seem to suggest that desires relate to the self as 
properties of it. But this does not follow, since of course any such nominative 
can occupy the place of predicate or subject indifferently. In Volume II I 
defend the familiar first Critique view that locutions such as "I desire x," or "I 
have a desire for x" express a relation of the unexplicated concept of the self or 
"I" to the experience of desiring, or of having a desire that is essentially 
possessive: Any such experience – of desiring, having, believing, and so on – 
itself has the feature of being had by someone. That is, it is true by definition 
of the cover term "experience" that each experience belongs to some self. I 
defer further amplification of these points to Volume II, Chapter II. For now 
notice just that the possessive relation of the concept of the self to its 
experiences such as desirings does not imply that the relation of actual selves 
to their experiences is similarly and inevitably possessive. 
The Humean conception of the self implies, rather, that the relation of an 
actual self to its motivationally effective desires is one of identity; and its 
relation to its other experiences – the bundle of impressions, ideas and 
inferences of which Hume himself spoke – instrumental. The dispositional or 
occurrent experience of desiring defines the Humean self, in that it determines 
(1) the structural relations among these other internal components of the self, 
as nested instrumental resources for the satisfaction of desire arranged 
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through similarly instrumental reasoning and calculation; and (2) the 
motivation for any intentional behavior in which the Humean self engages. To 
suggest that the Humean self is to be identified with its desires rather than its 
impressions and ideas is thus to take seriously the intrinsic connections 
between selfhood and agency, and between selfhood and determinate 
psychological structure. The Humean conception of the self illustrates one 
way in which the question as to the structural and motivational origins of 
behavior can be answered. 
 
1. Orthodox and Revisionist Variants 
 
1.1. Brandt and Kim's Ambivalence 
In characterizing what a desire is, Humeans converge in adopting 
definitions that are something like what Brandt and Kim seem to mean by a 
"want"; i.e. a disposition to feel pleasure or satisfaction in thinking about or 
admiring the object of desire, and a disposition to feel disappointment or 
frustration in its nonattainment.1 Brandt and Kim explicitly mean to construe 
wants or desires as theoretical constructs, with no experiential analogues.2 
This interpretation allows them to apply the concept of a want or desire to the 
explanation of a broader range of behavior than would be suggested by the 
ordinary sense. It attempts to divest the concept of a want or desire of the 
particular experience (or conjunction of experiences) that individuate it from 
other motivational states. However, five of their six proposed criteria for the 
correct usage of "x wants p" make explicit references to x's experience of such 
feelings as joy or disappointment in the attainment or nonattainment of p, 
pleasure in entertaining the thought of p or in the occurrence of p, and an 
impulse to do the act that x believes will eventuate in p. To analyze the 
concept of a want or desire for p in terms of joy or pleasure at the satisfaction 
of that want and a felt impulse to achieve that satisfaction seems inconsistent 
with denying that "want" denotes an experience. If it denotes a constellation 
of experiences then presumably its denotation includes each conjointly in that 
constellation. This ambiguity reflects a deeper ambivalence among Humeans 
such as Thomas Nagel, Alan Gewirth and Brandt about just what kind of 
entity a desire is supposed to be, and what kind of function in a conception of 
the self it is supposed to have.  
Brandt and Kim's definition is thus of interest for its systematic attempt 
to capture the dichotomy expressed in Nagel's distinction between 
                                                
1Brandt and Kim, "Wants as Explanations of Action," in N. S. Care and C. Landesman, 
Eds. Readings in the Theory of Action (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1969), 
199-213. References to this article are parenthesized in the text. Notice that this 
definition differs in several respects from that which Brandt offers in A Theory of the 
Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). 
2See Care and Landesman, ibid., pp. 200-202 and footnote 2. 
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unmotivated and motivated desires (discussed in Chapter VI.2.3, below), i.e. 
to encapsulate both the commonsensical notion of desire as an empirical 
event, and also those modifications of it that attempt to accommodate the 
demands of a theoretical first principle.3 So the Humean conception of the self 
vacillates between two interpretations of what a desire is. On one view, 
desires are events in the world with causal power. Call this the orthodox view.  
The orthodox view admits of competing beliefs about the content of a desire, 
of the sort that might separate the Freudian from the Adlerian. It accepts the 
possibility of disagreement about what desire one has; but broaches none 
about the presupposition that we are in fact moved by real events called 
"desires." In this respect, desires are as ontologically basic as furniture or 
plane crashes: they occur. Although they intend otherwise, Brandt and Kim's 
account of desire in fact conforms to the orthodox interpretation.   
The other view withholds the ascription of ontological irreducibility, in 
order to extend the scope of application of the term "desire" to cover the large 
variety of motives – e.g. greed, compassion, self-interest, duty – we commonly 
assume to exist. Call this the revisionist view. The idea of the revisionist view 
is that belief-desire talk supplies us with a kind of "theoretical construct" in 
terms of which all intentional behavior can be retrospectively described. Thus 
we ascribe to an agent a desire to achieve the end her behavior seems to us 
most clearly designed to achieve, and the belief that the action she actually 
performed was the most efficient way at her disposal for achieving it. These 
ascriptions enable us to preserve the assumption of the agent's instrumental 
rationality, by treating desires as ubiquitous in the sense that Nagel's 
motivated desires are: Whatever the agent does is assumed to promote the 
satisfaction of some desire she has as efficiently as she can, given the 
information and resources at her disposal.  Brandt and Kim's account aspires 
to conform to the revisionist interpretation, although in fact it does not. 
In the following chapter I elaborate at greater length on some of the 
problems with this view of desires as theoretically ubiquitous. Here merely 
note the resulting tension between the orthodox and the revisionist views. The 
credibility of the claim that desires are ubiquitous diminishes in inverse 
proportion to the extent to which we are required to construe "desire" as 
denoting an actual event or state of affairs in the world. For to that extent, it 
seems self-evident that on any nonvacuous interpretation of the word 
"desire," desires are neither necessary nor precipitating causes of many of the 
actions we perform.4 In the course of this project I examine several cases in 
which one performs actions intentionally, not because one desires their ends, 
                                                
3 Ibid.  
4W. D. Falk also makes this point in "'Ought' and Motivation," Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, New Series, NLVIII (1954-58). See especially pp. 115-117. 
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but rather because they instantiate normative principles or values to which 
one is deeply committed. 
 
1.2. Goldman's Orthodoxy 
Some orthodox desire-theorists claim ubiquity for desire despite the 
plethora of counterexamples. Alvin Goldman, for example, concurs with 
Brandt, Kim, Gewirth, Davidson, and others in characterizing an occurrent 
desire or want as a kind of "pro-attitude:"  
[W]ants need not be intense or emotion-laden; they need not absorb one's 
whole consciousness... wanting x is roughly equivalent with [sic] 'feeling 
favorably toward x,' 'being inclined toward x,' 'being pro x,' 'finding x an 
attractive possibility,' 'finding x to be a "fitting" or "appropriate" 
possibility," etc. ... wants have various strengths or intensities.5  
On Goldman's account, wants are mental states that, other things equal, are 
partial causes of basic act-tokens. Although we at present have neither 
techniques adequate for measuring the intensity of various wants, nor precise 
universal laws for predicting the acts they cause, we can often state ex post 
facto the beliefs and desires operative in causing behavior (73).
 
 Here the 
ceteris paribus clause is crucial: if other things are not equal, then the want in 
question may not cause the act in question: if, for example, a stronger want 
overrides it, or if a sudden, fleeting want momentarily eradicates awareness 
of it; or if external circumstances prevent one's acting on it; or if one's beliefs 
about how best to satisfy the want do not include this particular act (108, 113-
114). But even in these cases it is, on Goldman's analysis – as it is on Nagel's, 
"a logical truth that certain wants (together with certain beliefs) will lead to 
certain behavior." Even if one particular want cannot always be counted on to 
cause a particular action, that action must, by definition, "have been caused by 
some want or other" (115). 
But which want? How do we identify the motivationally effective want 
independently of the action itself? Goldman offers five empirical criteria of 
identification for the particular want that motivated an action that are, as he 
says, "extremely helpful in narrowing down precisely what the agent's goals 
or purposes are" (117): 
 
(1) co-temporal acts, such as the agent's looking in a certain direction 
(for example, looking at the lamp while flipping the switch as evidence 
that he wanted to turn on the light);  
(2) sequential acts, all of which are part of a program of action aimed 
at the same goal (as when, for example, the agent's looking at the lamp, 
                                                
5Alvin Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 49-50. 
Henceforth all references to this work are parenthesized in the text. 
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getting up and going over to the light switch, and finally flipping the 
switch are all presumably aimed at turning on the light);  
(3) observable events, characteristics, or clues given by the agent, such as 
facial expression, that enable us to tell what the agent's wants are;  
(4) information about the agent's likes, dislikes, and personality traits, 
obtained by observation of previous behavior; and  
(5) information about the agent's beliefs, obtained by observation of his 
perceiving something to be the case, and/or by his avowals. 
 
However, first, criteria (1), (2), (4), and (5) presuppose that prior criteria 
for identifying the goal of an action have already been satisfied. Once we have 
identified the agent as, for example, looking in a certain direction rather than 
rotating his neck muscles ((1)); or flipping the switch rather than patting the 
wall ((2)); or having certain likes ((4)) or beliefs ((5)) on the basis of the actions 
he performs that express them, we can then invoke this information in order 
to identify further ones. But if the mystery is how to identify the goal of any 
such action itself, these criteria are unlikely to be of assistance. Goldman's 
empirical criteria of want-identification do not necessarily hold in all cases. 
The second, more crucial difficulty is that they fail to identify the agent's 
wants independently of the action taken to satisfy them. Even if they enable 
us to identify the goal of a particular action the agent performed, and so the 
action itself (e.g. turning on the light rather than exploring the objects in the 
environment), they do not enable us to surmise what want caused him to 
perform it (to read legibly? to check the electrical wiring?). Of course if the 
motivationally effective want is stipulated to be just the desire to perform the 
action one in fact performed, then identifying the action thereby identifies the 
want, and no further question remains to be asked. But Goldman has already 
rejected this stipulation, and rightly so, on the grounds that the goal that 
identifies the action is not necessarily the goal one wanted to achieve by 
performing it (115). The major difficulty with these criteria, then, is that they 
do not enable us to preserve both ubiquity and full-blooded causal efficacy in 
any significant sense simultaneously. Desires cannot be both ubiquitous and 
ontologically basic. 
So the same conclusion holds here for Goldman that I later show to hold 
for Nagel and Gewirth as well: To the extent that desires are events, as the 
orthodox view requires, they cannot be required as a necessary condition of 
action. In particular, desire is an unnecessary presupposition of conforming to 
operative social norms of the sort discussed in greater detail in Volume II.6 
For this is to interpose a superfluous intentional state – a desire, "pro-
                                                
6Goldman acknowledges that his analysis may not work for habitual behavior, but 
neglects to say how habitual and nonhabitual behavior are to be distinguished: by 
token? by type? by structure? by repetition? etc.  
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attitude," or "appetition" – between us and the behavior we perceive as 
normatively appropriate. More generally, to stipulate any such desire or 
interest that necessarily intervenes between the awareness of what a situation 
requires and the resulting action is both counterintuitive from the point of 
view of commonsense introspection, and methodologically messy. For the 
stipulation of such a desire as necessary in all cases is based on the self-
fulfilling hypothesis that there must have been a desire present in order for 
one to act at all. So if my performing the action makes it true by definition that 
I desired its end, yet I find no evidence of such a desire when I examine 
carefully my own motives, then the concept of a necessarily motivating desire 
must be relegated to the explanatory status of a "theoretical construct." But 
this is to abandon the orthodox for the revisionist view of desire. 
Now some may find it difficult, if not impossible, to examine their own 
motives without coming upon a desire somewhere in the mix, and it is worth 
asking why, and for whom this ontological ubiquity actually obtains. For 
example, among the operative social norms which govern our behavior are to 
be found, first, prevailing linguistic practices which, since the seventeenth 
century, have relied increasingly on a psychological vocabulary of individual 
desires and interests that in the twentieth century was extended even beyond 
the scope of conscious awareness. Second, these linguistic practices are 
mutually interdependent with a globally disseminated economic explanation 
of human motivation that gives prime emphasis to the pursuit of individual 
gratification, rewards, and advantages. Third, these practices and 
explanations are the expression of an optimistic and future-oriented system of 
political and social institutions that accords central recognition to individual 
freedom and autonomy – specifically, the freedom and autonomy to pursue 
the gratification of individual desires. The belief-desire model of motivation, 
and the Humean conception of the self more generally, has had a central place 
in the intellectual history of Western culture of the last three centuries.7
 
 So it 
is hardly surprising that we buy into it. We conceive ourselves 
individualistically, define ourselves in terms of personal desires, and esteem 
ourselves to the extent that we satisfy them. 
Among the Tabwa of West Africa, on the other hand, observers' queries 
as to what an agent "wants" or "desires" are typically answered by elaborate 
descriptions of what normally obtains under such circumstances. Pressing the 
question meets with incomprehension. The Tabwa do not seem to have our 
concept of a desire at all.8 Here the problem is not that the revisionist view has 
been mistaken for the orthodox view. It is that the concept of desire, even on 
                                                
7See Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1977). 
8Here I am indebted to Kit Roberts for making available to me some results of her field 
research. 
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the orthodox view, is unintelligible to the Tabwa. There are no ontologically 
basic events in their experience that answer to our orthodox conception of a 
desire. Perhaps we could eventually get a Tabwan to "recognize" the existence 
of such events, by schooling him in our linguistic conventions, and convincing 
him to accept the resulting reconceptualization of his experience as valid, in 
the way that B. F. Farrell has documented for the indoctrination of 
psychoanalytic concepts.9 But in this case we would merely have won him 
over to our side. We would not have demonstrated that our side has any 
greater claim to objective accuracy than his from an unbiased perspective. The 
Tabwa constitute a counterexample to the revisionist interpretation of the 
belief-desire model of motivation. But they also afford interesting insight into 
the genesis of desire on the orthodox model. They suggest that desires as 
identifiable empirical events may be the effect of social and linguistic 
conditioning, and are not necessarily to be found in its absence. In Sections 2 
and 3 below, I detail the extent to which we buy into this conditioning, in the 
hope that the resulting unflattering portrait may inspire us to sell out of it. 
At this point it is tempting to respond by insisting that all agents have 
desires, even if they don't know what their desires are, or even what a desire 
is; and to set about trying to prove these claims by showing that their 
behavior can be explained by postulating the existence of unconscious or 
unrecognized desires. I argue in Chapter III that the closer we come to 
demonstrating the ubiquity of desire as a motive for behavior, the closer we 
come to a blanket metaphorical description of behavior that leaves far behind 
any pretense of explaining it. If we cannot distinguish between ontological but 
contingent desires and other motivationally effective causes of action, we 
cannot be said to have an independent concept of motivation at all. 
 
1.3. Lewis's Revisionism 
To see this, consider next David Lewis' revisionist suggestion for solving 
the problem of radical interpretation, defined as follows: How do we come to 
know Karl himself - his beliefs, desires, and meanings, as expressed in his 
language, and also as we might express them in ours, given the physical facts 
about Karl?10  Lewis sets up the problem by assuming all the data yielded by 
Karl as a physical system P, and then devising a way to fill in the information 
about Karl's beliefs and desires as expressed in our language Ao, as expressed 
in Karl's language Ak, and the meanings or truth-conditions of his full 
sentences M, given certain constraints. Lewis describes these constraints as 
"the fundamental principles of our general theory of persons. They tell us how 
                                                
9B. A. Farrell, "The Criteria for a Psychoanalytic Explanation," in D. Gustafson, Ed. 
Philosophical Psychology (New York: Doubleday, Inc., 1964). 
10David Lewis, "Radical Interpretation," Synthese 23 (1974): 331-44. Reprinted in 
Philosophical Papers, Volume I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 108-121. 
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beliefs and desires and meanings are normally related to one another, to 
behavioral input, and to sensory input"(111). The problem of radical 
interpretation, on this account, is the problem of how to read another persons' 
physical states, events, and behavior, all of which are guided and governed by 
her understanding of the world, in the terms that define our understanding of 
the world, without subjective bias or distortion. Do we, and can we, ever 
really understand what anyone else says or does on her terms? Or must we 
invariably appropriate her behavior to our own agendas and preconceptions? 
That Lewis is to be identified as a revisionist desire theorist (albeit a 
somewhat tentative one) can be inferred from his stated intention to limit 
discussion of Karl's propositional attitudes to his system of beliefs and desires 
"in the hope that all others will prove to be analyzable as patterns of belief and 
desire, actual or potential; but if not, whatever attitudes resist such analysis 
also should be included in Ao and Ak"(109). But Lewis' revisionism becomes 
much more militant later on, when he asserts that 
[w]e are within our rights to construe 'desire' inclusively, to cover the 
entire range of states that move us .... Humeanism understood in this 
inclusive way is surely true – maybe a trivial truth, but a trivial truth is 
still a truth.11 
(We are, of course, within our rights to construe words in any way we like, as 
Humpty Dumpty observed.) In this more recent discussion, Lewis goes on to 
ascribe to a hypothetical Anti-Humean opponent a very odd view: that some 
desires are beliefs, namely those which are necessarily conjoined with beliefs. 
More specifically, beliefs about what would be good are claimed to 
necessarily entail desires for that good. Since Lewis does not cite any 
philosopher who holds this view or defends it at any length, it is difficult to 
evaluate its plausibility or its merits.12 On the face of it, it would seem to have 
very few. Lewis claims, on behalf of his hypothetical Anti-Humean, that "[i]t 
is just impossible to have a belief about what would be good and lack the 
corresponding desire" (324). But surely one may both sincerely believe that, 
for example, a fair redistribution of resources to the disadvantaged would be 
good, and also desire not to redistribute one's own unfair accumulation of 
resources to the disadvantaged; or believe that a trade-in on a new car would 
be good, yet desire to retain one's 1956 VW Sunroof Sedan forever; or believe 
that a life of sloth and self-indulgence would be bad, yet desire to live such a 
                                                
11David Lewis, "Desire as Belief," Mind 97, 387 (July 1988), 323-332. 
12Lewis' Footnote 1 cites only criticism – not "criticism and defense of several Anti-
Humean views." A subtle treatment of it is to be found in Mark Platts, "Moral Reality 
and the End of Desire," in Reference, Truth and Reality, Ed. Mark Platts (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 69-82. A very plausible, genuinely anti-Humean 
version of this argument also not cited by Lewis is offered by S. I. Benn and G. F. Gauss, 
"Practical Rationality and Commitment," American Philosophical Quarterly 23, 3 (July 
1986), 255-266. 
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life. It is very hard to see how any such connection between beliefs and 
desires could be a necessary one – at least not without begging several 
important questions.13 
Lewis' general theory of persons in "Radical Interpretation" both 
implicitly defines the key theoretical terms of "belief," "desire," and "meaning," 
and also deploys them "to make an empirical claim about human beings – a 
claim so well confirmed that we take it quite for granted"(111). The definition 
of a person's system of belief, desire, and meaning requires that that system 
must more or less conform to the principles of the theory. The empirical claim 
this theory makes is that most human beings in fact have systems of belief, 
desire, and meaning that conform to the principles of the theory. Since the 
concepts of belief, desire, and meaning are common property, Lewis reasons, 
the theory that implicitly defines them "had better ... amount to nothing more 
than a mass of platitudes of common sense, ... on pain of changing the subject" 
(112). Thus Lewis, like Goldman, wants to claim both ubiquity and 
ontological primacy for his concept of desire. What makes him a revisionist, 
however, is his acknowledgment that belief-desire talk is primarily a theory-
laden convention – a convention laden with a universalistic theory. 
The constraining principles of Lewis' general theory of persons are as 
follows. 
 
 (1) A Principle of Charity constrains the relation between Ao and P 
such that Karl is represented as believing and desiring what we would 
believe and desire, were we in his place, given the existence of a common 
inductive method I and underlying system of basic intrinsic values V, 
respectively. 
 (2) A Rationalization Principle also constrains the relation between Ao 
and P: The beliefs and desires ascribed to Karl by Ao should allow us to 
interpret the gross physical behavior given by P as maximizing Karl's 
utility – which Lewis takes to be equivalent to an interpretation of his 
behavior as rational. "Thus if it is in P that Karl's arm goes up at a certain 
time, Ao should ascribe beliefs and desires according to which it is a good 
thing for his arm to go up then" (113). 
 (3) A Principle of Truthfulness constrains the relation between Ao and 
M such that the beliefs and desires ascribed to Karl by Ao should preserve 
the truthfulness of Karl's utterances in his language Ak. 
 (4) A Principle of Generativity constrains the assignment by M of truth 
conditions to the sentences of Karl's language Ak to that which is finitely 
specifiable, reasonably uniform and simple, and conforms to a set of 
standardized semantic and syntactic rules. 
                                                
13Michael Stocker takes up these questions in his "Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral 
Psychology," The Journal of Philosophy LXXVI, 12 (December 1979), 738-753. 
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 (5) A Manifestation Principle constrains the relation between P and Ak, 
and also Ao, by stipulating that Karl's beliefs, as expressed in his own 
language, ordinarily should be manifest in his dispositions to speech 
behavior; i.e. Karl is assumed to be truthful, honest, and to possess 
integrity of thought with utterance. Lewis acknowledges the difficulty of 
stating a companion Manifestation Principle of the desires in Ak, but 
suggests that there probably should be one; we shall return to this 
difficulty momentarily. 
 (6) A Triangle Principle constrains the three-way relation among Ao, 
M, and Ak, by requiring that Karl's beliefs and desires come out the same 
whether expressed in his language or ours. 
 
Lewis' preferred method for solving the problem of radical interpretation, as 
he has stated it, has three steps: The first step is to use P as a source of 
information on Karl's behavior and life history of evidence to fill in Ao, by 
means of the Rationalization and Charity principles. The second step is to use 
Ao as a source of information about those of Karl's attitudes pertaining to 
speech behavior to fill in M, in conformity with the Truthfulness and 
Generativity Principles. The third step is to use Ao and M to fill in Ak, by 
means of the Triangle Principle. The satisfaction of the Manifestation Principle 
then follows automatically from that of the Truthfulness, Rationalization, and 
Triangle Principles, and so is redundant.  
But Lewis' solution to the problem of radical interpretation suffers on 
account of his adherence to the revisionist variant of the desire model of 
motivation. First, recall the status of the theory of persons of which the six 
constraining principles are constitutive. They are, by hypothesis, 
systematizations of our commonsense views on the empirical interrelations of 
belief, desire, and meaning in most people. As we have just seen in 
considering the Tabwa of West Africa, this hypothesis by itself is 
controversial. The problem with the Principle of Charity is its presupposition 
of the belief-desire model in the first place. Despite Lewis’ stipulation of V in 
(1), this model leaves no room for basic intrinsic values, because it locates the 
source of value in individual and subjective desires. Individual desires held 
by different subjects at different times may fortuitously coincide in conferring 
value on some common state of affairs, such as food or shelter, with some 
degree of statistical regularity – on which its value is contingent. But its 
intrinsic value would require that its value be self-conferring (this is what the 
word "intrinsic" means), not by its statistical occurrence as an object of 
subjective desire.   
But when we examine the statistical occurrence of various states of affairs 
in the subjective desires of various individuals, we see that not only are the 
resulting values not intrinsic; they are, for the most part, not even held in 
common. It is far from obvious that, for example, the Principle of Charity 
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obtains between persons of neighboring voting districts, much less 
communities, cultures, societies, or nations. The prevalence of xenophobia on 
the global as well as local scales calls into question the extent to which others 
can be supposed to share with us a common set of basic values (let alone 
intrinsic values), such that they can be represented as believing and desiring 
what we would believe and desire were we in their place. Instead, the 
Principle of Charity would seem rather to hold primarily within relatively 
small and insulated communities, within which conventions of diplomacy 
and prohibitions against broaching the topics of politics, religion, or sex are 
superfluous to maintaining at least the appearance of mutual understanding.  
Of course the scope of the Principle of Charity could be extended to cover 
other cases in which such conventions and prohibitions are essential, by 
sufficiently weakening the qualifications for something's counting as a 
common system of basic values – of an extrinsic and contingent sort; but then 
even to state the Principle of Charity as a constraint on our general theory of 
persons would be otiose. The insufficiency of the Principle of Charity to the 
facts of social diversity undercuts not only Lewis' assumption of a shared 
fund of basic beliefs and desires; but thereby the revisionist assumption of the 
ubiquity of desire more generally. 
Similarly with the Principle of Rationalization. I argue in Chapter III that 
there are, in any case, internal, structural problems with this model that 
constrain its meaningful empirical application. But even were those problems 
not to arise, it would seem simply to be false empirically that most people 
maximize utility in their physical behavior, even if that claim is sufficiently 
weakened by qualification to bring it dangerously close to vacuity. For even if 
we suppose a rational agent always to act on those beliefs about how best to 
satisfy her desires, given her incomplete knowledge of probabilities and 
available resources, inadequate computational skills, distorted judgment, lack 
of mobility, disinclination to reflect seriously on her true desires, and so on, it 
is still doubtful whether most agents turn out to be rational, even in this 
attenuated sense. Neurosis, criminal insanity, weakness of will, and impulsive 
behavior provide abundant counter-evidence to the empirical applicability of 
Lewis' Principle of Rationalization. Of course this is not to deny the value of 
this principle in a possible normative theory of persons (at least not in this 
discussion). It is merely to restrict its role to the definitional. We may simply 
stipulate its applicability to some, sufficiently idealized community of human 
agents, but we should not expect its routine empirical confirmation in the 
behavior of actual ones. The insufficiency of the Principle of Rationalization to 
the facts of human imperfection undercuts not only Lewis' good-faith 
assumption of shared instrumental rationality; but thereby the applicability of 
the Humean model of instrumental rationality more generally. Both of the 
Humean conception's models – of rationality as well as of motivation – are 
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inadequate to the psychological facts, and ensure the inadequacy of Lewis' 
first two principles accordingly. 
However, without the empirical applicability of these first two principles, 
it is hard to see how they might enable us to carry out the first step of Lewis' 
proposed method for solving the problem of radical interpretation. If they fail 
adequately to conform to the empirical facts, then it is hard to see why we 
should use them to constrain the relation between P and Ao. To fill in Ao from 
P as constrained by the Principles of Charity and Rationalization would 
require us to ignore too much of the physical data actually supplied by P. The 
result would be an interpretation of Karl's beliefs, desires and utterances that 
would be inadequate to explain them; and we would thereby lose the use of P 
as an independent source of information about Karl. P would be relevant only 
in so far as it could be made to confirm the two Principles – a Procrustean task 
indeed, if the counterexamples just described are sufficiently pervasive. This 
would be to subordinate P to the constraints of the two Principles plus Ao. 
Then although the second and third steps might yield an interpretation of 
Karl's beliefs, desires, and sentences in Ao, they would not be the radical 
interpretation that Lewis originally set out to give; for it would not enable us 
to understand Karl's behavior on his terms in our language. Rather, it would 
require us to construct, from the data supplied by P, an interpretation of 
Karl's behavior on our terms, in our language. It would thereby eliminate by 
fiat all the data that make Karl distinctively different from us, and therefore 
an object of interest or curiosity, in the first place. In order to understand Karl 
on his terms, we must be willing to modify, abdicate or add to some of our 
own in light of them. So faithfulness to the physical data supplied by P 
requires us to reject or revise the Principles of Charity and Rationalization, 
whereas faithfulness to the latter requires us to reject salient portions of the 
former. 
But now suppose we modify the first two principles, and with them their 
underlying models of motivation and rationality respectively, by weakening 
them to fit the data. Suppose we accept vacuous attenuations of them that 
make it true by definition that, first, Karl is represented as believing and 
desiring what we would believe and desire, were we in his place, given 
suitably weakened criteria for what it might mean for us to be in his place, to 
share a common set of basic values, and so forth; and, second, Karl is 
represented as maximizing utility in his behavior, given suitably weakened 
criteria for what counts as maximizing utility, of the sort that often discussed 
under the rubric of revealed preference theory and that will be examined at 
length in the following chapter. Suppose, that is, that we interpret the physical 
data yielded by P so that they fit the Principles of Charity and Rationalization 
by stipulation. On this assumption, there is no further question to be asked 
about the empirical applicability of this theory of persons, for it closes the gap 
between what we take to be the case and how what we take to be the case is to 
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be theoretically interpreted. In this case, we gain nothing by invoking the two 
Principles in order to explicate our general theory of persons, because they are 
both trivially confirmed by any and all instances of Karl's behavior, whatever 
it may be. That is, the Principles of Charity and Rationalization add nothing of 
substance to our interpretation of the data furnished by P. They enable us to 
conceptualize them, but not properly to understand them. Rather than 
subordinating P to the two Principles plus Ao, we in this instance subordinate 
the two Principles plus Ao to P. Hence while our rendering of Karl's beliefs, 
desires and utterances in Ao and Ak may be described as radical in its 
assimilation of the physical data supplied by P, it is not, properly speaking, an 
interpretation of that data. 
The problem, it would seem, is Lewis' reliance on the Principles of 
Charity and Rationalization to motivate his solution. These are the culprits 
because they alone mediate the relation between Ao and P on which the 
formulation of the problem of radical interpretation depends. In interpreting 
Karl's behavior in P in terms of what we would believe and desire were we in 
his place, we reject the factual basis of cultural xenophobia – namely the 
inherent subjectivity and contingency of desire, in order to embrace the fiction 
of cultural appropriation. The comforting supposition that Karl really is 
basically just like us, except for relatively superficial differences in, say, life 
history, background, or appearance may be seen as a well-intentioned 
antidote to cultural xenophobia. But this antidote is purchased at the price of 
acknowledging information about the very real empirical divergences 
between Karl's motivational states and ours that make the problem of radical 
interpretation an important one. This, in turn, ensures the inaccessibility to us 
in theory of Karl's divergent motivational states themselves - and our 
continuing, guileless perplexity at the chasms of mutual incomprehension 
that can be generated by the introduction of sensitive topics into otherwise 
innocuous conversation. Thus our charitable impulses in trying to understand 
Karl's motivational states backfire, by rendering them yet more elusive of our 
attempts. 
Similarly, in interpreting Karl's behavior given by P as invariably utility-
maximizing, we compound the elusiveness of Karl's motivational states by the 
elusiveness and ubiquity of our own. In order consistently to apply the 
Principles of Charity and Rationalization conjointly, we must suppose the 
latter to describe our own behavior as well as his. We must interpret our own 
behavior, too, as invariably and ubiquitously maximizing utility, even in 
apparently irrational behavior; this is the essence of the revisionist variant on 
the desire model of motivation. As I argue at greater length in Section 3 
below, this interpretation requires us to ascribe to ourselves unknown, 
hypothetical final desires that our actual behavior, however suspect, 
efficiently satisfies. Thus the ubiquity of the utility-maximization hypothesis 
renders our own motivational states just as obscure and elusive as Karl's, for 
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the Principle of Rationalization requires the stipulation of final desires to 
which our behavior is instrumental that are in theory inaccessible to us. 
But these two features – elusiveness and ubiquity – are precisely what 
obscure the data supplied by P to our attempts to understand them. The 
Principle of Charity ensures the elusiveness of P by expropriating it to an 
account of our own behavior in Ao. The Principle of Rationalization then 
extends the scope of that account, by stipulating ubiquitous but inaccessible 
desires to which that behavior is instrumentally efficacious. This renders P as 
a source of information about Ak and M not just practically but theoretically 
mysterious – like a noumenal thing in itself, whose sole function is to 
represent our knowledge of Karl as inherently self-limiting. 
Now we are in a better position to see why it might be difficult to 
formulate a companion Manifestation Principle for desire in Lewis' general 
theory of persons. Such a principle would seem to have to run something like 
this:  
 
(5') Karl's desires, as expressed in his own intentional actions, 
ordinarily should be manifest in his dispositions to gross physical 
behavior.  
 
However, the attenuated Principles of Charity and Rationalization preclude 
appeal to Karl's gross physical behavior itself as an independent source of 
information about Karl's actions and desires, for it is already contained in P. 
Like P, then, that behavior is admissible only to the extent that it conforms to 
the two Principles – i.e. only to the extent that it supports the definitional part 
of the theory. This means that what is to count as intentional action, and what 
intentional action is understood to have been performed, is also determined 
solely by the definitional aspect of the two principles – which thus determine 
what is taken to be manifest in Karl's dispositions to behavior. 
Now if we think of language use as a special case of intentional action, 
and speech behavior as a special case of gross physical behavior, then on the 
Humean conception, speech behavior satisfies the speaker's desire to express 
her beliefs. So the redundancy of a Manifestation Principle for desire implies 
the redundancy of the Manifestation Principle for belief, independently of the 
Triangle and Truthfulness principles (Lewis' third step, above). To be sure, 
once we assume the Manifestation Principle for Desire, the companion 
principle for belief is unproblematic, for we thereby implicitly assume criteria 
for something's counting as speech behavior, and so, implicitly, for 
something's being expressable in a language. But without the criteria of 
speech behavior and language implied by the Manifestation Principle for 
belief, it is difficult to see what use we might make of the Principle of 
Truthfulness, nor how the Triangle Principle might fail to be satisfied. And it 
is unclear how we might derive such criteria without prior independent 
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criteria of Karl's intentional action in general. But since such criteria are 
exhaustively specified by P subject to the constraints of the Principles of 
Charity and Rationalization, no further independent criteria are to be found.  
It appears, then, that neither the revisionist nor the orthodox analysis of 
desire is fully satisfactory.14 What is right about the revisionist view is that it 
regards belief-desire talk primarily as a theory-laden convention, rather than 
as referring to ontologically basic events that all human beings must be 
supposed to experience. What is wrong with it is the effect of what we might 
fancifully describe as its cultural imperialism: This view is problematic 
because its universalistic ambitions render the concept of desire both vacuous 
and bereft of explanatory force. What is right about the orthodox view, on the 
other hand, is that it regards belief-desire talk as referring to particular 
                                                
14 Simon Blackburn’s resourceful attempt to salvage the belief-desire model in his Ruling 
Passions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) came to my attention too late to 
discuss in the text. In it he proposes a similar variation on Davidson’s principle of 
charity that attempts to turn the vacuity of the belief-desire model of motivation into a 
virtue. According to API, 
[i]t is analytic that creatures with beliefs, desires, and other states of mind, behave 
in ways that (best) make sense (and not in ways that make no sense), given those 
states of mind (55) … We know what a desire is by knowing what it would make 
sense to do in the light of having the desire; but then we know whether someone 
has the desire by seeing if this light is one that makes good sense of what they do. 
API can be true because desires and beliefs are defined by what it is that they make 
sense of. But they are attributed by what they make people do, under the rubric 
that people do what makes sense to them (58). 
According to API, we understand a desire through the action that would be rational if 
one had it, and attribute the desire that makes the corresponding action rational. Thus 
on Blackburn’s account, agent behavior satisfies both a norm of rational intelligibility on 
the one hand, and also a descriptive causal explanation on the other. However, API 
does not state an analytic principle. API implies that by definition, an agent performs 
just those actions that best illuminate, either to herself or to others, the beliefs and 
desires that motivate it. Construed as an account of rational motivation it would seem 
to be, at the very least, non-trivially true in a limited range of cases, in so far as it 
stipulates, in addition to the operative beliefs and desires, a further desire to make those 
beliefs and desires intelligible to the observer, whether oneself or another. Construed as 
an empirical causal description, API would seem equally non-analytic, because 
susceptible to falsification by any such observer to whom the motivationally effective 
causes of agent behavior are generally cryptic, mysterious or otherwise irrational – 
which in most real-world adult negotiations would seem to be the rule rather than the 
exception. Were API to have some such implications neither for first-person rational 
motivation nor for third-person causal attribution, it would be empty without being 
vacuous. Thus within that limited range of cases in which agents do, in fact, behave in 
such a way as to make intelligible rather than mysterious the desires we ascribe to 
them, this would seem to presuppose the same sort of shared assumptions and mutual 
coordination that, I have argued above, Lewis’ revisionism also presupposes. 
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discriminable events the occurrence of which are contingent on other events. 
What is wrong with it is that it requires us to construe desires as ontologically 
basic events that all human beings experience, rather than as more localized 
products of our social and linguistic conventions. What is needed, it seems, is 
a view that accounts both for the contingent experiential reality of desires as 
genuine motivational states, and also for their ontological obscurity.  
 
2. Desire and Externality 
 
2.1. A Representational Analysis of Desire 
I now offer an alternate account of what a desire is that attempts to do 
just that. This account formalizes somewhat the conception of desire I deploy 
in Chapters V through XIV below, makes explicit some of the presuppositions 
of Richard Brandt's "Kantian" account of desire I discuss in Chapter XI, and 
elaborates some of the commonsense connotations of the term as we tend to 
use it in ordinary discourse. It also sheds some light on certain familiar 
afflictions that beset the belief-desire model that neither the orthodox nor the 
revisionist variants alone can explain. Most important, it elaborates some of 
the psychological and characterological implications of the belief-desire model 
of motivation. 
Define a desire as a three-place relation between a conscious subject S, an 
object, event or state of affairs O, and conscious and occurrent 
phenomenological representations R1 – R3, such that  
 
(a) S has R1 of O, such that R1 represents O as lacking (i.e. wanting) in 
S; 
(b) S has R2 of S, such that R2 represents S as lacking (i.e. wanting) O; 
(c) R1 and R2 conjointly cause S to feel discontent, anxiety, insecurity, 
and craving for O; 
(d) S has R3 of S, such that R3 represents S's acquisition or 
achievement of O as causing S to be whole and sufficient relative to O;  
(e) R3 causes S to anticipate feeling satisfaction, gratification, 
security, self-sufficiency, and/or fulfillment. 
 
Call this the representational analysis of desire. Representations themselves, 
unlike assertions, do not necessarily have a propositional structure. Unlike 
beliefs, they themselves do not necessarily have the complex structure of an 
intentional attitude. Unlike images, they are not necessarily visual. Like 
thoughts, representations are necessarily conceptual. But they are both more 
psychologically atomic and more general in content than any of these.  
The representational analysis of desire is sympathetic with the orthodox 
variant. It similarly conceives a desire as a contingent, occurrent empirical 
event. It moves beyond the orthodox variant, however, in explicitly insisting 
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on the phenomenological and representational – and therefore conventional 
and theory-laden – nature of a desire as an object of conscious belief. This 
means that the occurrent empirical event that the term “desire” picks out is 
both the object of and a reaction to theory-laden thoughts and concepts. On 
this analysis, if a motive is not conscious – i.e. not systematically and causally 
interconnected with certain representations, it needs to be given another name 
in order to distinguish it from those which are. This stipulation will help us to 
see in Section 3 below some of the conceptual pitfalls to which the orthodox 
and revisionist variants of the belief-desire model succumb.   
On this analysis, in order to be said to have a desire, one must believe of 
oneself that something is wanting, and react accordingly. So a necessary 
condition of a conscious motive's or drive's being a desire is that the subject 
must be able to represent to himself the object of desire O as, strictly speaking, 
a want in the subject which the object represented will supply. So what one 
desires depends on one’s self-conception, on what one conceives oneself to 
lack. This stipulation implies the possibility of distinguishing between what 
one conceives oneself to lack – i.e. what one desires; and what, from a third-
personal and distanced perspective, one can be said to lack in fact. So it allows 
for a distinction between want and objective deprivation, and suggests that 
there is no necessary connection between the two.  
This stipulation also enables us to distinguish desires from other 
conscious motives or drives such as intentions, resolves, impulses, 
obligations, compulsions, and whims. It captures the defining content of a 
desire, namely the representation of a designated object, event or state of 
affairs as absent or lacking, such that it must be supplied in order to restore 
one's self-conception as sufficient or complete. This defining content may be 
found in mundane, ordinary objects of desire such as the consumption of a 
jelly doughnut or the purchase of new windshield wipers, as well as in more 
central and pervasive ones such as the desire for a simpler life, or for 
meaningful work, or for moral goodness. 
This representational analysis fills a significant lacuna in Brandt and 
Kim's definition. On their account, one just does feel satisfaction or pleasure in 
thinking about the object of desire, and frustration in its nonattainment: these 
are the occurrent internal events that cause one to pursue it. But why one 
should have these strong mental and emotional responses to a particular 
object remains a mystery. According to Brandt and Kim, desires are arbitrary 
in a sense well-captured by Thomas Nagel's designation of them as 
"unmotivated desires:" the orthodox variant offers no further rule-governed 
psychological explanation for their occurrence. Rather, we must recur to 
physiology or brain chemistry if we wish to trace the causal chain any further 
back. But this seems incomplete. Desires, as liberal sociologists are quick to 
assure us, are not as arbitrary as all that. The representational analysis 
provides the missing link. One feels satisfaction in entertaining a particular 
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object of desire, and frustration in its nonattainment, because one represents it 
to oneself as lacking in one. And one is moved to obtain that desired object 
because one further represents it to oneself as restoring one to wholeness and 
sufficiency: Once I have x, we tell ourselves silently, I’ll be fine. (And, for an 
instant, I am.) These representations in turn can be explained by forces of 
socialization, acculturation, and familiar forms of consumer indoctrination 
such as mass media marketing and entertainment. 
The representational analysis of desire is not susceptible to Michael 
Smith's objections to what he calls the "strong phenomenological conception 
of desires."15  In particular, it does not state that an agent has a desire only if 
he believes that he does; nor, therefore, does it imply that an agent knows 
infallibly what he desires. Rather, it states that the agent has a desire only if he 
represents something as an object of desire and reacts accordingly. This 
condition is consistent with his having beliefs about what he desires that turn 
out to be false. So, for example, Oscar might represent a charbroiled steak as 
an object of desire - i.e. as lacking etc.; and react accordingly – i.e. with 
discontent, anxiety, craving, etc. for one. These conditions conjointly imply 
that Oscar desires a charbroiled steak. Yet they are consistent with Oscar's 
believing that he desires, not a charbroiled steak, but rather merely a source of 
complete protein that, among the available options, only the charbroiled 
steak, unfortunately, can supply (we might suppose Oscar to be an 
ambivalent vegetarian with a talent for rationalizing his deviations). 
Nor is the representational analysis susceptible to Smith's second 
objection to the strong phenomenological conception, that it "cannot explain 
how it is that desires have propositional content" (48). Now here Smith makes 
an assumption about the necessity of propositional content to intentional 
states that I cannot address adequately until Volume II. Suffice it to say that if 
it were true that desires had to have propositional content, the 
representational analysis of desire would have no trouble explaining this. We 
would simply reformulate clauses (a), (b), and (d) as intensional belief 
statements; and clauses (c) and (e) as their corresponding hypothetical 
indicatives (notice that even this reformulation would not make the 
representational analysis susceptible to Smith's first objection). These 
reformulations would expose the propositional content of desires without 
making the further claim – which I argue in Volume II is much too strong – 
that the propositional content of those desires which have it exhausts the 
content of desire overall.16 
                                                
15Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation," Mind 96 (1987), 36-61. 
16Smith goes on to argue that desires need not have any phenomenological content, that 
they need not be felt, that they are best understood as dispositions to behave in certain 
ways, and that to have a goal just is to desire. In these arguments he does not refer to 
the early work in action theory that has been done on these issues by Brandt and Kim, 
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So the representational analysis of desire is inherently self-reflective, but 
not infallibilistic. It makes of a desire not merely a raw, empirical mental 
event, but rather a series of conscious mental events that is the product of a 
certain representational conceptualization by the subject of her inner 
experience. The representations in question may be conceptual, linguistic, 
imagistic, kinaesthetic, or some combination thereof. If one does identify and 
represent one's occurrent mental state as a state of desiring, then one believes, 
either dispositionally or occurrently, certain propositions about oneself, for 
example that one is wanting in some respect; that one can be made whole by 
acquiring or achieving that which one believes is wanting, etc.17 To accept the 
belief-desire model of motivation, on this analysis, is then implicitly to believe 
of oneself and others that we are motivated to action – and so actually to be 
motivated to action – solely by thoughts about what we lack, by beliefs about 
respects in which we are wanting, to achieve sufficiency and wholeness 
through the acquisition or achievement of those things. This analysis does not 
claim that we are motivated in a certain way merely because we think we are. 
Rather, it claims that our thought that we are wanting in some respect causes 
certain reactions in us that in turn motivates action to replenish those wants. 
                                                                                                     
Brandt, Dennett, Goldman, Hempel, Kenny, Melden, Pritchard, and Ryle, among 
others. 
The representational analysis of desire also avoids Pettit and Smith's objections to 
a very strong view that claims desires always to be in the "foreground," i.e. to figure as 
objects of self-conscious deliberation in an agent's motivational states (Philip Pettit and 
Michael Smith, "Backgrounding Desire," The Philosophical Review XCIX, 4 (October 1990), 
565-592). However, I know of no philosopher who holds this view, and Pettit and Smith 
cite none. They also seem to follow Mill in conflating what one desires with what one 
believes to be desirable, and overlooking the possibility that one might have a 
motivational aversion to what one recognizes as desirable. I. L Humberstone ("Wanting 
as Believing," The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17, 1 (March 1987), 49-62) also makes 
this mistake. 
17This interpretation finds its practical analogue in an idiomatic expression current in 
the world of finance. One says of a brokerage firm that protects an investor against 
financial losses incurred by delays in executions of stock transactions or other technical 
problems that it makes him (or her) whole. This means that the investor is compensated 
financially by the firm for any loss resulting from such problems. See Virginia Munger 
Kahn, "Brokers Making Amends for Trading Problems," The New York Times (Sunday, 
November 2, 1997), Money and Business Section, 8. More generally, to compensate 
someone for a loss they have incurred is to “make them whole,” as in the following 
example: “Accusing the government of reneging on a promise to make them whole 
financially for loved ones lost in the September 11 terrorist attacks, several relatives of 
the dead and injured now say the Justice Department is victimizing them a second time 
with its tight-fisted handling of the federal compensation fund” (Ralph Ranalli, 
“Victims’ kin decry formula for Sept. 11 compensation fund,” The Boston Globe (January 
14, 2002), A1). 
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This analysis implies that we perceive the external world as inherently 
superior to ourselves; as not only malleable through action in the service of 
our wants, but thereby as a source of gratification of them; as a set of 
resources for reinstating the wholeness or sufficiency of the self, in which a 
condition of abundance is transferred from the external world to oneself 
through one's action. So on the Humean conception of the self, our relation to 
the external world is one of felt privation. We are motivated to perform some 
particular action by the promise of restoring the self to wholeness in a certain 
respect – the respect defined by the desired object we represent to ourselves as 
lacking. To say, then, that the Humean conception of the self defines and 
identifies the self by its desires is to conceive of the self as defined and 
constituted by its self-perceived deficiencies, and its desired objects as 
external sources of replenishment of these deficiencies.  
This analysis also implies that we perceive the external world through the 
lens of our wants, i.e. as a source of respects in which we are lacking, wanting, 
or insufficient. All external states of affairs are implicitly evaluated and 
graded with regard to their suitability as instruments, resources, or 
approximations of objects of desire, such that the higher the desire-satisfaction 
rating of a particular state of affairs, the greater its perceptual salience for the 
subject. This is the essence of egocentrism. Since every state of affairs is 
assessed according to this criterion, no state of affairs is neutral with respect to 
it. Different desires may give different colorations and ratings to the same 
state of affairs at different times, depending on whether it is perceived as an 
opportunity or a setback relative to one's desires at that time. To the extent 
that a state of affairs is gradable neither as opportunity nor as setback, neither 
as attraction nor aversion, it effectively fails to exist for the Humean self. A 
state of affairs that bears no relation to the defining evaluative function of the 
self, i.e. desire, bears no relation to an egocentric self at all.  
So to perceive the external world through the lens of one's wants is to 
perceive a world considerably constricted by them. Perceptual salience does 
not, of course, imply perceptual veracity; precisely the opposite in this case. 
The primacy of desire-satisfaction as a criterion for evaluating states of affairs 
as enhancements of, obstacles to, or approximations or embodiments of 
objects of desire distorts perception of those states of affairs, by magnifying 
those properties that satisfy or violate the criterion and miniaturizing those 
which are irrelevant to it. The overriding desire for sufficiency and wholeness 
leads the Humean self to perceive the external world as a box of tools, 
instruments, and missing parts; and to ignore or devalue whatever lies 
outside it. 
The representational analysis of desire generates a terminating criterion 
of rationality for proliferating orders of desires in the Humean conception 
that, as we see in Chapter VIII.2 below, Frankfurt's concept of second-order 
desires as regulative of first-order ones is unable to provide. This criterion is 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception   69 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
the highest-order desire for sufficiency and wholeness, i.e. R3 as embedded in 
(d) and (e), above. This desire terminates the infinite regress of orders of desire 
because any desire, including this one, is by definition an instantiation of the 
highest-order desire R3 for sufficiency and wholeness; and because R3 neither 
instantiates nor leaves open the possibility of any yet higher-order desire. It is 
a terminating criterion of rationality because, first – to adapt Nagel's criterion 
of rationality for present purposes, wholeness and sufficiency are ends that 
can serve as justificatory reasons for actions taken to achieve them; and 
second, this criterion enables us to evaluate the rationality of any desire – 
including R3 itself – by asking whether satisfying it does, in fact, restore the 
agent's sense of sufficiency and wholeness. – That's the good news for the 
Humean model of motivation.   
The bad news is that no desire can satisfy this criterion, for the reasons 
Hobbes was the first modern Western philosopher to note: 
[T]here is no such ... summum  bonum, greatest good, as is spoken of in the 
books of the old moral philosophers. ... Felicity is a continual progress of 
the desire, from one object to another; the attaining of the former, being 
still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is, that the object of 
man's desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; but to 
assure for ever, the way of his future desire. ... So that in the first place, I 
put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless 
desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of 
this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he 
has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate 
power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, 
which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.18 
The reason no desire-satisfaction can meet the terminating criterion of 
rationality – that it restore one's sense of sufficiency and wholeness – is that 
any desire-satisfaction automatically generates a further desire – i.e. a 
represented want (or lack or insufficiency) – for the satisfaction to continue; 
and the satisfaction of this further want in turn generates yet a further want to 
acquire sufficient power to protect the power one already has to satisfy that 
one. So although it is true that once I acknowledge my desire for wholeness 
and sufficiency there is no higher-order desire I can have in terms of which 
that one can be evaluated, it is also true that that highest-order desire for 
wholeness and sufficiency itself generates an infinitely proliferating series of 
lower-order wants: for continuance, and for protection and proliferation of the 
means for continuance, that "ceaseth only in death;" and so prevents 
wholeness and sufficiency from being achieved. 
                                                
18Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier Books, 1977), 
Chapter 11, "Of the Difference of Manners," 80. 
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One paradigmatic real-life example of Hobbes’ observation would be the 
American growth economy. Unlike a maintenance economy, the American 
growth economy is driven, in part, by the desire of investors for a high return 
on their investments (not merely, as is often claimed, by consumer demand, 
population growth, or the needs of the labor force). Since different investors 
enter the market at different times, whatever the share price at which 
investors enter a particular market, they exert pressure on the relevant 
businesses to increase that price. Thus no share price can be high enough to 
satisfy investor desire for a high return. One conventional way in which a 
business responds to this pressure is by increasing its revenues from the 
product or service it sells. So just as no share price can be high enough to 
satisfy investor desire for a high return once and for all, similarly, therefore, 
no revenues can be large enough for the business thus pressured. One 
conventional way in which a business increases its revenues is by creating 
new rationales for raising its prices and new incentives for consumers to 
purchase its products or services. So just as no share price can be high enough 
and no revenues large enough, similarly no product or service price can be 
high enough and no quantity of sales large enough to slake investor desire. 
Since this system of perpetual serial pressures to increase dollar amounts is 
independent of the actual needs, desires and natural limitations of consumers 
(including, of course, investors themselves), they are continually inundated as 
a matter of course by “new, improved” product models, increasingly 
overloaded with irrelevant or confusing bells and whistles, that are regularly 
and rapidly introduced, withdrawn, and soon re-introduced with yet more 
“improvements.” Consumers are also pressured into further consumption by 
businesses that refuse to support the products they sell for longer than the 
short time span they are on the market, or interlocking businesses that form a 
monopoly to coerce consumers into “upgrading” each product in order to use 
others on which it depends. Thus satisfaction of investor desire pressures 
businesses to maximize revenues and consumers to maximize consumption 
irrespective of the actual needs or desires of either. Simultaneously, 
serviceable and reliable products are discontinued because they pull in a 
steady and predictable profit rather than an escalating one that satisfies 
investor desire for a larger return on investments. Thus other things equal, 
share prices, revenues, and sales escalate at roughly the same accelerating rate 
at which new goods and services are introduced, forced down the consumer’s 
throat, withdrawn, and re-introduced – accompanied by increasingly 
assaultive and invasive marketing techniques that rely on sex, violence, and 
disparities in social status to sell irrelevant goods that consumers neither want 
nor need and for which businesses fail to create a sufficient demand (since no 
quantity of demand would be sufficient). Hobbes’ “perpetual and restless 
desire of power after power” leads inevitably to fulsome overload. 
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This case makes it easy to see how desire on this analysis is distinct from 
pleasure. I argue at greater length in Chapter VI that desire-satisfaction is not 
necessarily pleasurable; and indeed – contra Brandt and Kim, that desire-
satisfaction and pleasure are entirely independent of each other. A feeling of 
pleasure is a reaction to a stimulus that causes in one feelings of sensory 
and/or emotional well-being, happiness, ecstasy, or joy. In one for whom a 
sense of wholeness and sufficiency is lacking, a pleasureable stimulus can 
create in one a desire for those feelings, under the misapprehension that these 
feelings will restore to one a sense of wholeness and sufficiency. But clearly, 
these two sets of responses are similarly independent of one another, and 
often not even contingently conjoined. It is possible to experience 
simultaneously feelings of wellbeing, happiness, ecstasy, and joy on the one 
hand; and feelings of insufficiency and deprivation on the other. Indeed, some 
accounts of religious ecstasy postulate a necessary connection between it and 
a belief in one’s own insufficiency. In this case the feeling of pleasure may be 
inflected by feelings of being undeserving or presumptuous or base; or by 
anxieties about future pain, punishment or retribution; or by unexpected 
revelations of one's value or entitlement to pleasure, etc. Or it may be simply 
and straightforwardly unsatisfying, as too much sugar, sex, socializing, or 
status often is. There is no real mystery as to how such things (to name only a 
few) can give both pleasure and dissatisfaction simultaneously. The more 
important and less obvious point is that any object of desire may fail to give 
pleasure, and any pleasure may fail even momentarily to satisfy desire. 
 
2.2. A Representational Analysis of Aversion 
Next consider aversion.  Somewhat analogously to desire, an aversion can 
be representationally analyzed as follows: 
 
(a') S has R1' of O such that R1' represents O as overloading S; 
(b') S has R2' of O such that R2' represents S as overloaded by O; 
(c') R1' and R2' conjointly cause S to feel overstimulation, repulsion, 
disgust, apprehension, fear, and/or pain with regard to O; 
(d') S has R3' of S, such that R3' represents S's obtainment or 
achievement of O as causing S's wholeness and sufficiency to be attacked, 
threatened, invaded, overwhelmed and/or undermined by O; 
(e') R3' causes S to anticipate feeling discontent, anxiety, insecurity, 
and craving for the eradication of O. 
(f) S has R4 of S, such that R4 represents S's eradication of O as 
causing S to be restored to wholeness and sufficiency; 
(g) R4 causes S to anticipate feeling satisfaction, gratification, 
security, self-sufficiency, and/or fulfillment. 
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This representational analysis of aversion is not exactly the converse of the 
representational analysis of desire, because aversion, on this account, is not 
simply a negative desire, i.e. a desire not to have something that someone else 
might have a desire for. An aversion is a complex emotion that also includes 
substantive spontaneous feelings – of distaste, of feeling revolted or 
oversensitive or invaded relative to the object, for example – that respond to 
the thought or representation of the object. They then in turn generate further 
feelings in response to the thought of actually realizing the object, and a 
subsequent desire to rid oneself of it. So the representational analysis of 
aversion embeds such a desire in (e'-g). But this subsequent desire is only one 
part of an aversion. It is not equivalent to it. Aversion also includes quite 
distinctive and visceral feelings of sensory overload, oversatiation, 
discomfort, and anxiety. On this revision of the Humean motivational model, 
the desire embedded in aversion is still the only source of effective motivation 
to action. But its prior or concomitant feelings may nevertheless cause 
spontaneous expressions of aversion, such as feeling nauseous, breaking into 
a cold sweat, heart palpitations, aggression, flight, or other instinctive 
behavior. It is the threat to one's sense of wholeness and sufficiency that 
motivates the desire for the eradication of O, not simply the experience of 
overload an sich. 
Like desire, aversion on the representational analysis is inherently self-
reflective. It involves representations of and beliefs about oneself as sufficient 
relative to O, and so beliefs about what will threaten or overwhelm and 
therefore destroy one's sufficiency. An aversive object is one that one 
represents to oneself as invasive, i.e. as violating the boundaries of one's self, 
as intruding into one's self where no interior psychological space has been 
made for it. An invasive object is one that by definition causes pain or 
discomfort. To perceive the world through the lens of those desires embedded 
in aversions is to perceive oneself as wanting in control over one's 
environment; as unable to vanquish attacks on one's sense of wholeness; as 
invaded, fragmented, and overwhelmed by alien external objects which the 
interior psychological space of the self is too limited, fragile, or crowded to 
accommodate. So, like desire, an aversion includes negative beliefs about 
oneself: as powerless, fragile and permeable; as well as negative beliefs about 
the world as overwhelming, threatening, and invasive. This part of the 
Humean conception of the self thus supplements and underwrites that 
according to which the self is defined and constituted by its self-perceived 
deficiencies. Desires and aversions conjointly create a mutually interlocking 
and mutually supportive set of assumptions about oneself as constitutionally 
deficient in various respects; and about the external world as correspondingly 
resource-abundant in some respects and threatening and overwhelming in 
others. 
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With the aid of this account of aversion, we can now discern a second 
reason why R3 as a terminating criterion of rationality for the Humean 
conception is nevertheless incapable of satisfaction. It is a well-known 
phenomenon that objects of desire begin to lose their luster after they are 
obtained. This is often attributed to fickleness, shallowness, or inconstancy of 
character. But actually it is instead implicit in the very structure of desire and 
aversion. After a desire has been satisfied, the desire or want itself disappears 
– and with it that which conferred psychological value on its object, leaving 
nothing for the object that satisfied it to satisfy, and so nothing relative to 
which it is valuable. A desired job, partner, lifestyle or dessert of necessity 
seems much less desirable after it is obtained because it stops being the object 
of one's want and starts being the object of one's surfeit – which is to say one's 
aversion. At the same time that we want the satisfaction of a desire to 
continue, we do not want the object of that satisfaction around after it has 
outlived its usefulness as a satisfaction. So to obtain the object of one's desire 
is thereby not only to devalue it in the act of obtaining it, but a fortiori to 
transform it into an object of aversion. Absent any other source of value beside 
desire, no object of desire can remain desirable for long after it has been 
obtained, because no desire can endure after it has been satisfied. The infinite 
proliferation of lower-order desires in the Humean self is matched only by the 
finitude of their duration. In this the Humean self is both a bubbling cauldron 
and a bottomless pit, in which countless desires endlessly form, expand, 
explode, and disappear.  
 
2.3. Funnel Vision 
The belief-desire model of motivation defines the Humean self as 
future-oriented, in that the self finds expression and continuity in setting for 
itself, in the present, some future, extrinsic desired state of affairs that it can 
anticipate working to actualize over time.19 This feature of the Humean self 
can be regarded as the consequence of tying a dispositional analysis of traits 
of character to the foundational notion of a desire.20 To call a person generous 
or corrupt, on this analysis, is to describe a way she is disposed to act under 
certain circumstances. But since on the Humean conception of the self, all 
action is motivated by desires the agent wishes to satisfy, the concepts we 
invoke to describe a person's character or personality denote certain kinds of 
desires that person is disposed to try to satisfy under the relevant 
                                                
19This is essentially Bernard Williams' notion of character. See his "Persons, Character 
and Morality," in A. O. Rorty, Ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley, Cal.: University of 
California Press, 1976). It is also consistent with Hume's own analysis of the self in Book 
I of the Treatise, given certain qualifications. 
20See, for example, Richard Brandt, "Traits of Character: A Conceptual Analysis," 
American Philosophical Quarterly 7, 1 (January 1970). 
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circumstances. The self then achieves full realization to the extent that it 
succeeds in satisfying those desires. 
Indeed, on the desire model of motivation, objects of desire are by 
definition external to the self that adopts them, even if they consist in an 
internal modification of some aspect of self or character. The Humean self is 
heteronymous, to use Kant's term, in that the conditions of its expression are 
objects or states of affairs that are psychologically and/or spatiotemporally 
external to the self in its present state. This external relation of the self to its 
desired objects motivates actions performed in order to appropriate those 
objects.21 So the full realization of the Humean self consists in bringing into 
existence those extrinsic desired states of affairs, and regarding them as newly 
incorporated satisfaction-states of the self. To become a better person of a 
specified sort, or to acquire a condominium, or a few moments of peace 
conceived as objects of desire makes of them psychologically (and perhaps 
spatiotemporally) distant entities in relation to the present state of the self; 
entities which the self approaches with a realistic plan, not only for the 
satisfaction of its desires, but thereby for the appropriation of the objects of 
those desires. As satisfactions of the self, former objects of desire are then 
available for recycling as instrumental resources in the service of further 
objects of desire: The few crumbs I crave today fuel my pursuit of a piece of 
the pie tomorrow. These further objects nevertheless remain remote from the 
self in its present incarnation, as they must, in order to provide its structure 
and present motivation. 
The objects of desire to which the self is committed thus provide it with 
an evaluative perspective on its internal states that is remote without being 
detached. It is remote in that it regards the present internal state of the self 
from the perspective of a future desired object or state of affairs that the self at 
present lacks. A remote evaluative perspective on the present state of the self 
follows from one's identification with those objects of desire that the Humean 
self is conceived presently to lack. From the perspective of the present state of 
the self, the future goals to which one aspires may indeed promise both 
satisfaction and value. But from the perspective of those future goals, the 
present state of the self must seem unsatisfactory at the very least. It is a 
feature of any self conceived heteronymously that there is a seesaw between 
present state- and future satisfaction-perspectives that must tilt both ways 
without being fully anchored in either. Some degree of remoteness from the 
present state of the self might, perhaps, be avoided by a being that was fully 
identified only with its desiring-states and never with their intentional objects. 
                                                
21"This relation, whether based on inclination or on rational ideas, can give rise only to 
hypothetical imperatives: 'I ought to do something because I will something else."' 
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York, 
NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), Ac. 441; italics in original. 
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Such a being might act systematically to satisfy its desires, without, however, 
representing the objects of those desires to itself. Following Frankfurt's 
terminology, we might describe such a being as a blind wanton. But it is hard 
to see such a condition as either possible or, so to speak, desirable for human 
agents. 
The heteronymous perspective on the present state of the self is remote 
without being detached because this perspective remains a personal and 
subjective one, constricted and defined by the desires, expectations and hopes 
that simultaneously define that individual self. It regards what I am, have and 
lack from the point of view of what I want, not from any independent point of 
view from which what I want itself might be critically assessed. This is 
something like tunnel vision: We regard our present state of insufficiency 
from a point further ahead in a temporally linear future, at which sufficiency 
has been restored by acquisition of the desired object. But since on the 
Humean conception of the self, we evaluate all perceptually available objects, 
events, and states of affairs from the perspective of their suitability to restore 
what we lack and not merely those on which we finally settle as objects of 
desire, the perspective is actually shaped more like a funnel: circumscribed, to 
be sure, by those states of affairs that satisfy the criterion of perceptual 
salience – i.e. seen as opportunities or setbacks to varying degrees; but 
narrowing at the location point of the agent and fanning out to encompass 
and evaluate the entire array of such possible objects, events and states of 
affairs within the agent's purview as desirable or aversive, as enhancing or as 
undermining the agent's wholeness and sufficiency.  
So the Humean self is also egocentric in the sense that it carves up the 
internal and external world of actual and possible states of affairs in terms of 
their satisfaction-potential in the eyes of one particular agent, namely itself. I 
am motivated to satisfy some desire only if the satisfaction in question is 
mine. If the desire belongs to someone else, then I am motivated to satisfy it 
only if I have a further desire I might thereby satisfy: i.e. to satisfy her desire. I 
argue in Chapter VI.1 that this is not to claim that all the desires I am moved 
to satisfy are inherently egoistic.22 I may be moved to satisfy my desire to 
advance the common good, even at considerable personal disadvantage, by 
the prospect of advancing the common good, not by that of personal 
satisfaction. Nevertheless, advancing the common good must be satisfying to 
me; otherwise I have no motivation for advancing it. Thus on this conception 
of the self, that I merely perceive some state of affairs to best contribute to the 
common good, or to satisfy someone else's desire, is not sufficient to motivate 
me to try to achieve it. In addition, I must have a desire to so contribute. For in 
the absence of such a desire, I have no motivation to contribute. 
                                                
22Bernard Williams also argues this in "Egoism and Altruism," Problems of the Self (New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
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These observations underscore the intimacy of the relation between the 
self and agency, and so the necessity of identifying the self not just with a 
certain rational structure, but with a motivational capacity. If I were nothing 
more than a passively rational contemplator, I could have no self whatsoever. 
For if I necessarily failed to distinguish, among the ongoing panorama of 
events, some which I caused to occur, I would equally lack the means of 
identifying those among my experiences that were caused by something else; 
I could identify no subject to whom these events were happening. But if I 
were unable to distinguish myself from the events that happened to me, it is 
difficult to imagine how I might then distinguish my self at all. However, that 
the self must find definition and expression through action does not imply 
that the self must be future-oriented, heteronymous, and egocentric. Hence it 
does not follow from the intrinsic connection between selfhood and agency 
that the Humean conception of the self is necessarily the correct one. 
The hypothesis of a Humean conception of the self and its attendant 
funnel vision conjointly offer an explanation of why moral conduct as an 
object of desire has a peculiarly self-directed and narcissistic quality. This may 
manifest itself in the varieties of self-absorption or contextual insensitivity 
anatomized in Chapter VI; or in an unusual assertion of will and insistence on 
the conduct even when evidence of its artificiality, insensitivity or 
inappropriateness abounds; or in close and regular correspondence between 
the achievement of the goal of the conduct and feelings of satisfaction in the 
agent. In all such cases, and many others, we have good reason to speculate 
that the conduct is driven by desire-satisfaction rather than other moral 
motives such as duty, compassion, or indignation.  
I argue in Chapter VI that all desire-satisfaction is self-interested; and also 
in Chapter VIII.3.2.4 that narcissism directs the interests of the self toward its 
own self-image and image in the eyes of others. But we can already see that 
the self-image in which the Humean self necessarily takes an interest is the 
self envisioned as whole and sufficient, made so by the satisfaction of desire; 
that the performance of moral conduct as an object of desire is one among the 
array of such objects that instantiate that higher-order one; and that all 
opportunities for satisfying this desire are among those surveyed, ranked and 
graded by the Humean self. Finally, we can anticipate one of the conclusions 
of Chapter VIII, that narcissism is not, after all, merely a pathological 
condition of the psyche, as I have argued elsewhere.23 It is built into the 
desire-based motivation of the Humean self. 
The hypothesis of a Humean conception of the self conjoined with its 
attendant funnel vision also offer a partial explanation for the moral 
phenomenon of ignorance of oneself as a particular (I offer a fuller explanation in 
                                                
23"Moral Theory and Moral Alienation," The Journal of Philosophy LXXXIV, 2 (February 
1987), 102-118. 
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Volume II, Chapter VIII.5). This phenomenon is a familiar and comical one: 
Mildred, a Machiavellian social climber, complains bitterly about the 
Machiavellian social climbers she must contend with daily, and plots to 
destroy them; Mortimer, the consummate hypocrite and liar, fulminates 
earnestly to his friends against the evils of hypocrisy and lying, fabricating 
examples of honesty to prove his points; Maxine and Chester, fair weather 
friends to all who know them, castigate Archibald’s inconstancy and betrayal 
of them both; Lucille glibly condemns Vernon for his glibness. In all such 
cases, the agent sincerely holds a moral principle and fails to recognize her 
own violations of it – indeed, sometimes violating the principle in the act of 
denouncing violations of it by others. An observer of the scenario wonders 
how anyone can be so blind to their own faults even while discussing them in 
the abstract. More generally: How can someone advocate a moral principle on 
the one hand, and simultaneously exemplify its violation on the other, 
without being aware of the inconsistency?   
Kantian-style explanations to the effect that the agent indulges herself by 
recognizing the inconsistency and making a just-this-once exception24 do not 
go deep enough into the Humean conception of the self. For they assume in 
the Humean agent a perspective from which the inconsistency is recognizable, 
i.e. an intellectual and cognitive perspective, detached from the demands of 
desire-satisfaction and the pull of emotion, that conceives all of the agent's 
behavior as instances either subsumable under abstract principles or their 
negations, or with which they are consistent or inconsistent. But a self that is 
motivated and structured according to the Humean conception allows no 
room for such a perspective, in which one's actions and character exist in a 
relation of consistency or instantiation to something more abstract than their 
effects. We have just seen that such a self is beset by funnel vision. Humeans 
such as Bernard Williams celebrate this constricted perspective as an index of 
personal integrity. But we see in Chapter VIII.3.2 that personal integrity does 
not and cannot require the imprisonment within the personal and subjective 
perspective that funnel vision expresses. This precludes the stance of detached 
self-reflection on one's actions and emotions that is so central to a Kantian 
conception of the self.25  The Humean self in its pure form is limited to 
assessing its present state in light of its agenda for envisioned desire-
satisfaction, from the envisioned spatiotemporal location of those envisioned 
satisfactions.  
                                                
24Kant, op. cit. Note 21, Ak. 424-425. 
25 I develop this point at greater length in "Kants intelligibler Standpunkt zum 
Handeln," in Systematische Ethik mit Kant, Eds. Hans-Ulrich Baumgarten and Carsten 
Held (München/Freiburg: 2001), in English translation at adrianpiper.com; and in 
Kant’s Metaethics: First Critique Foundations (manuscript in progress).  
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The explanation of ignorance of oneself as a particular in a Humean self 
is simpler: It is that there is no higher-order principle beyond desire-
satisfaction itself, embedded in such a self, that it might recognize itself as 
instantiating. Identified with its desires, the only available vantage point from 
which its own actions can be assessed is the remote perspective offered by its 
future-orientation toward its envisioned satisfactions. This is what it means to 
say that an agent who satisfies a desire at the expense of prudence or duty has 
“lost perspective”: From the envisioned future point in time at which 
particular deficiencies are supplied and wants replenished, present and 
salient abstract moral principles are simply items among the array of 
externally available resources for achieving this. They are instruments like 
any others, to be invoked, used, applied, or discarded as needed; and their 
salience and importance varies accordingly.  
Thus the Humean self is rigid in some respects and malleable in others. It 
is rigid in its confinement to the subjective and personal perspective of its 
agenda for desire-satisfaction, which is a characterological constant. But it is 
malleable in its readiness to adapt opportunistically any principle, any 
perspective, any situation or resource or state of itself to the achievement of 
that agenda. For a Humean self, there is no inconsistency in violating moral 
principle while advocating it, because there is no inconsistency in a strategy 
that utilizes both advocacy and violation of that which one advocates 
simultaneously in the service of desire-satisfaction. Such an agent advocates 
the principle when it is convenient, and violates it when it is convenient; there 
is no contradiction in the possibility that both may be convenient at the same 
time. To bring the phenomenon to the attention of the agent herself is to invite 
detailed explanations as to why her actions do not, in fact, constitute 
violations of the principle at all, but rather something completely different, 
required by circumstance. Since the deployment of instrumental means in the 
service of desire-satisfaction is for her uppermost, her actions really are 
something different: not violations of her principles, but necessary strategies 
for restoring herself to wholeness and sufficiency. Who could possibly quarrel 
with that? 
 
2.4. Attachment and Self-Hatred 
The representational analysis of desire implies that from the point of 
view of what one now wants, what one is and has may look more or less 
promising, but it can never look evaluatively neutral. And in Section 3, 
following, I argue that it is a consequence of accepting the belief-desire model 
of motivation that from the perspective of what one really, deeply wants, 
what one is and has cannot even look promising, by hypothesis. In either case, 
one's experience of desiring confers evaluative coloration, not only on the 
world, but on oneself as one is. One must always size up the world with an 
eye to its resources for satisfying one's desires, and one's present condition as 
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one of potential for satisfying those desires. We might say that the funnel 
vision of the Humean self entails a retrospective personal self-awareness, 
since from the perspective of one's future satisfactions, one's present condition 
must always appear inadequate.  
Thus there is an elemental sense of inferiority attendant on representing 
one's self in the terms the Humean conception offers. This is engendered not 
only by the comparison of one's own state of privation with the plenitude of 
the external world as a resource for fulfilling it; but even more centrally by the 
self-evaluation demanded by the funnel vision perspective on one's present 
wants. By comparison to that envisioned (but unrealizable) future self, made 
whole by the satisfaction of desire, one's present condition is, in fact and 
inevitably, inadequate; and so long as one continues to have desires, one can 
never catch up to it. A felt sense of inferiority is a permanent psychological 
feature of the self on the Humean conception.  
I have argued above that the Humean conception of the self implies that 
one's reflective view of oneself from the perspective of the objects of one's 
desires is remote without being detached. But not only is this perspective not 
detached; it is exactly the opposite of being detached. It is one of deep and 
obsessive attachment. I shall say that an agent A is attached to some object, 
event, or state of affairs x if  
 
(a) x's existence is a source of personal pleasure, satisfaction, or 
security to A;  
(b) x's nonexistence elicits feelings of dejection, deprivation, or 
anxiety from A; and  
(c) these feelings are to be explained by A's identification with x.   
 
And I shall say that A identifies with x if A is disposed to identify x as 
personally meaningful or valuable to A.  
One can be attached to some x without desiring it, for example if x is a 
longstanding authority figure whom one regards with a mixture of respect 
and revulsion. But to say that one is attached specifically to the object of one's 
desire O is to say that x = O in (1.a) and (b), above; and that failure to obtain 
this object of desire causes one to feel dejected, deprived, and/or anxious; 
discontented, inferior, insecure. And to say that one's self-reflective 
perspective is one of attachment is to say that one's attachment to the objects 
of one's desires gives one a highest-order attachment to one's representation 
of oneself as made whole and sufficient by them (i.e. R3 in (1.d), above), such 
that failure of R3 to reflect an actual condition of wholeness and sufficiency in 
oneself elicits feelings of dejection, deprivation and/or anxiety. R3 then 
becomes an object of desire O whose attainment would replace these feelings 
with different ones: of satisfaction, gratification, security, self-sufficiency, self-
confidence, and/or fulfillment. Thus a Humean self has a central attachment 
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to its terminating criterion of rationality, namely the highest-order desire for 
wholeness and sufficiency.  
In the event that this object of highest-order desire were unattainable, 
feelings of dejection, deprivation, and/or anxiety would be a permanent 
character trait of a Humean self. But we have just seen in Subsection 2.2, 
above, that this object of desire is unattainable, because it automatically 
generates supplementary, lower-order desires for the continuance and 
protection of the satisfaction of this one that in turn proliferate without limit – 
thus insuring that feelings of dejection, deprivation, anxiety; discontent, 
inferiority, insecurity, and craving are, indeed, permanent character traits of 
the Humean self. Now let us consider some of the more practical implications 
of this psychological conception. 
An agent who is attached, in the sense just defined, to the objects of his 
desires as replenishments of his variously perceived insufficiencies will 
experience any failure to satisfy them as increasing his insufficiency. For in 
failing to satisfy the lower-order desire, he is simultaneously exacerbating his 
failure to satisfy the highest-order one, and thereby generating further lower-
order ones. Each failure of desire-satisfaction thus ramifies throughout the 
structure of the Humean self, and further expands the range and depth of its 
sense of privation. And so with every such failure, the felt insufficiency, sense 
of inferiority, and so the negative self-evaluation of the self from the 
perspective of its envisioned future increases. But the persisting 
unattainability of R3 as an object of desire is identical to the persisting inability 
to close the gap between one's self and one's fundamental self-conception, i.e. 
to live up to the ideal that guides and motivates one's actions. Relative to that 
ideal, the Humean self experiences itself not only as insufficient, but therefore 
as deficient. Hence every thwarted attempt to satisfy its lower-order desires 
intensifies its self-dislike to the point of self-hatred. In this way the motivation 
to succeed in satisfying some desire or other, any desire, so as to restore self-
esteem intensifies and escalates as a bulwark against a downwardly spiraling 
self-hatred. The quest for desire-gratification intensifies as an antidote not 
only to privation and insufficiency but to self-hatred for the Humean self, and 
its need for external infusions of esteem increases correspondingly. 
By self-hatred, I will mean the belief – with its concomitant feelings of 
revulsion, shame and despair – that one is inferior, to varying degrees, to 
everything and everyone external to oneself. Thus self-hatred is the subjective 
expressive counterpart of the Humean self to its representation of the external 
world as consisting in an abundance of resources for replenishing its felt 
insufficiencies and restoring itself to wholeness. A self-hating agent perceives 
himself as inferior to external others who, because they are other than himself, 
by definition have what he lacks. He perceives himself as inferior to external 
nonhuman things that, because he sees them as potential resources for desire-
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satisfaction, are by definition what he lacks. And he perceives himself as 
inferior to his envisioned future self whose lacks have been replenished.   
Thus self-hatred is an inherently relational, comparative, and quantitative 
emotion.  It is relational and comparative in that it depends on pairwise 
comparisons of relative status, such that his own perceived inferior status is 
perceived as a function of others' perceived superior status, and others' 
envisioned inferior status – i.e. as lacking what he has – as effecting his own 
envisioned superior status. It is quantitative in that it calibrates the degree of 
his inferiority to different external others with respect his own gain or loss 
relative to theirs. From the perspective of a self-hating agent, any gain to 
another is an aversive loss to oneself; and any loss to oneself is an aversive 
gain to another. Conversely, any loss to another is a desired gain to oneself; 
and any gain to oneself is a desired loss to another. So self-hatred is also an 
inherently competitive emotion. An index of the pervasiveness and depth of 
self-hatred is the degree to which the agent implicitly keeps count: no gain to 
himself, no matter how much of a desired loss to another it is perceived to 
exact, suffices to restore equity.  
Self-hatred is also an implicitly envious emotion, because if a loss to 
another is equivalent to a desired gain to oneself, then a Humean self is 
naturally and necessarily willing to suffer loss to itself if this effects loss to 
another, provided that the gain to itself it obtains through the other's loss 
outweighs the loss it suffers in order to effect that loss to the other. Envy pays 
in those cases in which the consequence of one's self-imposed loss is a greater 
self-directed gain. In Chapter X.3.1.2 below we see that Rawls adopts both a 
Humean conception of the self and also a stipulation that the parties in the 
original position are not moved by envy. But we can already see here that 
these two assumptions are mutually inconsistent. Envy is implicit in the 
belief-desire model of motivation because one's attempts to achieve the 
impossible goal of wholeness and self-sufficiency necessitate personal 
sacrifice when this effects another's loss that maximizes one's own 
competitive and status-comparative gain. 
Thus self-hatred within the Humean conception presupposes belief in a 
zero-sum hierarchical game in which the goal is to enhance one's own status-
superiority and the means is to reduce the status-superiority of others. 
Because, like all available means, the desire for this goal engenders not only 
further lower-order desires for them, but in addition desires for the means to 
protect them, the acquisition and replenishment of means can provide 
satisfaction independently of that envisioned for the goal. Since this goal is an 
impossible one for a Humean self to achieve, satisfying desires for means and 
resources of various kinds provide a more immediate source of gratification 
that may effectively outweigh and replace that envisioned in obtaining the 
impossible goal of status-superiority. Thus not only does a Humean self grade 
and sort the external world into opportunities and setbacks relative to its 
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wants. More specifically, it evaluates them relative to its instrumental wants, 
i.e. as means to further desired ends. In practice, then, the highest-order desire 
for wholeness and sufficiency translates into a pure time-preferential desire 
for power; and the concept of intrinsic value becomes nugatory. 
Self-hatred differs from shame and guilt. It differs from shame in that it 
presupposes no shared social ideal by comparison with which one regards 
oneself as defective and so vulnerable to others' ridicule. On the contrary: one 
perceives oneself as inferior relative to every ideal and every reality, whether 
social or personal (this is the person who, for example, feels offended at your 
casual inquiry as to how he is, patronized by your interest and scorned by 
your indifference). And it differs from guilt in that it involves (like shame) a 
negative evaluation of the whole person, not merely a single action for which 
one can be held responsible and required by others to make amends. Self-
hatred nevertheless shares with both a negative social dimension, in this case 
the need to hide one's inferiority from both oneself and from others in acts of 
self-deception, dishonesty, and hypocrisy.   
Self-hatred on the Humean conception also differs from self-criticism, 
respect for authority, and respect for higher status of any kind. Nor does 
acknowledgement of one's own lower status imply self-hatred. On the 
contrary: the ability to acknowledge oneself as flawed, imperfect, or inferior in 
some respect relative to some valued standard or person who is perceived to 
meet it presupposes self-esteem, because it presupposes that any such 
judgment cannot devalue the whole person. Self-esteem thus shares with guilt 
the ability to isolate and criticize particular actions or characteristics without 
reducing one's status as a person relative to others in one's own eyes. Because 
a Humean self permanently lacks a sense of wholeness, any 
acknowledgement of imperfection reinforces its felt inadequacy.  
Because this condition is a permanent and fundamental condition of its 
agency, the Humean self may experience its self-hatred as natural, neutral, 
and familiar rather than as traumatic. Indeed, the inherent aversiveness of this 
condition may be indistinguishable from – in fact, may be the motivational 
spark behind all action in the service of desire-satisfaction. Because all such 
action is forward-looking with reference to its envisioned future end-state of 
wholeness and sufficiency restored, action serves to distance the Humean self 
temporarily from its underlying aversive condition – to which inaction 
returns it and from which further action is its only escape. So such a self is 
most clearly marked by the compulsive, continuous, and manic quality of its 
activity. It conceives and identifies itself through doing rather than being, for 
whereas its being is poisoned by self-hatred, its doings are fueled by hope. 
And as its self-hatred increases, so does the attachment to the objects of its 
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desires as sources not only of satisfaction and wholeness, but thereby of self-
esteem.26   
Thus we may recast the highest-order terminating criterion of rationality 
for the Humean conception, alternately, as the aversion to self-hatred, i.e. as 
R3' in (1.a'-g) above. This aversion would serve as the highest-order causally 
effective motive for the Humean self, and also as an alternative way of 
explaining attachment to the objects of one's lower-order desires. Think of the 
highest-order desire for wholeness and sufficiency and the highest-order 
aversion to self-hatred, then, not as equivalent but rather as mutually 
interdependent. 
These two mutually interdependent highest-order criteria may explain 
how it is that thwarted desires may elicit in a Humean self not merely 
frustration or discontent, but also further desires: for revenge, reparation, or 
recompense. If a felt failure of wholeness and sufficiency is interdependent 
with intense feelings of self-hatred to which one is averse, then those feelings 
will overwhelm and threaten whatever remaining sense of sufficiency the self 
may retain. Then if some form of desire-satisfaction is not immediately 
forthcoming, some other form of compensation – some substitute that 
promises the restoration of completeness – must be. Of course the desire for a 
substitute for desire-satisfaction is subject to the same frustrations as that for 
which it is supposed to substitute, since no desire-satisfaction endures, nor 
fails to generate further dissatisfactions. Persistent frustration of desire, 
conjoined with the persistent and standing desire for recompense, lead one 
beyond the object of desire to a persistent and reified sense of oneself as a 
victim of deprivation and injustice. This not only exacerbates the proliferation 
of lower-order desires, but rationalizes their pursuit to the agent himself.  
It also thereby rationalizes any further infliction on others of deprivation 
or injustice in turn. We have already seen above that a Humean self regards 
itself and others as players in a zero-sum game in which the stakes are the 
accoutrements of desire-satisfaction, namely power and status-superiority, 
such that losses of these things to others are perceived as gains of them to 
oneself. For the Humean self, sadistic desires and their resulting acts of spite, 
revenge, or aggression against others are a natural expression of the self-
hatred engendered by attachment to the objects of one's desires. I argue in 
Chapter VI.3 that a sadistic person takes satisfaction both in others' suffering 
and also in being the instrument of it; and also that satisfying sadistic desires 
accelerates self-brutalization. 
Finally, the sense of oneself as a victim of injustice and deprivation 
consequent on the pursuit of recompense for thwarted desire-satisfaction 
rationalizes unlimited consumption of objects and experiences perceived as 
satisfaction-substitutes: of commodities for friendship, sex for love, food for 
                                                
26I am grateful to Hans and Linda Haacke for discussion of the concept of self-hatred. 
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sex, status-superiority for life purpose, clothes for status-superiority, media 
fantasy for meaningful work, and so forth. These are all subject to the same 
analysis of the distinction between desire-satisfaction and pleasure offered 
above, in Subsection 2.1. I examine the relationship among desire, self-hatred, 
and consumption, with particular reference to American consumerism, at 
greater length elsewhere. The important point here is merely that the 
unlimited proliferation of consumption, like the unlimited proliferation of acts 
of sadism or revenge, are natural expressions of the two interdependent, 
highest-order impulses of the Humean self: the desire for wholeness and 
sufficiency which is impossible to satisfy, and the aversion to self-hatred 
which is impossible to avoid. 
 
3. Desire and Instrumentality 
We have just seen that self-hatred and the consequent impossible desire 
for status superiority is endemic to the psychology of the Humean self. This 
self evaluates its perceived external environment with regard to its 
instrumental opportunities or setbacks, i.e. as indices of power. If the Humean 
self thus manipulates intrinsic into instrumental goods from the remote but 
attached perspective of its future satisfactions, then it misuses itself as a 
similarly instrumental good whose worth is similarly measured in future 
power obtained. The source of value for the Humean self is determined by the 
variety and grade of ways in which it can use itself to satisfy its desires: 
socially, politically, financially.  
 
3.1. The Instrumentalization of Belief 
Its own beliefs are, therefore, similarly among the array of instruments 
and means for satisfying the desires of the Humean self. On the belief-desire 
model, I begin by having a certain desire. On the basis of my background 
information and familiarity with the specifics of my situation, as well as my 
ability to reason and calculate instrumentally, I formulate dispositional 
and/or occurrent beliefs about how to satisfy it most efficiently. These 
included beliefs about what my real situation actually is, what resources I 
have at my disposal, how to utilize them with minimum cost to effect the 
satisfaction of my desire, and of course, more general beliefs about causal 
laws, particular causal connections, and so on. Agent-specific means for the 
satisfaction of desire, then, can be viewed as constituting a two-part, 
multitiered hierarchy, with theoretical beliefs ranging from the general to the 
specific in the uppermost half, and the concrete behavior and other resources 
available to the agent that may express those beliefs in the lower half.
 
Clearly, 
there is nothing intrinsically instrumental in these beliefs, behavior, or other 
resources. They become instrumental insofar as the agent places them at the 
disposal of the desire she wishes to satisfy. 
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Now assign to the concept of a belief the same degree of ubiquity that 
Humeans claim for the concept of a desire. That is, think of it as a 
dispositional or occurrent mental phenomenon that interprets our internal 
goings-on and thereby causes further ones. Such a phenomenon can take any 
propositional content whatever, e.g. perceptual (as in "I believe I am seeing a 
red patch"), emotional (as in "I believe I am angry at having missed the bus"), 
or intentional (as in "I believe I intend to keep my promise"). This illuminates 
the sense in which the Humean conception of the self promotes the 
thoroughgoing instrumentalization of all the constituents of the self. For all 
such beliefs, on this picture, are available for deployment in the service of the 
satisfaction of desire, including beliefs about the intentional object of that desire. 
Thus, for example, my desire for security and personal aggrandizement may 
motivate me more efficiently to surround myself with sycophants, and so to 
satisfy that desire, if I believe it instead to be a desire for peers who recognize 
true worth when they see it. Or my desire to inflict pain on a competitor may 
motivate me more efficiently to exploit his vulnerabilities if I believe it instead 
to be a desire for excellence in performance at any cost. Or my desire to 
appropriate ideas from a manuscript I have reviewed, rejected, and refused to 
return may motivate me more effectively to disregard professional ethics if I 
believe it instead to be a disinterested desire to improve on the performance 
of an intellectual inferior. In this way, thoroughgoing self-deception – about 
my perceptions, emotions, and intentions, as well as about my desires – is 
rationally justified by the imperative of efficiency inherent in the structure of 
the Humean self (much as free riding is by the same imperative in the 
structure of the corresponding Hobbesian society): The rationality of my 
beliefs, like that of my behavior, is a function of their instrumental efficacy in 
enabling me to satisfy my desires. No other criteria of rationality are 
independently relevant, and so no independent moral considerations are, 
either. 
Thus within the constraints of the Humean conception, beliefs may be 
rational in either of two ways. They may be rational in virtue of representing 
accurately what I need to do in order to get what I want; call these veridically 
rational beliefs.  Or they may be rational in virtue of best enabling me to get 
what I want; call these efficaciously rational beliefs.  Veridically rational beliefs 
are true beliefs about the most efficient strategies for me to adopt in order to 
satisfy my desires. Efficaciously rational beliefs, on this interpretation, are 
those which in fact bring about the satisfaction of my desires most efficiently. 
I may have veridically rational beliefs about what beliefs are efficaciously 
rational; and I may count veridically rational beliefs among those which are 
efficaciously rational for me to hold. 
Efficaciously rational beliefs may diverge from veridically rational ones 
because the most efficient action for me to perform in order to satisfy my 
desires may not be the most efficacious means to the satisfaction of my 
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desires. It may be that a different set of beliefs, combined with less reflective 
and deliberate behavior, may be more efficacious in satisfying my desire than 
acting on true beliefs about the most efficient actions to take to satisfy that 
desire. It may be more efficaciously rational for me to hold veridically 
irrational beliefs about the satisfaction of my desires. For example, satisfying 
my desire to improve the human condition may require false and overly 
sanguine beliefs about my capacity for satisfying it and about what counts as 
satisfying it. Or my accurate, detailed, lengthy plan for learning Sanskrit as 
efficiently as possible may prove to be so boring and pedestrian that it kills 
my enthusiasm for doing so. The requirements of the Humean conception 
subordinate veridical rationality to efficacious rationality, because the 
requirement that I achieve my end as efficiently as possible outweighs the 
requirement that my beliefs about how to do so be as accurate as possible. 
Hence in the end, beliefs are truly rational within the Humean conception 
only to the extent that they are efficaciously rational. Veridically accurate 
beliefs have no special, noninstrumental value in the belief-desire model of 
motivation. 
This holds not just with respect to beliefs about the various components 
of the self, but about these components considered independently. Take the 
emotion of resentment. If I desire to participate more fully in the political 
process, and find that such activism provides a satisfying outlet for this 
emotion, which is a pervasive one for me, then it may be rational for me to 
cultivate and dwell extensively on my feelings of resentment, in order to 
satisfy my desire to participate politically. In such a case, I use my emotions to 
motivate me to satisfy a prior, but motivationally ineffective desire. Or take 
the aural perception of traffic sounds on the street outside my window.  If I 
desire to solve a conceptual problem subliminally, by freeing my imagination 
from its habitual intellectual constraints, and find that temporary aural 
distraction enables me to do so, I may attend deliberately to this aural 
perception in order to solve the conceptual problem subliminally. Here I 
utilize a perception to satisfy a desire I would be unable to satisfy by 
attending to the object of the desire directly. As we have already seen, desires 
themselves are equally susceptible to this brand of instrumentalization in the 
service of a further desire, as when I recruit my long-term desire to master a 
chunk of philosophical material in order to satisfy my immediate desire to 
finish preparing a lecture. 
These cases, and others like them, are not unusual because they are 
unfamiliar or infrequent, but rather because they are rationally prescribed by a 
model of motivation that stipulates the satisfaction of desire as the only 
motivationally effective source of intentional behavior, and that behavior 
itself – any behavior – as reflecting the agent's beliefs about how best to go 
about this. It is rationally prescribed because, as we have seen in Subsection 
2.1, above, no instrumental resources, whether internal or external to the 
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physical boundaries of the agent, are exempt or privileged with respect to this 
stipulation.  The desire model of motivation requires the mobilization of all the 
components of the self - physical and mental, internal and external – as potential 
resources for the appropriation of objects of desire.   In Chapter IV.5 I argue that the 
Humean model of rationality is incapable of accommodating moral or rational 
side-constraints as intentional objects of behavior. This means that these other 
components, including, for example, a sense of duty or moral conviction, 
feelings of compassion or moral indignation, and so on, are not just 
instrumental to the satisfaction of desire, but motivationally subordinate in 
importance to it as well. Call this the instrumentalization dilemma. 
 
3.2. The Instrumentalization Dilemma 
This dilemma is exemplified by the case of Dick. Suppose Dick desires to 
become a spontaneous and emotionally responsive person, adept at 
discerning his emotional reactions and at articulating them honestly to his 
friends. Suppose further that this desire is instrumental to a further desire to 
improve morally his personal and social relationships by being concerned, 
compassionate, and honest. To these ends, Dick undergoes therapy, keeps a 
journal, and encourages his friends and associates to confront him with their 
responses to his behavior, and to engage with him actively regarding 
whatever issues are raised by doing so. He realizes he is inviting intense 
emotional upheaval by seeking out such situations and analyzing them 
introspectively. But his desire to improve morally his interpersonal 
relationships is genuine, and he strongly believes (correctly, let us suppose) 
that his emotional arridity and fear of vulnerability have made him a moral 
cripple in the past. Then suppose Dick reacts dismissively or arrogantly in a 
meeting to a professional associate's suggestion as to how to improve the 
efficiency of their business, and is taken to task for it publicly. It is suggested 
that Dick frequently has difficulties in countenancing from women colleagues 
the same professional input that he invites from men; is even more 
characteristically ungenerous when competing with the former; that perhaps 
he feels threatened by women, or has not successfully resolved his separation 
from his mother, or is re-enacting his childhood sibling rivalry, and so on. 
Dick's responses to these confrontatory remarks are various: He is alternately 
outraged, thoughtful, defensive, receptive, insulted, and sarcastic. 
Occasionally he is sorely tempted to storm out of the meeting in a huff, or 
revamp his strategy for moral self-improvement; but is reminded, or reminds 
himself, of his commitment to the process of social engagement – and so sits it 
out, outwardly contemptuous of his colleagues' unconscionable armchair 
psychologizing, but inwardly wondering whether they may not, after all, be 
right. 
Now most of us know such individuals, and it is worth examining why 
we may feel an uneasy sense of insincerity in their presence. This response 
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itself is a complex one: We ourselves may feel insincere for not revealing our 
own personal foibles and blind spots more fully, in the presence of someone 
who courageously subjects his imperfections and immaturities to the 
traumatic ordeal of public scrutiny, the way the matador waves the red cape 
before the bull. We may also feel that there is something distastefully 
exhibitionistic in this public display of breast-beating, and that suffering one's 
neurosis silently is more honorable. But there is often more to the response 
than this. We may, in addition, sense something insincere in Dick's own 
stance toward his psychological and moral flaws: If they are all out there on 
the table, then who is in the kitchen? That is: what kind of psychological entity 
is serving them up?  
The problem is that despite Dick's avowals, the belief-desire model of 
motivation requires us to view all his overt behavior, including his actions, 
avowals, responses, and explanations, as instrumental to the satisfaction of 
some further, unspoken desire. So by that hypothesis, none of that behavior 
intrinsically expresses the desires Dick says he is striving to satisfy. Dick's 
stated program for moral self-improvement requires the assumption that he 
has, as it were, turned himself inside out for the sake of that program; that the 
reactions we and he are invited to scrutinize are not just instrumental to the 
satisfactions of the self, but expressive of it. But by the lights of the belief-
desire model of motivation, we are entitled to view this assumption with 
suspicion. Because no matter how genuine and transparent his reactions, they 
are mere instruments to the satisfaction of some further desire. And so Dick's 
motivations for revealing them remain opaque: they are, by hypothesis, not 
among the responses with which we are invited to engage.  
Of course Dick explains his moral reason for inviting us to engage with 
him in this way. This explanation, too, is among the issues raised by his 
behavior with which we are asked to engage. But we have no independent 
evidence for the truth of this explanation, and no reason to accept it on faith, 
as he seems to want. Instead it merely defers our suspicions one remove, 
rather than allaying them. For now the question becomes that of what desire 
he satisfies by adopting this strategy for moral self-improvement rather than 
some other; what desire he satisfies by telling us all this; and to the 
satisfaction of what desire Dick's desire for moral self-improvement itself 
might be instrumental. We may think him excessively self-absorbed, 
preoccupied, narcissistic, or simply a glutton for attention, thereby 
discounting right away the possibility that his concerns are authentic. Indeed, 
the more confiding and self-revelatory Dick becomes, in response to our 
demurrals, the more we may feel somehow sucked in or manipulated; and the 
correspondingly less of a chance he has to satisfy his stated desire to improve 
his moral condition and relationships with others. 
So far the instrumentalization dilemma has been painted as arising from 
our third-personal perspective on Dick's avowals; from an apprehension that 
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he is in fact instrumentalizing his relationships with us to serve an agenda to 
which we are not privy. But we can see that Dick himself may not be 
impervious to these concerns. He may wonder, for example, whether his 
stated moral object of desire is what is really structuring his responses and 
behavior instrumentally, or whether it may not in fact be merely a valued 
side-effect of his narcissism, or his desire for attention or power. For given the 
premise that it is an object of desire to which all the other components of his 
self are instrumental, it remains an open question which of the available, 
conjoined ones is really doing the structural and motivational work; or 
whether it is among the available, conjoined ones that he should even seek an 
answer. 
But Dick's deeper concern is an unease at the very availability of his 
thoughts and responses for instrumentally rational scrutiny. Here the worry is 
not just the obscurity of the overriding object of desire as such; but rather that 
the explicit desire from the perspective of which he introspects, whatever it is, 
preselects which thoughts and responses are available for such scrutiny, and 
thereby obscures the yet more basic intrinsic desires that are more thoroughly 
in need of reform. The distance afforded by the intrinsic object of desire to 
which Dick is apparently committed makes the true explanation of his 
behavior seem equally remote and inaccessible. His unease is a consequence 
of the truisms into which the desire model of motivation inevitably 
degenerates, namely: You can only know about yourself what you desire to 
know; and: What you desire to know about yourself is never what you truly 
need to know. Dick's worry that he may be overlooking the elements in his 
personality that are truly responsible for his moral and social sterility are a 
natural consequence of his suspicion that it is precisely the self he desires to 
reform that is engendering that very desire instrumentally, as a kind of 
lip-service to moral self-improvement that makes genuine improvement 
impossible. Thus our suspicion of his insincerity, and sense that we are being 
manipulated, may be mirrored in Dick's own worries that his true motives 
remain obscure, and his character beyond the reach of his own conscious 
efforts at self-development. 
 
3.3. The Instrumentalization of the Self 
Note, then, that the instrumentalization dilemma is not generated by 
assuming the nonmateriality or privacy of Dick's desire for moral 
self-improvement, or whatever desires are hypothesized to motivate that one. 
The dilemma would remain even if we could literally see Dick's internal states 
represented on a video screen as states of his organs and brain. For the 
question would still arise as to how these states should be interpreted, and 
what explanatory hypothesis was best suited to this purpose. The hypothesis 
in question, namely the belief-desire model of motivation, stipulates that all 
such states are resources for the satisfaction of desire, and it has already been 
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argued that this must include available desiring-states as well. This means 
that any such state that appeared on the video-screen could be assumed to be 
instrumental to the satisfaction of some further desiring-state, which 
therefore, by hypothesis, did not appear on the video screen; and the desire 
model of motivation encourages us to make this assumption. 
Nor would the instrumentalization dilemma be solved by assuming the 
existence of some ultimate desiring-state – such as that for wholeness and 
sufficiency – that did not appear on the video screen, but rather somewhere 
else, or only to Dick. For wherever, or to whomever it appears, the question 
can always be reiterated: To the satisfaction of what further desire is this one 
instrumental? Dick's underlying motives in doing what he does are obscure, 
not because they are private or nonmaterial, but rather because they are by 
hypothesis one step ahead of whatever motivational explanation we already 
have. This lays the foundation in the arena of psychological explanation for 
Chapter VIII.2’s analysis of the infinite regress problem of self-evaluation that 
many have noted besets the Humean conception of the self. The existence of a 
highest-order terminating criterion of rationality for the Humean conception – 
i.e. the desire for wholeness and sufficiency – terminates the regress of orders 
of desire. But it does nothing to terminate the regress of instrumental desires 
themselves. There is, then, no point at which we can rest assured that all of his 
motives in invoking our participation are fully "on the table." We are entitled 
to probe just as much further when he represents them to us on the video 
screen as when he explains them to us verbally. 
Postulating a Freudian unconscious is equally unable to allay Dick's and 
our worries, although it is a natural consequence of accepting the desire 
model of motivation to turn to the Freudian variant. The premise that all 
mental and physical behavior is instrumental to the satisfaction of a further, 
intrinsic desire obfuscates both the object of that desire and its motivationally 
effective desiring-state simultaneously. Then it may indeed seem that if these 
motives and objects are not accessible to our scrutiny, they must exist 
somewhere else – the unconscious – where no one, not even the agent, can get 
at them. But this does not nullify the concern that motivated this tack, for that 
a desire exists in an epistemically inaccessible psychological realm does not 
imply that it is therefore not instrumental to the satisfaction of some further, 
equally inaccessible one. So it is possible to view one of the central postulates 
of Freudian theory as a natural, though not conceptually inevitable, 
consequence of an historically and conceptually prior commitment to the 
Humean conception of the self. For it is not useful, in order to satisfy the 
explanatory requirements of the belief-desire model, merely to stipulate that 
final desires which are inaccessible to us here exist somewhere else, where 
they are inaccessible. That they are inaccessible there does not alter their 
inherently instrumental designation. 
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The instrumentalization dilemma is generated, then, not by Dick's moral 
interests, nor even by his strategy for achieving them. For if we and he were 
inclined to take his words and deeds at face value, we could each simply 
decide whether or not it was a good project, whether he should go through 
with it, and whether we wanted to participate or not. Rather, Dick's 
difficulties are engendered by his – and our – presupposition of the belief-
desire model of motivation in formulating and assessing it. By conceptually 
nesting his behavior, and his and others' responses to that behavior, within a 
scheme relative to which all such events are instrumental to the satisfaction of 
an ultimate desire he is assumed to have, we collaborate with him in 
effectively obviating the possibility that that desire will be satisfied; or, if it is, 
that anyone will be able to recognize it as being so. For the self that desires 
that satisfaction itself remains, by hypothesis, impervious to the transforming 
effects of our common scrutiny. 
And so it must, again by hypothesis.  For whatever occurs, either in Dick 
himself or in us, are at best instrumental or constitutive means by which his 
ultimate desire is satisfied; they are not themselves direct expressions of that 
desiring. Thus yet another infinite regress arises in response to the express 
desire for self-knowledge or self-assessment, which is entirely familiar, 
predictable, and self-defeating: For any proposition P that I (or you) may 
entertain about my self as true, it is equally true that perhaps I (or you) 
believe P only because of my (or your) desire Q. But my (or your) belief in my 
(or your) desire Q may be explained entirely by its efficacy in satisfying my 
(or your) further desire R. And so on. This schema may deny us the Olympian 
satisfaction of irrefutable self-knowledge; but it simultaneously affords us an 
endless series of "perspectives" and "insights" on our actual behavior, with 
which we may entertain ourselves endlessly, from the perspective of that 
hypothesized desire we currently acknowledge as final.  
In actual fact, we need not pursue the regress doggedly, in order to arrive 
at a satisfactory explanation of a person's behavior; and, unless we are feeling 
particularly perverse or powerless, we usually don't. Rather, we accept that 
explanation that best coheres with our other beliefs about her, and call it into 
question only with the acquisition of further beliefs with which it may fail to 
cohere. In these commonsense cases, the explanation in question need not 
invoke a "deep" desire or other motive. An agent's absentmindedness, 
insensitivity, or naiveté often suffices to explain behavior that the desire 
model of motivation encourages us unendingly to probe. In Volume II, I 
develop an alternative model of motivation that tries to better respect these 
ordinary psychological facts about us. For now it should be noted just that the 
belief-desire model of motivation as stated encourages us to regard any 
attitude or desire we currently ascribe to the agent as instrumental to a further 
one. Thus our suspicion of Dick's insincerity, and that we are being 
manipulated by his stated moral program, are built into the Humean 
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conception of the self. He has framed his project in such a way that, given this 
set of metapsychological assumptions about the self, we are all forced to the 
conclusion that he is hiding something; and using his and our responses in the 
service of that which he is hiding. 
 
3.4. The Puppeteer Fallacy 
Of course this conclusion is mistaken. It relies on a suspect view of the 
"real" self as puppeteer, pulling our psychological strings as subjects, agents, 
and observers from behind the scenes, for some further purpose to which we 
are, by hypothesis, not privy. Call this the puppeteer fallacy. This fallacy does 
not arise because of the supposed nonmaterial status of internal states, as Ryle 
thought. As we have already seen, the identification of motivationally 
effective desires is equally obscured by the stipulation that desires are 
physical events to which all physical behavior is instrumental. Nor is the 
problem engendered by the purported privacy of desire, as Brandt and Kim's 
dispositional analysis of desire as a theoretical construct without experiential 
analogues seems to suggest. We have also seen that a person's public behavior 
and declarations are equally as inscrutable, on this view, even to the agent, 
because equally instrumental to the satisfaction of a desire that is not just 
physically or publicly but conceptually obscure. 
From this perspective, a major complaint against the belief-desire model 
of motivation is that it makes us out as agents to be much more in control of 
our behavior than we are, and thus engenders the insoluble puzzles about free 
will and determinism I address in Chapter VIII.2. By promoting the ascription 
to the agent of a hidden agenda to which all of its – and our – mental and 
physical behavior is instrumental, it exacerbates the puppeteer fallacy by 
rendering the "true" self simultaneously ubiquitous and elusive. And this 
confronts us all with the triply self-defeating (literally) task of discerning what 
that hidden agenda is, whether or not we approve of it, and to what extent it 
should indeed be promoted or discouraged. 
This model thus indirectly instrumentalizes all social relations. For in 
response to this perceived hidden agenda, it forces us to construct our own. 
Acceptance of this model encourages us to regard unfamiliar individuals as 
cryptic or unpredictable, and familiar ones as secretive, devious, or 
manipulative; and we ourselves often choose our words and gestures with an 
eye to their calculated psychological or social consequences, rather than their 
conventional linguistic meanings. For of course the supposition of hidden 
desires that motivate an agent's social behavior requires us as participants to 
respond to those supposed desires, and not to the overt social behavior that is 
interpreted as instrumental to them. It thereby requires us to choose our 
responses on the basis of calculations of how best to reinforce, modify, or 
discourage those desires in light of our own. 
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This shared imperative may even generate a second-order set of 
meta-conventions of social meaning, supervenient on the traditional ones, in 
which linguistic participants attempt to arrive at a mutual understanding of 
one another's postulated hidden desires, by inference from utterances and 
behavior which, to the uninitiated, are completely unrelated to the desires 
with which they are, according to the meta-conventions, systematically 
correlated.27 Of course the development of meta-conventions of social 
meaning serve merely to up the ante in terms of the efficaciously rational 
calculations each agent must perform in order both to comprehend and 
communicate successfully, and the degree of efficaciously rational 
sophistication required in order to manipulate these meta-conventions in the 
service of one's own desires. For on this model, there is invariably some 
motivational variable that must remain unspoken. But it is not difficult to 
imagine actual situations of bargaining, diplomacy, or social coordination in 
which repeated exposure and practice may instill these skills of perception, 
calculation, and response so deeply in one as to be second nature. 
Thus the impersonal attitude that Strawson28 argued to be a consequence 
of taking determinism seriously as a theory of human social and moral 
behavior can be gotten by a much shorter route. Regardless of whether or not 
human behavior and motivation is causally determined, a commitment to the 
belief-desire model of motivation as an explanatory theory has the same 
outcome; for as we see in Chapter XII below, it replaces the ideal of social 
cooperation with strategies of mutual manipulation. It encourages us to 
disregard the prima facie significance of what others actually say and do, in 
order to seek out their underlying desires and shape them for our own ends. 
For any direct appeal to their rational or moral faculties is presumed to be 
itself instrumental to the satisfaction of some further desire.  
The unreflective acceptance of this model makes it unsurprising that we 
approach the practical tasks of self-knowledge and self-control with the aid of 
a professionally trained, paid third-personal perspective – whether therapist, 
self-help manual, or religious counselor, whose job it is to infer from our 
mental and physical behavior the true, hidden condition of the self, and to 
prescribe remedies for healing it. In each of these cases, we presuppose the 
ubiquitous existence of hidden desires the identification of which provides the 
key to mental and physical behavior hypothesized to be instrumentally 
rational to them. These desires are hidden to the observer because we perceive 
only the agent's physical, instrumental behavior. They are hidden to the agent 
                                                
27For accounts of meaning that might be compatible with this analysis, see H. P. Grice, 
"Meaning," Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377-88; and Stephen Schiffer, Meaning 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). 
28P. F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays 
(London: Methuen and Co., 1974). 
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because, on the Humean view, even our mental behavior as agents is 
instrumental to the satisfaction of final and ultimate desires to which we by 
definition lack access. Thus for both, this presupposition requires a detached, 
third-person perspective on those desires that is personally invested neither in 
their frustration nor their satisfaction.29 The remote but attached perspective 
of future wholeness and sufficiency from which the Humean self regards its 
present condition of want is not adequate to fulfill this requirement. Under 
these circumstances, verifiable self-knowledge becomes a theoretical 
impossibility, the act of trust required for genuine friendship a fundamentally 
irrational leap of faith, and moral concern and personal honesty objects of 
desire that seem remote indeed. 
 
4. The Veracity of the Model 
In this chapter I have tried first to sort out and clarify the conception of 
desire on which the belief-desire model of motivation – and so the Humean 
conception of the self – in fact rests. I have argued for the inadequacy of both 
the orthodox and the revisionist variants on this model, particularly as they 
find expression in the work of Brandt and Kim, Goldman, and Lewis; and 
have proposed to replace them with a representational analysis of desire that 
circumvents their liabilities yet retains their assets. I have then tried to 
explicate some of the psychological, characterological, and behavioral 
implications of the representational analysis for actual selves socialized and 
structured in accordance with the Humean conception. I have concluded that 
a Humean self is committed to the satisfaction of several Quixotic and 
structurally impossible higher-order desires: for wholeness and sufficiency, 
for the avoidance of self-hatred, for status, power, recompense, unlimited 
consumption, and self-knowledge. 
Of course the fact that these objects of higher-order desire are impossible 
to attain does not imply that actual human agents do not desire them 
nevertheless. And so it may be objected to this critique of the belief-desire 
model of motivation that the frequency with which these implications are 
confirmed in actual human behavior within a global consumerist culture 
redounds to the credit of the Humean conception as a plausible and well-
confirmed explanatory hypothesis, rather than undermines its legitimacy as 
the critique apparently intends. But recall from the General Introduction to 
this project that this critique is embedded in a more general one that argues 
not that the Humean conception of the self is intrinsically wrong, but rather 
that it is incomplete; that it is inadequate to the full range of psychological facts 
of human nature, and so often makes false predictions about human behavior; 
and that its internal, structural and conceptual inconsistencies arise from the 
                                                
29See Peter Alexander "Rational Behavior and Psychoanalytic Explanation," in Care and 
Landesman, op. cit. Note 3. 
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attempt to universalize an explanatory hypothesis that in fact is incapable of 
universalization. So the plethora of empirical instances that confirm the 
psychological profile I have developed here do not undermine the critique 
unless no counter-instances can be found to disconfirm it. And I have tried in 
Section 1, above, to demonstrate that this question cannot be settled simply by 
arbitrarily extending the denotational scope of the term "desire" to include all 
human motivation. Humpty Dumpty couldn't get away with it, and neither 
can we. 
 
  
Chapter III. The Utility-Maximizing Model of Rationality:  
Informal Interpretations 
 
 
 In Chapter II I examined the motivational model of the Humean 
conception of the self, the belief-desire model. In this and the following 
chapter, I examine its structural model, the utility-maximizing model of 
rationality, and try to make good on the promissory note issued in Chapter II. 
There I suggested that the revisionist view of desire as a theoretically 
ubiquitous explanatory entity rendered it vacuous – and, along with it, the 
utility-maximizing model of rationality within which desire is embedded as 
its sole conative element. Here and in Chapter IV I contend that in order to 
retain its status as a bona fide explanatory theory, utility theory also must 
abdicate its claim to universality. This conclusion follows, I claim, upon the 
Humean refusal to impose substantive constraints upon the final ends – or 
intrinsic preferences – the attainment of which constitute maximizing utility. 
Without such constraints, any behavior can be interpreted as utility-
maximizing because any final end can be understood as a source of utility, 
and hence any behavior can be rationalized through the ascription of such a 
final end to it. This makes the theory universal in its explanatory reach, all 
right, but also vacuous. Only by imposing such constraints can some ends – 
and therefore some behavior – be identified as irrational in its terms, i.e. not 
susceptible to interpretation as a case of maximizing utility. These constraints 
thus protect the theory from vacuity, but only by sacrificing its claim to 
universality. 
 Some economists would question the need to demonstrate this. They take 
it to be obvious that this model of rationality is intended to ground a 
specifically economic theory of consumer behavior under free market 
conditions. They take it to be equally obvious that human beings do not act as 
free-market commodity consumers in all areas of their lives; and that the 
utility-maximization model therefore has a restricted scope of application. I 
agree with this view. But we have already seen in Chapter I how philosophy 
generally tends to seek outside the boundaries of its own discipline for 
scientific models that can be imported back into it and pressed into 
foundational service. In this regard, metaethics – particularly Humean 
metaethics – is no different. In subsequent chapters I scrutinize Nagel’s, 
Gewirth’s, Rawls’s and Brandt’s success at this; but they are only a few of the 
contemporary metaethicists who look to the Humean model of rationality for 
a scientifically validated foundation on which to erect a well-justified 
normative moral theory.
1
 So in the present and the next chapter, I develop at 
                                                
1
 Among the many late twentieth century moral philosophers who have promoted this 
view are Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); and 
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greater length the thesis that the universalized version of the utility-
maximizing model of rationality is vacuous, by addressing several different 
interpretations of the Humean claim that utility theory has explanatory 
universality. For the most part, my criticisms of this claim address the 
purported scope of the model, not its substance; and therefore have no 
bearing on the model’s validity within the context of free market economics 
for which, in its formalized version, it is intended. 
 Similarly, I do not try to specify which final ends should be excluded 
from the scope of a suitably restricted version of the utility-maximization 
model of rationality; nor, therefore, which areas of human action may lay 
entirely outside it. So my conclusions here do not imply that the utility-
maximizing model may not have important applications to such areas as 
making financial investments, purchasing lottery tickets, or buying insurance. 
My argument is merely that the utility-maximizing model of rationality must 
incorporate some such restrictions, in order to avoid vacuity. However, the 
argument does, therefore, imply that Max U. (as some economists fondly refer 
to the quintessential utility-maximizer) cannot do just anything to maximize 
utility. So if you agree that, for example, Max U. should not be allowed to 
harvest body parts from the poor at 50¢ a piece and sell them at $50,000.00 to 
the rich for organ transplants, you should have some sympathy for my thesis. 
Whereas Chapter IV focuses on formal decision-theoretic interpretations 
of the utility-maximizing model, the present chapter focuses primarily on its 
informal philosophical arguments. Section 1 specifies the formulation of the 
basic principle of utility-maximization (U) that I target both here and in 
Chapter IV. Sections 2 and 3 develop in detail the criticism that if (U) is 
formulated so as to have universal application as an explanatory social theory, 
then it is either vacuous, in that it is confirmed by all instances of behavior; or 
else its detailed formulation is internally inconsistent, in that it implies that 
utility-maximization itself both is and is not an intentional end, subject to cost-
benefit analysis like any other. The argument begins with the simplest and 
most commonsense rendering of (U); and proceeds by examining increasingly 
complex and sophisticated formulations of it. I show in Section 2 that this 
                                                                                                     
David Gauthier, "The Social Contract as Ideology," Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (1977), 
130-164. Some philosophically inclined jurisprudes are also guilty. Mid- to late 
twentieth century work in the economic analysis of law applied the utility-maximizing 
model of rationality to the legal sphere. See Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," 
Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1960); "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and 
Economics 15 (1972); and Richard Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law (New York: Little, 
Brown, and Co., 1975). For a critical view, see Staffan B. Linder, The Harried Leisure Class 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970); Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1977); and Robert Paul Wolff, "Robert Nozick's 
Derivation of the Minimal State," in Jeffrey Paul, Ed. Reading Nozick (Totowa, NJ: 
Rowman and Allenheld, 1981), 77-104. 
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implication holds for single ends considered independently; and in Section 3 
that it holds equally for the coherence set comprising all of one's ends. In 
Section 4 I show that this argument holds whether the concept of utility is 
interpreted phenomenologically, psychoanalytically, or behaviorally. The 
following chapter then extends these conclusions to more technical 
formulations of (U). 
 
1. Formulating the Principle 
 My target is one particular formulation of the basic principle of utility 
theory, namely 
 
  (U) If a rational agent acts, she maximizes utility. 
 
This minimalist formulation of (U) superficially resembles what Maurice 
Allais calls the Axiom of Absolute Preference, i.e. that given two alternatives, 
a rational agent prefers that one that consistently yields the greater gain.
2
 
However, Allais claims that this axiom is merely a consequence of a much 
weaker definition of rational choice as consistency. But the three criteria that 
constitute his definition always include the axiom of absolute preference 
among them.
3
 Without it, there would be no ordering relation specified for the 
ordered set of gambles among which, on his definition, a rational agent 
chooses. I criticize his conception of consistency directly below. Moreover, 
Allais' Axiom of Absolute Preference is not, according to his account of it, 
implied by the assumptions grounding the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
cardinal utility function (discussed in below in Chapter IV, Sections 1.2-3). By 
contrast, (U) is presupposed by it, in the concept of a highest-ranked member 
of an ordered set of preference alternatives, regardless of whether these 
alternatives are objects, events, conditions, states, or gambles.  
(U) is similar to Allais’ Axiom of Absolute Preference, however, in its 
atomistic ascription of utility-maximization to the smallest behavioral unit in 
which preference is revealed. It is also similar in assuming satisfaction of the 
                                                
2
See his "Fondements d'une Théorie Positive des Choix Comportant un Risque et 
Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de L'Ecole Americaine,"Memoir III of Econometrie XL 
(1953), 257-332 (Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique, Paris), translated as "Foundations of a Positive Theory of Choice Involving 
Risk and a Criticism of the Postulates and Axioms of the American School," in Maurice 
Allais and Ole Hagen, Eds. Expected Utility and the Allais Paradox (Dordrecht, Holland: 
D. Reidel, 1979), 27-146.  See esp. 39-41. 
 This formulation of (U) also encapsulates Ward Edwards' treatment in his 
comprehensive survey paper, "The Theory of Decision-Making," Psychological Bulletin 
51, 4 (1954), esp. 381-3. 
3
 Allais, ibid. See particularly 34, 69, 78-79, 82, and footnote 78'. 
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Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition on preference orderings, 
what McClennen would call the Context-Free Ordering.
4
 This condition states 
that an ordering Y produced by a series of pairwise comparisons among a set 
of alternatives X is not changed by the introduction of additional alternatives 
on some particular occasion that expands X to a larger set X*. So, for example, 
if I prefer alternatives P to Q, Q to R, and R to S, the introduction of 
alternative T, on a particular occasion, does not alter my ranking of P, Q, R, 
and S relative to one another. Either I prefer T to P, or I prefer S to T, or I do 
not rank T at all. Thus this condition excludes the case in which the 
introduction of T leads me to reverse my ranking of Q and R. This means that 
the ranking of a set of alternatives can be inferred from its pairwise rankings 
and vice versa. The discussions below, in Chapter IV, and in Volume II, 
Chapter III follow Sen
5
 and Broome
6
 in assuming that considerations of 
temporal continuity and human cognitive limitations necessitate pairwise 
comparisons as a necessary precondition of Y, and thereby block the inference 
to the material equivalence of Y and the series of pairwise rankings that 
produce it. Nevertheless, each can be read off from the other. 
 (U) is also superficially similar to a different and more nuanced 
formulation, that if a rational agent acts, she maximizes her preferences, that 
would seem to avoid the vacuity I argue to be endemic to the utility-
maximization model. On this conception, the agent’s preference rankings are 
numerically represented by the theorems of utility theory interpreted as 
representation theorems in a theory of measurement, and she chooses from 
among those alternatives she maximally prefers. The ordering axioms – 
transitivity, connectedness, asymmetry of strict preference – then ensure the 
existence of at least one most-preferred alternative in a finite set of such 
alternatives, and the agent maximizes by choosing that alternative. As Sen has 
shown that connectedness is not necessary for maximizing in this sense, it can 
be replaced by his concept of a maximal set, i.e. sets consisting of mutually 
nondominating alternatives none of which is strictly dispreferred to any 
other.
7
 The transitivity requirement similarly can be replaced by a weaker 
requirement of acyclicity of strict preference, since maximization requires 
merely the avoidance of cyclical preferences. It would seem, on the face of it, 
                                                
4
 Edward McClennen, Rationality and Dynamic Choice (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), xi, 29-31, 64-67. 
5
 Amartya K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden-Day, Inc., 
1970), 3.  
6
 Broome, John, “Rationality and the Sure-Thing Principle,” in Thoughtful Economic Man, 
edited by Gay Meeks, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 74–102. Cited and 
discussed in McClennen, op. cit., 66-67. 
7
 Sen, op. cit. Chapter 1*, Section 1*2. 
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that this conception is weak enough to satisfy universality yet strong enough 
to avoid vacuity.  
However, a theory of measurement adequate to this conception would 
first have to solve the problems raised by interpersonal comparisons that are 
discussed in Chapter IV, Sections 1.1 – 1.4 below. Second, weakening 
transitivity to acyclicity does not alter the behavioral options actually 
available to the choosing agent, because the two are logically equivalent; 
though a demonstration of this must await the apparatus I develop in Volume 
II, Chapter III.6.2.1. Third, the argument of Chapter IV, Section 1.6 below 
implies that it is in any case not possible to exclude cyclical preferences by 
imposing any further familiar normative requirements – neither transitivity, 
nor irreflexivity, nor independence, nor substitutability, nor continuity – 
unless these are subordinated to strictly logical constraints on preference 
orderings for which the canonical notation of decision theory affords no 
resources. I offer some in Volume II, Chapter III. Finally, a closer look at the 
money pump in Chapter IV, Section 2.3 shows that utility-maximization does 
not require excluding cyclical preferences in the first place. So the criticisms of 
(U) I make in the following pages apply to this more complex variant on it as 
well.  
 (U) is not the only possible formulation of the principle. Some utility 
theorists would insist, on Bayesian grounds, that (U) should address the 
maximization of expected utility. Whether (U) is formulated so as to address 
the maximization of utility or of expected utility does not, for the most part, 
affect the substance of my arguments. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, my 
arguments do not depend on whether a rational agent is assumed to act under 
conditions of certainty, risk, or uncertainty. Rather, they focus on the concept 
of a preference ordering that must be presupposed in the assignment of 
objective as well as subjective probabilities to options. But I shall assume for 
the sake of argument that the agent has full information and that any 
probability assignments to outcomes are based on multiple trial repetitions, 
again unless specifically indicated otherwise. 
 Others would substitute "human beings" for "a rational being," 
emphasizing the descriptive over the normative and reducing the explanatory 
scope of (U) in that way. Still others would object to the suggestion of 
intentionality in (U), on the grounds that action implies intentionality and 
agents maximize utility whether or not they intend to. I think it is a mistake 
for a Humean to raise this objection, for reasons explicated in Section 4 below. 
Yet others would complain that (U) conceals an essential normative 
dimension, in that people should maximize utility but often do not in fact. I 
address expected utility theory's conception of the relation between what 
human beings actually do and what fully rational beings are conceived to do 
in Chapter IV, Section 4, below; and the issue of intentionality in this chapter’s 
Section 2, below.  
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 The point of choosing this particular formulation of the basic principle is 
to grant the utility theorist as much as possible at the outset. Among the 
philosophical claims that are often made for utility theory are: that it enables 
us to predict actual human behavior; that it furnishes a systematic account of 
fully rational behavior; and that it supplies a normative guide to rational 
choice to which actual human behavior aspires and may approximate to 
varying degrees. To the extent that actual human behavior achieves the status 
of rational behavior, then, an axiomatized system of decision theory should 
enable us to predict it. (U) captures the idea of utility-maximization as fully 
intentional and therefore deliberate behavior. Furthermore, it captures the 
idea of a basic action (in Danto's sense) – specifically, the type of basic action 
involved in making pairwise comparisons among a given set of alternatives – 
as itself utility-maximizing prior to any more complex utility function that 
may emerge from such an ordering.  
 (U) is thus charitable both to our actual human potential for rational 
behavior, and to the potential of axiomatized systems of decision theory to 
predict such behavior. I argue, however, that if (U) is assumed to be universal 
in its scope of application, then regardless of the further details of its 
interpretation, it is either a tautology of the form P  P, or else logically 
inconsistent. If it is either then it cannot meet the requirements of an 
explanatory theory because it "explains" everything and nothing 
simultaneously. But if (U) is reconceptualized as a contingent principle of 
limited scope,
8
 subordinate in status to the requirements of logical 
consistency, then any reformulation of (U) needs to observe the constraint of 
logical consistency as well.  
                                                
8
Harvey Liebenstein reconceptualizes (U) in a very different direction in his Beyond 
Economic Man (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976). His attempt to 
reformulate microeconomic theory in terms of a basic concept of trying or "effort" to 
replace that of maximization avoids some of the difficulties I discuss below – as H. A. 
Simon's concept of "satisficing" does not (see his "A Behavioral Model of Rational 
Choice," Quarterly Journal of Economics 69 (1955), 99-118; and "Rational Choice and the 
Structure of the Environment," Psychological Review 63, 2 (1956), 129-38, discussed in 
Note 20 below). In Hard Choices (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), Isaac 
Levi subverts (U)'s claim to universality by demonstrating the inadequacy of revealed 
preference theory to characterize decision-making under the very widespread condition 
of unresolved conflict: Since its favored conception of optimality does not require a 
weak ordering of all the elements of the choice set, it recognizes optimal alternatives 
even when that set contains ordinal conflict among some of them. Hence revealed 
preferences may generate alternatives that are optimal without being admissable in a 
given value-structure. I myself mount complaints about the revealed preference 
interpretation of (U) in Chapter IV, Sections 1 and 2, below. Much less than being, in I. 
M. D. Little's words, "nothing other than a purely logical exercise" ("A Reformulation of 
the Theory of Consumer's Behavior," Oxford Economic Papers I (1949), 99), universalized 
utility theory, according to the main thesis of this chapter, is not even a logical exercise. 
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 This makes (U) and its alternative reformulations a special case of a more 
general, Kantian theory of rationality that situates the principle of 
noncontradiction at its foundation. However, by this I do not mean what 
Allais means. For him, action that is "non-self-contradictory" and so rational 
satisfies two criteria: first, its ends are "logically consistent;" and second, its 
means are appropriate to them. "Logically consistent ends" for Allais are those 
which constitute a set ordered by his axiom of absolute preference, i.e. such 
that its elements are ordered by the relation "<<".
9
  
 I agree with Allais' insistence that consistency is the only criterion for the 
rationality of ends, which are otherwise arbitrary, and with his sensitivity to 
legislating any more substantive, "politically correct" criteria for the 
rationality of ends.
10
 But his account would not suffice for logical consistency 
as philosophers ordinarily use that term; nor would the more general account 
of non-self-contradiction in which his notion of logical consistency figures. In 
the philosophical context, two sentences are consistent if and only if one does 
not contradict the other. We ascertain this by quantifying them using the 
conventions of predicate logic, and relating them by means of the traditional 
Boolean connectives ".", "v", "", and "~". However, the ends that constitute 
elements in Allais' ordered set are not quantifiable using the symbolic 
resources of predicate logic, and "<<" is not one of the Boolean connectives. 
Below in Chapter IV, Sections 2 and 3, I argue that no notion of consistent 
choice that does not meet these two basic philosophical desiderata can do the 
job even on its own turf; and in Volume II, Chapters II and III of this project I 
try to develop one that does. 
 
2. The Single End Interpretation of (U) 
 I describe as the single end interpretation of (U) the commonsense notion 
that a rational agent maximizes utility if he acts efficiently to achieve a 
particular goal, i.e. by minimizing the expenditure of resources in its service 
(this is efficiency in the pedestrian rather than the Pareto sense). Can any 
particular action fail to achieve its particular end efficiently in this sense? I 
conclude that either no action can, in which case (U) is vacuous; or else the 
concept of efficiency is inconsistent.  
In the single end interpretation of (U), we rely on an implicit ceteris 
paribus clause, by evaluating the rationality of an action in the service of one 
particular end, assuming all others to be fixed. Conventionally, this 
interpretation finds expression in questions as to whether a particular action 
is the most efficient way to achieve a given end. According to the pedestrian 
version of the concept of efficiency, we achieve such an end efficiently when 
                                                
9
 Allais, op. cit. Note 2, 40. 
10
 Ibid., 70 and footnote 52. 
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we minimize the expenditure of resources in its service, irrespective of other 
substantive ends we may have. The requirement to do this can be understood 
as following naturally from two weak assumptions: (1) that resources are 
limited; and (2) we have other ends. But even in a case in which both of these 
assumptions were false, i.e. in which an agent had just one end – for example, 
making money – and more than sufficient resources for achieving it, he would 
still have reason to minimize their expenditure. For the one end he had might 
still require adopting and achieving subsidiary or instrumental ends in order 
to achieve that one. Squandering resources on one part of his overall action 
plan might well leave him unable or less well equipped to bring about the 
others. More than sufficient resources are not the same as infinite resources, so 
he would still have to trade off their expenditure on some of his instrumental 
ends against their availability for achieving others. So minimizing 
expenditures in order to maximize achievement would be rational whether (1) 
and (2) held or not.
11
 In either case, this concept of efficiency is roughly 
interchangeable with that of utility-maximization.
12
   
 For example, dissecting the gluttonous spending patterns of the United 
States military by contrast with the deeply acculturated thrift of its declining 
manufacturing industry, Jane Jacobs remarks about industrial engineers that 
they are “major antagonists of waste and inefficiency … [t]heir objects are to 
maximize efficiency and minimize costs.”
13
 Similarly, the Waterford Crystal 
Company claims (unpersuasively) to repudiate efficiency in this sense by 
announcing that 
At Waterford, we take 1,120 times longer than necessary to create a glass. 
While a machine can churn one out in only 45 seconds, we take over 14 
                                                
11
 For this formulation of the argument, and at many points in this chapter I am grateful 
to Ned McClennen (Personal Communication, July 9, 1991), and to his Rationality and 
Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), from which I have learned a great deal. I discuss the significance of McClennen’s 
concept of resolute choice in Volume II, Chapter IV. 
12
Pace Harsanyi, who complains that "the means-end concept of rational behavior is too 
narrow because ... it restricts rational behavior to a choice among alternative means to a 
given end, and fails to include a rational choice among alternative ends" ("Advances in 
Understanding Rational Behavior," in John Harsanyi, Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, 
and Scientific Explanation (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976), 93. Harsanyi's criticism seems to 
ignore the ontological insecurity of the distinction between means and ends: Means or 
resources to achieve our final ends are themselves instrumental ends, and the mutual 
adjustment of final ends so as to preserve coherence and ensure their achievement is 
itself a means of maximizing utility. The discussion of opportunity costs that follows 
Harsanyi's criticism illustrates nicely the essential equivalence of efficiency-talk, cost-
benefit-talk, and utility-maximization talk. 
13
 Jane Jacobs, Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and 
Politics (New York: Random House, 1992). 
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hours to mouth-blow and hand-cut a single glass. But then, our goal is 
not efficiency, but beauty.
14
 
Of interest in both of these examples is the offhand assumption that efficiency 
itself can be a goal, or end. At first glance, this seems unproblematic. I may 
not think or visualize the concept of efficiency to myself when choosing the 
shortest route between the cleaners, the supermarket, and the bookstore. 
Nevertheless, I am certainly aiming to minimize the expenditure of time and 
energy as much as possible in doing my errands. If minimizing the 
expenditure etc. is the pedestrian concept of efficiency, and minimizing the 
expenditure etc. is what I am aiming at, then I am aiming at efficiency in the 
pedestrian sense. If I am aiming at it, then it is one of my ends.  
 
 
Figure 3. Efficiency as a Goal of Action 
                                                
14
The New York Times Magazine, February 14, 1988, 3. 
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 Although economists describe consumers as maximizing utility in their 
choices of commodity bundles, they do not ordinarily ascribe this to 
consumers as an end they intend to promote by making those choices. But this 
does not mean it is not one. For if, ex hypothesi, consumers thereby maximize 
utility in choosing the particular commodity bundles they choose, then 
maximizing utility is a conceptual or causal consequence of their choices. As 
such, it is either an intended or an unintended consequence. If it were an 
unintended consequence, then discovering that they had failed to maximize 
utility presumably would not lead them to revise their choices. But if 
consumers who chose commodity bundles that failed to maximize their utility 
would, upon discovering this, revise their choices, other things equal, then 
maximizing their utility is not an unintended consequence of their choices. 
Therefore it is an intended consequence of them, i.e. it is a goal or end. And 
therefore, the fact that economists do not recognize maximizing utility, i.e. 
efficiency, as an end does not mean it is not an end. Efficiency is an end, just 
as Jane Jacobs and the Waterford Crystal Company suppose. 
 However, the Waterford Crystal Company claims to reject this end for the 
sake of beauty. If the single end version of (U) is universal, it would then seem 
that the Waterford Crystal Company chooses beauty at the expense of 
rationality. But this is not obvious. Prereflectively, it is easy to imagine many 
alternatives to achieving an end efficiently – i.e. in a way that minimizes the 
expenditure of resources in its service – that are not prima facie irrational. I 
might opt for achieving an end expressively, elegantly, tastefully, honestly, 
diplomatically, traditionally, excitingly, gracefully, with panache, or in a way 
that preserves personal integrity. There is a prima facie adverbial parity 
between the concept of efficiency – i.e. of utility maximization – and those of 
beauty, elegance, honesty, etc. They each refer to conceptually distinct styles or 
manners of acting. Achieving my end efficiently is a manner in which I achieve 
my end – i.e. when I am feeling peppy and competent, just as is achieving an 
end diplomatically.  
 It is not hard to conceive a case in which these two manners of achieving 
an end might conflict. For example, the most efficient way of informing 
Clarence that his job application has been rejected may be to call him up and 
tell him just that. A more diplomatic, though less efficient way of conveying 
the same information would be to write Clarence a letter informing him who 
has been hired and thanking him for his interest. Other things equal, rejecting 
Clarence's job application in a way that does not hurt his feelings demands a 
more-than-minimal expenditure of resources in its service. That is, it demands 
that the goal of diplomacy override that of efficiency. If this overriding 
alternative end does not intuitively strike us as an obvious deviation from 
rationality, then we might need to invoke some more comprehensive 
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rationality principle in order to choose between the two. In Volume II, 
Chapter III I articulate one at length. 
 In addition to adverbial parity, there is also an intentional parity between 
the concepts of efficiency and the alternatives just mentioned. Achieving my 
end efficiently is not only a manner or style of achieving my end. Like other 
manners or styles, it is itself an end at which I may or may not aim – as is 
achieving my end tastefully, honestly, etc.
15
 Let a meta-end be an end or goal 
regarding the style or manner in which I aim to achieve my ordinary ends, or 
object-ends. Meta-ends, on this account, are adverbial descriptions of action, of 
the sort just mentioned, that I aim to realize in acting to achieve my object-
ends.  
 Orders of meta-ends may ramify as one considers in greater detail the 
style in which one wants to achieve some object-end. For example, Gladys 
may achieve her object-end of getting an education efficiently by going to 
college, and she may achieve this instrumental object-end in a way that tends 
to preserve her personal integrity by choosing among colleges with a socially 
progressive reputation. In this example, efficiency and the preservation of 
one's personal integrity are meta-ends.  
 Note also that the distinction between meta-ends and object-ends cuts 
across that between instrumental and final ends. A question as to the style in 
which one wants to achieve either instrumental or final ends may 
appropriately arise. And like object-ends, meta-ends, too, may be either 
instrumental or final in nature. Object-ends are, however, always 
instrumental to the achievement of meta-ends, whether these latter are 
instrumental or final in nature. Living the good life, for example, may be 
instrumental to the final meta-end of living in a graceful and aesthetically 
pleasing manner. 
 To say that I intend to achieve my end efficiently, or, alternatively, 
gracefully, does not imply that I must have such meta-ends consciously in 
mind when I act – anymore than I must my object-end. Let us say that I 
minimally intend to achieve some such end if, were I to discover that a 
particular action hindered this end, other things equal, this discovery would 
motivate me to refrain from performing it. Conversely, I do not minimally 
intend to achieve this end, if such a discovery would not motivate me to thus 
refrain from it. From now on, I shall use the word "intend" in this minimal 
sense. My main point is that achieving my end efficiently is itself a meta-end 
such that, if I were to discover that a particular action hindered it, it is an open 
question, dependent on context, whether this discovery would motivate me to 
refrain from performing it or not. So achieving my end efficiently is not a 
                                                
15
This distinction between adverbial and intentional parity corresponds to Jeremy 
Rifkind's distinction between efficiency as a method and efficiency as a value in his 
Time Wars (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1987), Chapter 8. 
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meta-end with a special value-neutral and conceptually necessary status. It is 
one contingent value among others among which an agent may legitimately 
choose. 
 It may seem, however, that this conclusion ignores the conceptual 
distinction between adverbial intention descriptions and one particular group 
of adjectives and adverbs – call them maximizing words – that may always 
modify them, i.e. terms like "most," "more," "less," "greatest," "successfully," 
"optimally," and "maximally." We can always evaluate our actions in terms of 
how fully, successfully, or maximally they achieve the meta-ends of taste, 
honesty, efficiency, etc. This fact may suggest that rational action always 
involves maximizing something,
16
 and that the seeming differences among 
these alternative meta-ends lie solely in the instrumental sources of utility 
they require us to maximize. If this is true, it means that efficiency or utility-
maximization does have a special value-neutral and logically necessary status 
after all. For however we seek to realize our object- or meta-ends, it appears, 
we are acting rationally only if we are efficient in realizing them in precisely 
that way. 
 But it is a mistake to try to reserve this privileged position for the concept 
of efficiency or utility-maximization. If I achieve any end I intend to achieve 
efficiently by virtue of achieving it successfully or maximally, then I act 
efficiently merely by acting with deliberate intent. This makes the concept of 
utility-maximization vacuous. To see this, suppose Reginald is a mole in a 
local governmental bureaucracy, and that his assigned end is to impede the 
functioning of this bureaucracy as fully as possible. So he deliberately tries to 
achieve the explicit object-ends of this bureaucracy inefficiently. He achieves 
this meta-end by flooding himself and his staff with useless paperwork. Thus 
Reginald aims to achieve the meta-end of inefficiency itself efficiently, via the 
instrumental object-end of useless paperwork. But he may achieve this 
effectively obstructive flood of useless paperwork either efficiently, by 
convincing his superiors of its utility; or inefficiently, by printing up the forms 
himself and hoping his staff will use them. Assume Reginald chooses the 
former, instrumentally efficient strategy. Convincing his superiors of the 
utility of more paperwork is a further instrumental object-end which he may 
achieve efficiently, by arguing eloquently the advantages of extra paperwork; 
                                                
16
As D. M. Winch puts it, "the consumer is said to maximize utility, and utility is 
defined as that which the consumer attempts to maximize. This truism is completely 
general and cannot be false." (Analytical Welfare Economics (Harmondsworth: Middlesex, 
1971), 17). Quoted in David Wiggins, "Weakness of Will, Commensurability, and the 
Objects of Deliberation and Desire," in Amelie O. Rorty, Essays on Aristotle's Ethics  (Los 
Angeles: University of California, 1980), 260. David Gauthier also holds this view in 
"Economic Rationality and Moral Side-Constraints," Midwest Studies in Philosophy III: 
Studies in Ethical Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), 76-77. 
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or inefficiently, by making a few perfunctory and tactless remarks about their 
record-keeping practices. Again assume Reginald chooses the former, 
instrumentally efficient strategy. Arguing eloquently is a further instrumental 
object-end he can achieve efficiently, by marshalling and rehearsing his 
arguments in advance; or inefficiently, by relying on his native wit and ability 
to be fast on his feet.   
 Now suppose that here Reginald chooses the latter alternative. He 
realizes, of course, that he could argue his case for more paperwork before his 
superiors with far greater eloquence if he marshalled and rehearsed his 
arguments beforehand; and that he is likely to forget some of them, as well as 
deliver those he remembers with less polish, if he relies on his native wit.  
Nevertheless, rehearsing beforehand is just too boring. And since Reginald 
opts for excitement over efficiency when these two particular meta-ends 
conflict, he chooses to rely on his native wit. Now having made this choice, 
there may well be further choices of instrumental strategy to be made: 
whether to speak quickly or slowly, whether to use a Latinate or an Anglo-
Saxon vocabulary, whether to wear a sports jacket or a three-piece suit, and so 
forth. In all such cases, Reginald may choose among these instrumental object-
ends on grounds of efficiency, or on other grounds – of excitement, 
tastefulness, honesty, etc. At no point does rationality require him to opt for 
efficiency over these other meta-ends, if they are more important to him, even 
if he thereby endangers his chances of efficiently sabotaging the bureaucracy's object-
ends. For although this is one of Reginald's long-term meta-ends, it may be 
perfectly rational for him to be unwilling to subordinate his personal style for 
its sake. 
 Now the efficiency expert may retort that Reginald thereby maximizes 
the instrumental meta-end of avoiding boredom and preserving his personal 
style by relying on his native wit; that he achieves this instrumental meta-end 
itself efficiently, by means of such reliance. But how does he maximize the 
instrumental object-end of relying on his native wit? By what means does he 
efficiently achieve it? The efficiency expert must reply that he maximizes the 
instrumental object-end of relying on his native wit simply by relying on it, or 
by performing any set of actions which relying on his native wit comprises. 
This is the "means" by which Reginald "efficiently achieves" this instrumental 
end. The efficiency expert's conception of achieving an end E by performing 
an instrumental action A thus conflates two cases: one in which E is a 
physically discrete causal consequence of A, in which case E can be achieved 
efficiently or inefficiently by means of A; and one in which E is merely an 
intentional redescription of A. In this second case, one "efficiently achieves" E 
by ascribing E to A as the object of its intention. All actions, in this sense, are 
"efficient means" to the ends they conceptually instantiate. So either efficiency 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception   109 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
is one contingently valuable meta-end among others, or else it is vacuously 
equivalent to intentional action in general.
17
  
 Now suppose, contra hypothesi, that efficiency is a universal but 
nonvacuous meta-end. Assume it is universal in that any basic action an agent 
performs in fact satisfies that agent's overriding desire to perform that action, 
and so maximizes his utility. If the meta-end of efficiency is universal, it has a 
special status that is not comparable to those of other meta-ends – honesty, 
taste, panache – that have adverbial and intentional parity. And since 
efficiency is a pervasive aim, it cannot conflict with any other meta-end. For 
however else one intends to act, and in whatever manner, one also intends to 
act efficiently.   
 Also assume the meta-end of efficiency is nonvacuous in that this is 
nevertheless not true by definition of "action." That is, performing a basic 
action that does not satisfy the agent's overriding desire to perform that action 
is a conceptual possibility. For example, suppose Edna has an overriding 
desire to speak from conviction. Yet when she says what she believes, the 
experience doesn't live up to her expectations. She feels that there must be 
some depth to her convictions she has not been able to plumb in speech. So 
she remains unsatisfied. Although she does speak from conviction, her 
utterance does not satisfy her overriding desire to speak from conviction. So 
Edna performs an action – uttering certain words – that does not satisfy her 
overriding desire to have uttered the very words she in fact uttered, and the 
                                                
17
Harsanyi explicitly embraces this latter alternative in Rational Behavior and Bargaining 
Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1977), 17: "In effect, what we mean by 'rational behavior' is essentially behavior ... 
highly adapted, within the possibilities available to the person concerned, to successful 
achievement of his intended goals." Similarly, I. M. D. Little (op. cit. Note 8, 91, footnote 
2) says, "The condition that an individual chooses a larger collection of goods is not, 
strictly, a postulate. It is an analytic proposition following from the meaning of an 
economic good. A larger collection of things is not necessarily a larger collection of 
goods." Also see Daniel Dennett, "Intentional Systems," The Journal of Philosophy LXIII, 4 
(February 25, 1971), 87-106. The prevailing tendency to embrace the definitional 
equivalence of utility-maximization and intentional action confutes David Wiggins' 
claim that "[t]he statement that there is something the subject seeks strictly to maximize 
is not itself a definition, and must be allowed to take its chance with other empirical 
sentences....To defend it as a truism is to make into humbug everything that social 
scientists say in deference to Popper about falsification." (ibid., 260). I think Wiggins 
here misidentifies (U) as a testable empirical hypothesis, when in fact it functions in 
utility theory as a higher-level principle of interpretation (see Chapter IV, Section 4, 
below, for further discussion). In a footnote he dismisses this possibility, by declaring 
that the truistic representation of an agent's choices by indifference maps is not 
necessarily projectible. But of course if these indifference maps are interpreted in 
accordance with the truism in question, i.e. as a truism, then it is hard to imagine how 
they could fail to be. 
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very words that nevertheless ensure the efficiency of her action. Uttering that 
sequence of words fails to satisfy Edna's overriding desire to utter that very 
sequence of words. This example can be generalized to any overriding desire 
to perform a basic action that builds in an expectation of satisfaction relative 
to which the performance of the desired action falls short.
18
 
 But if performing a basic action that does not satisfy the agent's overriding 
desire to perform that very action is a conceptual possibility, then it is a 
conceptual possibility that one might not minimally intend to satisfy one's 
overriding desire to perform that very action. That is, were one to discover 
that an overridingly desired basic act A hindered efficiency – i.e. that 
performing A failed to satisfy one's overriding desire to perform A, one 
nevertheless would not refrain from performing A. So, to recur once more to 
the example, were Edna to discover that speaking from conviction failed to 
satisfy her overriding desire to speak from conviction, she nevertheless would 
not refrain from speaking from conviction. She might intend to speak from 
conviction anyway, perhaps from a sense of duty, or a need to preserve her 
integrity, or from habit, without regard to her desires or their satisfaction. So 
it is a conceptual possibility that one might not minimally intend to act 
efficiently.  
However, this conclusion violates the above universality assumption, 
that however else one intends to act, and in whatever manner, one also 
intends to act efficiently. In this case, it seems, Edna both intends and does not 
intend to act efficiently. Similarly with any overridingly desired basic action 
that, in the performance, falls short of the satisfaction its performance was 
expected to give. The meta-end of efficiency – and therefore the single-end 
interpretation of (U) – cannot be both universal and nonvacuous without 
being inconsistent; indeed, self-contradictory.  
 This conclusion can be avoided by lifting the universality assumption 
from the single-end interpretation of (U). For if it is not true that one acts 
efficiently in performing whatever basic action one wants overridingly to 
perform, then there is no inconsistency in Edna's having on the one hand 
intended to act efficiently, and on the other failed to so act because she failed 
to satisfy her overriding desire to perform that act. There is no inconsistency 
                                                
18
 In "Adaptive Utilities," (Allais and Hagen, op. cit. Note 2, 223-241), Richard M. Cyert 
and Morris H. DeGroot propose a method of deriving, from the gap between an agent's 
expected utility for some preference and her actual utility obtained as the result of 
satisfying it, her "adaptive or dynamic utility function" for the satisfaction of that desire. 
Cyert and DeGroot's proposal would remove the contradiction I describe only for those 
preferences in which multiple trials enabled the process of learning to occur. Of course, 
trial repetition does not ensure that learning occurs, even for a fully rational agent. 
Therefore Edna's disappointed expectation of desire-satisfaction does not depend on 
interpreting her action as a single-trial case. Being a "superstitious pigeon" is consistent 
with fully informed instrumental rationality under objective probability assignments. 
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here because not all rational ends need be efficiently achieved; and in 
particular, Edna's action of speaking from conviction may be rational even 
though it does not satisfy her desire to have done so. Edna's example shows 
that even in the case of basic actions, one may act inefficiently and still be 
rational in some wider sense that is not captured by the single-end 
interpretation of (U). 
 
3. The Coherence Set Interpretation of (U) 
 
3.1. Coherence 
 Next let us see whether this conclusion holds for a more comprehensive 
interpretation of (U). I describe as the coherence set interpretation of (U) the 
stipulation that utility is maximized when all of one's ends at a particular 
moment are ordered relative to one another. I conclude that here, too, 
universalizing the principle of utility-maximization implies that it is either 
vacuous or inconsistent.  
In the coherence set interpretation, an agent maximizes utility by 
promoting as efficiently as possible the achievement of all of her ends 
conjointly. In this case the agent assigns a weight and a probability to each 
one of her ends, and trades off those of little weight or low probability against 
those with higher ones. She also discards those ends that are incompatible 
with others whose aggregate value is greater, as well as those which obstruct 
the achievement of others of greater aggregate value. She then schedules a 
plan for the achievement of those that remain. Many economists do not think 
of these calculations as actions a consumer performs. But they are 
nevertheless, and have costs and benefits just like all others. The costs and 
benefits of calculation themselves must be figured into the agent's calculations 
at the outset, so far as she is able to settle for herself the question as to 
whether these calculations are worth making; or whether it might rather 
maximize utility to organize all of her ends by repeatedly flipping a coin, 
perhaps, or according to a system of omens. Suppose she concludes that these 
calculations are worth making, and then proceeds to make them. Call the set 
of mutually coherent ends that results the agent's coherence set.  
 Now suppose Myrtle has the following two meta-ends, among others: (1) 
to achieve her object-ends simply; and (2) to achieve them efficiently in the 
single-end sense, i.e. with a minimum expenditure of resources in their 
service. Assume also that, as already argued in the preceding section, 
simplicity and efficiency have prima facie adverbial and intentional status. 
Then both of these meta-ends must enter into the calculus along with all the 
other ends Myrtle has. About the meta-end of efficiency, as with the meta-end 
of simplicity, Myrtle can and should calculate to what extent the aggregate 
value of each may outweigh the aggregate value of the other, and of object-
ends that are instrumental to them. For example, Myrtle may need to settle 
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the extent to which minimizing expenditures may conflict with her wish to 
live a simple lifestyle. Simplicity may dictate weaving her own cloth, 
chopping firewood, drawing rain water from a bucket on the fire escape, 
growing her own fruits and vegetables, etc. How much time, energy and 
resources is Myrtle willing to devote to these activities for the sake of 
simplicity before they come into conflict with her desire to get things done 
efficiently? This is the kind of question that Myrtle's calculations should be 
able to answer.  
 Henceforth I shall use the term efficiency to refer to the single (meta-) end 
interpretation of (U), and the term utility-maximization to refer to the 
coherence set interpretation of (U) within which all of an agent's ends, both 
object-ends and meta-ends, including the meta-end of efficiency, must be 
situated. (U) in the coherence set sense remains a meta-end because 
organizing, balancing, and scheduling all of one's ends are themselves an 
object of goal-directed deliberative activity, i.e. they constitute an end. And 
(U) in this sense is a meta-end because it is a style or manner in which one 
may achieve each of one's object-ends, i.e. such that the achievement of some 
one object-end advances, or at least does not obstruct, the achievement of any 
of one's other object-ends. 
 The resulting conception of a coherence set appears to be universal. First, 
it applies to the totality of any agent's ends, regardless of content. Second, it 
subjects any particular end or meta-end, including that of efficiency, to the 
same cost-benefit analysis by which all of the agent's other ends must be 
mutually adjusted. It also thereby illuminates the sense in which utility-
maximization in this universal, cost-benefit sense is not just one more 
contingently valuable meta-end, but rather does have a special value-neutral, 
logically necessary status. For when Myrtle asks herself at what point she 
should trade off the meta-end of efficiency against the meta-end of simplicity, 
she is really asking herself whether the cost of efficiency – i.e. sacrificing 
simplicity – may or may not outweigh its benefits; and whether, in fashioning 
her lifestyle, it really maximizes her utility to be efficient.  
 Since at bottom efficiency just is maximizing utility, this question may 
seem at first glance to have a paradoxical ring to it. But it is no more 
problematic than the question whether satisfying a certain desire itself is 
satisfying. In either case, there is no special difficulty about evaluating a 
lower-order value from the reflexive standpoint of that same value as a 
higher-order criterion. Efficiency as a meta-end that adverbially modifies an 
agent's achievement of various object-ends may be one such meta-end among 
many, all of which are subject to the higher-order regulating constraint of 
utility-maximization, itself an overriding meta-end of special status. 
 The resulting conception of a coherence set also seems to be nonvacuous, 
in that it is conceptually possible for an agent to violate it, i.e. fail to maximize 
utility, by failing to thus order all of her ends. She might include in the set an 
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end that conflicts with or obstructs others she deems more important. For 
example, Myrtle may find it very difficult to live simply, get things done 
efficiently, and hold down a full-time job. Or, to take another example, an 
agent might assign the greatest weight to an end with the lowest probability, 
such as winning the lottery, and subordinate all of her other endeavors to that 
one – thereby depriving herself of the resources necessary to achieve any of 
them, as the gambling addict does. So it would seem that the coherence set 
interpretation of (U) is not susceptible to the reproach of vacuous universality. 
 
3.2. Nonvacuity 
 But now let us examine each of these features, i.e. universality and 
nonvacuity, at greater length. First assume universality and consider 
nonvacuity. The claim is that an agent's coherence set as just described is 
nonvacuous in the sense that it is possible for him to violate it, by failing to 
order all of his ends in the requisite way. But is it possible for him to thus fail 
to order his actual ends? Suppose that, having arrived at such a coherence set, 
he now proceeds to pursue an end not contained in the set, that conflicts with 
its ordering. Is he maximizing utility anyway, or is he not?  
 There are at least three possible answers to this question. A first is that he 
is not; that he is then acting irrationally, since he is, by hypothesis, not 
advancing all the ends contained in the set. This is the answer the utility 
theorist should give. Nevertheless it ignores the criterion according to which 
we were originally supposed to identify irrationality, namely failure to adjust 
all of one's ends so as to produce a coherence set. The case is one in which the 
agent is guilty of no such failure. He simply pursues an end not contained in 
the set he successfully ordered.  
 It is tempting to respond that if he pursues this end, then it is his end that 
then must be ordered relative to the set. But this does not follow. It is not 
difficult to imagine a case in which an agent pursues an end that is not his 
own. For example, wives traditionally have been expected to pursue their 
husbands' ends, regardless of what they thought about those ends, and have 
done so sometimes despite their own severe reservations or opposition to 
them. If an agent can pursue an end that is not his own, then an agent can 
pursue an end not contained in the coherence set of all his ends. 
 A second answer might be that if the agent pursues such an end, then if it 
is his end, it conflicts with the coherence set he has ordered. He has, therefore, 
violated that set, has thereby failed to maximize utility, and so has acted 
irrationally. But the fact that he is pursuing an end of his that conflicts with 
the set he ordered is evidence – indeed, for the revealed preference theorist, 
conclusive evidence
19
 – that he has reorganized his priorities, reordered the 
set to incorporate the seemingly delinquent end, and indeed has ascribed to it 
                                                
19
I address revealed preference theory at length in Chapter IV, Sections 2 and 3, below. 
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overriding importance. So he is conforming to his coherence set, and his 
pursuit of this seemingly delinquent end promotes all of his ends after all. 
This answer saves the special, universal status of the utility-maximizing 
criterion. But it also implies that any end one pursues in action retrospectively 
satisfies the constraints of one's coherence set by reorganizing its priorities 
accordingly. This makes the coherence set vacuous, for any action one takes 
can be made to satisfy its requirements. 
 A third answer might be to concede that the delinquent end the agent 
pursues is an end, deny that it is his end, and deny also that pursuit of it 
counts as a genuine action. Here the thought would be that although he 
behaves intentionally in virtue of aiming at an end, the end he aims at is not 
an end he desires to obtain; so he merely "goes through the motions" of acting, 
without being motivated by the conative resolve that desire ignites. But this 
third answer would also underwrite the conclusion that his coherence set is 
vacuous. For it implies that any action that does not conform to it is not really 
an action at all. This means, in turn, that an agent cannot rationally regard any 
end he pursues as thwarting its constraints, consistently with regarding it as 
his end. He must discount any action he performs that appears to thwart its 
constraints either as third-personal, behavioral evidence that he has altered 
his coherence set to accommodate it; or else as mere physical behavior that is 
not, in fact, a genuine action. But this just seems mistaken.  
 Suppose, for example, that Sylvester must order the object-ends of being 
a dentist, being a poet, and making lots of money, and invokes the meta-end 
of utility-maximization to do so. Having decided that being a poet is 
incompatible with making lots of money whereas as being a dentist promotes 
it; and, moreover, that being a rich dentist would make him happier overall 
than being a poet, Sylvester then finds himself writing poetry, attending 
readings, publishing a little magazine, and neglecting his dental practice. He 
is deeply troubled about this behavior, and regrets in advance the many 
cavities he will not fill, dollars he will not make, and cruises he therefore will 
have to forego.  
 Obviously such cases of internal conflict require their own complex 
analysis. But there are two claims we probably ought not to include in such an 
analysis. First of all, it is not open to us to conclude that Sylvester's pursuit of 
poetry is not a genuine action at all. Writing poetry, attending readings, and 
publishing a little magazine are definitely actions, if any behavior is. Second, if 
he clearly recognizes that he is sacrificing happiness for the sake of his poetry 
(perhaps he even hopes that his suffering will improve it), it is not open to us 
to conclude that Sylvester's coherence set has changed to accommodate his 
poetry-seeking behavior – at least not without inviting the threat of vacuity. 
For recall that Sylvester organized that set according to the meta-end of 
utility-maximization. By sacrificing his happiness in order to write poetry, 
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Sylvester clearly fails to achieve that meta-end, if any action can. If no action 
can, then the vacuity of that meta-end follows immediately. 
 The notion of a coherence set of ends organized to maximize utility 
overall is defective as a universal criterion of rationality, because it assumes 
that we can always make an ordinal trade-off between those ends the 
achievement of which maximize utility and others whose utility costs are too 
great. But this assumption is false. Ends that are discarded from the coherence 
set on grounds of inferior utility do not necessarily disappear, if their 
qualitative character is sufficiently compelling. They may remain sources of 
intense longing and regret – intense enough to motivate action in their service, 
without upsetting the original ordering of the set. Indeed, their qualitative 
importance may increase, even as their ordinal rankings decrease. Therefore, 
an agent may rationally choose to forego utility-maximization for the sake of 
those ordinally inferior but qualitatively compelling ends, if they are 
compelling enough. To reply that an end that is sufficiently qualitatively 
compelling to motivate action must be ordinally overriding as well merely 
repeats the error of reasoning I am targeting, for it begs the question of 
whether or not qualitative superiority is reducible to ordinal superiority. 
Sylvester's choices suggest that it is not.  
 Thus an agent may choose rationally to live in a way that fails to 
maximize utility, and to accept his consequent unhappiness or dissatisfaction, 
if other considerations – for example, giving expression to his deepest 
impulses – are more qualitatively important (not: "more satisfying") to him. To 
then retort that if these other considerations really are more important to him 
then he has maximized utility after all is revert to the vacuous single-end 
interpretation of (U), in which any action one performs maximizes utility by 
definition. The vacuity of the coherence set can be avoided only by denying its 
universality.
20
  
 
                                                
20
H. A. Simon's modifications of the utility-maximization model of rationality (op. cit. 
Note 8) seem to me unsuccessful in circumventing the worries I have raised because, 
unlike Liebenstein's theory of "selective rationality" (op. cit. Note 8) which attempts to 
reformulate (U) in terms of a basic concept of "trying" or "effort", Simon's notion of 
"satisficing" is equally susceptible to the charge of vacuity. Indeed Simon comes close to 
acknowledging as much when, in discussing changes in an agent's "aspiration level" as 
definitive of a satisfactory alternative, he states that "[s]uch changes in aspiration level 
would tend to bring about a 'near-uniqueness' of the satisfactory solution and would also 
tend to guarantee the existence of satisfactory solutions. For the failure to discover a solution 
would depress the aspirational level and bring satisfactory solutions into existence." (italics 
added; "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," 111) Simon's satisficing agent would 
seem to be incapable of frustration, disappointment, or fear of failure. In fact her 
dissatisfaction level would be so low, and her contentment level so easily reached, that 
her motivation for acting in any way at all is obscure. 
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3.3. Universality 
 Now again assume, as in the single end interpretation of (U), that an 
agent's coherence set is nonvacuous, and consider further its universality. This 
means that on the one hand, it is conceptually possible for an agent to violate 
the set by pursuing an end not contained within it. On the other, its ordering 
subjects all meta-ends, including that of efficiency, to the same cost-benefit 
analysis by which all of an agent's object-ends must be mutually adjusted, 
regardless of particular content. So although this is not true merely by 
definition of having an end or of maximizing utility, utility-maximization in 
this sense is not just one more contingently valuable meta-end, but rather does 
have a special necessary and universal status.  
 If utility-maximization is a necessary and universal meta-end, then it is 
an absolute meta-end. First, it is permanently superior in ranking to all of an 
agent's other meta- and object-ends. Like moral side-constraints on action,
21
 
utility-maximization is, first of all, an intentional object (conscious or 
otherwise) of goal-oriented behavior, i.e. it is an end. Second, it is an end that 
is not subject to revision or sacrifice for the sake of otherwise realizing any 
further object- or meta-ends. Rather, one must sacrifice, revise, or reschedule 
these other ends in order to maintain conformity to the constraints one's 
coherence set imposes, just as (U) requires. Failure to make such revisions 
results in violation of the set.  
 Moreover, utility-maximization in this universal sense is a final meta-end, 
in that any considerations invoked to justify its imposition must be 
noninstrumental in nature. So I cannot convince you to organize all of your 
ends into a coherence set that maximizes utility by pointing out that it 
maximizes utility to do so. For this would make (U) on the coherence set 
interpretation either instrumental to some higher-order (U) on some other 
interpretation; or else redundant. Similarly, I cannot justify your satisfying a 
certain desire by pointing out that it satisfies that desire to do so.  
 In Chapter II.2 we have already previewed Chapter VIII.2’s argument 
below, that one may ramify orders of desire infinitely in recursive acts of self-
evaluation, without meeting the requirement of rational justification. But 
quite independently of that argument, we can already see that invoking any 
such higher-order criterion of evaluation to rationally justify itself is merely 
redundant. Hence Chapter II’s conclusion regarding desire applies here to 
utility-maximization: whatever the considerations are that justify organizing 
one's ends in order to maximize utility, these must be independent of utility-
maximizing considerations themselves. But within this model of rationality, 
utility-maximizing considerations are the only considerations available. So 
according to the coherence set interpretation of (U), any further 
                                                
21
of the sort discussed by Robert Nozick in Chapter III of his Anarchy, State and Utopia  
and David Gauthier (op. cit. Note 1). 
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considerations, whatever they are, must be arbitrary from the point of view of 
rational justification.
22
 
 So, to recur to the example, suppose Sylvester wants to know whether it 
is best for him to organize his ends according to (U) in the first place. That 
principle itself can afford him no answer. He may seek one outside the 
constraints of the utility-maximizing model of rationality – such as that  
 
  (E) If a rational agent maximizes utility, he expresses himself. 
 
But if (E) is, indeed, external to the model, then either it justifies (U) by 
invoking a more basic value – self-expression – to which (U) is in fact 
subordinate; or else it has no authoritative status relative to (U), and so cannot 
be invoked as a reason for adhering to it. If (E) is internal to the model, on the 
other hand, then the costs and benefits of following it must be instrumentally 
calculated just like any other. Finally, if (U) is so understood to presuppose or 
imply (E), then (E) is not independent of utility-maximizing considerations 
after all. Thus invoking a principle such as (E) as the "further consideration" 
that would purport to justify (U) itself would be unsuccessful. Either (U) is a 
first principle, or it is not. 
 If utility-maximization is an absolute and final meta-end, it cannot be 
abandoned if its opportunity costs relative to other final ends seem too high. 
For by hypothesis, utility-maximization is not the kind of end to which such 
costs and benefits themselves can be assigned. Suppose Sylvester carefully 
and reflectively decides that he would be happier overall being a rich dentist 
than being a poet. Then according to this model, he cannot then go on to reject 
the meta-end of being happier overall on the grounds that it obstructs 
expression of his deepest creative impulses to attain it. That would be to reject 
the very criterion relative to which expressing his deepest impulses was 
evaluated and rejected. If Sylvester decides that expressing his creative 
impulses is more important, then on this view that is what makes him 
happiest overall. That is what maximizes his utility.   
 So utility-maximization is not only an absolute, final meta-end, the status 
of which is arbitrary with respect to rational justification. In addition, it is not 
                                                
22
Indeed this implication is explicitly embraced by the progenitor of principle (U) when 
he argues that 
'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the 
scratching of my finger.  'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, 
to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me.  'Tis 
as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my 
greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter.  
(David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1968), 416). In Chapter XIV, I argue that Hume is not merely being provocative in 
this and comparable passages, i.e. that Hume really is a Humean. 
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an end about which further rational deliberation is possible. Of course this 
does not mean it cannot function as a methodological criterion for identifying 
and evaluating rational action from the third-person perspective. But it does 
mean that it cannot be an ascribable meta-end that any utility-maximizing 
agent might rationally and deliberatively choose to adopt. It is either an 
absolute, final, and rationally arbitrary meta-end within the rationality model 
of utility-maximization, or it is not an end at all. It would be unfortunate 
indeed if this were the reasoning that motivated some economists to deny that 
(U) is an end. 
 But an absolute and final meta-end that is by definition incapable of 
entering into a utility-maximizing agent's cost-benefit analysis cannot be 
ranked relative to her other final ends, not even as superior to all of them. For to 
ascribe to it this superior ranking implies that, all things considered, it has 
lower opportunity costs than any alternatives. And this presupposes the 
contingent dispensability of (U) we have just seen is excluded by stipulation 
of its universality. Hence utility-maximization is not just a rationally arbitrary, 
absolute, final meta-end; it is a conceptually inconsistent one. For it both is 
and is not superior in ranking to all other ends, so both is and is not absolute, 
and so both is and is not universal. Therefore it is not a meta-end that any 
utility-maximizing agent could consistently intend, even minimally, to 
adhere. It seems, then – here as in the single-end interpretation, that assuming 
(U) to be both nonvacuous and universal implies that it is inconsistent. (U) can 
be made consistent only if it is either vacuous or limited in its scope of 
application. 
 I take it that these conclusions give us some reason to rethink the claim 
that (U) is universal. For of course people do sometimes carry out their 
intentions to accomplish things efficiently, and to maximize utility in all of 
their projects. The argument has not been that utility-maximization is an 
inherently inconsistent end. Rather, it is inherently inconsistent when 
conceived as an absolute final end. Utility-maximization as an overriding value 
could not be both universal and nonvacuous in its application, for in that case 
it would be conceptually inconsistent. As soon as we acknowledge that utility-
maximizing considerations might be compared with other contingently 
valued meta-ends according to completely different and extrinsic rationality 
criteria and ranked or rejected accordingly, the inconsistency disappears. If 
this strikes you as a reason to reject its claim to universality, then you must 
view the value of rational consistency as overriding it. This is the extrinsic 
rationality criterion I shall try to defend at length in Volume II. 
 
4. Three Interpretations of "Utility" 
 So far I have argued that, in order to avoid the Scylla of vacuity and the 
Charybdis of inconsistency, (U) must be understood as contingent and 
restricted in its scope of instantiation. In discussing the single end and 
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coherence set interpretations of (U) in Sections 2 and 3 above, I have deployed 
an uninterpreted concept of utility itself that is loosely interchangeable with 
commonsense concepts of happiness, desire-satisfaction, etc. It may seem that 
my arguments have depended on this uninterpreted concept of utility, such 
that they would collapse if this concept were specified to denote one 
particular set of intentional conditions rather than some other. But I now go 
on to reject the suggestion that the implied vacuity or inconsistency of (U) 
depends on such an uninterpreted concept of utility, and fails when some 
particular interpretation is supplied.
23
 In this section I argue that it does not 
matter whether the concept of utility is interpreted phenomenologically, 
psychoanalytically, or behaviorally. The problem remains: If (U) describes an 
end that agents always have, i.e. a universal end, then it is vacuous. If the 
utility theorist tries to maintain universality while denying vacuity, then we 
may simply repeat the reasoning of Sections 2 and 3 and conclude to 
inconsistency. 
 
4.1. The Phenomenological Interpretation 
 The classical concept of utility was understood to refer to occurrent 
happiness, pleasure, or the satisfaction of desire
24
 as a conscious mental state, 
or disposition to have such states.
25
 Call this the phenomenological interpretation 
of the concept of utility. As we have already seen in Chapter II.2.1, happiness, 
pleasure and desire-satisfaction are notoriously nonequivalent. But for 
purposes of the present argument we lose nothing by regarding them as more 
or less interchangeable.
26
 On the phenomenological interpretation, a fully 
                                                
23
So far as I know, this suggestion first appears in Ward Edwards, op. cit. Note 2, 382. 
24
The traditional definition of utility as happiness or pleasure is to be found in Sidgwick, 
The Methods of Ethics (New York: Dover, 1966), Book I, Chapter IV; Book II, Chapters I-
III; Book III, Chapter XIV; Book VI, Chapter I. Also see Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to 
the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart (London: 
Athlone, l970), Chapter I, Sections 1.-2. Richard Brandt discusses the merits of the 
"happiness' versus the "desire" theory in his A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979), Chapter XIII. Also see his "The Concept of Welfare" 
(unpublished paper, 1980). 
25
Brandt's own definition is dispositional. See his A Theory of the Good and the Right, ibid. 
Chapters II.1 and XIII.2; and Richard Brandt and Jaegwon Kim, "Wants as Explanations 
of Actions," in N. C. Care and C. Landesman, Eds. Readings in the Theory of Action 
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1969), 199-213. 
26
But see Brandt's analysis of the different implications for utilitarianism of each in A 
Theory of the Good and the Right, ibid. Wayne Davis analyses occurrent happiness in terms 
of desire-satisfaction in "A Theory of Happiness," American Philosophical Quarterly 18, 2 
(April 1981), 111-119; and identifies occurrent happiness with pleasure in "Pleasure and 
Happiness," Philosophical Studies 39 (1981), 305-317. 
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rational agent performs actions that multiply and intensify these states as 
fully as possible. Thus particular final as well as instrumental ends are 
understood as instrumental to the further, ultimate end of maximizing utility.  
 The stipulation of happiness or desire-satisfaction as the ultimate end 
does not in all cases imply that all of an agent's particular ends must be 
instrumental to it. Instead, some might be constitutive of it, and so could be 
identifiable final ends in their own right.
27
 But in utility theory, there is an 
implicit distinction between structure and intention that requires this 
inference. Let a, b, c, ... be structurally constitutive of X if a, b, c, ... are in fact 
always found together, and together constitute X. Let a, b, or c, ... be 
structurally instrumental to X if X is a causally or conceptually distinct 
consequence of a, b, or c; and not vice versa. Let a, b, and c be intentionally 
constitutive of X if to intend, desire, or believe a, b, c, ... is to intend, desire or 
believe X. And finally, let a, b, or c be intentionally instrumental to X if one 
intends, desires or believes a, b, or c only if one believes that a, b, or c results in 
X.  
 Now it may be that the achievement of certain ends is inextricably linked 
with a state of happiness or desire-satisfaction, in that their achievement is 
always in fact accompanied by it. Experiencing deep and satisfying 
friendships, or fulfilling work, or a work of art, may have this character, 
whereas driving a hard bargain, having a well-paying job, or listening to an 
edifying lecture may not. Ends that are inextricably linked with the experience 
of happiness or desire-satisfaction are, to be sure, structurally constitutive of 
those mental states.
28
 Nevertheless if their only intentional function is to 
engender these states; if one consciously works to achieve these ends only if 
and because they result in these states, and not for any other reasons (such as 
that they are intrinsically valuable), then they are intentionally instrumental to 
them. And this is the role that classical utility theory assigns to all such ends. 
They are all instrumental to the maximization of utility, understood as 
happiness, pleasure, or desire-satisfaction. Hence classical utility theory 
                                                
27
See W. F. R. Hardie's distinction between inclusive and dominant ends in "The Final 
Good in Aristotle's Ethics," Philosophy XL (l965), 277-295. 
28
I take Sidgwick to be denying this point when he says that "if I in thought distinguish 
any feeling from all its conditions and concomitants – and also from all its effects on the 
subsequent feelings of the same individual or of others – and contemplate it merely as 
the transient feeling of a single subject; it seems to me impossible to find in it any other 
preferable quality than that which we call its pleasantness, the degree of which is only 
cognizable directly by the sentient individual." (The Methods of Ethics, op. cit. Note 24, 
Book II, Chapter II, Section 2, p. 128). 
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assigns to (U) a universal and logically necessary status. And we have already 
seen that this means it is either vacuous or inconsistent.
29
   
 
4.2. The Psychoanalytic Interpretation 
 Utility theorists sometimes try to meet this charge by appending to (U) a 
theory of unconscious desires. They reason that actual agents do not 
invariably maximize utility merely by acting intentionally, because actions are 
sometimes motivated by unconscious, destructive desires that may cause one 
a great deal of conscious unhappiness or dissatisfaction. Hence though (U) is 
true for fully rational agents, it is not true for conflicted, ambivalent, self-
destructive, or self-deceived actual agents. Hence it cannot be vacuously true. 
Call this the psychoanalytic interpretation of the concept of utility.  
 Let us grant, for the sake of argument, the distinction between fully 
rational and imperfectly rational agents that I claimed in the introduction to 
this chapter to be irrelevant to my argument in this section. Even if we do so, 
this interpretation does not have the implications its proponents claim. 
Stipulating the existence of unconscious desires whose satisfaction thwart 
conscious ends implies unconscious ends they do not thwart but rather 
achieve. Then conscious actions and the ends they promote become 
instrumental means to the achievement of those unconscious ends.
30
 And the 
                                                
29
In this respect, classical utility theory seems mistaken on purely common-sense 
psychological grounds. Happiness or pleasure may be merely a contingent consequence 
or side-effect of an end we deliberately adopt, rather than that to which all our ends are 
intentionally instrumental, as Bishop Butler argues (Fifteen Sermons, Sermon XI, 415; 
reprinted in The British Moralists 1650-1800, Volume I: Hobbes-Gay, Ed. D. D. Raphael 
(Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1969). For example, gratification may be a valuable side-
effect of personal integrity, but individuals may strive to achieve this end even when no 
such gratification is anticipated. Reliance upon common-sense distinctions among our 
mental states, and consequent application of the terms "utility," "happiness," or "desire-
satisfaction" to some of them and not others, enables us to both retain the conceptual 
resources for distinguishing expected utility-maximization from other ends of action, 
and thus pick out the full range of mental phenomena a social theory is concerned to 
explain. (David Lewis makes much the same point in "Radical Interpretation," 
Philosophical Papers, Volume I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 110, when he 
remarks, "If our interest is in the philosophy of mind and of language, then the pursuit 
of ontological parsimony seems to me an unnecessary distraction" – without, I think, 
seeing the implications for his own use of the belief-desire model of action in that 
discussion.) In this case, (U) holds only under certain contingent circumstances that 
may or may not obtain for an agent. But she may act with full rationality nevertheless. 
30
But see Peter Alexander, "Rational Behavior and Psychoanalytic Explanation," in Care 
and Landesman, for a different view. Theodore Mischel defends Freudian explanation 
against Alexander's criticism (misguidedly, I think) in "Concerning Rational Behavior 
and Psychoanalytic Explanation," Mind 74 (1965), 71-78. A more moderate defense is 
provided by Robert Audi, "Psychoanalytic Explanation and the Concept of Rational 
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conscious utility such actions fail to maximize become mere opportunity costs 
that are by definition outweighed by the unconscious utility they succeed in 
maximizing.  
 Moreover, the point has been made often that there are no firm 
theoretical constraints on when we are justified in invoking unconscious 
desires to explain action, nor even on what those desires must be.
31
 This 
means that whenever an action appears to be destructive or self-defeating for 
the agent who performs it, an unconscious desire it satisfies can always be 
found. So interpreting (U) to include unconscious as well as conscious desires 
does not circumvent the charge of vacuity. Quite the contrary.  
 
4.3. The Behavioral Interpretation 
 The phenomenological and psychoanalytic interpretations of the concept 
of utility both rely on the background concept of a phenomenal mental state. 
It may seem that this background concept is to blame for failing to block the 
charge of vacuity. Of course a mental state-conception of utility is vacuous, 
the argument might go. Since we never experience another's conscious (or our 
own unconscious) motivation first hand, we are free to speculatively attribute 
to an agent any conscious or unconscious motive we like in order to explain 
his behavior.
32
  
                                                                                                     
Action," The Monist 56 (1972), 444-464. Alexander's thesis is augmented by Harvey 
Mullane, "Psychoanalytic Explanation and Rationality," The Journal of Philosophy LXVIII, 
14 (1971), 413-426. 
31
To my knowledge, the first argument to this effect is to be found in B. F. Farrell, "The 
Criteria for a Psychoanalytic Interpretation," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Supplementary Volume XXXVI (1962). Also see Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: 
The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 37-38; Frank 
Cioffi, "Freud and the Idea of a Pseudo-Science," in Robert Borger and Frank Cioffi, 
Explanation in the Behavioral Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 
471-499; Adolph Grünbaum, "How Scientific is Psychoanalysis?" in Raphael Stern, 
Louise S. Horowitz, and Jack Lynes, Eds., Science and Psychotherapy (New York: Haven, 
1977); "Is Freudian Psychoanalytic Theory Pseudo-Scientific by Karl Popper's Criterion 
of Demarcation?" Americal Philosophical Quarterly XVI, 2 (April 1979), 131-141; 
"Epistemological Liabilities of the Clinical Appraisal of Psychoanalytic Theory," Nous 
XIV, 3 (September 1980), 307-385; Richard Nisbett and Timothy Wilson, "Telling More 
than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes," Psychological Review LXXXIV 
(1977), 231-259; Edward Erwin, "The Truth about Psychoanalysis," The Journal of 
Philosophy LXXXVIII, 10 (October 1981), 549-560. 
32
 This argument appears explicitly in Joel Feinberg, “Psychological Egoism,” in Joel 
Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau, Eds., Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic 
Problems of Philosophy (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998), 493-505; 
and in James Rachels, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: Random House 
1986). 
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 This argument explains the vacuity of utility-ascriptions by the 
inaccessibility of mental states. It reasons that this inaccessibility furnishes the 
license to arbitrarily conjecture mental states of third-personally observed 
agents or actions, and so to ascribe utility-maximizing motives in a similarly 
arbitrary manner. The implication is that a physical state-conception of utility 
would avoid these difficulties, because a physical state is an interpersonally 
accessible state that restricts speculative motivational explanations to what is 
third-personally observable. Thus it motivates a behavioral interpretation of the 
concept of utility, the theory of revealed preference. According to revealed 
preference theory,
33
 utility rankings – preferences – are revealed in observable 
behavior. Any action an agent performs expresses his preference for that 
result actually achieved, and/or some finite set of its consequences. If one 
chose or preferred that end one actually achieved, then all of one's behavior is 
by definition fully intentional, and one always chooses to act as one most 
prefers to act.
34
  
 But if every action expresses the overriding preference to have performed 
precisely that action, then citing that preference can provide no independent 
explanation of why that action, rather than some other, was performed; this is 
Nagel's concept of a motivated desire, discussed at greater length in Chapter 
VII.2.3 below. Instead we must seek an account of why the agent had that 
preference. Such an account might appeal to environmental and biological 
influences; the agent's experiences, values, and beliefs; social and historical 
determinants; impulses, cravings, and occurrent drives (i.e. Nagel's 
unmotivated desires); and so forth. Such an account will illuminate some of 
the causal connections between these factors and the agent's actual behavior.  
But it also eliminates the concept of preference revealed in behavior – i.e. of 
motivated desires – as an intervening explanatory variable. At least this 
oversimplified formulation of the theory would seem to hasten the conclusion 
to vacuity rather than sidestep it. 
                                                
33
The basic idea of revealed preference theory is in Frank P. Ramsey, "Truth and 
Probability," in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, Ed. R. B. 
Braithwaite (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), 157-198. P. A. Samuelson first 
formulates it explicitly in "A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer Behavior," and "A 
Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer Behavior: An Addendum," Economica 5 (1938), 
61-71 and 353-4. Also see I. M. D. Little, op. cit. Note 8, 90-99. Little later anticipates the 
vacuity problem discussed here, but apparently without seeing its implications for the 
theory of revealed preference. See his Critique of Welfare Economics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970), Chapter II, esp. 21-22.  Amartya Sen states and critiques these 
implications in "Behavior and the Concept of Preference," Economica 40 (1973), 241-259; 
and "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory," 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, 4 (1977), 317-44. 
34
See Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy, p. xi, op. cit. Note 1. 
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 Moreover, Sen has argued that the theory of revealed preference has not 
succeeded in detaching the concept of utility from inaccessible mental states. 
For the notion that an individual expresses or reveals his expected utility 
rankings in his behavior presupposes that there is, indeed, some internal 
mental state his behavior reveals.
35
 Then it is an open and empirical question 
whether his observable behavior actually does express that state, or whether it 
is motivated by covert, strategic ends. If it is covertly motivated, there exists 
an instrumental relationship between his overt behavior and the covert ends it 
promotes. If one of his preferences is to conceal his true preferences, then he 
maximizes utility by expressing false preferences in his overt behavior. 
Therefore, either the agent's behavior itself satisfies his preferences – thus 
maximizing utility constitutively, or else it is instrumental to the satisfaction 
of covert preferences – thus maximizing utility instrumentally. Structurally, 
the behavioral interpretation of utility has the same infelicitous consequences 
as the psychoanalytic interpretation. The following chapter pursues further 
some of the infelicities attendant on the behavioral interpretation of utility-
maximization. 
 
 
                                                
35
Amartya K. Sen, "Behavior and the Concept of Preference," op. cit. Note 32. 
 
 
Chapter IV. The Utility-Maximizing Model of Rationality:  
Formal Interpretations 
 
 
In this chapter I consider and evaluate some more formal versions of the 
claim to universality of the utility-maximizing model of rationality (U), as 
formulated in Section 1 of Chapter III. Readers who are uninterested in 
technical exposition are invited to skip directly to Sections 4 and 5 below, 
which offer conclusions pertinent to the discussions of both chapters. Section 
1 criticizes the attempts of Von Neumann-Morgenstern, Allais, and others to 
extend the behavioral and phenomenological interpretations respectively of 
(U) into interpersonal comparisons of utility. This extension is usually 
understood to be required merely for deriving a social utility function from 
individual ones. But the viability of third-personally observable ascriptions of 
utility, and hence of the behavioral interpretation of (U), themselves 
presuppose an interpersonally shared criterion of utility, and therefore the 
ability to make interpersonal comparisons. Even Allais’ phenomenological 
interpretation of (U) depends on an unexamined conception of veridically 
observable speech behavior. Hence my argument, that interpersonal 
comparisons – and therefore the interpersonally communicable utility-
ascriptions based on them – are impossible whether utility states are 
empirically observable or not, has unfortunate implications for both 
interpretations.  
Section 2 contends that the Ramsey-Savage consistency constraints on 
preference rankings by themselves do not succeed in both rescuing the utility-
maximizing model from vacuity and preserving its universality, because they 
do not successfully exclude preferences that are, from an external perspective, 
identifiably logically inconsistent; and that excluding them by fiat does not 
solve the problem. I suggest – but defer to Volume II extended defense of the 
thesis – that constraints of logical consistency would rescue (U) from vacuity. 
I similarly defer to that volume extended discussion of McClennen's concept 
of resolute choice as in effect supporting my analysis. I issue a promissory 
note, to be redeemed in Volume II, Chapter III, as to how such constraints of 
logical consistency on preferences might be symbolized, using the traditional 
Boolean connectives and some familiar conventions of predicate logic, so as to 
formally exclude cyclical rankings. Finally, I defer to that discussion an 
extended argument for the thesis that (U) is a special case of a different 
conception of logically consistent choice that is much broader in scope. Hence 
my discussion in Sections 2 and 3 merely lays the critical groundwork for 
several substantive suggestions I make later as to how (U) might be rethought 
so as to avoid some of the problems I raise here.  
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Unlike most formal decision theory, which basically ignores the 
traditional Boolean connectives, Jeffrey-Bolker expected utility theory
1
 does 
not. It uses them to construct preference alternatives comprising strings of 
weighted and probabilistically defined propositions and complex gambles 
among them. But it leaves undisturbed the conventional connectives imported 
from mathematics  (“>,” “≥,” “=,”) for ordering those complex preferences 
themselves. This leaves moot the question whether or not strictly logical 
interrelationships among them also obtain. So it may seem that in general, the 
canonical notation and axiomatic formulation of decision theory place it 
outside the purview and constraints of classical logic. However, the mere fact 
that formal decision theory in its canonical symbolization does not recognize 
the constraints of classical logic would not seem sufficient grounds for 
inferring that those constraints do not apply. Similarly, the fact that we cannot 
seem to symbolize logically the inconsistency involved in a cyclical ranking 
does not suffice to infer that no logical inconsistency is present. The question 
whether or not a cyclical ranking violates the law of noncontradiction is not in 
theory unanswerable. In Section 3, I merely raise this issue for discussion, by 
showing some of the commonsense ways in which a cyclical ranking certainly 
does seem logically inconsistent, even though the canonical notation of formal 
decision theory does not allow us to express this. I defer to Volume II, Chapter 
III a full and detailed treatment of this topic, including some suggestions as to 
how this notation might be modified so as to reveal its subordination, not 
only philosophically but also formally, to the requirements of logical 
consistency. 
Sections 4 and 5 argue that thus relativizing the Humean model renders 
it, like the maximin principle, contingent with respect to the requirements of 
rational action more generally understood. Only after reaching this conclusion 
do I address the metaethical status of the utility-maximizing model of 
rationality. Most of this chapter looks at the explanatory reach of this theory 
without regard to its metaethical status as normative or descriptive within any 
particular discussion.  The question whether a theory is explanatory or not can 
be answered independently of the question whether it has a normative or a 
descriptive metaethical status.  The metaethical status of any principle is fully 
exhausted by specifying the relation between two descriptive versions of it: 
that which describes actual behavior and that which describes ideal behavior.  
                                                
1
 See Richard C. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision, Second Edition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983), especially Chapter 9; Ethan D. Bolker, “A Simultaneous 
Axiomatization of Utility and Subjective Probability,” Philosophy of Science 34 (1967), 
333-340; and Bolker, “An Existence Theorem for the Logic of Decision,” Philosophy of 
Science 67 (2000), S14-S17. I discuss the role of the indifference relation in the Jeffrey-
Bolker representation theorem in Volume II, Chapter III.7. 
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A theory can be both explanatory and normative if it explains the behavior of 
an ideal agent who sets a standard we are exhorted to emulate.  
Section 4 considers the normative implications and conceptual 
inconsistencies of (U) as a limiting ideal, in order to demonstrate why it 
cannot be defended as a higher-level, prescriptive principle of interpretation 
that is therefore immune to Popperian falsification requirements. Yet even if 
the utility-maximizing model is a bona fide explanatory theory of necessarily 
limited scope, utility theory can be no more or less prescriptive and value-
laden than moral theory. Section 5 therefore concludes with a brief 
comparison between Kantian moral theory and utility theory as two theories 
of value that compete for foundational status, each subordinating the other to 
itself, and between which we must choose to explain the data of human 
behavior. The utility-maximizing model is argued to be at best a contingent 
normative theory that loses out to a Kantian model of rationality for primacy 
within our conceptual scheme. I develop the thesis that a Kantian moral 
theory is a descriptive and explanatory theory to which we bear a special 
relation in Volume II, Chapters V.5 and IX. 
 
1. Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility 
 The behavioral interpretation of (U) was intended to be a theory of 
consumer behavior freed from dependence on the concept of utility 
interpreted as an inaccessible mental state. The underlying reasoning was that 
utility states would be accessible if and only if they were empirically 
observable from a third-personal perspective. We could then meaningfully 
compare them, and ascribe utility rankings to an agent's ends on the basis of 
those empirically based comparisons. Since the actual values of each of those 
ends would be interpersonally accessible, the resulting utility-ascriptions 
would be empirically confirmable and so nonvacuous. But utility-ascriptions 
to third-personally observable behavior can be empirically confirmable only if 
there is some interpersonally shared criterion of utility relative which such 
utility-ascriptions can be confirmed. That is, the feasibility of third-personally 
observable ascriptions of utility – and so of the behavioral interpretation of 
(U), the theory of revealed preference – presupposes the ability to make 
interpersonal comparisons of utility. Unfortunately we have no such ability.   
The problem of interpersonal comparisons ordinarily arises in the context 
of how to extract a social utility function from individual ones. But it is not 
unique to that context. My ascription of utility-maximization to your behavior 
requires a similarly rule-governed relationship between my criteria for 
assessing utility-maximization and your purported manifestation of it. That is, 
it requires that the type and degree of utility-maximization I see in your 
behavior be the same as the type and degree of utility-maximization you see 
your behavior as actualizing; that we share in common a quantitative 
standard of utility-maximization by which both my judgment and your 
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behavior can be calibrated. I now argue that interpersonal comparisons, and 
so the utility-ascriptions based on them, would be impossible whether utility 
states were empirically observable or not.
2
 Hence their accessibility would 
ensure neither their empirical confirmability, nor, therefore, the nonvacuity of 
those utility-ascriptions. 
 
1.1. The Social Utility Function 
 Interpersonal comparisons of utility are what we need to be able to make 
in order to derive from the measurement of individual utilities a social utility 
function representing the combined utility functions of individuals.
3
 The 
simplest such function would be additive: all individual utility functions 
would be summed to total the social utility function. Other possibilities would 
include finding the average or median, or a representative utility function of 
all individuals.   
 Measuring the happiness or utility level of a single individual would 
seem to present no obvious difficulty. We simply ask her to make consistent 
pairwise comparisons among given available options F, G, and H such that F 
> G (= F is strictly preferred to G), G > H, and F > H; and then rank them in 
the resulting order of preference, i.e. F, G, H. This much gives us an ordinal 
utility ranking, in which we can ascertain the agent's preferences without 
regard to the numerical values that may be assigned to them. Such values 
may be arbitrary so long as they descend from F to H, or absent altogether. So 
although such a ranking certainly may be combined with that given by other 
agents (voting would be the obvious example), its values cannot be 
interpersonally compared. That is, they cannot be manipulated arithmetically 
relative to others in order to derive a social utility function. 
 By contrast, a cardinal utility ranking of the agent's preferences would 
produce a fixed proportion of intervals on a preference scale that could be 
calibrated by the functions n, n+1 for any n. Following Edgeworth,
4
 assume 
that the agent can distinguish only a finite number of utility levels; and is 
indifferent between alternatives at the same level. Then a cardinal measure of 
the utility of different alternatives to an agent would be the number of levels 
on that agent's utility scale that separate them. But cardinality alone does not 
ensure interpersonal comparability. To make interpersonal comparisons, we 
                                                
2
 John Rawls stated but did not elaborate this thesis while teaching a class in Social and 
Political Philosophy in 1974. In this section I attempt that elaboration.   
3
See John Broome, "Utilitarianism and Expected Utility," The Journal of Philosophy 
LXXXIV, 8 (August 1987), 405-422 for a good discussion. 
4
Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics and Other Essays (San Diego: James 
and Gordon, 1995), pp. 46-50, Appendix III ("On Hedonimetry"). Edgeworth derives 
these assumptions from Wilhelm Wundt, Principles of Physiological Psychology, trans. E. 
B. Titchener (New York: Macmillan, 1904). 
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then would have to further assume that the intervals between levels is the 
same for all agents, and then compare the different cardinalities assigned to 
each given option by each agent.   
 It is this last assumption that generates the problem.  Why should we 
assume that the intervals between levels of utility are the same for all agents, 
when the perceived intervals between seconds and minutes and hours differ 
so radically from one agent to the next depending on age, circumstance, and 
neurochemistry? Different individuals might have different feelings of 
different qualitative intensity about different alternatives at the same level (for 
example, apples and oranges). Or different individuals might feel differently 
about the same increase or decrease in utility level, of the sort that might 
distinguish the response of an emerging novelist from that of John Updike to 
a single bad review following a succession of favorable ones. To take another 
example: if an hour can drag by for an eighteen-year-old but rush by for a 
sixty-year-old, the difference between liking an orange at five units and liking 
orange juice at one unit more similarly might be vast for the former and 
negligible for the latter. For these reasons establishing even a subjective 
cardinal utility function bodes trouble enough. The prospects of establishing 
an interpersonal one look even gloomier. 
 
1.2. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern Cardinal Measure 
 The Von Neumann-Morgenstern (henceforth the vN-M) cardinal measure 
for choices under risk presupposes the behavioral interpretation of (U),
5
 and 
amplifies and clarifies a method first developed by Ramsey. Designed to 
determine the expected utility of some gamble x for an agent, it is based on 
empirical observation of that agent's choices among gambles. It thereby 
answers the question, how willing is that agent to gamble on satisfying some 
preference given the weights and probabilities he assigns to the outcomes of 
the actions open to him? The answer – the total value V of that preference – is 
the sum of the weights of each of the possible outcomes a1, a2, ... an times their 
respective probabilities p1, p2, ... pn, i.e. 
 
  V = a1p1 + a2p2 + ... +anpn. 
 
The vN-M method derives from three preference axioms stipulating 
conditions on the relation '>' for the set S of all probability distributions or 
gambles on a set of outcomes: 
 
                                                
5
 Although it should be noted that Morgenstern is critical of revealed preference theory. 
See Oskar Morgenstern, "Thirteen Critical Points in Contemporary Economic Theory: 
An Interpretation," Journal of Economic Literature 10 (1972), 1163-1189. 
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(a) Weak Ordering: '>' is complete and transitive, i.e. 
(i) for any F, G in S either F > G or G > F; and 
(ii) if F > G and G>H then F>H; 
(b) Independence: if F > G and 0 < p < 1 then  
 F(p) + H(1 – p) > G(p) + H(1 – p) for any H in S; 
(c) Continuity: if F > G and G > H then F(p) + H(1 – p) > G and  
G > F(p') + H(1 – p') for some real numbers p and p' between 
zero and 1. 
 
The method consists, roughly, in two steps. The first is to arbitrarily assign 
weights of 1 and 0 to two alternatives F and H. The second is to then 
determine the expected utility to the agent of the third alternative G by 
finding the lottery of F and H that is indifferent to G, under the assumption 
that the agent's preference ordering of F, G and H satisfies constraints (a) – (c). 
So we first assume the agent's ranking of F, G and H: 
 
  F > G, G > H, F > H. 
 
Then we assign a weight of 1 to F and 0 to H, and try to find the expected 
utility of G for the agent. We do this by constructing a choice situation for 
him: Either he will definitely get G – call this the certain option; or else he will 
get either F with a subjective probability of (p) or H with a probability of (1-p) 
– call this the lottery option. Otherwise represented, the choice situation for 
that agent is 
 
  G or [F(p) or H(1 –  p)]. 
 
 For example, suppose p = .95 for Mabel.  Then (1 – p) = .05.  So Mabel's 
choice is between G for certain on the one hand, and a 95% probability of F 
and a 5% probability of H on the other. Since Mabel has ranked F highest and 
the probability of F is awfully close to a sure thing, Mabel should choose the 
lottery option. On the other hand, what if p = .05 and (1 – p), correspondingly, 
= .95? In this case Mabel's choice is between G for certain on the one hand, 
and, on the other, only a 5% probability of Mabel's highest-ranked option – F 
– and a 95% probability of Mabel's lowest-ranked option – H. In this case it 
would be more prudent for Mabel to choose the certain option – G. In general, 
as p changes from 1 to 0, Mabel's preference for the lottery option becomes a 
preference for the certain option because as her probability of getting her 
highest-ranked option decreases, the attractiveness to her of the certain option 
increases. 
 Now suppose there is a point at which Mabel is indifferent between the 
certain and the lottery options, i.e. 
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  G ≈ [F(p) or H(1 – p) ]. 
 
So, for example, suppose that p = .66. Then 
 
  G v [F(.66) or H(1 – .66)]. 
 
Remember that F = 1 and H = 0.  So 
 
  G ≈ [1(.66) or 0(.33)],   
 
i.e. 
 
  G ≈ (.66). 
 
So the expected utility of G for Mabel is .66, or 2/3. If F > H and G = F(p) + 
H(1 – p), then F > G > H for 0 < p < 1. By assigning a weight of 1 to Mabel's 
highest-ranked option F and 0 to her lowest-ranked option H, the vN-M 
method enables us to assign a cardinal value to any option in between them – 
without Edgeworth's assumption that intervals along individual utility scales 
are equal for all agents.   
 
1.3. Interpersonal Cardinality 
 The vN-M method enables the construction of a cardinal utility scale. But 
it does not enable the construction of an interpersonal utility scale. For there is 
no independent way of locating our respective 1s and 0s relative to one 
another, nor of determining objectively the unit value of any interval between 
them. For example, suppose you observe my choice behavior over a broad 
array of pairwise comparisons. Suppose you then ask me to assign an 
aggregate numerical value, in increasing order of desirability, to each option 
chosen, such that each such value is the product of that option's weight for 
me, multiplied by the probability I assign to achieving it. Assume for now that 
my choice behavior is transitive and my options complete (these assumptions 
will be discussed in greater detail later). Suppose I give watching "The 
Simpsons" a 3, reading Trollope Sr. a 6, and listening to Mozart's "Jupiter" 
Symphony a 9. Then you could conclude that listening to Mozart's "Jupiter" 
Symphony was more satisfying to me than the other two, and that reading 
Trollope Sr. was more satisfying to me than watching "The Simpsons" by 
certain measurable proportional intervals. This would give us a cardinal 
ranking of my preferences.  But it would not enable us to compare my utility 
rankings with yours, such that the members of both sets might be assigned 
objective rankings relative to one another on a single scale. 
 Why not?  Because there is no way to rule out the possibility, nor to 
confirm it, that you express the very same responses towards "The Simpsons," 
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Anthony Trollope , and Mozart's "Jupiter" Symphony, by assigning them the 
aggregate values of 1, 2, and 3 respectively that I expressed by assigning them 
the aggregate values of 3, 6 and 9 respectively:  
 
Choice Options Me You 
“The Simpsons” 3 1 
anything by Trollope Sr. 6 2 
Mozart’s “Jupiter” 9 3 
 
I.e. we both might agree that the "Jupiter" was better than Trollope Sr. and 
that Trollope Sr. was better than "The Simpsons." This much would yield 
agreement in our ordinal comparisons of interpersonal utility. Further, we 
both might agree on the proportional relations among them. And we both in 
fact might assign each option the same objective quantity of aggregate value. 
Despite all that, we might still diverge in our numerical representations of 
those quantities when assigned to a place on our respective scales, in how 
much quantity our respective scales could accommodate, and in how finely 
calibrated each such scale was. This point must be kept in mind when we 
address the quantitative representation of preference rankings in Sections 2.1 
– 2.2 below and in Volume II, Chapter III.7. A cardinal utility scale without a 
viable method for making interpersonal comparisons among such scales does 
not suffice for the quantitative representation of preferences.  
 In this case, our respective utility functions might be distinguished by 
saying that I (or, of course, you) had a wider range of response capabilities, 
discriminated more finely, had higher expectations of satisfaction, and so on. 
But there would be no objective basis, independent of the incommensurable 
numerical rankings of each, for establishing these objective differences. Since 
there would be no way of ascertaining whether your 1 referred to the same 
objective quantity as my 1, there would be similarly no way of ascertaining 
whether or not your .5 might be the same as or different from my .1.  
 This could easily lead to mischief of a sort that merely ordinal 
interpersonal comparisons do not avoid. When ranked objectively on a single, 
numerical scale, my least preferred alternative would be assigned the same 
aggregate value as your most preferred one: 
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 -10 
 -9 – Mozart’s “Jupiter” (me) 
 -8 
 -7 
 -6 – Trollope Sr. (me) 
 -5 
 -4 
 -3 – "The Simpsons" (me), Mozart's "Jupiter" (you) 
 -2 – Trollope Sr. (you) 
 -1 – "The Simpsons" (you) 
 
Some third party, appointed to collate a social utility function from our 
respective preferences, might well reason that I didn't seem to mind Trollope 
Sr. all that much, whereas you didn't seem to care for Mozart's "Jupiter" all 
that much more than Trollope Sr. On that basis we both might be sentenced to 
a steady diet of Trollope Sr. – even though both of us in fact most preferred 
Mozart's "Jupiter," and to the same degree. The subjective degree of our 
respective preferences for each of these alternatives cannot be ascertained 
despite their aggregate numerical values. So although each of us can assign 
cardinalities to the options presented, my preferences cannot be given a 
verifiably accurate cardinal ranking on the same scale as yours. 
 The difficulty is nevertheless not a special case of a private language, first-/third-
person asymmetry, or other minds problem. No such calibration could be objective 
in the sense utility theory requires, even if the term "utility" had some fixed 
reference to a qualitatively identifiable inner state, and even if that state were 
empirically observable and individually quantifiable by means of some overt 
behavioral manifestation. To see this, suppose there were some sort of natural 
physiological barometer that all human agents had, such as a pale pink 
"utility mole" in the middle of our foreheads that turned bluer as one felt more 
overall satisfaction. Suppose further that my utility mole turned bright cobalt 
blue when I received $500.00, whereas yours attained that hue only upon 
receiving $500,000.00. What would that demonstrate? Surely not that I was 
objectively more satisfied overall with my $500.00 than you were with your 
$500.00. My satisfaction with my $500.00 might still be less objective 
satisfaction quantitatively than your dissatisfaction with yours, even though 
my utility mole is bluer. And surely not that I was just as objectively satisfied 
overall with my $500.00 as you were with your $500,000.00. My satisfaction 
with my $500.00 might still be far less objective satisfaction quantitatively 
than yours with your $500,000.00, even though our utility moles were the 
same shade of blue.  
 Thus the problem about making interpersonal comparisons of objective 
utility does not disappear by conjuring a solution to the problem of other 
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minds. The faith that such a solution would make the problem of 
interpersonal comparisons go away is based on conceiving of the third-
personal, intersubjectively verifiable mechanism calibrating individual utility 
as though it were a thermometer measuring a temperature. However, if 
maximizing utility were relevantly similar to running a fever, then the 
problem of interpersonal comparisons would not arise. It is because it is not 
that a thermometer does not help to measure it. The utility mole example 
shows that the problem of interpersonal comparisons is caused, not by the 
existence of other minds, but rather by the existence of different subjects. It is 
not the inaccessibility of a subject's inner states, but rather his subjectivity 
itself that presents the obstacle to interpersonal comparisons of utility.
6
 
However, that interpersonal comparisons are in theory impossible to make 
does not imply that there is no objective fact of the matter about whether two 
individuals are equally satisfied or not. 
 So interpersonal comparisons of utility are in theory impossible because 
it is impossible to compare utilities among subjects, whether or not those 
subjects' mental states are interpersonally accessible. If individual cardinal 
utility rankings cannot be interpersonally compared, interpersonal 
comparisons of utility cannot be made. Hence neither can meaningful 
interpersonal ascriptions of utility. There can be in theory no shared criterion 
of cardinal utility-maximization that would enable me to confirm the actual 
degree of utility-maximization you reveal in your behavior from the degree of 
utility-maximization I ascribe to your behavior. If there can be no shared 
interpersonal criterion of cardinal utility-maximization, then there can be no 
nonvacuous but universal criterion of cardinal utility-maximization that 
applies to the evaluation of each and every case, even under conditions of risk 
or uncertainty. So long as (U) is claimed to have universal application, such 
ascriptions will be vacuous whether "utility" is interpreted as a mental state or 
not. 
 
1.4. Allais on Psychological Value 
 Maurice Allais vehemently opposes this conclusion. He argues that 
cardinal utility, which he calls psychological value, "is fundamental to the 
theory of random choice [i.e. decisions under conditions of risk] (45)" and "an 
undisputable [sic] reality(8)."
7
 He also believes an index of cardinal utility can 
                                                
6
Thus I disagree with Allan Gibbard, who conceives the problem of making 
interpersonal comparisons as a special case of the problem of knowing other minds. See 
his "Interpersonal Comparisons: Preference, Good, and the Intrinsic Reward of a Life," 
in Foundations of Social Choice Theory, Edited by Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 165-193. 
7
 "Fondements d'une Théorie Positive des Choix Comportant un Risque et Critique des 
Postulats et Axiomes de L'Ecole Americaine,"Memoir III of Econometrie XL (1953), 257-
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be ascertained only through "introspective observation of either 
psychologically equivalent increments or minimum perceptible thresholds 
(35)" as a basis for answers to "appropriate questions following processes 
similar to those used by psycho-physiologists such as Fechner and Weber 
(8)."
8
 Through such directed questioning, psychological value, according to 
Allais, can be operationally defined and therefore measured in accordance 
with the Fechner-Weber laws concerning differential thresholds, or JNDs (just 
noticeable differences) (33, 43-44, 46). Allais’ position in essence returns us to 
the phenomenological interpretation of (U) addressed in Section 4.1. 
 Let us put aside the question of whether Allais' cardinal utility index is 
being derived from or presupposed by this procedure, in order to look more 
closely at the Fechner-Weber laws which Allais claims provide the standards 
and methods for measuring psychological value. The Fechner-Weber laws, 
formulated in the mid-nineteenth century, express proportional relations 
between an external sensory stimulus, such as a physical weight or tone, and 
the subjective sensation it causes. These relations are established by 
experimentally measuring, for example, the increase in physical weight a 
subject lifts that is necessary for her to distinguish it as heavier than the first; 
or the distance apart on a region of skin two points must be in order for the 
subject to sense them as two. If R is a standard stimulus amount, ∆R is the just 
noticeable stimulus difference (i.e. the subjective sensation), and K is a 
constant, then according to Fechner, 
 
  (1) ∆R/R = K. 
 
Next we assign a value of 0 to the absolute threshold stimulus, i.e. that at which 
the subject's sensation of the stimulus is just about to appear, and assume that 
JNDs are equal within a given sensory modality. Then arithmetically 
increasing ∆R by steps of one multiplies the value of R by a constant ratio, and 
it becomes possible to measure and compute magnitudes of sensation relative 
to the stimuli that cause it. Because the subjective sensation increases 
                                                                                                     
332 (Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris), 
translated as "Foundations of a Positive Theory of Choice Involving Risk and a 
Criticism of the Postulates and Axioms of the American School," in Maurice Allais and 
Ole Hagen, Eds. Expected Utility and the Allais Paradox (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 
1979), 27-146. Henceforth references to this article will be paginated in the text. 
8
 To this Marschak rightly points out that answers are empirically observable behavior, 
too. He says, "[T]he 'introspective' comparison of 'satisfaction increments' by the subject 
provides the experimenter with words not with observed choices; … I suppose we are 
more interested in predicting actions than words; and such predictions are probably 
better based on recorded actions than recorded words." J. Marschak, "Utilities, Values, 
and Decision Makers," in Allais and Hagen, ibid. Note 7, 168. 
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arithmetically by a constant difference while the external stimulus increases 
geometrically by a constant multiple, the final form of Fechner's law is 
 
  (2) S = K log R, 
 
where S is the magnitude of the sensation, K is a constant, and R is the 
magnitude of the stimulus.
9
  
 But whether JNDs can be assumed to be equal, even within a given 
sensory modality, is – as before – open to question. On what grounds can a 
subject (let alone the observer) conclude that the perceived difference between 
weightlessness and noticeable physical weight is equal to the difference 
between noticeable weight and just noticeably heavier weight? Or between 
the latter and weight just noticeably heavier than that? In order to justify this 
assumption, there would have to be some way of measuring, not only the 
material increases in physical weight of the respective stimuli relative to the 
sensation of increase reported by the subject; but also the sensed intervals 
between each of these increases. It is hard to imagine how these sensed 
intervals themselves could be measured; or why, in the absence of such 
measurement, they should be assumed to be equal. 
 However, there are more serious problems with Allais' reliance on this 
theory. The Fechner-Weber laws have been long since overtaken by more 
recent developments in experimental psychology. For example, it transpires 
that their ratios differ according to the sensory modality. Also, they hold only 
for the middle range of stimuli and not for extremes at either end of the 
spectrum. Further, what counts as an extreme differs from one subject to 
another, as do absolute stimuli thresholds.
10
 But putting aside even these 
doubts, what relevance can the Fechner-Weber laws have for measuring the 
cardinal utility of various complex outcomes of action? Are we supposed to 
count the number of sensory modalities involved in each projected outcome 
and sum their respective ratios? Or multiply them? What if their sensory 
modalities have nothing to do with their psychological value for a particular 
agent? What if a psychologically valuable outcome engages none of the 
agent's sensory modalities, but rather her intellectual or aesthetic 
discrimination? What if the gambles an agent confronts involve, not simply 
various sums of money, as Allais supposes, but more complex but pedestrian 
intangibles such as status, intellectual stimulation, or self-worth, none of 
which can be realistically calibrated in terms of monetary gain?   
                                                
9
G. T. Fechner, Elements of Psychophysics, Vol. I, Trans. H. E. Adler, Ed. E. G. Boring and 
D. Howes (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966).  
10
 These more recent developments are summarized in Robert Watson, The Great 
Psychologists: From Aristotle to Freud, Second Edition (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 
1968), 232-239.  
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 Allais depends on these laws to ground his claim that for a given field of 
choice defined by an ordinal preference function 
 
  (3) S = S(A, B, … C), 
 
such that A, B, … C are quantifiable commodity bundles, "it is possible to 
specify a cardinal preference function 
 
  (4) S = S(A, B, … C) 
 
[in which S is the corresponding expected utility function], determined up to a 
linear transformation, such that for two increments of utility that are deemed 
equivalent, the variation ∆S will have the same value (43)." But he does not 
explain how or why two "increments of utility" are to be "deemed equivalent" 
any more than Fechner did. He does argue as follows: 
Hardly anybody would fail to reply 'yes' without any hesitation if asked 
'would you prefer to inherit $100 million rather than $10,000 more 
strongly than you would prefer to inherit $10,000 rather than $1,000?' The 
absence of hesitation demonstrates without any doubt that the notion of 
equivalent psychological increments indeed corresponds to a 
psychological reality (46).  
That is, Allais reasons that because we would unhesitatingly most prefer a 
larger amount of money that is ten thousand times more than what we would 
least prefer, to a smaller amount that is only ten times more than what we 
would least prefer, we must have a concept of equivalent psychological 
increments. But in order to infer from our ranking of the proffered monetary 
sums that we have a concept of equivalent psychological increments, this 
argument must presuppose that monetary value is equivalent to 
psychological value. Allais does not defend this presupposition. Instead he 
offers the suggestion, in a footnote, that "[i]t is worth recalling that the 
problem of determining cardinal utility is identical to the problem of 
determining the marginal utility of money (n. 17)." He also simply states in 
passing that to each monetary value there corresponds such a measurable 
psychological value, or cardinal utility (45-46). But if Allais' experiments are 
supposed to yield conclusions merely about agent responses to the 
probabilities of receiving certain sums of money, then he does not need the 
concept of psychological value; whereas if they are to have implications for a 
broader and more complex range of cases of the sort described above, then his 
equation of monetary with psychological values is inadequately defended. 
 On the basis of this equation, Allais then draws a further analogy 
between the comparison of (3) and (4) and a second one. Given a field of 
choice among risky outcomes defined by the function  
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  (5) S = S(g1, g2, … , gn, p1, p2, …, pn), 
 
Allais proposes a function of cardinal preference 
 
  (6) S = S(g1, g2, … , gn, p1, p2, …, pn), 
 
"which," he claims, "in the field of the economic psychology of risk, is the 
equivalent of the Fechner-Weber functions expressing psychophysiological 
sensation as a function of excitation (44)." Note that Allais is claiming that 
formula (6) is the equivalent, in economic choice under conditions of risk, of 
Fechner's (1) and (2), above, in the psychology of physiological stimulation. 
He is not merely claiming that they are related, or analogous. Nor is he 
claiming merely that there is some correspondence between them. He is 
claiming that they are equivalent. However, he does not show in what the 
equivalence consists. What remains is, first, to explain the relevance of this 
seemingly anachronistic psychological theory to the construction of a cardinal 
utility scale. Second, the sense in which its laws are equivalent to (6) is also in 
need of clarification. Without this, a convincing case even for the existence of 
a single subject's cardinal utility scale, much less for the possible of comparing 
such scales interpersonally, has not been made. 
 
1.5. The Allais Paradox 
 Allais grounds his rejection of the vN-M method in the view that an 
individual subject must be asked to introspect on her subjective, 
phenomenological response to alternative gambles with weights and 
subjective probabilities that differ radically in some cases and very minimally 
in others. He shows that the outcome of this experimental procedure 
generates real life counterexamples to the vN-M independence condition 
(E.2.(b), above), and therefore uncovers inconsistencies in rational choice that 
undermine its universal scope.  
Now the vN-M axioms were not intended to be universal in scope. As we 
will shortly see, it is true that the assignment of huge weights, infinitesimal 
probabilities, or minute incremental differences to preference alternatives can 
in some cases produce counterexamples to the vN-M axioms. But 
Morgenstern rightly protests that the method is not designed to extend to 
such extreme cases.
11
 In Section 1.6 following, however, I argue that there is in 
theory no way of ruling out such cases; and that their necessary inclusion 
sabotages the attempt to exclude cyclical rankings through the imposition of 
normative requirements such as transitivity, irreflexivity, or independence. 
                                                
11
 See Oskar Morgenstern, "Some Reflections on Utility," Allais and Hagen, op. cit. Note 
7, esp. 178.  
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 Second, the force of Allais' experimental counterexample does not 
depend on his phenomenological interpretation of (U). The case presents an 
agent with two sets of compound gambles. In (1), the agent is presented with 
a choice between F and G, such that 
 
(1)  F =  $500,000 with a probability of 1 (the "sure thing"); and 
 G =  ◊$2,500,000 with a probability of .10, or 
  ◊$500,000 with a probability of .89, or 
  ◊$0 with a probability of .01. 
 
In this case, the agent prefers F to G. In (2), the agent is presented with a 
choice between H and I, such that 
 
(2)  H =  ◊$500,000 with a probability of .11, or 
  ◊$0 with a probability of .89; and 
 I =  ◊$2,500,000 with a probability of .10, or 
  ◊$0 with a probability of .9. 
 
Here the agent prefers I to H. So she prefers a certain tidy sum to an unlikely 
jackpot, but an equally unlikely jackpot to an only slightly less unlikely tidy 
sum. That is, she chooses the risk-averse option in case (1), but the riskier 
option in case (2). We can see the dilemma by parsing the payoffs in 
thousands as follows:
12
 
 
  (1) 
 .89 [E1] .01 [E2] .10 [E3] 
F $500 500 500 
G $500 0 2500 
 
  (2) 
H 0 500 500 
I 0 0 2500 
 
By partitioning E1 and (E2 or E3), we see that options F and H have identical 
payoffs under E2 and E3, as do options G and I. According to the 
independence axiom, if F is preferred to G, then (500,p; 500 1 – p) is preferred 
to (0, p; 2500, 1 – p). But then H should be preferred to I. Substituting 0 for 
$500 under E1 should make no difference. But Allais’ experiment shows that 
most subjects prefer I to H because although the probability of winning is 
almost identical in both gambles – 11% in H, 10% in I, the payoff in I is much 
                                                
12
 Here I am grateful to Ned McClennen. 
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larger. It shows that the behavior of a seemingly otherwise rational chooser 
may disconfirm independence when it is interpreted as descriptive, predictive 
and explanatory; and violate it when it is interpreted as normative. But Allais’ 
experiment does not show that requiring subjective introspection from such a 
subject is needed to do this; nor, therefore, does it make a case for an 
alternative to the vN-M measure of cardinal utility. 
 Now Morgenstern, in refuting Allais' experimental results with his own, 
finds nothing objectionable in "educating" his experimental subjects as to the 
theory their behavior is predicted to fit, in order to insure the veracity of the 
prediction.
13
 But in standard experimental procedure, coaching one's subjects 
in order to achieve the desired result predicted by the theory would violate 
prohibitions on tampering with the data. Morgenstern rejects this concern on 
the grounds that since his theory is normative, his student subjects are merely 
"correcting" their behavior in light of what they believe, as the result of his 
instruction, to be rational. However, a theory cannot function as both 
normative and empirically predictive for the same subjects under 
experimental conditions without invalidating the experiment as a legitimate 
test of the theory's explanatory power. Morgenstern then comments 
Naturally, it is assumed that the individuals are accessible intellectually 
whether it be physics or arithmetics [sic] or utility that is being explained 
to them.  ]In that sense there is a limitation since there are certainly 
persons for whom this is impossible.  ]Whether they then should be 
called "irrational" is a matter of taste (180).  
It appears that those who fail to adjust their behavior according to his 
instruction must be stupid, and perhaps irrational. This would make a 
universalized version of the von Neumann-Morgenstern cardinal utility 
function both normatively and at the same time descriptively vacuous. This 
unhappy implication can be avoided by decisively rejecting the claim of 
universality. 
 
1.6. Preference and Probability 
 We have seen that Allais’ phenomenological interpretation of utility-
maximization does not redress the insufficiencies of the vN-M measure for 
interpersonal comparisons, and therefore does not block the conclusion to the 
vacuity of (U). We have also seen that the Allais Paradox depends on the 
assignment of weights and probabilities of extreme magnitudes to preference 
alternatives; and that the vN-M cardinal utility measure excludes these as 
beyond the scope of the weak ordering, independence and continuity axioms. 
In this section I argue first, in 1.6.1, that Allais assignments must be 
admissable in an agent’s preference ranking – thereby generating the Allais 
Paradox in certain cases; and in 1.6.2 that the same considerations that 
                                                
13
 Allais and Hagen, op. cit. Note 7, 180. 
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guarantee the admissibility of Allais assignments to preference rankings also 
generate cyclicities that structurally violate all of the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms, and by implication several others. From this conclusion 
I infer that imposing upon an agent’s ranking any such normative axioms of 
choice fails to exclude cyclicities; and that these structural inconsistencies 
hasten the conclusion to (U)’s vacuity. Sections 2 and 3 below detail the close 
connections between cyclicity and vacuity; and Volume II, Chapter III both 
exposes their logical relationship (essentially, the relationship between self-
contradiction and tautology); and also proposes a way to avoid both.  
 
1.6.1. Aggregate Value and the Sorites Paradox 
 The argument is grounded in an implicit tension between the concepts of 
preference and probability. The concept of a consistent preference ordering 
implicitly presupposes observation of the all-or-nothing law of 
noncontradiction as understood in predicate logic – the principle of bivalence, 
as vagueness theorists call it; whereas weight and probability assignments to 
projected outcomes presuppose a linear mathematical progression. Some 
simple examples show how these two sets of presuppositions may conflict.  
Consider first a series of cases in which an agent must choose among 
three simple, weighted tidy sum-alternatives F, G, and H, such that in each 
case the three consistently weighted alternatives receive different probability 
assignments relative to the others. An infinitesimal probability assignment or 
incremental difference in probability assignment may reduce a consistently 
weighted alternative’s aggregate value so much that it becomes a non-
alternative for that agent. The gradient metamorphosis of an alternative into a 
non-alternative generates a sorites paradox that thereby creates an 
inconsistency in the set of alternatives available to him, and therefore in the 
choices he makes as a consequence. 
 For example, suppose Percy must choose among F = $100, G = $90, and H 
= $80; and that Percy chooses in accordance with (U), such that this choice 
satisfies completeness and transitivity (vN-M’s 1.2.(a) i. and ii., above). Then F 
> G, G > H, and F > H.
14
 Now consider the following three sets of probability 
assignments to F, G, and H, and their effect on the aggregate value to Percy of 
each alternative. In the first, we assume that each alternative is a sure thing: 
                                                
14
 We can ignore the distinction between monetary worth and its intrinsic or marginal 
value for purposes of this example. 
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(1) 
 weight x  probability =  aggregate value 
F $100 1 100 
G $90 1 90 
H $80 1 80 
 
Since the alternatives do not constitute a gamble, the assignment of a 
probability of 1 to each alternative does not change its aggregate value to 
Percy – nor, therefore, its place in Percy's preference ordering: He still prefers 
F to G and G to H. By contrast, the second set of probability assignments does 
present Percy with a gamble: 
 
(2) 
 weight x  probability =  aggregate value 
F $100 .2 ◊20 
G $90 .000000000001 ◊.000000000009 
H $80 .799999 ◊63.99992 
 
In this case, the probability of achieving each alternative revises the aggregate 
value of each to Percy, and so changes his preference ordering. Although he 
still prefers F to G, he now prefers H to F because H is close enough in weight 
to F that the higher probability of getting H considerably increases its 
aggregate value. So Percy prefers H to F and F to G, and therefore H to G. 
This ranking is neither irrational nor remarkable in its degree of risk aversion. 
The third set of probability assignments has a different effect: 
 
 (3) 
 weight x  probability =  aggregate value 
F $100 .2 ◊20 
G $90 0 0 
H $80 .8 ◊64 
 
It would seem that under this probability assignment, G is ruled out as a 
preference alternative because the probability of its occurrence – and so its 
aggregate value – is zero, despite its dollar weight. (Similarly, if there is no 
chance whatsoever that Rupert Murdoch will give me a billion dollars, it 
makes no sense for me to claim that I prefer a modest but steady paycheck.) 
So G has no place in Percy's preference ordering. Although Percy does prefer 
H to F, it is therefore not the case that Percy prefers F to G, and so not the case 
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that he prefers H to G. This would seem to violate transitivity (1.2.(a.ii), 
above). 
 But if G in (3) is not one of Percy’s live options, how can it cause the 
violation of a condition imposed on them? Easy: by being assigned a weight, 
which assures it a location in Percy’s ordinal preference ranking; but zero 
computable probability, which eliminates its positive aggregate value. Like 
the weak ordering axiom more generally, the requirement of transitivity is not 
contingent on the particular numerical probability assigned to each 
alternative. Transitivity is required to hold whatever those probabilities may 
be. 
 Yet the difference between G's aggregate value in case (2) and its 
aggregate value in case (3) is very, very small. If G is not a live option in case 
(3), is it one in case (2)? And how much would we have to pump up the 
weight of G in case (2) in order to convince Percy to see it as such? Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern, in rejecting Allais assignments, might plausibly 
contend that the likelihood of G is sufficiently negligible in both cases that it is 
not a live option in either; and that we should simply discount G's pro forma 
status as a ranked alternative in case (2) as well as (3).  Call this the Contra-G 
Argument.
15
 Then since G is not a preference alternative, it is no truer in case 
(2) than it is in case (3) that Percy prefers F to G; nor, in either, that he prefers 
H to G.   
 On the other hand, Allais might argue with equal plausibility that case (2) 
leaves room for some minimal expectation of G, however unrealistic, whereas 
case (3) leaves none; and that therefore, G's status as a preference alternative 
in case (2) must be honored. Of course an expectation this minimal is not 
merely unrealistic but negligible. But so long as there is a probability, 
however minute, that G, a correspondingly minute aggregate value can be 
attached to it. So G remains a live option despite its infinitesimal probability. 
Call this the Pro-G Argument.  The Pro-G Argument implies that Percy does 
after all prefer F to G and so H to G; and therefore satisfies transitivity. 
 In either case, the extent to which G qualifies as a live option or not is a 
matter of degree, dependent on the agent's – and our – evaluation not of its 
probability, but of the significance of its resulting aggregate value. If the 
likelihood of some option O is small enough, it will be imperceptible even to 
the agent whose option it is. O’s aggregate value will decline toward zero 
accordingly, to a point at which it, too, is imperceptible to the agent, 
regardless of its weight. As O’s aggregate value declines to imperceptibility, 
the significance of its aggregate value correspondingly declines towards 
negligibility. 
                                                
15
 Samuel Gorovitz's "The Saint Petersburg Puzzle" (Allais and Hagen, op. cit. Note 7, 
esp. 265-268) might be understood as an extended Contra-G Argument. 
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Notice that we could run the same argument on weight, keeping 
probability fixed and certain: 
 
(4) 
 weight x  probability =  aggregate value 
F 2 1 2 
G .000000000001 1 .000000000001 
H 6 1 6 
 
(5) 
 weight x  probability =  aggregate value 
F 2 1 2 
G 0 1 0 
H 6 1 6 
 
Is G in (5) a live option or not? Even if Inez is one hundred percent certain 
that G, which is worthless to her, will obtain if she so chooses, its utter lack of 
value in her eyes does not merely reduce it to a lowest-ranked option. Its zero 
aggregate value decisively rules it out as an option for her. The difference 
between a state of affairs that is a lowest-ranked option and one that is not an 
option at all is that the latter lacks any discernible qualities that might 
persuade the agent to choose it, even in the worst-case scenario. 
If G’s zero aggregate value rules it out as one of Inez’s options in (5), then 
it is hard to see why she should count it among her options in (4) either, given 
its negligible aggregate value – and so indiscernible redeeming qualities – 
there. In both cases, aggregate value exists along an asymptotic linear 
continuum that shades off imperceptibly to zero at its lower limit. Here, too, if 
the agent’s weighting of option O is small enough, it will be imperceptible. 
O’s aggregate value will similarly decline toward zero and hence 
imperceptibility regardless of its probability. As O’s aggregate value declines 
to imperceptibility, the significance of its aggregate value again 
correspondingly declines towards negligibility. 
Both the contra-G and the pro-G arguments, both about probability and 
about weight, generate sorites paradoxes: 
16
 
 
                                                
16
For a lucid analysis of the sorites paradox, see Stephen Schiffer, The Things We Mean 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), Chapter 9: “Vagueness and Indeterminacy.”   
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(a) THE CONTRA-G [VON NEUMANN-MORGENSTERN] SORITES PARADOX 
(i) A weighted preference alternative of zero probability has no 
aggregate value. 
(ii) A weighted preference alternative of (0 + .000000000001) 
probability has no aggregate value. 
(iii) A weighted preference alternative of (0 + .000000000002) 
probability has no aggregate value. 
. 
. 
. 
(iv) ∴ A weighted preference alternative of .2 probability has no 
aggregate value.  
(v) ∴ No weighted preference alternative of any probability has 
aggregate value.   
 
(b) THE PRO-G [ALLAIS] SORITES PARADOX 
(i’) A weighted preference alternative of .2 probability has aggregate 
value. 
(ii’) A weighted preference alternative of (.2 – .000000000001) 
probability has aggregate value.  
(iii’) A weighted preference alternative of (.2 – .000000000002) 
probability has aggregate value. 
. 
. 
. 
(iv’) ∴ A weighted preference alternative of 0 probability has 
aggregate value. 
(v’) ∴ Every weighted preference alternative has aggregate value 
regardless of its probability. 
 
In both (a) and (b), the conclusions (iv)-(v) and (iv’)-(v’) respectively are false. 
In both (a) and (b), the first three members of the infinite series of premises 
[(i), (ii), (iii) …] and [(i’), (ii’), (iii’), …] respectively are true. But in the infinite 
series of premises neither of (a) nor of (b) is there a cut-off point that 
decisively marks the distinction between having aggregate value and having 
none; nor, therefore, a viable criterion for excluding Allais assignments from 
the corresponding preference rankings. The concept of aggregate value is 
vague. 
Stephen Schiffer proposes to solve the sorites paradox by narrowing the 
scope of the principle of bivalence in classical logic – i.e. that every 
proposition is either true or false. For Schiffer, whether bivalence applies to 
non-tautological propositions containing vague concepts – i.e. those without 
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determinate cut-offs between truth and falsity – is indeterminate.
17
 Although 
Schiffer would disagree,
18
 we in fact often say that such concepts – for 
example, baldness or wealth – hold true to different degrees; that propositions 
containing them are more or less true.  But the concept of aggregate value – 
like the concepts of weight, probability or degree itself, and unlike the 
concepts of baldness or wealth – already is precisely that sort of formal 
quantitative and gradient concept of degree to which the principle of 
bivalence typically yields in propositions containing vague concepts. Yet in 
order successfully to apply that concept of degree itself in (a) and (b), the 
principle of bivalence must be invoked: it either is or is not true that whether 
G in (2) has aggregate value or not is a matter of degree. If we answer that  
 
^whether G in (2) has aggregate value or not is a matter of degree^  
 
is itself a matter of degree, the unavoidable reply is that it either is or is not 
true that  
 
^^whether G in (2) has aggregate value or not is a matter of degree^ 
is itself a matter of degree^  
 
and so on. (a) and (b) demonstrate that even concepts of degrees of shading 
admit of degrees of shading; and so that abandoning bivalence exacerbates 
rather than dissolves the sorites paradox, by generating an infinite regress of 
concepts of degrees of shading. 
A resolution to the question of whether G in (2) has aggregate value or 
not requires some means of differentiating between having and not having a 
particular degree of aggregate value. This is the principle of bivalence. To this 
question, Allais would answer affirmatively for all probability assignments to 
G excluding (3). Von Neumann-Morgenstern would beg to differ; and 
perhaps might marshal a large sample of experimental subjects to settle the 
matter statistically by voting. But if whether any preference alternative has 
aggregate value is, as (a) and (b) imply, a matter of degree, which itself is a 
matter of degree, etc., then no such means of differentiating between having 
and not having aggregate value can be found. Then whether any preference 
alternative has aggregate value or not is indeterminate; and the above 
argument applies to the concept of indeterminacy as well. Either it, too, is 
subject to the principle of bivalence; or else it is vague and so generates an 
infinite regress of degrees of indeterminacy.  
                                                
17
 Schiffer argues that the paradox can be generated for any vague concept whatsoever 
(ibid., 178, n.1).  
18
 See Schiffer’s critique of degree-theoretic notions of truth at ibid., 191-194. 
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A sorities paradox can be generated for any judgment involving a 
quantitative concept, and a fortiori for any assignment of weights and 
probabilities to preference alternatives, whether they fall within the normal or 
the infinitesimal range. Therefore any Allais assignment must fall within the 
series of premises [(i), (ii), (iii), … (iv)-(v)] in (a), or [(i’), (ii’), (iii’), …(iv’)-(v’)] 
in (b). So it is hard to imagine on what special grounds, or according to what 
special criterion, the extreme assignments on which the Allais Paradox relies 
can be excluded from an agent’s preference ranking. On the contrary: other 
things equal, certain preference alternatives (excluding death and taxes) may 
enter the outermost edges of an agent’s field of choice with probability 
assignments that decrease in magnitude with their temporal distance from the 
agent, and, so long as their weights do not decrease to zero, increase in 
aggregate value as the agent moves forward in time to meet them. My 
preferences for having an apple for breakfast and residing in Berlin exactly 
twenty years from today would be of this kind. Alternatives that enter the 
field at the most temporally remote outer edges may well bear, at that point, 
the infinitesimal probability assignments on which Allais-style paradoxes 
thrive. They may remain preference alternatives nevertheless. 
 
1.6.2. Sorites, Cyclicity and the vN-M Axioms 
I have just argued that Allais assignments must be admissable in an 
agent’s preference ranking – thereby empirically disconfirming the 
independence axiom via the Allais Paradox. But the same Pro-G or Contra-G 
arguments that generate sorities paradoxes also generate cyclical rankings 
that structurally violate all of the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, and 
indeed several others. 
We have seen above that, by contrast with the vagueness built into the 
quantitative gradience of weight and probability assignments, whether or not 
Percy’s ordinal ranking of the options available to him is consistent or not is 
(at least on the face of it) not a matter of degree but rather of classical logic. If 
G is among Percy’s live options at a particular moment, then at that moment it 
either is or is not the case that Percy prefers H to F, F to G, and so H to G. 
However, that a sorites paradox can be generated in either case results from 
the fact that G’s negligible aggregate value may figure in an argument on 
either side of this disjunction. G's aggregate value in case 1.6.1.(2) favors the 
Pro-G argument to the same extent that it favors the Contra-G argument. G's 
aggregate value would need to increase considerably in degree in order to 
shift the balance decisively in favor of the former over the latter, or else 
decrease to 0 in order to shift it in the opposite direction. In the absence of any 
such incremental increase or decrease, it both is and is not the case that Percy 
prefers H to F, F to G and so H to G.   
 From these unresolvable ruminations on case 1.6.1.(2) we can now easily 
generate formal violations of the other condition of the vN-M weak ordering 
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axiom (1.2.(a.i), above) that are recognizable using some of the conventional 
transformations of classical logic: 
 
(1) F>G or G>F Completeness 
(2) not-F>G the Contra-G Argument 
(3) ∴ G>F (1), (2) 
(4) F>G the Pro-G Argument 
(5) ∴ F>G and G>F (4), (3) 
(6) not-F>G or not G>F (2) 
(7) not-G>F (6), (4) 
(8) F>G and not-F>G and G>F and not-G>F  
 
 Both the pairwise cyclical ordering expressed in (5) and the 
straightforward logical contradiction expressed in (8) are structural rather 
than empirical or experimental. Therefore they are not susceptible to 
Fishburn's analysis of experimental violations of the weak ordering axiom 
either as "behavior [that] reflect[s] the individual's indecision about which of F 
and G he prefers" or as a case in which F and G "are 'close enough' that it is 
not worth his effort to be careful about which he chooses, [in which case] it 
seems reasonable in an operational sense to say that he is indifferent between 
F and G."
19
 Rather, the individual – and we – are in a state of permanent and 
necessary indecision about how to classify G in case 1.6.1.(2). I discuss the 
distinction between such indecision and the indifference relation in Volume II, 
Chapter III.6.2. We cannot definitively answer the question as to whether G is 
a live option or not because this question requires a yes-or-no answer, 
whereas the extent to which it is or not is a matter of degree – which itself is a 
matter of degree, and so on. Under such circumstances, yes-and-no is the best 
answer we can give.  
 There is a deeper moral to this story. Allais’ experimental result shows, 
like Tversky and Kahnemann’s, among others, that empirical choice behavior 
may violate what we intuitively view as rational standards of consistent 
choice. A familiar and understandable response to such counterexamples is to 
try to protect consistency by imposing further conditions – transitivity, 
irreflexivity, independence, substitutability, continuity, etc. – on rational 
choice in order to rule out such counterexamples as instances of irrationality. 
But it is easily seen that the above argument need be only slightly 
reconfigured to generate similar structural cyclicities and contradictions for 
any such condition (I leave this as an exercise to the reader). Thus the same 
                                                
19
 Peter C. Fishburn, "On the Nature of Expected Utility," in Allais and Hagen, op. cit. 
Note 7, 245. 
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rationality considerations that motivate the imposition of the conditions also 
generate the structural inconsistencies that undermine them.   
 This suggests that imposing such restrictive conditions on preference 
rankings may not be the most efficient way to protect the consistency of those 
rankings, because counterexamples to those conditions remain logically consistent 
with them. Instead of protecting preference consistency, imposing these 
conditions merely restricts the scope of application of the theory to the 
narrowly normative, thereby diminishing its empirical applicability and 
inviting structural inconsistencies like the ones above. Now we have already 
seen that a theory can be both explanatory and normative if it explains the 
behavior of an ideal agent who sets a standard we are exhorted to emulate. 
However, a theory that can be explanatory when and only when it is 
normative is not doing the work a theory is supposed to do. In Volume II of 
this project I take up the challenge to protect the consistency of rational choice 
using classical logic as a resource rather than rejecting it as a threat. 
 
2. The Ramsey-Savage Concept of a Simple Ordering 
 In “Truth and Probability,” Ramsey demonstrates that imposing certain 
consistency conditions on an agent's choices among an unlimited set of 
alternatives yields the interpretation that she seeks to maximize utility in her 
behavior, i.e. (U).
20
 This is the original idea on which the theory of revealed 
preference is based. Ramsey’s consistency constraints on preference rankings 
are generally assumed to rescue the behavioral interpretation of the concept of 
utility from vacuity or logical inconsistency. There are two reasons why they 
do not. First, particular axioms in Ramsey’s system that help define in what 
consistency consists overlook the intensionality of preference and so at best 
spell out a sub-logical conception of consistency that does not clearly apply to 
it. Second, these constraints presuppose a more primitive concept of utility-
maximization, namely (U), that is even more vulnerable to the reproach of 
vacuity under the revealed preference interpretation than under earlier ones. 
 
2.1. Ramsey’s Value Axioms 
Ramsey begins with the assumption that  
[1] we act in the way we think most likely to realize the objects of our 
desires, so that a person’s actions are completely determined by his 
desires and opinions … [2] we seek things which we want, which may be 
our own or other people’s pleasure, or anything else whatever, and our 
                                                
20
Frank P. Ramsey, "Truth and Probability," in The Foundations of Mathematics and Other 
Logical Essays, Ed. R. B. Braithwaite (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), 157-198. 
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actions are such as we think most likely to realize those goods.
21
  … [3] 
our subject has certain beliefs about everything; then he will act so that 
what he believes to be the total consequences of his action will be the best 
possible.
22
 
Ramsey assumes that sentences [1] and [2] in the above passage are equivalent 
to [3]. [1] and [2] more accurately summarize the belief-desire model of 
motivation already discussed. However, [3] does not describe a motivational 
model. Rather, it is a prediction of intentional maximizing behavior, and as 
such encapsulates the utility-maximizing model of rationality, i.e. (U). [3] is in 
fact the foundational theoretical assumption underlying the constraints 
Ramsey offers.   
Ramsey’s project is to create a subjective probability measure of the 
degrees of belief on which a chooser’s intention to maximize is based. His 
value axioms make it possible to calibrate and compare the value of different 
total outcomes F, G, H, I, J, K to a chooser based on the numerical value 
intervals among them. The basic idea is to measure my degree of belief in a 
sentence s by asking how much between 0 and 1 I would be willing to bet on 
the truth of s; the von Neumann-Morgenstern cardinal measure discussed in 
Section 1.2 above is a refinement on this basic idea. According to it, I believe s 
to a degree of only .5 if I am indifferent between the following two 
alternatives: 
 
(i) the truth of s secures total outcome F and its falsity secures G; and 
(ii) the falsity of s secures F and its truth secures G. 
 
That is, nothing of consequence for me turns on whether s is true or false. If s’s 
truth gives it a probabilistic value of 1 and its falsity gives it a probabilistic 
value of 0, then my indifference between (i) and (ii) amounts to an 
indifference between the following two cases: 
 
  (i’) (1, F) and (0, G); and 
  (ii’) (0, F) and (1, G); 
 
i.e. my ranking of total outcomes F and G remains unaffected by the possible 
truth or falsity of s. Call s a toss-up belief.   
The difference in value I assign to F relative to G is equal to the difference 
in value I assign H relative to I if, given that my ranking of F and G remains 
                                                
21
 Ibid., 173. By contrast with Ramsey, I. M. D. Little defines consistent behavior to 
include the maximizing motivational assumption ("A Reformulation of the Theory of 
Consumer's Behavior," Oxford Economic Papers I (1949), 91, 97). 
22
 Ramsey, ibid., 176. 
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unaffected by the possible truth or falsity of s, I am equally indifferent 
between the following two options: 
 
  (iii) the truth of s secures F and its falsity secures I; and 
  (iv) the truth of s secures G and its falsity secures H. 
 
That is, if nothing of consequence for my ranking of F and I turns on the truth 
or falsity of s, then similarly nothing of consequence for my ranking of G and 
H does, either. And similarly, this amounts to indifference between the 
following two cases: 
 
  (iii’) (1, F) and (0, I); 
  (iv’) (1, G) and (0, H); 
 
i.e. my ranking of F and I relative to G and H remains similarly unaffected. In 
this case the value intervals between F and G, and between H and I are the 
same.  
Then define as a value any set of outcomes I prefer to a given outcome, 
such that if I prefer outcome F to G, then I prefer any outcome with the same 
value as F to any outcome with the same value as G. In this case the value of F 
to me is greater than the value of G, and I can be said to rank total outcomes F, 
G, … in an ordinal series. Also define as an ethically neutral sentence (or 
proposition) s one whose truth or falsity makes no difference to the equal 
value of two possible worlds identical in all other respects. 
Ramsey’s first axiom (A1) stipulates the existence of such an s believed to 
a degree of .5, i.e. of an ethically neutral toss-up belief. His second axiom,  
 
(A2) if s, t are such sentences and the option F if s, I if not-s is 
equivalent to G if s, H if not-s, then 
 F if t, I if not-t is equivalent to G if t, H if not-t 
 
replaces the indifference relation between (iii) and (iv) above with an 
equivalence relation, and derives from it similarly equal value intervals for 
total outcomes F, G, H and I with respect to a second ethically neutral toss-up 
belief t. This establishes that the equality of the value intervals between F and 
G and between H and I is independent of the content of the ethically neutral 
toss-up belief on the truth of which I am willing to bet either way for the same 
stakes; and so, by definition, the equivalence of the intervals FG and HI. From 
this equivalence plus the operations of transposition and distribution, Ramsey 
derives the equivalence of the ordinal rankings F>G and H>I and of the 
equalities F=G and H=I.  
The consistency of these intervals is secured by Ramsey’s third and 
fourth axioms: 
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(A3) If option A is equivalent to option B and B to C, then A to C;  
 
call this the Transitivity of Equivalent Options Axiom.  (A3) establishes the 
unit consistency among comparable outcomes of whatever the unit quantity 
by which all of them are compared. 
 
  (A4) If FG = HI, HI = JK, then FG = JK; 
 
call this the Transitivity of Equal Intervals Axiom. (A4) establishes the interval 
consistency among the intervals of measurement relative to which each 
outcome, conceived as some multiple of their unit quantity, is calibrated. 
Together axioms (A2) – (A4) ensure that, independent of the particular 
numerical values assigned to alternative outcomes, all such comparable 
outcomes can be ranked relative to one another as multiples of some unit 
quantity along a cardinal scale that assigns some numerical value to each. 
There are eight axioms in all.  (A5) and (A6) stipulate unit quantity 
uniqueness, (A7) stipulates ordinal continuity, (A8) the ratio between two 
numbers a and b given integers m, n such that na>b and mb>a. Together they 
demonstrate how a value a might be correlated with a real number u(F) such 
that the value interval between F and G can be represented by the numerical 
expression u(F) – (u)G. I focus here on the reasoning behind (A2)-(A4) just 
summarized.  
 
2.2. Consistency and Intensionality 
 From the outset, Ramsey’s exposition relies on intuitive and unexplicated 
notions of preference and ranking. Axioms (A1) – (A8) articulate these 
intuitive notions with formal precision. But they do not function as 
foundations that these intuitive notions presuppose.  The relationship is 
rather the reverse: The intuitive notions of preference and ranking provide the 
foundations that the formal axioms presuppose, and on the basis of which 
those formal axioms are interpreted. That is, we need to assume and accept 
the intuitive notions in order to make sense of the formalization. This means 
that implicit from the very beginning in the conception of utility-
maximization and partial belief Ramsey develops formally is a more 
primitive, clearly intentional proto-concept of utility-maximization as basic 
action – (U), in fact, as defined in Chapter III, Section 1 above – that gives the 
formalized axioms meaning. Because this more primitive conception of 
utility-maximization is implicitly intentional, Ramsey’s value axioms, in so far 
as they are valid, are implicitly intentional as well. The point in Ramsey’s 
exposition at which intensionality is abandoned for the flexibility, precision 
and objectivity of extensional notation is the point at which these axioms 
cease to pertain to preference as we ordinarily understand that concept. 
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 Now we have just seen that in the move from (A1) to (A2), Ramsey 
replaces the indifference relation between (iii) and (iv) that defines equality of 
value intervals FG and HI relative to an ethically neutral toss-up belief s with 
an equivalence relation that enables him to derive similarly equal value 
intervals relative to a second ethically neutral toss-up belief t with which s is, 
as regards content and degree of belief, interchangeable. This move deserves 
further scrutiny. Indifference between (iii) and (iv) was stipulated to be a 
sufficient condition for the equality of the value intervals of ranked total 
outcomes FG and HI. However, indifference is an intensional relation 
between two complex objects of value, whereas equivalence is an extensional 
relation between two complex sentences or propositions. To say that I am 
indifferent between (iii) and (iv) is to say that it does not matter to my preference 
ranking of F, G, H, and I whether s is true or false. This is what enables us to 
infer the equality of value intervals FG and HI.   
By contrast, to say that (iii) and (iv) are equivalent is to say that (iii) is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for (iv), i.e. that the truth of s secures F and its 
falsity secures I if and only if the truth of s secures G and its falsity secures H. 
From this it follows that the truth of s secures F if and only if it secures G; and 
that its falsity secures I if and only if it secures H. To see this, use the Boolean 
connectives under their conventional interpretation in classical logic, and 
assume for purposes of this argument that F, G, H, I, J, and K can be 
interpreted as symbolizing not outcomes but rather sentences or propositions 
describing outcomes. Then (iii) becomes 
 
  (iii”) (s  F) . (~s  I) 
 
and (iv) becomes 
 
  (iv”) (s  G) . (~s  H). 
 
Then (A2) becomes 
 
  (A2’) [(s  F) . (~s  I) ≡ (s  G) . (~s  H)]  
⇒ [(t  F) . (~t  I) ≡ (t  G) . (~t  H)]. 
 
The antecedent of (A2’) can be rewritten as 
 
  (A2’a) [(s  F) ≡ (s  G)] . [(~s  I) ≡ (~s  H)]. 
 
This makes the truth of s a sufficient condition for F if and only if it is a 
sufficient condition for G, and its falsity a sufficient condition for H if and 
only if it is a sufficient condition for I. But it does not show that the difference 
in value between F and G is the same as the difference in value between H 
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and I. Because, unlike the indifference relation, the equivalence relation does 
not assign value to its terms (not even equal value), it cannot show this. 
 Then the consequent of (A2), here rewritten as  
 
  (A2’c) [(t  F) ≡ (t  G)] . [(~t  I) ≡ (~t  H)] 
 
follows as a statement about the independence of the connective relations 
among F, G, H, and I from the content of the ethically neutral toss-up belief on 
the truth of which I am willing to bet either way for the same stakes. But it 
does not show the independence of the equality of the value intervals between 
F and G and between H and I from that belief. The equality of these intervals 
depend upon my indifference between (iii”) and (iv”). Because indifference is 
an intensional relation that ranges over the objects of value within its scope, it 
is not permissible to substitute or logically manipulate the terms of this 
relation with impunity as Ramsey does and can do with impunity the terms of 
the equivalence relations set out in (A2). Within the scope of an intensional 
operator, probabilistically identical toss-up beliefs are not automatically 
intersubstitutable. For example, I may strictly prefer peaches to pears given an 
expected 50% chance that a random coin-toss will come up heads. But I may 
be indifferent between them given an expected 50% chance of rain, because 
my apprehension about the weather ruins my appetite. So it remains moot 
whether the value intervals that separate F, G, H and I remain equal relative 
to some toss-up belief different than s.  
 This raises the question of what it is that axioms (A3) and (A4) stipulate 
the transitive consistency of. Without an unproblematic derivation of the 
equality of value intervals FG, GH, and HI that accommodates the 
intensionality of these values and the relations among them, we lack explicit 
guidelines for understanding how value options can be equivalent (A3) and 
how the intervals among them therefore can be equal (A4). We have just seen 
that an unexplicated transition from indifference-talk to equivalence-talk does 
not suffice. Then the ordinal ranking of F, G, H and I yields no guidelines for 
ascertaining what it would mean to speak of the transitivity of “equivalent” 
value options (A3), nor what it would mean to speak of the transitivity of 
“equal” value intervals (A4). It appears that the familiar, extensional 
interpretation of the transitivity relation is the only one available (I examine 
the Jeffrey-Bolker solution to this problem in Volume II, Chapter III.6.2). 
To see why this does not suffice, try replacing the equivalence relation in 
(A3) with the indifference relation abandoned in the move from (A1) to (A2).  
Using “≈” to mean “is indifferent to,” (A3) becomes 
 
  (A3’) If A ≈ B and B ≈ C, then A ≈ C. 
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(A3’) is not valid even as an empirical generalization, much less as an axiom. 
For example, (A3’) is violated by my indifference between cherries and apples 
and between apples and peaches, but strong preference for peaches over 
cherries. Moreover, there is no way to translate (A3’) into the 
straightforwardly extensional notation of sentential logic that would preserve 
the transitive structure of (A3’). Letting P symbolize the sentence, “A is 
indifferent to B,” and Q symbolize “B is indifferent to C,” the most we can get 
out of (A3’) sententially is 
 
  (A3”) If P and Q, then R, 
 
which is less than helpful. Since the plausibility of (A4) depends on the 
suspect transition from (A1) to (A2), it, too, remains suspect. Ramsey’s 
conception of transitivity as spelled out in (A3) and (A4) looks as first glance 
to be quite innocent, and logically unproblematic. But in both axioms it 
surreptitiously combines intensional and extensional elements that turn out to 
be incompatible. Because this conception of transitivity works only by 
ignoring these underlying incompatibilities, I describe it as sub-logical.  
It would seem that Ramsey was stuck between a rock and a hard place: 
either respect intensionality and sacrifice consistency; or ignore intensionality 
and reap the benefits of sub-logical transitivity. One such benefit was an 
extensional equivalence relation that obscured not only the intensionality of 
choice, but thereby the irreducible subjectivity of the chooser – the two 
persisting obstacles to interpersonal comparisons that, as we saw in Section 
1.3, were not circumvented by stipulating that preferences are revealed in 
behavior. In their absence a cardinal utility scale could be fashioned that 
might be thought to have extensional application, and so measure the utility-
maximization of more than one subject. The price of Ramsey’s sub-logical 
conception of transitivity, however, was the replacement of the primitive 
notions of preference and utility-maximization he originally set out to 
axiomatize with an extensional equivalence relation that obtains merely 
between sentences. Next I show why this Faustian bargain does not 
circumvent the charge of vacuity. 
 
2.3. Vacuity and Cyclicity 
 We have just seen that Ramsey’s proof presupposes the truth of (U), i.e. 
that an agent “will act so that what he believes to be the total consequences of 
his action will be the best possible.” We have also seen that the suspect 
replacement of the indifference relation with the equivalence relation in the 
move from axiom (A1) to (A2) calls into question whether Ramsey’s axioms 
do, in fact, impose consistency constraints on bona fide preference rankings; or 
whether, instead, they merely impose such constraints on the sub-logical 
relations among extensional sentences that may or may not assert such 
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preferences; and whether, therefore, there is in Ramsey’s account good reason 
to venture much beyond (U) to construct a more complex formalization of 
expected utility theory. But even were these worries about the sub-logical 
status of these constraints to prove unfounded, there would be independent – 
though related – reason to move cautiously beyond (U). 
An independent implication of (U) is that I always perform that basic 
action that I believe will effect the best total consequences, i.e. that when I act, 
I maximize expected utility. This is the vacuous behavioral version of (U) 
already discussed, according to which the very fact that I perform an action 
legitimates the inference that I most preferred to perform that action. So from 
the fact that certain consistency constraints plus Ramsey's motivational 
assumptions about preference might imply a more complex and formally 
robust version of (U), it does not follow that lifting these constraints implies 
the negation of (U). It cannot, because the truth of (U) is assumed at the 
outset. The concept of preference itself, not that of consistent preference, is 
what gives meaning to the concept of maximizing a quantity of utility.
23
 
                                                
23
This point is presupposed in two different methods of evaluating multidimensional 
alternatives. The additive model assigns a scale value to an alternative as a measure of its 
utility based on the sum of the utility or subjective value of its components. This model 
satisfies the Ramsey-Savage consistency constraints. The additive difference model is based 
on the difference between the subjective values of two alternatives along some 
particular dimension. The contribution of this particular difference to the overall 
evaluation of the alternatives is then determined by a difference function. This model 
satisfies the Ramsey-Savage consistency constraints only if all difference functions are 
linear. Although only unidimensional preference rankings will be treated in the 
following discussion, the significance of these two methods lie in their implication that 
the utility of alternatives ranked in pairwise comparisons can be established 
independently of the Ramsey-Savage consistency constraints on those rankings 
themselves. For a discussion, see Amos Tversky, "Intransitivity of Preferences," 
Psychological Review 76, 1 (1969), esp. 41-44.   
 To my knowledge, the inevitability of intransitive preferences among 
multidimensional alternatives is first suggested by Ward Edwards, "Probability- 
Preferences in Gambling," American Journal of Psychology 66 (1953), 363. In "Intransitivity 
and the Mere Addition Paradox" (Philosophy and Public Affairs 16, 2 (Spring 1987), Larry 
Temkin ingeniously applies the problem of intransitivity among multidimensional 
preferences to utilitarianism, in which we must order the number and existence of 
people and the comparative quality of their lives according to various values such as 
equality, utility, and the maximin principle (he cites Tversky's paper in a different 
connection, but nowhere mentions the general intransitivity problem of 
multidimensional preferences which his discussion illustrates). Ordinarily the problem 
can be solved if all-things-considered judgments about the alternatives can be made that 
rank them unidimensionally on an ordinal scale. However, Temkin uses the concept of 
A being all things considered better than B to define "A is preferable to B." This 
terminology is doubly misleading, for it falsely suggests that multidimensional 
intransitivities persist in the face of all-things-considered judgments, which they do 
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Hence the agent can be interpreted as maximizing utility in her actions 
whether she in fact behaves consistently or not. 
 Indeed, the concept of expected utility-maximizing preference revealed in 
behavior would subvert the imposition of consistency constraints on action, 
even were those constraints not subject to worries about intensionality. For if 
any action can be interpreted as maximizing the agent's expected utility in 
virtue of the fact that she performs it, then in particular any preference 
ranking of alternatives the agent makes at a particular moment can be 
interpreted as the outcome of consistent pairwise comparisons among all the 
alternatives available at that moment, and so as reflecting a consistent 
ordering of those alternatives.
24
 Ramsey's result does not redress the vacuity 
of (U) because it fails to insure the consistency through time of the agent's 
preferences. As Donald Davidson observes, “The theory merely puts 
restrictions on a temporal cross-section of an agent's disposition to choose.”
25
 
This means that any behavioral violation of Ramsey’s consistency axioms can 
be understood, in accordance with the principle of charity, as a change in the 
agent's preferences instead. Hence these restrictions are vacuously inviolable 
– not because agents never in fact behave inconsistently, but because the 
Ramsey-Savage concept of a simple ordering
26
 by itself is not sufficient to 
ensure transitivity of preference through time. 
                                                                                                     
ordinarily do not; and that all-things-considered judgments express not preference but 
normative preferability, which it ordinarily does not. Temkin's discussion is valuable 
because of its breadth, detail, and focus; but these terminological idiosyncrasies lend it a 
greater air of paradox than seems warranted. I suggest a way of avoiding intransitivities 
caused by preferences among multi-dimensional alternatives in Volume II, Chapter 
III.9. 
24
I use the term "preference ranking" to refer to the result of a pairwise comparison 
between two given alternatives, and "ordering" to refer to the resultant relations of 
priority that obtain among all such alternatives consecutively ranked. One way of 
putting my point would be to say that the burden of interpreting the concept of 
maximizing utility is carried by the concept of a preference ranking, not by that of a 
simple ordering. This is why the impossibility of linearly representing intransitive 
preferences does not exclude their cyclical ordering. For an example, see the discussion 
of Cleopatra in Section 3.2, below. 
25
 Donald Davidson, "Psychology as Philosophy," in Essays on Actions and Events 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 235. Sen makes essentially the same point in "Rational 
Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 6, 4 (1977), 317-44; see esp. 325. 
26
As refined by Leonard Savage in The Foundations of Statistics (New York: Dover 
Publications, Inc., 1971), 17-21; also see R. D. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and 
Decisions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957), 25-28. Tjalling Koopmans (in 
"Allocation of Resources and the Price System," in Three Essays on the State of Economic 
Science (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957) dismisses the time-dependence problem 
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To sharpen the underlying problem here, I consider examples using the 
strict preference relation, rather than the indifference relation on which 
Ramsey relied, to construct a scale of equal value intervals. Following 
Ramsey, let “>” be the relation, “is strictly preferred to.” Then a transitive 
ordering of the kind adopted by Savage and others of alternatives F, G, H, ... 
must conform to the following rule of transitivity: 
 
  (T) If F>G and G>H, then F>H. 
 
(T) is where the intensionality problem and the vacuity problem begin to 
dovetail. We have already seen, using the indifference relation as an example, 
that it is not possible to cast a transitivity relation among intensional 
preferences in a strictly sentential form. This is even truer for examples using 
the relation of strict preference. Hence (T) is regarded as what Savage calls a 
"logic-like" criterion of consistency among alternatives in decision-making.
27
 It 
is not strictly a criterion of logical consistency because it is neither among nor 
implied by the laws of logic. Nor can we conclusively identify the relation 
between (T)'s antecedent and consequent as one either of logical entailment or 
material implication.   
If (T) were an axiom of logic, then it would assert something like a 
conceptual truth about what it means to prefer F to G and G to H. In this case, 
to violate (T) would be to have no genuine preferences among F, G, and H at 
all. If, on the other hand, the relation between (T)'s antecedent and consequent 
were that of material implication, then it would assert a merely truth-
functional relation between preferring F to G and G to H on the one hand, and 
F to H on the other. In this case, to violate (T) would be simply to furnish an 
instance that merely falsifies (T), in which one's genuine preferences happen 
to be intransitive. Utility theorists vacillate between treating (T) as though it 
involved something like material implication, and as though it involved 
something like logical entailment.
28
  But presumably we would think (T) – or 
                                                                                                     
discussed below by stipulating that on one interpretation of his proposed model of 
competitive equilibrium, "a choice by a consumer is in fact a plan for future 
consumption extending over all periods considered. His preference ordering is thought 
of as an ordering of all such plans" (61). But this will not suffice if any such meta-
ordering realistically may change from moment to moment as the consumer herself 
advances in time. By contrast, Donald Davidson, J. C. C. McKinsey, and Patrick Suppes 
suggest that we preserve transitivity by reinterpreting changes in preference over time 
as changes in the alternatives ranked. This makes (U) unnecessarily vacuous, since they 
have already denied any interest in how people may in fact order their preferences. See 
their "Outlines of a Formal Theory of Value, I," Philosophy of Science 22 (1955), esp. 144-5. 
27
 Ibid., Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, 19. 
28
For example, I. M. D. Little (in "A Reformulation," op. cit. Note 21) and Davidson, 
McKinsey, and Suppes (op. cit. Note 26) treat (T) as involving entailment, whereas Ward 
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something like it – rational, even if no one's behavior ever conformed to it. So 
whatever (T) is, it is not an empirical generalization describing actual choice 
behavior. This should be kept in mind in what follows.  
 (T) has sufficient structural and intuitive similarity to certain laws of logic 
– transitivity of implication, for example – that we tend prereflexively to agree 
with Ramsey in thinking “inconsistent” (in some sense) an agent whose choice 
behavior violate (T) in a cyclical ordering of F, G, and H: 
 
  (C) F>G and G>H and H>F 
 
(C) seems in some sense inconsistent because we reflexively think, first, that 
F>G and G>H "imply" F>H; and second, that F>H and H>F are mutually 
contradictory. But although implication and mutual contradiction are well-
defined within the apparatus of classical logic, it is not possible to give them a 
similarly rigorous meaning here. Thus because H>F does not logically imply 
not-F>H, F>G, G>H, F>H, and H>F all may be true together. Hence (T) and 
(C) may be, too. Because Ramsey’s value axioms secure (at best) the 
consistency of value measurement units and value intervals among ranked 
alternatives and not the mutual consistency of the pairwise comparisons 
among alternatives on which such a ranking is based, they do not exclude (C); 
nor, therefore, the sub-logical “inconsistency” that (T) and (C) represent. 
 Whereas (T) is not an empirical generalization over actual behavior, (C) 
appears to be. As Sen has shown, the theory of revealed preference preserves 
the distinction between preference and "selection"
29
 behavior. This means that 
intransitive selection behavior described by (C) need not violate the transitive 
preference ordering described by (T), any more than an agent who 
sequentially asserts inconsistent beliefs thereby commits a logical 
impossibility. Just as we save the assumption of rationality in an agent whose 
speech behavior calls it into question by attributing to her rational beliefs that 
conform to the laws of logic, we similarly may save the assumption of rational 
preferences in an agent whose selection behavior is intransitive by attributing 
to her preferences that conform to (T).   
                                                                                                     
Edwards (in "Probability-Preferences in Gambling" (op. cit. Note 23) treats it as 
involving, at best, material implication. 
29
Thus I adopt Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser's nomenclature (see Edna 
Ullmann-Margalit and Sidney Morgenbesser, "Picking and Choosing," Social Research 
44, 4 (Winter 1977), 757-785). But I use "selecting" as the generic term in order not to 
prejudge the question whether every selection is, in their terminology, a choice (hence 
reflects a preference), rather than in order to raise the question whether picking is a real 
possibility. I am convinced by Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser that it is, but my 
account addresses the canonical preference (-or-indifference) relation in order to 
preserve the completeness condition on orderings. 
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So the quasilogical status of (T) can be retained, and the empirical 
findings respected, by invoking the principle of charity.
30
 Rather than charge 
the agent whose selection behavior is described by (C) with inconsistency, we 
may instead simply revise our hypothesis about her present preference 
rankings. Thus suppose Cyril's behavior produces a cyclical ordering over 
three temporally sequential trials, in each of which he must make pairwise 
comparisons among F, G, and H, as follows: 
 
  (Ct) t1: F>G 
   t2: G>H 
   t3: H>F 
 
Call these temporally sequential trials time-dependent. That Cyril prefers H to F 
at t3 permits us to infer that he has changed his mind about his earlier 
rankings at t1 and t2, i.e. that at t3, he rather prefers H to G and G to F. The 
vacuity of the Ramsey-Savage concept of a simple ordering arises from the 
fact that the transitivity of an agent's preferences always can be preserved by 
making this inference. Because all selection behavior always permits it, no 
such behavior, not even that described by (C), can be shown to violate (T).
31
 
                                                
30
For extended discussion of this principle, see W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object 
(Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1960), 59, 69; Ontological Relativity and Other Essays 
(New York, N. Y. Columbia University Press, 1969), 46; Donald Davidson, "On the Very 
Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," APA Presidential Address, Proceedings and Addresses of 
the American Philosophical Association 47 (1974). Also see Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman, "Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases," Science 185 (1974), 
1124-31; ""The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice," Science 211 (1981), 
453-458; James G. March, "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity, and the Engineering of 
Choice," Bell Journal of Economics 9 (1978), 587-608; Elliot Sober, "Psychologism," Journal 
for the Theory of Social Behavior 8 (1978), 165-191; L. Jonathan Cohen, "On the Psychology 
of Prediction: Whose is the Fallacy?" Cognition 7 (1979), 385-407; "Can Human 
Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?" Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (1981), 
317-331; Steven P. Stitch and Richard E. Nisbett, "Justification and the Psychology of 
Human Reasoning," Philosophy of Science 47 (l980), 188-202; Richard E. Nisbett and Lee 
Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J. Prentice-Hall, 1980); Paul Thagard and Richard E. Nisbett, "Rationality and 
Charity," unpublished paper, 1981; Steven P. Stich, "Could Man be an Irrational 
Animal?" Synthese 64, 1 (1985). 
31
In "The Theory of Decision-Making," (Psychological Bulletin 51, 4 (1954), Ward Edwards 
acknowledges and criticizes this argument on the grounds that “unless the assumption 
of constancy of tastes over the period of experimentation is made, no experiments on 
choice can ever be meaningful, and the whole theory of choice becomes empty. So this 
quibble can be rejected at once” (405). !!? These concluding sentences do not follow as 
obviously as Edwards thinks they do. My argument in this chapter is that, on the 
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Since the appeal to the principle of charity is intended to interpret a 
temporally sequential series of pairwise comparisons of alternatives, and 
since this appeal is required in order to preserve the transitivity of those 
comparisons in the face of (C), the vacuity of the concept of a simple ordering 
arises, in part, from its implicit time-dependence.
32
 Then even when (Ct) 
obtains, (U) is satisfied; i.e. (U) is vacuous. 
 Seemingly intransitive behavior explained by systematic changes in taste 
resulting from learning or sequential effects over repeated trials is one 
obvious application of the principle of charity. But (T) may be vacuously 
preserved by appeal to this principle even in cases otherwise explained as a 
momentary lapse or glitch in the evaluative process. In these cases, too, no 
genuinely intransitive behavior can be identified.
33
 Thus the probabilistic 
                                                                                                     
contrary, the utility-maximizing theory of choice may meaningfully survive if its 
explanatory scope is reduced. If not, I think it is not "this quibble" that should be 
"rejected at once." Davidson, McKinsey, and Suppes (op. cit. Note 26) conceive the 
problem as consequent on a revealed preference interpretation of choice. They think 
that if preference is taken to be equivalent to selection behavior, then each time-
dependent selection may spring from a "momentarily rational preference ranking," and 
so we cannot prove what a person's preference ranking is over more than two 
alternatives. Their solution is to interpret particular selections as evidence for preference 
interpreted as a disposition to select. A cyclical ranking is then “evidence, so far as it 
goes, that [a person's] preference ranking is not rational; but we would reconsider this 
verdict if we learned he had changed his mind about the relative ranking of a and c after 
his first two choices” (147). But to change one's mind after each selection just is to have 
a series of "momentarily rational preference rankings." So the dispositional 
interpretation of preference is of no help here; I address some further arguments for this 
interpretation in Note 34, below. Also see Donald Davidson, Sidney Siegel, and Patrick 
Suppes, "Some Experiments and Related Theory on the Measurement of Utility and 
Subjective Probability," Applied Mathematics and Statistics Laboratory, Technical Report 
1, Stanford University, Stanford, Cal., August 15, 1955.  
32
Notice that it will not solve the problem to devise a way for Cyril to select a 
simultaneous linear ordering of F, G, and H – say, by requiring him to choose among 
pressing buttons for an F-G-H, an H-G-F, and an F-G-H-F scale. If he chooses the last, 
the time-dependent appeal to the principle of charity can be made for scanning the scale 
just as for pairwise-ranking alternatives. The implications for the use of the principle of 
charity of "changing one's mind" under such circumstances are discussed further in 
Section 3.1, below. In any case, a simultaneous linear ordering is a plausible substitute 
for pairwise comparisons only where the number of alternatives to be ordered is 
sufficiently restricted to those which are simultaneously comparable in practice. Even 
three or four such alternatives, simultaneously presented, is a stretch. 
33
Again I mean to be referring only to unidimensional criteria for ranking alternatives. 
In "Intransitivity of Preferences" (op. cit. Note 23), Tversky demonstrates that genuinely 
intransitive behavior can be identified when multidimensional criteria are used. He 
acknowledges, however, that in the absence of replication, “one can always attribute 
intransitivities to a change in taste that took place between choices” (45). For this reason 
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reformulation of (T) designed to incorporate such intransitivities, weak 
stochastic transitivity, or WST, is susceptible to similar complaints. Let the 
probability p(F,G) of choosing F over G in a choice between them and the 
probability p(G,F) of similarly choosing G over F equal 1. Then WST defines 
the preference for F over G thus: 
 
  (WSP) F>G if and only if p(F,G) ≥ 1/2, 
 
i.e. F is defined as preferred to G if and only if it is chosen over G more than 
half the time.  Then the rule of weak stochastic transitivity can be restated as 
follows: 
 
  (WST) If p(F,G) ≥ 1/2 and p(G,H) ≥ 1/2, then p(F,H) ≥ ½ 
 
But by elevating preference to a second-order probabilistic function over a 
range of transitive and intransitive choices, WST replaces revealed preference 
– the original target of the argument for (U)'s vacuity – with a new target, 
namely WST's unanalyzed notion of choice, which is susceptible to the same 
critique.
34
 
                                                                                                     
he introduces variables into the experimental design “to minimize the memory of 
earlier choices in order to allow independent replications within one session” (34). 
Presumably, the point of minimizing memory from one trial to the next is to minimize 
the possibility that the agent's choice is motivated by a desire to maintain consistency, 
rather than to maximize utility. This rationale begs my question, of whether there can be a 
coherent concept of utility-maximization that does not presuppose conformity to the 
requirements of logical consistency. (An example of such conformity would be L. L. 
Thurstone's "naive" subject with an "even disposition", whom he instructed to assume a 
"uniform motivational attitude" (personal communication cited in Ward Edwards, "The 
Theory of Decision-Making," op. cit. Note 31. See L. L. Thurstone, "The Indifference 
Function," Journal of Social Psychology 2 (1931), 139-167).) It also begs the question of 
what an authentic choice is. Tversky seems to assume it is a matter of reflexive, 
unreflective behavior, rather than an expression of conscious and consistent 
deliberation about all the relevant considerations. But it is unclear why independent 
replications based on minimal memory of previous rankings should be treated as more 
authentic expressions of preference than those influenced by memory or by a 
hypothesized change of mind. I air some further reservations about this device in 
Section 3, below. 
34
Can this problem be avoided by defining preference rankings dispositionally rather 
than time-dependently? Suppose we stipulate that the agent has intransitive preferences 
if at any tn, she is disposed simultaneously to select F over G, G over H, and H over F. On 
the basis of empirical evidence, a counterfactual account could then be given of how she 
would select time-dependently if confronted with pairwise comparisons among F, G, 
and H. The empirical evidence for this might consist in the following sort of statistical 
study:   
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 The money pump may seem to refute (U)’s vacuity. A money pump is an 
agent who pays out – hence loses money – for the privilege of making cyclical 
preferences in the manner of (Ct). Thus suppose Hazel at t1 purchases F, a cell 
phone/ alarm clock/ radio/ video camera/ gameboy/ pager with maximal 
roaming flexibility for $200.00. At t2 she pays a fee of $10.00 to exchange F for 
G, a cell phone/ alarm clock/radio/video camera/pager with no gameboy 
(because she thinks it’s silly) but maximal roaming flexibility for $150.00. At t3 
Hazel pays another fee of $10.00 to exchange G for H, a basic cell phone with 
no accoutrements and sufficient roaming flexibility for her needs for $50.00, 
because the video camera freezes up when the pager or alarm clock is 
                                                                                                     
 
We explain to each of 1,000 subjects that, given F and G, if they reach out a hand 
for F, G will be removed. We describe these subjects as "selecting F" if they reach 
out for F under these circumstances. We then give to each subject the same 
instructions regarding G and H, and F and H: Whichever the person reaches out 
her hand for is that which we interpret her has having "selected." We find that, 
over a series of such trials, randomized over individual subjects, this population 
selects F over G, G over H, and H over F. 
 
On this basis, when Hilda later selects F over G at t1, G over H at t2, and H over F at t3, 
we can then infer that at t3 she is disposed to select F over G, G over H, and H over F. 
We conclude that Hilda has genuinely intransitive preferences. She has not merely 
changed her mind about her earlier ones. 
 However, the statistical study legitimates this conclusion only if we have evidence 
that at least most subjects in the test population have not changed their minds about 
their earlier preferences. At most, their behavior encourages the generalization that 
when people select F over G and G over H, they often select H over F. But this 
generalization is neutral between their changing their minds and having intransitive 
preferences. It is hard to imagine what empirical data would justify the above 
conclusion, without arbitrarily ruling out even the possibility that Hilda had changed 
her mind. 
 Second, the notion of a disposition that is intended to explain Hilda's cyclical 
ordering itself encounters the same problems as the theory of revealed preference. If 
"disposition" means the structural propensity (causal, teleological, statistical) to behave 
as she did in fact behave, the disposition at t3 to select G over G, G over H, and H over F 
is consistent with the hypothesis that she selected H over F at t3 because she changed 
her mind about her earlier preference rankings; i.e. that Hilda now at t3 prefers G over F 
and H over G – regardless of how she is structurally disposed to behave. Either it is 
vacuously true that people always prefer what they are disposed structurally to select – 
in which case there is no significant difference between preference and selection 
behavior after all; or else such behavior must be supposed to "reveal" "preference" in 
some more full-blooded psychological sense that is independent of behavior. And then, 
as Sen's argument suggests, it is an open question whether one's behavior reveals that 
state or not. So the vacuity of (T) is not mitigated by invoking dispositions as an 
alternative to time-dependent behavior. I owe this objection to Allan Gibbard. 
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beeping. But at t4 Hazel pays a third fee of $10.00 to exchange H for F because 
F maximizes her options. At t5 she pays a fourth fee of $10.00 to exchange F 
for G because she thinks the gameboy is silly. And so on. By now Hazel has 
paid $40.00 for the privilege of ending up with her original choice and 
embarking once again on the cycle of preferences, and there is no end – aside 
from Hazel’s bankruptcy – in sight. The argument would be that since the 
money pump depletes her own resources with no noticeable return, she 
clearly fails to maximize utility, and so demonstrates the irrationality of a 
cyclical ranking. 
 However, both premises of this argument are false. Changing her mind 
repeatedly among the available options really is a privilege – and not only 
that but a luxury – for which Hazel is quite rightly willing to pay. When she is 
feeling expansive and adventurous, she prefers F; and both G and H would be 
wrong for her in that mood. Similarly, when she is feeling like a Serious 
Person, she prefers G; and both F and H would be wrong. And when she is 
feeling austere and disciplined, she prefers H; F or G wouldn’t do at all. Hazel 
is paying for the privilege and the luxury of expressing her shifting moods in 
her choice of cell phone. What’s so irrational about that? – Nothing, according 
to (U). Although the concept of utility has, as we have seen, many possible 
interpretations, it cannot be meaningfully distinguished from notions of 
desire-satisfaction, pleasure, or preference, however loosely these are 
interpreted. But we also have seen in Chapter II.2.3 that the standpoint of 
desire affords no emotionally detached perspective, external to the agent’s 
system of desires overall, from which the agent might evaluate the worth of 
this system itself – much less the cyclical preferences it may contain, or the 
quality of those preferences. (U) tells us that if we wish to express our shifting 
moods through our shifting choices of cell phone, and have the means to 
satisfy this wish, there is no reason not to do so. 
 
3. Transitivity 
 The time-dependence of a simple ordering generates a dilemma about 
when to invoke the principle of charity to protect (T) against seemingly 
intransitive preferences. Below I argue that protecting (T) using the principle 
of charity must defer to a more important rationality assumption, i.e. 
psychological consistency, that may be incompatible with (T) under certain 
circumstances. In the next subsection I argue that psychological consistency 
presupposes logical consistency; and therefore that under those same 
circumstances, (T) and logical consistency are incompatible as well. 
 
3.1. Minimal Psychological Consistency 
 Suppose that F, G, and H represent, not relatively humble, conceptually 
pedestrian alternatives like apples, oranges, and pears, but rather more 
inclusive, personally momentous, but often mutually incompatible alternative 
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meta-ends like being honest, being entertaining, and being tactful, 
respectively; and that Amos gives these three a cyclical ordering as described 
by (C). To suppose that Amos has merely changed his mind at t3 is to suggest 
that he can vacillate with ease among the values of honesty, entertainment, 
and tact, just as he might among apples, oranges, and pears; i.e. that adopting 
and discarding these behavior attitudes, and all that each implies for the more 
specific choices of behavior he must make from moment to moment, is no 
more problematic than adopting and discarding a jacket when the weather 
changes. An agent capable of effortlessly altering his primary 
characterological priorities from one moment to the next, or whenever new 
alternatives and circumstances present themselves, either purchases 
transitivity at the price of psychological consistency, or at least gives new 
meaning to the concept of spineless compromise. 
 But this is to conceive only the more realistic case. Clyde, who reorders 
literally all of his priorities from one choice occasion to the next, presents the 
more radical challenge to the principle of charity. By hypothesis, Clyde is able 
to sustain an enduring sense of psychological continuity at the same time that 
all his preferences undergo revision from moment to moment. But in the 
absence of at least some enduring priorities, it is not easy to see in what this 
sense of psychological continuity could consist. Under these circumstances, 
Clyde would be little more than an enduring physical entity, constantly 
bombarded by new possibilities, constantly changing his mind about what to 
do and what is important, with no psychological consistency from one 
moment to the next. We can assume, for the sake of argument, that he has 
memories of previous ranking occasions. Indeed he must, in order to be 
capable of remembering, from moment to moment, what the enterprise of 
ranking alternatives requires him to do. But by hypothesis, he is unmotivated 
to recall these previous orderings as in any way important or interesting, for 
there are no ongoing goals, values, or plans of action of overriding importance 
relative to which they can be assessed and ranked.  
 But the problem is even worse than this. So far I have described Clyde’s 
dilemma as one concerning choice among alternatives that can be consistently 
ordered. However, Clyde himself is incapable even of picking among 
alternatives all of which are acceptable. I quote at length Edward 
McClennen’s description of Clyde’s dilemma: 
How is he to pick? Suppose that he decides to settle it by the flip of a 
coin: if heads, he will pick x, and if tails, he will pick y. Let him now 
perform the experiment and observe its outcome. Whatever the outcome 
[heads or tails], why now should that outcome settle anything as to which 
one to pick? The decision to settle the matter by the toss of a coin is 
history. … Moreover, it is still the case that from a [utility-maximizing] 
perspective he has no basis for deciding which one to pick. Perhaps he 
should flip the coin again! Alternatively, suppose that [Clyde] simply 
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finds himself reaching for x rather than y and then, in the middle of the 
reach, the thought crosses his mind to reconsider – not to reconsider the 
evaluation that led to the determination that both x and y are fully 
acceptable, but to reconsider the settled picking of x instead of y that the 
reach toward x implies. From a [utility-maximizing] perspective, there is 
still no basis for the picking of x rather than y. Both are still open to him. 
Whatever impulse it was that resulted in the agent’s hand reaching 
toward x, that impulse, given the intervening reflection, is now history.
35
 
In such cases, it is difficult to comprehend the sense in which Clyde could be 
understood even as picking, much less as choosing anything at all. Hence 
Clyde would be an agent only in a truncated sense, for he would be unable 
even to initiate, let alone carry out any sustained plan of action.
36
 
 Earlier it was argued that we could preserve under all circumstances the 
hypothesis that an agent’s preferences are transitive, by appealing to the 
principle of charity to ground the assumption that seemingly intransitive 
selection behavior in truth represented the agent's changes of mind about her 
earlier preference rankings. This seemed in keeping with the canonical 
practice of accepting that explanation of an agent's behavior that preserves the 
assumption of her rationality. But Clyde's is a cautionary tale that warns us 
against protecting the rule at the expense of the rationality of the agent. For it 
appears that in this extreme case the principle of charity preserves (T) only by 
undermining what we can now see is an even more important rationality 
assumption of minimal psychological consistency, i.e. that a rational agent retain 
some long-term priorities that are not subject to constant revision in ranking 
status. It is more important that Amos and Clyde retain some such long-term 
priorities, than that their moment-to-moment selections among 
unidimensional alternatives be transitive; and these two rationality 
assumptions may conflict: Clyde's selection behavior can be (repeatedly 
re)interpreted as transitive only if he is assumed to lack psychological 
consistency. (T) as it stands does not protect the assumption of psychological 
consistency that is necessary for agency, and so we doggedly protect (T) at its 
peril. Since the standard reading of (T) may force an unacceptable choice 
between transitivity and psychological consistency, we need some way of 
                                                
35
 Edward McClennen, Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 208. I discuss this passage at greater length in 
Volume II, Chapter IV.6. 
36
The psychological consistency provided by ongoing goals, values, and plans that 
forms the focus of this and the next section is usually presupposed in discussions of 
personal identity. See, for example, the essays by Locke, Grice, Perry, Williams, and 
Parfit in John Perry, Ed. Personal Identity (Los Angeles: University of California, 1975). 
Also see Joel Feinberg's analysis of Durkheimian anomie in "The Idea of a Free Man," in 
Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
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incorporating this requirement into a more sophisticated interpretation of (T) 
that circumvents it.   
 As stated, the requirement of psychological consistency is an extremely 
weak one to impose on a transitive preference ordering. For example, Doris, 
who at t1 prefers her galoshes to her sneakers, at t2 her sneakers to her high 
heels, and at t3 her high heels to her galoshes does not violate it – provided 
that she also prefers both at t1 and at t2 that she try to make the world a better 
place, at t2 and t3 that her loved ones prosper, and so on. That is, it takes only 
one ranking priority that is unrevisable from t1 to t2 in order to satisfy the 
minimal requirement of psychological consistency as stated here. Nor does 
this requirement exclude Cecil, whose only stable, nonrevisable ranking 
priority is his sneakers. That an agent's nonrevisable ranking priorities must 
be psychologically fundamental rather than frivolous or peripheral in order to 
sustain psychological consistency in some more full-blooded sense is a thesis I 
shall not defend, though I believe it is true. The minimal requirement of 
psychological consistency that I now examine more closely is merely a skeletal 
adumbration of a more complex and realistic one that I do not think it 
necessary to develop here. 
 Satisfying the requirement of minimal psychological consistency is a 
necessary condition for intentionally ranking alternatives. Suppose Winifred 
must rank three alternatives F, G, and H in a series of three pairwise 
comparisons, and that her other preferences are, as a matter of psychological 
fact, transitive and temporally stable. In order for Winifred’s selection 
behavior in this instance to count as an instance of intentionally ranking F, G, 
and H, she must both 
 
(a) have the concept of something's ranking superiority, i.e. the 
concept of its being preferred to other available alternatives; and also  
(b) remember on each trial the relation of the pair she is ranking to  
the third alternative she is not.   
 
That is, when ranking F and G on the first trial, she remembers that H has yet 
to be ranked; when ranking G and H on the second trial she remembers that F 
has already been ranked; and similarly with G when ranking F and H on the 
third trial.
37
   
                                                
37
 (b) has been regarded as much more controversial than it should be. Tversky's version 
of the money pump seems to depend on ignoring it (Amos Tversky, “Intransitivity of 
Preferences,” op. cit. Note 23, 45); and Thomas Schwartz ("Rationality and the Myth of 
the Maximum," Nous 6 (1972), 97-117) is surely right in observing that "once you realize 
you are engaged in a drawn-out process of choosing among three options, even though 
only two are available at any one instant, you should spend your money as if you are 
choosing among all three options – paying for a given option only if it is optimal among 
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Now suppose a series of contiguous moments in time during which 
Winifred is to rank F, G, and H. At t1 she is presented with alternative F and G 
and selects F. At t2 she is presented with G and H and selects G. At t3 she is 
presented with alternative F and H. Now assume she already has the concept 
of something's ranking superiority, i.e. has ranked alternatives on previous 
occasions and learned to conceptualize her behavior in the usual way (a), and 
remembers the rankings she has already given to F relative to G and G 
relative to H (b). Then Winifred can conclude that F is superior in ranking not 
only to G, but to H as well. Her memory of her earlier rankings in effect 
establishes her third. So selection behavior that satisfies conditions (a) and (b) 
for intentionally ranking alternatives thereby satisfies (T). Winifred has at 
least one relatively long-term priority throughout each of three ranking trials. 
This establishes her as minimally psychologically consistent and her 
preference ranking as therefore transitive. Although we have already seen 
that having transitive preferences is compatible with psychological 
inconsistency, an agent who is minimally psychological consistent will have at 
least one transitive preference ranking. 
 Contrast Winifred with Rex, who has and at t3 applies the concept of 
ranking superiority (a) to H, because he has thoroughly forgotten the relation 
of F and H to G established by his two previous rankings. That is, Rex’s 
selection behavior satisfies (a) and violates (b). Then he can, contra hypothesi, 
draw no conclusions as to the ranking superiority of any one of the three 
alternatives to any of the others. That is, if 
 
  (1) t1: F>G 
  (2) t2: G>H 
  (3) t3: H>F, 
 
then by transitivity,  
 
  (4) G>F (on (2) and (3)) 
  (5) H>G (on (3) and (1)) 
  (6) F>H (on (1) and (2)). 
 
So Rex must conclude that everything is preferred to everything else, hence 
that none of the three alternatives is superior in ranking to any of the others. 
So, in particular, it is not superior in ranking to F. So his application of the 
concept of something's ranking superiority to H at t3 has involved him in a 
                                                                                                     
the three and you cannot make an optimal choice without paying as much or more" 
(109). I have more to say about this below. 
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straightforwardly logical inconsistency: H both is and is not preferred to F.
38
 
Just because we cannot symbolize a logical contradiction within the 
constraints of standard decision-theoretic notation does not mean we do not 
know it when we see it, nor that we cannot describe it in natural language. We 
have just done so. So although Rex has thereby produced a cyclical ordering, 
he nevertheless cannot be said to have ranked F, G, and H at all.
39
 Rex’s case 
shows that, as Kant might have put it, concepts without memory come up 
empty. Without a recollection (or “synthesis”) of previous ranking occasions 
to supply continuity with this one, the concept of a thing’s ranking superiority 
is applied so indiscriminately that it has no proper application at all. 
 But now contrast Winifred with Wallace, whose selection behavior 
violates (a) but satisfies (b). Wallace remembers on each trial the relation of 
the pair of alternatives he is ranking to the third he is not, but lacks the 
concept of ranking superiority to apply to his behavior. If he never forms this 
concept, he cannot be described as preferring any one alternative to any other. 
But could Wallace develop and consistently apply that concept to the ordering 
he produces? – Yes, assuming he does not thoroughly change his mind about 
his previous orderings. That is, he can form the concept of ranking superiority 
only if he is minimally psychologically consistent. Minimal psychological 
consistency may provide a kind of foundational structural support that 
determines the transitive consistency of future pairwise comparisons with 
past ones, and so enables the concept of ranking superiority to develop. In the 
absence of this support, it is hard to imagine how it might. 
Take Wallace's first pairwise comparison, the choice of F over G at t1. This 
alone would not enable him to form the concept of F's ranking superiority. For 
this would be to treat F as an instance of something's ranking superiority. But 
                                                
38
Essentially this is Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes' defense of transitivity (op. cit. Note 
26, 145-6), although they do not distinguish unidimensional from multidimensional 
orderings. They recognize that the irrationality of a cyclical ordering consists not simply 
in a violation of transitivity, but of logical consistency in the application of the concept of 
rational choice. That concept plays the same role in their argument that the concept of 
ranking superiority plays in mine in this volume; in Volume II, Chapter III, I demand 
greater formal rigor from the notion of logical consistency. Here Schwartz (ibid.) seems 
patently mistaken in supposing that under these circumstances, "it is a matter of 
indifference" which alternative is chosen – unless he means it is a matter of indifference 
to an agent who is unable to comprehend what is involved in ranking alternatives at all. 
39
Of course if Winifred forgets the relation of the pair she is ranking to the third 
alternative she is not, she is free to apply the concept of ranking superiority locally, to 
either of the two alternatives presented on each of the three trials sequentially, without 
regard to what has occurred on either of the others. But it will still be true in fact that, at 
t3, when she produces a cyclical ordering of F, G, and H, we will have applied that 
concept inconsistently, if we continue to insist on describing Winifred’s behavior as an 
instance of intentionally "ranking F, G, and H."  
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as yet Wallace has no such concept for F to be an instance of, and he can't 
form an inductive generalization on the basis of a single case. Next proceed to 
the second pairwise comparison, in which Wallace chooses G over H at t2. It 
might seem that we now have the second case on which the inductive 
generalization to the concept of something's ranking superiority can be made. 
But we do not. For the concept, "something's ranking superiority," is identical 
to the concept, "some (one) thing's ranking superiority;" and there is no one 
thing at both t1 and t2 from which that concept can be inductively derived. 
Again: of course both F at t1 and G at t2 are instances of this concept. But the 
question remains of how Wallace might ever come to form it in the first place. 
Call this Wallace’s learning problem (without, however, intending to suggest 
that the problem is Wallace’s). He comes to form it by remembering at t2, 
while choosing G over H, the alternative he chose over G at t1, namely F. The 
“some one thing” that has ranking superiority both at t1 and at t2, therefore, is 
F. The concept of a thing’s ranking superiority is an inductive inference from 
Wallace’s memory of his first two pairwise comparisons. His ranking of F 
over H at t3 then follows by implication. 
This conclusion assumes that, while making the third pairwise 
comparison between F and H at t3, Wallace has not changed his mind about 
his ranking of F and G at t1 and his ranking of G and H at t2. This is where 
minimal psychological consistency becomes important. For if he now at t3 
were to prefer G to F and H to G, the effect would be the same as if he had not 
changed his mind but instead violated the consistency of his earlier rankings 
by choosing H over F: He would have produced a cyclical ordering, and there 
would no longer be some one thing ranked as superior in at least two cases 
over which to generalize inductively. But we have already seen that, in this 
event, the concept of a thing's ranking superiority would be otiose even if he 
had acquired it.  Kantians will recognize this argument as a streamlined 
version of Kant’s analysis of transcendental synthesis at A 99 – A 102.
40
 
 So far the argument has been that intentionally ranking a set of given 
alternatives is possible only if two necessary conditions are satisfied:  
 
(a) The agent must be able to form and apply consistently over time 
the concept of a thing's ranking superiority; and  
(b) she must remember the relation of the two alternatives she is 
presently ranking to the third she is not. 
 
                                                
40
 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
(New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
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This is what it means to have a genuine preference. A genuine preference can 
be expressed in a series of pairwise comparisons that satisfy (T). But a genuine 
preference also expresses an agent’s minimally psychologically consistency. 
Now consider briefly what is involved in the requirement of 
psychological consistency, i.e. that an agent have at least some long-term 
priorities that are not subject to constant revision in ranking status from one 
pairwise comparison to the next. First, she must have the concept of a thing's 
priority in her system of ends, and be able to reapply it to those alternatives 
she ranks most highly from moment to moment. This just is the concept of a 
thing's ranking superiority (a) just discussed. Second, she must remember 
from moment to moment that her long-term priorities are not subject to 
constant revision. This means that she must remember the relation of these 
priorities to any two alternatives she is presently ranking. They must 
constitute a third alternative relative to any pairwise comparison she is 
presently making, such that her long-term priorities actually are prior relative 
to other alternatives available, i.e. she assigns them most preferred status 
relative to these other alternatives. This is equivalent to (b), above. (a) and (b) 
together imply that her ordering of the given alternatives is transitive. I 
discuss the significance of (a) and (b) for the more comprehensive, Kantian 
model of rationality in which utility-maximization must be embedded in 
Volume II, Chapter III. 
Of course there are other conditions that must be satisfied in order that an 
agent be psychologically consistent. For example, she must be individuated, 
capable of conceptual discrimination, and so forth. But these conditions must 
be satisfied in order that she be able intentionally to rank alternatives as well. 
So an agent can intentionally and consistently rank a given set of alternatives 
– i.e. express a genuine preference – only if she is psychologically consistent at 
least in the minimal sense described. 
 In the following subsection I propose, following Kant, that psychological 
consistency presupposes logical consistency, in which case the concept of a 
genuine preference does, too. I also suggest briefly some desiderata that a 
revised version of (T) would need to satisfy.  This completes the more general, 
critical part of the argument that (T) must be subordinated to the 
requirements of logical consistency in order to avoid the unappetizing 
alternatives of vacuity and inconsistency. I offer a substantive and detailed 
picture of what (T) looks like when thus subordinated in Volume II, Chapter 
III of this project. 
 
3.2. Logical Consistency 
 Winifred’s and Wallace’s cases demonstrate that having and consistently 
applying the concept of a genuine preference is a necessary condition of 
observing the rule of transitivity; and so the necessity that an agent possess 
the concept of a genuine preference when intentionally ranking alternatives. 
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This is a condition about which conventional decision-theoretic 
interpretations of (T) have nothing to say.   
(T)'s silence on the concept of a genuine preference results not only from 
conflating genuine preference with selection behavior, as Sen has shown. It 
therefore results from failing to incorporate the fact that, like any human 
behavior, the selection behavior of making pairwise comparisons is physically 
discrete and time-dependent, whereas the logic and concepts that inform the 
preferences thereby expressed are not. The process of making transitive 
pairwise comparisons can be represented as selection behavior of the 
following sort, where “s” means “is selected over”: 
 
  (Tt) t1: FsG 
         t2: GsH 
         t3: FsH 
 
 Now ordinarily, when Horace is asked to rank F, G, and H, we assume 
(b) above, i.e. that he remembers at t2, while ranking G and H, his previous 
ranking of F and G at t1. So if he has selected F over G at t1 and G over H at t2, 
we do not therefore suppose, as we did provisionally for Wallace, that Horace 
has changed his mind about G from t1 to t2, first ranking it as inferior and then 
as superior. We do not conclude this because we understand at t2 that 
whereas earlier Horace was ranking G relative to F, he is now ranking it 
relative to H; and these two rankings are obviously consistent. Ordinarily, 
then, we also assume condition (a) above, i.e. that there is a most selected 
alternative common to both trials, namely F. These commonsense 
assumptions ensure the interpretation of Horace's preferences as 
psychologically consistent. 
 Canonical preference language gives no indication of this psychological 
consistency, and fails to incorporate the conditions that ensure it. We have 
already seen that this is what makes (T) vacuous. Instead, it collapses 
preferences that satisfy (a) and (b) into a time-dependent series of discrete 
physical selection behaviors. Thus literally interpreted, the first two pairwise 
comparisons are psychologically unconnected and temporally sequential, such 
that G is ranked lowest in the first trial and highest in the second (recall that 
this absence of a most highly ranked alternative common to t1 and t2 
accounted for Wallace’s learning problem). But of course this literal 
interpretation is not the one we make, for it misrepresents the rank we assume 
Horace has in fact assigned to G. We do not think that he prefers G most at 
one moment and least the next. This would be logically inconsistent, in the 
familiar, time-dependent sense in which we say of someone with unstable or 
shifting opinions that they are "constantly contradicting themselves".  
Describe this as intertemporal logical inconsistency. If Horace were simply to 
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prefer an alternative most at one moment and least the next, his preference 
would be intertemporally logically inconsistent. In that case he would have no 
genuine preference at all.   
 In interpreting the canonical language of preference, we instead make the 
correct but extranotational assumption that in selecting F over G at t1 and G 
over H at t2, Horace is applying a time-independent, logically consistent rule, 
namely the concept of a genuine preference, in the selection behavior he 
enacts. (T)'s horseshoe should be understood as expressing the conceptual 
implication that by ranking F over G and G over H, one thereby ranks F over H, 
and so expresses a genuine preference. On this reading, (T) implicitly 
expresses a conceptual truth. An agent like Horace who has a genuine 
preference for F over H will be constrained by the concept of a genuine 
preference to select F over H at t3.  
 Similarly, the concept of a genuine preference (henceforth the CGP) is the 
time-independent rule that a cyclical ordering violates. To the same extent 
that one may violate the law of noncontradiction in one’s speech behavior by 
sequentially verbalizing contradictory beliefs without intentional operators, 
one may also violate the CGP in one’s selection behavior by sequentially 
making contradictory – i.e. cyclical – pairwise comparisons. And just as we 
may conclude in the belief case that under these circumstances, the agent has 
no intelligible belief at all, similarly, in the preference case, we may conclude 
that the agent has no CGP at all. In rejecting the distinction between a genuine 
preference and the selection behavior that may or may not reveal it, the 
canonical language of preference thereby conflates the distinction between an 
abstract, time-independent rule and its physical, time-dependent application.  
 Moreover, the CGP is the rule violated by Clyde, who, you will recall, 
sacrificed psychological consistency in order to preserve transitivity in the 
canonical form of (T). What enabled Clyde to alter all his priorities from 
moment to moment was an inability to compare and recognize his present 
ordering as the same as or different from previous ones. And this inability 
stemmed from an absence of perceived enduring similarities between present 
and previous alternatives that would have motivated him to recall them to 
mind at present. Clyde might have had some volatile and transient 
preferences, but he would not have known it. For like Wallace, he would be 
incapable of inductive generalization over his experiences to the CGP. Only 
an abstract rule such as the CGP furnishes could have provided Clyde with a 
criterion of consistency for recognizing such similarities from moment to 
moment, and therefore for conforming his preferences to this criterion.  
But the criterion of consistency any genuine concept or rule provides is in the 
end always one and the same, i.e. that some concrete particular shall not exemplify 
both it and its negation at one and the same time and in one and the same respect. 
That is: the criterion of consistency a genuine concept provides is a criterion of 
logical consistency. The psychological inconsistency of Clyde's preferences, 
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therefore, was an unavoidable consequence of their intertemporal logical 
inconsistency. 
 But logically inconsistent preferences are psychologically inconsistent as 
well. Recall that Winifred fell into psychological inconsistency only at t3, when 
her selection of H over F produced a cyclical ordering. This selection ensured 
that there could be no subset of pairwise comparisons that contained at least 
one selected alternative in common. But this psychological inconsistency was 
the consequence of failing to apply consistently the CGP to the alternatives 
presented. Failure to apply this concept, and the consequent absence of a 
common selected alternative, also accounted for Wallace's learning problem, 
i.e. his difficulty in inductively generalizing to this concept. We have seen that 
in order to form and consistently apply such a concept to one's selections 
among alternatives, those selections must be psychologically consistent. But 
the selection of one alternative in common to two pairwise comparisons 
implies the consistent application of the concept of a most preferred 
alternative, i.e. of a genuine preference, on both trials. So an agent's selections 
are psychologically consistent if and only if they are intertemporally logically 
consistent. 
 Nonvacuous utility-maximization presupposes the subordination of (T) 
to the requirement of logical consistency expressed in the concept of a 
genuine preference. Suppose an agent in fact ranks F highest at t1 if and only 
if she ranks F lowest at t3; Cleopatra's swift and lethal disposal of her nightly 
suitors in Theophile Gautier's tale might illustrate such a case.41  Here any 
particular suitor is most preferred at night if and only if he is least preferred 
the following morning. This sort of arrangement detaches Cleopatra's love life 
from the integrated continuity of the rest of her life. While she may integrate 
her practice of lethal one-night stands into her life, she cannot integrate any 
love relationships into it. For she fails to develop and experience the depth 
and intensity of emotion that accompany prolonged engagement with a 
romantic other. Her present feelings and responses will tend to harden into 
stereotypes, because they are of the kind elicited only by the earlier, formulaic 
stages of courtship and never by the later, more individuated ones she has 
chosen to forego. After many repetitions of an initially novel or exciting 
experience, these responses may tend to become gestural or perfunctory, or so 
highly refined that their meaning evaporates – not only because of their 
repetitive character, but more importantly because she has chosen to foreclose 
to those responses an open-ended future. In thus voluntarily constraining 
their object, duration, and course of development, Cleopatra constrains in 
advance the range of significance and consequences they can have for her, 
                                                
41
Theophile Gautier, "The Nights of Cleopatra," in Mademoiselle de Maupin (New York: 
Modern Library, 1949). 
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and so their potential interest for her. Her nightly courtships thus become an 
empty and dilatory ritual, practiced on an unsuspecting other with whom 
genuine emotional exchange is thereby precluded. Unless there exist some 
peculiarly constructed agents for whom such empty rituals can be regarded 
plausibly (and nonvacuously) as utility-maximizing, the conclusion seems 
obvious that Cleopatra's romantic arrangement renders her quest for utility-
maximization self-defeating. 
 The same conclusion holds whenever FsG at tn if and only if GsF at tn+1, 
where the relevant units of time are, say, days or weeks, or even months. In all 
such cases, the utility of F at tn is at least partially obviated by its disutility at 
tn+1 for an agent who is otherwise supposed to endure through time.
42 The 
reason why it would be rational for Cleopatra to maintain longer-term 
intertemporal logical consistency among her preferences is because, like all 
agents with the capacities both to recall the past and anticipate the future, 
something experienced as a source of utility at one point that later becomes a 
source of disutility becomes a source of greater disutility in light of its history. 
Far from being eradicated entirely in its earlier guise, it is later experienced for 
that very reason as a loss or disappointment. And for theoretically rational 
creatures who can anticipate this outcome at the outset, this expectation itself 
tends to diminish the original estimate of its earlier utility. This is a perfectly 
general argument that does not depend on the particulars of this example for 
its force. So the same conclusion derived from considering Clyde's, 
Winifred’s, and Wallace's failure to preserve short-term logical consistency 
among their preferences applies here as well: Preserving longer-term logical 
consistency among our preferences is also necessary, in order to be able to 
intentionally rank alternatives in the first place. Nonvacuous utility-
maximization presupposes conformity to the requirements of logical 
consistency. 
 It would seem, then, that the principle of maximizing utility under the 
Ramsey-Savage interpretation is, as argued, best understood as instantiating a 
more comprehensive principle of logical consistency in selection behavior, 
and modified accordingly. In this case, it is possible that there are other, 
equally contingent principles of rational action that are rational just in virtue 
                                                
42
But can't I prefer sleeping most in the late evening and least the following morning 
without at any time decreasing the utility of sleeping? Of course. But in so far as I do so, 
I do not actually select sleeping in the late evening nor waking the following morning at 
all; they steal over me. And in so far as I do actually prefer sleeping most in the late 
evening and least the following morning, it is not at tn and tn+1 respectively that I do so, 
but rather from some rationally distanced perspective on my health habits that is time-
independent of both. To say in what that rationally distanced perspective consists 
requires a conception of rationality that avoids the problem of funnel vision described 
in Chapter II.2.3. I try to develop that conception in Volume II. 
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of satisfying the requirements of that more comprehensive principle, even 
though they demand of the agent no utility-maximization in the nonvacuous 
sense. For example, the principle that, under certain circumstances, an agent is 
to achieve her ends with respect for tradition might satisfy this more 
comprehensive principle as well: If Agnes prefers the messenger-delivered, 
handwritten note on embossed stationary to the telephone at t1, and the 
telephone to the e-mail at t2, then logical consistency – not mere, defenseless 
transitivity – requires her to prefer the messenger-delivered, handwritten note 
on embossed stationary to the e-mail at t3. Even though the e-mail may be 
more efficient in the nonvacuous sense, tradition and elegance triumph 
nevertheless. This is because, if the above arguments are sound, to preserve 
intertemporal logical consistency in action may be, but is not by definition, to 
maximize utility. Since the alternative that an agent must rank most highly in 
order to preserve at least one most preferred element from one pairwise 
comparison to the next temporally contiguous one will depend on her actual 
preferences and circumstances, whether the requirement of logical 
consistency is to be satisfied by maximizing utility or in some other way will 
depend equally on those circumstances. 
 This use of the concept of a genuine preference also has the important 
virtue of blocking the charge that the (suitably reformed) concept of utility 
maximization is vacuous. For if an agent's selection of alternatives on the third 
trial is logically inconsistent with her selections on the first and second, as (U) 
allows it to be, we cannot assume that she is merely changing her mind, as the 
principle of charity would have it. We now have some reason to suspect she 
might be losing it. 
 
4. The Utility-Maximizing Ideal 
 That according to (U), all our behavior comes out rational raises 
questions, not only about the viability of utility theory as an explanatory and 
predictive theory of human behavior, but about (U) as a higher-level principle 
of interpretation. (U)'s higher-level status is often invoked to excuse its 
vacuity against some of the arguments presented here. It is claimed that 
vacuity is a necessary side effect of a principle that normatively enjoins us to 
interpret all the phenomena of human behavior in its terms, and that it is 
therefore exempt from the Popperian requirement of falsification that lower-
level hypotheses derived from it must meet. But (U)'s purported normative 
status throws into relief the contingent values it expresses. I shall refer to 
these values conjointly as expressing the utility-maximizing ideal. Dissecting 
this ideal in some detail will show that the inconsistencies mentioned so far 
stem from flaws inherent in the basic conceptualization of (U), rather than in 
faulty and therefore corrigible applications of it. 
 The utility-maximizing ideal expresses the idea that the envisioned 
alterations in oneself or one's environment provide, as objects of value or 
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desire, the sole justification for performing the actions that effect them. In one 
sense, this idea is so obvious as to be tautological on the face of it: We act as 
we do in order to achieve the valued ends that motivate us. These ends may 
include the action itself as a valued object, in addition to its causally or 
conceptually distinct consequences. But this tautological interpretation of the 
idea is not the one that the utility-maximizing ideal expresses. (U) as a 
descriptive principle may be vacuous, but its prescriptive implications are not. 
The point is rather that the utility-maximizing ideal regards physical human 
action and its practical extensions – tools, machines, other people, etc. – as 
only derivatively valuable or significant; i.e. only in so far as they 
instrumentally promote its intended consequences. 
 To the utility theorist this point may not be sufficient to distinguish the 
utility-maximizing ideal from commonsense tautology. It is true that if, for 
example, behaving with dignity is Miles’ intended end, then that is at least a 
conceptually distinct consequence of the physical actions he undertakes – 
forbearing from reciprocating insults, refraining from malicious gossip, 
comporting himself with poise in hostile situations, and so on. And it would 
be hard to think of any conceptually distinct action that is not instrumental at 
least to this degree.  
 To see what makes the utility-maximizing ideal meaningful and 
distinctive, we need to draw on the distinction made in Chapter III, Section 
4.1, between structure and intention. We saw there that the relation between 
forbearing from reciprocating insults and behaving with dignity may be 
structurally instrumental, if the latter is a conceptually distinct consequence of 
the former. But forbearing from reciprocating insults is intentionally 
instrumental to behaving with dignity only if Miles’ only reason for forbearing 
is to behave with dignity; i.e. only if there is no further value he attaches to 
forbearing beyond that derived from behaving with dignity. Thus what is at 
issue between the tautological and the meaningful interpretations of the 
utility-maximizing ideal is not the structural relation between physical action 
and its causally or conceptually distinct consequences. We can agree that 
there is always, or perhaps even necessarily, an instrumental element in this 
relation. The question is rather whether or not one is inclined to regard such 
an action favorably, independently of the instrumental value conferred on it 
by its promotion of those intended consequences. 
 It is not difficult to conceive of a person who does view forbearing from 
reciprocating insults favorably for additional reasons, besides her desire to 
behave with dignity. Forbearing may be valuable to Ruby because, due to her 
upbringing, she is naturally disposed to behave that way. Perhaps trading 
insults makes her feel social uncomfortable or ill at ease, or makes her feel 
ashamed of herself. Of course each of these feelings could be reformulated as 
intentional ends Ruby desires to achieve – to avoid social discomfort or self-
condemnation, say – by forbearing from reciprocating insults. But by 
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hypothesis such formulations would be inaccurate, since they are not in fact 
intended consequences of her physical actions.43 They are instead internalized 
dispositional constraints on her behavior that lead her to experience 
forbearing favorably an sich. Aside from wanting to behave with dignity, 
Ruby forbears because that is the most natural, comfortable, and acceptable 
way for her to act. Her physical actions are valuable to her as actions, aside 
from the consequences she intends to effect by performing them. This is the 
sort of person whose attitude toward action furnishes a counterexample to the 
utility-maximizing ideal. 
 The utility-maximizing ideal implicitly denies the theoretical interest of 
such a case. It fails to find anything of theoretical significance in physical 
human action in itself, independently of its structurally instrumental relation 
to its intended consequences. Of course the utility-maximizer recognizes the 
inescapability of the effects of conditioning or habituation on an agent's 
attitude toward her own behavior – for example, as the swimmer comes to 
experience swimming as intrinsically valuable, aside from its intended health 
benefits or competitive goals. But from the utility-maximizing perspective, 
this value is not really intrinsic. Either it must be interpreted as a utility the 
swimmer attempts instrumentally to maximize by swimming, or else it is 
theoretically irrelevant. The concept of physical human action as itself a 
source of noninstrumental, rational value or interest is meaningless on this 
view.44 
 Again it may seem that this is a merely logical consequence of an action's 
being described by its intended ends, whether it is physically basic (such as 
raising one's arm)45 or complex (such as signaling a turn). But it does not 
follow from the fact that all actions are described in terms of their ends that 
the relation of the actual physical behavior to that end must be either 
                                                
43
For the same reason, it would be conceptually incoherent to regard these ends as 
intentionally instrumental means to the final end of expected utility-maximization. If 
Clarissa does not forbear from reciprocating insults because it ultimately makes her 
happy (in a nonvacuous sense), then she does not intend to secure her happiness by 
doing so.  
44
Richard Brandt states this view explicitly when he asserts that "in large part human 
behavior is an instrument, also. For we care about how people act mainly because of 
how their behavior affects other persons for good or ill, by disappointing their 
expectations, injuring them, and so on. For the most part, acts are important to us 
because of their consequences." (A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979), 196-7. 
45
See Arthur Danto, "Basic Actions," in Care and Landesman. Also see J. L. Austin, "A 
Plea for Excuses," in Philosophical Papers, Ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 175-204. 
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structurally or intentionally instrumental.46 We have already seen in Chapter 
III, Section 4.1 that the relation of actual physical behavior to the end of a basic 
action such as raising one's arm is structurally constitutive if the physical 
behavior is invariably linked with that end, i.e. if the description of the one is 
equivalent to the description of the other. Here the physical behavior of 
raising one's arm is distinct from that of one's arm rising, although both might 
be nonintentional under certain circumstances (for example, I might 
reflexively and unintentionally raise my arm in response to the national 
anthem, or to a random synaptic firing. These cases are different from those in 
which my arm simply goes up, without any experienced connection to my 
sense of agency at all, as in hypnosis.). There is no structurally instrumental 
element in this relation if the end is not a conceptually distinct consequence of 
the physical behavior: The end of raising my arm is not a causally or 
conceptually distinct consequence of my physical behavior; it is my physical 
behavior. This description is satisfied by many basic physical actions. 
Therefore, more complex actions that include them include a structurally 
noninstrumental element as well. 
 Similarly, the relation of actual physical behavior to the end of a basic 
action is intentionally constitutive if an agent's intention to perform that 
physical behavior is inextricably linked to her intention to achieve that end; if 
a fortiori, the performance of that actual physical behavior is her end. There is 
no intentionally instrumental element in this relation, if she does not intend to 
perform the physical behavior in order to achieve the end. Again this 
description is satisfied by many basic physical actions. Therefore, all more 
complex actions that include them include an intentionally noninstrumental 
element as well. So the utility-maximizing ideal that views physical human 
action as theoretically interesting or valuable only because of its instrumental 
relation to the ends it enables us to achieve is not a tautological consequence 
of our concept of action as described by its ends. The explanatory origin of 
this distinctive stance lies elsewhere.47 
 The distinctiveness of the utility-maximizing ideal as a perspective on 
action illuminates some further implications of utility theory. To define 
rational action in terms of efficiency or utility-maximization means that the 
fractional ratio of the resources an agent expends in action to the number and 
importance of ends she achieves should be as small as possible, and the 
                                                
46
Although the single end interpretation (Chapter III, Section 2) shows that utility 
theory requires us vacuously to construe it that way. 
47 See Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Trans. Talcott Parsons 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958) and Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the 
Interests (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 
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smaller the ratio the more rational the action.48 Thus that physical human 
action has only instrumental value conferred on it by the ends it promotes 
implies that the less of it we need to perform in order to achieve those ends, 
the better and more rational our behavior is. This is why, when constructing 
an ideal model of rational action, Neoclassical economists abstract from 
certain natural characteristics of actual human action that are viewed as flaws 
or constraints on efficiency: an agent's limited mobility, the time lag between 
desire and achievement, incomplete information regarding available 
resources for achieving her ends, limited foresight of the consequences of 
alternative courses of action, uncertainty with respect to their probability 
distribution, and so forth.49 The view of such characteristics as limitations on 
an agent's efficiency implies that in the ideal limiting case, a rational agent 
should achieve her ends instantaneously, with no expenditure of time or 
energy whatsoever. This is the way to achieve the smallest possible fractional 
proportion of resources expended to ends achieved. So the limiting ideal of 
utility-maximization implied by (U) requires that an agent's adoption of an 
end physically and temporally coincide with its realization. That is, it 
describes a situation in which instrumental human action is eliminated 
entirely. The ideally rational action, then, is not really an action at all, but 
rather an atemporal set of instantaneous desire-satisfaction events, relative to 
which any instrumental effort at all is an unwelcome deferment of 
gratification.50 
                                                
48 See Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 
65. 
49
For critiques of this maneuver, see Ward Edwards' work on the existence of 
preferences for particular probabilities of winning at gambling over others (e.g. of a 4/8 
over 6/8 probability of winning) independently of utility considerations, in 
"Experiments on Economic Decision-Making in Gambling Situations," Econometrica 21 
(1953), 349-350; "Probability-Preferences in Gambling," op. cit. Note 23; "Probability 
Preferences Among Bets with Differing Expected Values," American Journal of Psychology 
67 (1954), 56-67; "The Reliability of Probability Preferences," American Journal of 
Psychology 67 (1954), 68-95; "The Theory of Decision-Making," op. cit. Note 31; Donald 
Davidson, Sidney Siegel, and Patrick Suppes, "Some Experiments and Related Theory," 
op. cit. Note 31; Herbert A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 69 (1955), 99-118; and "Rational Choice and the Structure of the 
Environment," Psychological Review 63, 2 (1956), 129-38); and more recently, the work of 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, op. cit. Note 30. George Katona discusses these 
constraints in "Rational Behavior and Economic Behavior," Psychological Review 60, 5 
(1953), 307-318. 
50
Michael Slote has described this (in conversation) as the "let there be light" model of 
human action. 
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 Notice that this attitude extends to desired future events. For me to want 
at t1 that the world be such that event E occurs at tn, without any expenditure 
of instrumental effort or resources on my part in the interim, is to want now 
that the course of objective events conform itself to the desire I now have, 
whether for present or for future gratifications. It is also, by implication, to 
want at any future moment that that course of events conform itself with 
equal exactitude to the desires I have at that moment, whether for present or 
for future gratifications.51 That is, it is to have a second-order desire about the 
manner and efficiency with which my first-order desires are satisfied, namely, 
that they are to be satisfied the moment I desire that they be satisfied, without 
any expenditure of effort on my part in the interim. And in the ideal case, this 
second-order desire itself is to be gratified instantaneously as well. 
 Thus the limiting ideal of utility-maximization implies that there is no 
order or sequence in which events should occur that is independent of when 
an agent desires their occurrence. Like the belief-desire model of motivation, 
the utility-maximizing model of rationality is egocentric, in that it describes a 
limiting ideal in which the time, place, and manner in which desired events 
occur are entirely dependent upon the agent's desires as to when, where, and 
how they should occur. Of course a egocentrist is sensitive to information 
regarding predictable causal sequence, the pace of natural processes, and so 
on, and defers the satisfaction of her desires accordingly: The egocentrist is, of 
necessity, ordinarily forced to be an opportunist. But even this much 
moderation is provisional. The egocentrist regards ritual, custom, and the 
natural order of things, like the natural characteristics of human action, as 
obstacles to the maximization of utility which it is the basic project of utility-
maximizing rationality itself to overcome.52 
                                                
51
See Richard Brandt's discussion of the incoherence of this want in A Theory of the Good 
and the Right, Chapter XIII, Section I, 247-253 (op. cit. Note 44). 
52
For alternatives to this way of thinking, see, most recently, Jeremy Rifkind, Time Wars 
(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1987), Chapter 8. A contrast is also provided by E. E. 
Evans-Pritchard's description of the Nuer of the Egyptian Sudan: 
[T]he Nuer have no expression equivalent to time in our language, and they 
cannot, therefore, as we can, speak of time as though it were something actual, 
which passes, can be wasted, can be saved, and so forth. I do not think that they 
ever experienced the same feeling of fighting against time or of having to 
coordinate activities with an abstract passage of time, because their points of reference 
are mainly the activities themselves, which are generally of a leisurely character. 
Events follow a logical order, but they are not controlled by an abstract system, 
there being no autonomous points of reference to which activities have to conform with 
precision (italics added). 
(E. E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political 
Institutions of a Nilotic People (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), 103; quoted in Staffan B. 
Linder, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 19. 
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 Intrinsic to the utility-maximizing ideal, then, is the tendency, found in 
more fully elaborated, decision-theoretic formulations of (U), to eliminate the 
natural characteristics of human action as independent variables. But it is 
equally evident in the three interpretations of utility sketched in Chapter III, 
Section 4, which eliminate human action as an independent variable by 
redefining every action as itself a case of utility-maximization.53 Thus on the 
one hand, we never succeed in attaining the limiting ideal of utility-
maximization because we must always perform some instrumental action, 
however minimal, in the service of our goals. But on the other, we invariably 
attain it by definition of having acted at all. In utility theory, human action is 
both crucial and irrelevant to full rationality. It is both identical with and 
dispensible to utility-maximization. Utility theory furnishes an ideal of 
rationality that is both everywhere and nowhere instantiated. 
 Notice, further, that these two possibilities paradoxically coexist. The 
description of the ideally rational action as omniscient, omnipotent, and 
instantaneously effective is of a kind of action that maximizes utility just by 
being performed. Similarly, the stipulation that actual human action reveals 
the agent's preferences, i.e. maximizes utility, implies that it, too, is of this 
kind. But actual human action is not, or at least rarely of this kind. If it is true 
that any human action must incur some opportunity costs, then the limiting 
ideal of egocentric utility-maximization is in theory unattainable. The obstacle 
to its attainment is not simply that we are not smart, quick, or resourceful 
enough. The obstacle is a conceptual one:  We can never be smart, quick, or 
resourceful enough, no matter how much so we are, because we are not the 
immaterial but omnipotent will that the limiting egocentric ideal requires. 
That there is a distinction between what we intend and what previously 
exists, and between what exists and what we do, is implicit in the concept of a 
conscious and individuated agent. If there were no such distinctions, utility 
would be maximized – continually, universally, and necessarily. What exists 
would be logically equivalent to what was desired. Agency would be 
unnecessary. Thus it is the necessity of agency that constitutes the real 
obstacle to the attainment of this limiting egocentric ideal. It is inaccessible to 
us, not because we are not rational enough, but rather because we are, indeed, 
agents.  
So consider further the case in which there are no such distinctions, and 
no such agents in the strict sense; i.e. the case in which all that exists is the 
continual, universal and necessary maximization of utility to which the 
                                                
53
As Gauthier puts it, "the economist does not define an individual's utilities, and then 
ask whether the individual seeks to maximize utilities so defined. Rather, he determines 
what the individual seeks to maximize, and then defines his utilities accordingly." 
("Economic Rationality and Moral Side-Constraints," Midwest Studies in Philosophy III: 
Studies in Ethical Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), 76. 
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utility-maximizing ideal aspires. This is the limiting state of bliss for Max U., 
in which he does nothing and receives everything he wants, every minute, all 
the time. A perpetual, universal and necessary desire-satisfaction event 
eliminates all instrumental expenditures in its service, and therefore has no 
costs. Similarly, such an event eliminates all wants or lacks that it might have 
replenished, and therefore satisfies no desire. For as we have seen in Chapter 
II, within that value system a desire-satisfaction event loses its inherent value 
at the moment it occurs. Hence in this limiting, blissful state, neither costs of 
achieving it nor the experience of achieving it are available to confer value on 
it. This means that this event is not only gratis, but – in Max U.’s value system 
– therefore worthless; for no sacrifices have had to be made that might confer 
value on it, and no more overriding values of any other kind are available to 
take up the slack. In the limiting case, then, in which Max U. gets everything 
he wants at the exact moment he wants it, this not only costs him nothing but 
also means nothing to him. 
Of course Max U. is only an abstraction; and the continual, universal and 
necessary maximization of utility in perpetual desire-satisfaction events is 
only an ideal. But it is worth meditating on the condition of actual human 
agents who, often for reasons beyond their control, asymptotically approach 
this ideal: who get virtually everything they want the minute they want it, 
without paying any significant costs of achievement, either before or after the 
fact; who are never required to strive or sacrifice in order to realize their goals, 
and who are never required to compensate for mistakes in their choice of 
goals or the strategies for achieving them; for whom, therefore, no such choice 
can ever have negative implications or consequences, and for which they 
therefore never need take responsibility. For such agents, it is all good, all the 
time, whatever “it” is; and because whatever “it” is is worthless and 
meaningless in the sense just described, it does not matter what “it” is in the 
end. The limiting ideal of perpetual utility-maximization robs agents of their 
abilities, robs goals of their value, and robs lives of their meaning, leaving in 
its wake victims who cannot understand why the instant gratification of their 
every wish increases their unhappiness and disconnectedness rather than 
alleviates them. To instill or cultivate this ideal in the young is effectively to 
destroy them. I flesh out some of its further psychological and social 
implications in Volume II, Chapter V.6.1 of this project. 
 
5. Efficiency vs. Ethics 
 The argument so far has been that utility theory is either riddled with 
paradox, or else expresses a contingent value that is limited in its scope of 
application and subordinate in status to the requirements of logical 
consistency. Now, finally, I cash out the suggestion that utility theory and 
moral theory compete for our practical and theoretical allegiance.   
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 Despite the conceptual and normative paradoxes of utility theory, it, like 
moral theory, performs a regulative function for its adherents. It determines 
their behavior by determining their interpretation of their experience – as 
does any explanatory theory the behavior of those who believe it. In this 
respect, utility theory, like, for example, Freudian theory, is entirely on a par 
with moral theory; and each is likely to determine their adherents' behavior 
differently. Suppose, for, example, that Oswald's subordinate Daphne 
complains loudly to him over what she considers to be a paltry salary 
increase. If Oswald is a Freudian, he may be more inclined to speculate on the 
subconscious motives and meanings of her behavior, and to respond to those 
assumed subconscious motives and meanings more than to the explicit ones. 
He may interpret Daphne's tantrum as evidence of an unresolved Electra 
complex rather than as frustration over her meager raise, and so help her 
work through her anger, rather than increase the size of her raise. But if 
Oswald is a utility theorist, he may be more inclined to assume that Daphne is 
acting in order to maximize her expected utility, try to discern the advantage 
her action promotes – to embarrass and ultimately unseat him, perhaps, and 
react to the promotion of that perceived advantage – say, by calling her bluff – 
rather than to the conventional or explicit meaning of her action. These 
possibilities are no different in status than that moral interpretation which 
understands Daphne's temper tantrum as an expression of moral outrage at 
the lack of respect for her job contribution her pittance of a pay raise 
expresses. Nor does this third interpretation differ in its capacity to motivate a 
distinct sort of response from Oswald:  contrition, grudging respect, a promise 
to rethink the profit margin to which he aspires, etc. All of these possibilities 
suggest that moral theories and social theories both perform a regulative 
function, with roughly comparable success. When confronted by such a case 
we are often uncertain how to react.  This may be because we are uncertain 
which theory of another person's behavior to believe.54 
 Moral theory and social theory are also comparable in the valuational 
status of the ideal type55 in each respectively, and indeed of each kind of 
theory more generally. A theory may be value-laden in two ways. First, it may 
mention certain values within the value-conferring part of the theory itself, as, 
say, a theory of religion mentions what is good, right, and divine relative to 
particular religions. Second, it may itself express or promote certain values in 
its action-guiding part, whether or not it mentions any within the value-
conferring part. For example, a theory of scientific method that promotes the 
values of deductive inference, intersubjective confirmation, and experimental 
                                                
54
I elaborate this point in Volume II, Chapter IX.7. 
55
in Weber's sense; see The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Ed. Talcott Parsons 
(New York: Free Press, 1964), Chapter 1.1-2. 
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testing does this. I discuss this distinction at greater length in Chapter V.2, 
below.  
Now it may seem that a moral theory like Kant's is value-laden in both of 
these respects, whereas as utility theory is value-laden in neither. First, the 
value-conferring part of Kant's moral theory mentions certain values, such as 
autonomy, freedom, trustworthiness, and beneficence. These are the values 
that, according to Kant, guide the behavior of a perfectly rational being. In this 
respect, Kant's concept of a perfectly rational being is comparable to what 
Weber calls an ideal type of Wertrationalität.56 Second, the action-guiding part 
of Kant's moral theory promotes these values, in so far as it offers us a 
regulative ideal to which to aspire in our conduct. 
 By contrast, some would say that the concept of fully rational economic 
man in Neoclassical economics – roughly Weber's ideal type of 
Zweckrationalität – is value-laden in neither of these senses, or at least is so to a 
much lesser degree. First, it does not claim to mention any values; on the 
contrary. (U) purports to describe value-neutrally an agent who pursues 
whatever values she has efficiently. Second, since (U) purports to express the 
basic principle of an explanatory social theory, it appears to promote only the 
value of computational rationality itself. These two reasons alone have been 
invoked to justify ascribing to the concept of utility-maximization that special, 
logically necessary and therefore value-neutral status in the concept of 
rational action which, it is claimed, even Kant himself conceded.  
 I do not believe Kant conceded this, although I shall not defend this belief 
here. But I have tried to show in the preceding sections of this discussion that 
the concept of utility-maximization or efficiency itself is a fully contingent 
value an agent may rationally choose to reject in favor of some competing 
alternative. Among the competing alternatives from which an agent may 
choose are to be found the values that load a moral theory such as Kant's: 
autonomy, respect, beneficence, trustworthiness, and so on. That Kant's moral 
theory, and the values that define it, compete with utility theory and the 
values that define it, is uncontroversial: Values like trustworthiness versus 
efficiency, duty versus self-interest, beneficence versus personal satisfaction 
continually vie for importance and for our attention, and present us with 
familiar conflicts both in theory and in practice. The two theories that 
respectively contain these values are not significantly different in regulative 
or valuational status, as some social theorists have sought to argue.57 If this is 
                                                
56 ibid. 
57 
Weber represents the reasoning of the Zweckrationalität advocate about Wertrationalität 
particularly clearly: "From the [Zweckrationalität] point of view, ... absolute values are 
always irrational. Indeed, the more the value to which action is oriented is elevated to 
the status of an absolute value, the more 'irrational' in this sense the corresponding 
action is. For, the more unconditionally the actor devotes himself to this value for its 
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true, and if utility theory regulates the behavior of its adherents in the ways I 
have tried to suggest, then there is no intrinsic difference in prescriptive status 
between moral theories like Kant's and a highly developed social theory like 
that of Neoclassical economics. These two theories express contingent, 
competing, equally regulative theories of value. So a moral theory like Kant's 
is to be distinguished from a social theory like Neoclassical economics solely 
by its content, i.e. by the values it both mentions and promotes. 
 Now each of these two kinds of theories purports to subsume the other as 
a special case. Utility theory treats adherence to principles of the sort found in 
Kant's moral theory as a special case of instrumental, utility-maximizing 
behavior under special conditions in which the agent is one of many equally 
rational, powerful, and self-interested agents with equal access to limited 
resources that benefit each. Under these circumstances, adherence to moral 
principles is rationally justified as a means of avoiding Prisoner's Dilemma-
type situations when they threaten,58 but not otherwise. By contrast, moral 
theories like Kant's treat adherence to utility-maximizing principles as 
rational only under the constraint that it not violate overriding and 
fundamental moral principle: that one's efficient actions be willable as a 
universal law, for example; i.e. that they satisfy Kant's principle of rational 
consistency. Under these circumstances, utility-maximization is rationally 
justified in so far as it promotes or at least does not undermine overriding 
moral principle, but not otherwise.59 Thus each of these two kinds of theories 
does not merely compete for our commitment to the values they express. 
They also compete for regulative and theoretical superiority within our 
conceptual scheme. If the preceding extended argument, that utility-
maximization is only one contingent value among many, is well-taken, then it 
is also an argument for the more comprehensive principle to which we have 
seen it must be subordinated as a special case, namely the principle of logical 
consistency that governs philosophical reasoning. I have not argued that 
Kant's universalization principle of rational consistency is identical to this, 
although I argue elsewhere that Kant thought it was. But that Kant's principle 
presupposes it, while canonical utility theory does not, is clear. 
 
 
                                                                                                     
own sake, to pure sentiment or beauty, to absolute goodness or devotion to duty, the 
less is he influenced by considerations of the consequences of his actions" (Weber, ibid., 
p. 117).
 
58
See, for example, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University, 1971), Part I; also David Gauthier, "The Incompleat Egoist: From Rational 
Choice to Moral Theory," The Tanner Lectures (Stanford University, 1983), esp. Part II: 
“What Should an Egoist Do?" 
59
Here, see Rawls, ibid., Part III. 
  
Chapter V. A Refutation of Anscombe's Thesis 
 
 
 In Chapter I I framed this project as a defense of a Kantian conception of 
the self against the prevailing Humean paradigm. In her influential mid-
twentieth century article, "Modern Moral Philosophy,"1 G. E. M. Anscombe 
takes a different view. She sees the Kantian tradition as historically dominant. 
She argues that we should now abandon the Kantian law conception of moral 
philosophy as an anachronistic relic of a religious, divine-command 
sensibility without which moral philosophy itself, traditionally understood, is 
impossible. In her opinion, Kant's moral theory is a deontological theory that 
requires a religious motivational foundation that is now lacking. She 
characterizes the more contemporary consequentialist trend in modern moral 
philosophy as equally impotent without an adequate philosophy of 
psychology to support it, and calls for the development of one. Call this 
division of normative moral theories into consequentialist and deontological 
Anscombe's thesis.  
I do not accept Anscombe's thesis. Nor do I accept her interpretation of 
the history of moral philosophy and its vicissitudes. In fact, I would reverse 
the historical order she proposes. I believe, rather, that the anachronistic 
paradigm that has gripped Anglo-American moral philosophy (and indeed 
philosophy and the social sciences more generally) for the last two and a half 
centuries is the one which Anscombe describes as "consequentialist" – that is, 
that model of reasoning instrumentally about moral action which has its 
origins in Hobbes' Leviathan and finds its fullest and most detailed expression 
in Book II of Hume's Treatise. I would argue that it is now time to move on to 
the historically more modern, "deontological" alternative that prescribes 
moral action in accordance with the dictates of conscience rather than with its 
probabilistically anticipated outcomes. I see the "consequentialist" paradigm 
as an ideological relic of that ancient and primitive style of magical thinking 
(which has its place, although not in academic philosophy) that supposes 
one's ability to causally determine, through individual symbolic physical acts, 
the unforeseeable course of the universe; and that conflates control of external 
consequences with self-determination and personal divinity.  
 I argue below that this paradigm in any case has no practical application 
to any actual normative theory developed, and that it is too rigid and 
schematic ever to do so. Nevertheless, Anscombe's thesis has generated a 
virtual cottage industry among philosophers who, on the one hand, choose 
not to address normative issues; but who, on the other, similarly choose not to 
address the perennial metaphysical and metapsychological issues of 
traditional metaethics. Anscombe's thesis has stimulated a seemingly endless 
                                                
1Philosophy 33 (1958), pp. 1-19. 
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debate that, by generalizing and arguing about what consequentialist-type and 
deontological-type theories require or do not require or imply or presuppose, 
enables one to steer clear both of overwhelmingly complex casuistical issues 
and also of the deeper metaphysical value commitments these issues 
presuppose. My aim in this chapter is not to dampen this debate,2 but merely 
to establish a rationale for those who might prefer not to join it. Briefly stated, 
my rationale is that Anscombe’s thesis is false, and that the distinction 
between Humean and Kantian metaethical views is the philosophically 
fundamental one for the twenty-first century. 
 Anscombe contrasts "consequentialist" theories in general with a Kantian 
theory in particular as an example of what she calls a "deontological" theory. 
Whereas a Kantian theory is a certain kind of normative view, Anscombe's 
consequentialist/ deontological distinction sorts normative theories into those 
which assign primary value to the effects of actions – Utilitarianism, 
Aristotelianism, Marxism, and Perfectionism would all be putative examples; 
and those which purport not to, such as Kantianism, Intuitionism, or Moral 
Sentiment Theory. I do not think Anscombe’s thesis is defensible. But it is 
important to say why, in order to clear the ground for the more appropriate 
metaethical distinctions I go on to defend. I argue here that given the content 
and structure of any normative theory we are likely to find palatable, there is 
no way of uniquely breaking down that theory into either consequentialist or 
deontological elements. In fact, once we examine the actual structure of any 
such theory more closely, we see that it can be classified in either way 
arbitrarily. So if we ignore the metaethical pronouncements often made by 
Anscombeans, we find that the consequentialist/ deontological distinction 
contributes nothing of consequence to an understanding of moral philosophy. 
 There are basically two reasons for this. First, what we mean by the terms 
endemic to the consequentialist/ deontological distinction have no unique 
references to particular states of affairs in actual cases of moral decision-
making. Hence we may justify any such concrete moral decision by reference 
to typically consequentialist or deontological reasoning indifferently. Second, 
scrutiny of actual and viable normative theories reveals a much finer-grained 
structure than the cosequentialist/deontological taxonomy can capture. And 
                                                
2As one prominent moral philosopher put it, the nice thing about Anscombe's thesis is 
that it keeps a lot of people busy so that the rest of us can get on with the hard tasks of 
figuring out how to behave and how to make the world a better place. And when this 
chapter was first excerpted for publication in article form, one up-and-coming 
Anscombean commented about it that my analysis was very likely right but had no 
relevance for his work, since he had no interest in actual normative theories, whether 
past or future, and moreover thought it presumptuous to compete with the Great 
Thinkers by proposing one. I asked him what he thought the consequentialist/ 
deontological distinction purported to refer to, if not actual normative theories. 
Idealized possible normative theories, he replied. 
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it is this structure, rather than simple attention to consequences or principles, 
that determines practical moral decision-making. We would thus do better to 
develop the richer vocabulary of causes and constituents, goals and effects, 
states and events (mental, social, or physical). When we do so, we see that all 
so-called consequentialist theories in fact presuppose the Humean conception 
of the self. So in the end, Anscombe's thesis is irrelevant at the normative level 
of actual moral reasoning, whereas at the metaethical level it crudely 
schematizes two opposing types of dummy theory, neither of which is of use 
to normative moral philosophers who seek in their work practicable solutions 
to actual moral, social, or political problems.  
 Section 1 begins by distinguishing two uses to which the 
consequentialist/ deontological distinction can be put. First, it can be applied 
to the construction of a theory of what is morally valuable, i.e. good or right. 
Call this the value-theoretic part of a normative theory.3 Second, it can be 
applied to the construction of practical principles that guide deliberation. Call 
this the practical part of the normative theory. These two aspects of a moral 
theory are mutually independent, and normative theories need not be 
uniformly consequentialist or deontological with respect to both of these 
parts. I consider briefly the normative theories of Kant and Aristotle as 
examples of views that are mixed in different ways with respect to these two 
parts. Once we make this distinction between the value-theoretic and the 
practical parts of a normative theory, no such theory can be characterized as 
either uniquely consequentialist or uniquely deontological. Section 2 
compares the practical parts of a purportedly consequentialist normative 
theory – namely Classical Utilitarianism – with the practical parts of a 
purportedly deontological one – namely Ross’s Intuitionism. The comparison 
shows that we may submit the action any such theory prescribes to either 
characterization arbitrarily. Section 3 examines the value-theoretic part of a 
normative theory. It argues that the content of such a theory can, in turn, be 
distinguished from its structure; and that value-theoretic content is 
interchangeable between consequentialist and deontological theories, while 
there are no inherent structural differences between them. So the 
consequentialist/ deontological is as superficial to the value-theoretic part of a 
normative theory as it is to the practical part. Section 4 argues that the 
                                                
3Thus I use the term "moral value" (or worth) to refer broadly to that which is morally 
evaluated. This includes both what William Frankena calls "moral value" (i.e. moral 
goodness and badness) and what he describes as "moral obligatoriness or rightness" 
(Ethics, Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 62). It is not clear 
how to characterize our moral attitudes to that which we deem right, if we cannot say 
that we value it, just as we value that which is good. My distinction between the value-
theoretic and the practical parts of a normative theory resembles Holly Smith's 
distinction between moral theories as such and their uses as practical action-guides in 
"Making Moral Decisions," Nous XXII, 1 (March 1988), pp. 89-108. 
Chapter V. A Refutation of Anscombe’s Thesis        190 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
consequentialist/ deontological distinction between normative theories is 
rather to be located in intensional metaethical attitudes proponents of these 
theories take toward them. But these attitudes suggest a different distinction 
which cuts across the consequentialist/ deontological one, namely between 
those normative theories which are person-regarding and those which are 
theory-regarding. Anscombe's thesis, then, finally implies a metaphilosophical 
claim about the moral psychology of philosophers rather than one about the 
adequacy of normative theories. Section 5 concludes by showing that all so-
called consequentialist moral theories in fact depend for their models of 
motivation and rationality on the Humean conception of the self. 
 
1. Values and Practice 
 
1.1. Value Theory 
 The first of the two ways in which the consequentialist/ deontological 
distinction can be used is value-theoretically. Here the distinction is formulated 
in such a way as to distinguish between two approaches to the construction of 
a moral theory (thus I speak of "value-theoretic uses," "value-theoretic senses," 
as well as "value theories" simpliciter, according to context). On this view, a 
consequentialist theory4 is one that begins by defining the good, i.e. the 
state(s) of affairs that is (are) claimed to have intrinsic value, e.g. happiness, 
pleasure, or perfection. The right, or morally obligatory, is then characterized 
as that which is conducive to the good.5 The right may include, for example, 
                                                
4I.e. that which Rawls and Frankena call a "teleological" theory, and which Brandt calls a 
"result" theory (see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard 
University Press, 1971), p. 24; William Frankena, ibid., pp. 14-17; and Richard Brandt, 
Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 354. So-called 
"consequentialist" theories are actually only one possible kind of teleological theory, 
since, not all final ends of action are necessarily causal consequences of action.  
5Frankena distinguishes between the morally and the nonmorally good on the basis of 
the subjects this predicate applies to. On his view, only persons, groups of persons, and 
elements of personality (such as motives, intentions, emotions, and dispositions) may be 
morally good, whereas practically anything, including physical objects, experiences, 
and forms of government may be nonmorally good. The two bases for this distinction 
are (1) ordinary usage; and (2) the reasons for which we make the judgment of 
goodness, which are not further elucidated. My own linguistic intuitions disincline me 
to accept this distinction. But more important, I find no distinction in the range of 
reasons for which I might make such judgments that would lead me to accept it. Why 
should not happiness be viewed as a moral good, just as is virtue? Why cannot 
democracy be judged to be just as much a moral good as rational beings as ends in 
themselves? Now Frankena does argue that "it does not make sense to call [things like 
experiences or forms of government] morally good or bad, unless we mean that it is 
morally right or wrong to pursue them." (Ethics, ibid., p. 62). But neither would we think 
virtue or rationality were moral goods unless we thought it was morally right to pursue 
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actions the results of which are characterized as good, or institutions the 
effects of which are so characterized. In either case the good is then described 
as having priority over the right in the sense that the actions, institutions, or 
states of affairs that conduce to it derive their moral value from this fact alone, 
and all such acts and institutions are to be evaluated according to this 
criterion. 
 A deontological theory, by contrast, is one that defines the right 
independently of the good. It is argued that the moral value of an action or 
institution deemed right by the theory depends on other properties of it 
besides its consequences.6 Such other properties might include, in the case of 
an action, how it was decided, or whether it conforms to certain more general 
moral prescriptions intuitively known to be valid. In the case of an institution, 
the relevant valuable or right-making property might include having evolved 
in a certain way, or expressing certain central interests or values of the 
community it is intended to serve, for example, as the institutions in Rawls's 
well-ordered society express the value of respect for persons. 
 In both cases, a common characteristic of the value-theoretic use of this 
distinction is that normative theories as so classified do not issue immediate 
directives to action. A consequentialist theory like utilitarianism that defines 
the good as, for example, the greatest sum of happiness on the whole for all 
sentient beings, and the right as that which is maximally conducive to this, 
does not prescribe any particular action or kind of action that it would 
therefore be right to perform in order to realize this end under particular 
circumstances. This purely value-theoretic part of utilitarianism leaves open 
the possibility that no individual action might be conducive to happiness; or 
that only institutions, and not individual actions, might promote this end. 
Similarly, a deontological theory that defines the right as that which conforms 
to certain general moral injunctions intuitively known to be true, such as 
keeping promises, does not enjoin us to perform any particular actions under a 
given set of circumstances. In both cases, the respective kinds of value theory 
provide different normative accounts of what is valuable or worthwhile, 
relative to which particular actions or institutions can be assessed. 
 In addition, value theories by themselves abjure specification of how, or 
in what sense, their particular normative values are to be promoted. They 
describe a purely conceptual or methodological priority relation between 
                                                                                                     
them. Nor could we think certain individuals were morally good if we simultaneously 
denied that they were worthy of emulation. But if this is the criterion, then experiences, 
objects and forms of government can be moral goods after all. Happiness is a moral 
good for the Utilitarian, just as the Koran is for the Muslim, and just as Socialism is for 
the Marxist. I therefore ignore this distinction. 
6I use the term "right" to cover duties, obligations, and recommendations indifferently 
for the time being. The importance of further distinguishing between uses of this word 
is taken up in Section 2. 
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what the theory stipulates to be good and what it stipulates to be right – 
without, however, specifying how the conceptually prior value is to be 
realized: causally or constitutively. To claim, for example, that justice is the 
highest good and that the good has priority over the right implies that those 
actions, institutions, or states of affairs are right which promote justice, and 
only insofar as they do so. But justice can be promoted causally, for example 
by effecting dispositions to just behavior in oneself and others, or 
constitutively, by acting justly or participating in just institutions oneself. 
Terms like "promotes," "furthers," or "realizes" are neutral between these two 
possibilities, and the value-theoretic part of a moral theory does not explicitly 
commit itself to either. Often the choice is made at the practical level, where 
the action-guiding directives prescribe how the value is to be promoted under 
particular circumstances. But this matter of value-theoretic policy is not made 
explicit as a policy at the practical level. Typically we just assume, when a 
value theory announces itself as consequentialist, that its conceptually prior 
value is to be promoted causally and instrumentally, whereas the value 
espoused by a deontological theory is to be promoted constitutively. But these 
assumptions are mistaken, for they suppose that a choice between these two 
possibilities is precisely what distinguishes value theories as consequentialist 
or deontological. In Section 3 of this chapter I show that the failure of such 
value theories to commit themselves explicitly one way or the other is better 
explained by the fact that any acceptable value theory must include both 
causal and constitutive relations, and so that no such distinction can be made. 
 Examples of purely value-theoretic normative theories that contain no 
practical parts are Rawls's theory of justice as originally elaborated in his book 
of that title, and Plato's theory of justice in the Republic. In both cases we are 
presented with an elaborated conception of the just society and a rationale for 
adopting it as a social ideal. But in neither case are we given any guidelines 
for bridging the gap between this ideal and our actual social condition. By 
contrast, Marx's social ideal of the truly human society is buttressed by an 
immediate call to revolutionary activity on the part of the proletariat in the 
service of this ideal. To be sure, the directive to overthrow the bourgeois 
system of exploitation through revolution does not specify the prescribed 
actions in the degree of detail one might like. But the degree of abstractness 
with which a prescribed action is described does not prevent it from being a 
practical prescription. Rawls' and Plato's normative theories contain no such 
prescriptions at all. 
 
1.2. Practical Decision-Making 
 A second application of the consequentialist/ deontological distinction is 
therefore to the formulation of these prescriptions or directives to action. Call 
this the practical use of this distinction. Here the distinction differentiates 
between two different methods for deciding what to do. The consequentialist 
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method directs us to decide what to do by evaluating the expected outcomes 
of alternative available actions with reference to some wanted or valued state 
of affairs, and to perform that action most conducive to it. The deontological 
method bids us invoke other criteria for making this decision: It may, for 
example, direct us to perform that action the maxim of which can be 
consistently willed as a universal law of nature; or to perform that action we 
intuitively know to be right. In either case, the method for deciding what to do 
does not supply normative value criteria for deciding what to do. Rather, it 
supplies a particular model of moral deliberation.   
 Writers who observe the consequentialist/ deontological taxonomy have 
not been sensitive to the further distinction between its value-theoretic and 
practical uses. Frankena, for example, begins by characterizing a teleological 
moral theory as one that "says that the basic or ultimate criterion or standard 
of what is morally right, wrong, obligatory, etc., is the nonmoral value that is 
brought into being," and concludes a few paragraphs later that "in order to 
know whether something is right, ought to be done, or is morally good, one 
must first know what is good in the nonmoral sense and whether the thing in 
question promotes or is intended to promote what is good in this sense."7 That 
is, he thinks it follows from the independent and prior characterization of the 
good typical of a consequentialist or teleological theory in the value-theoretic 
sense that the practical decisions of a person who accepts this theory must 
take a consequentialist cast; that the person must decide what to do by 
evaluating the outcomes of her actions with a view to promoting the good 
that is value-theoretically characterized.  
 Similarly, Brandt, in explaining Ross's deontological or formalist theory 
of prima facie obligations, criticizes it as incomplete on the grounds that "it is 
not possible to infer, from the principles he explicitly states, what is our duty 
in a particular situation ... even ... when it is known which act would 
maximize the welfare of sentient beings ... [and] with full factual information 
at our disposal, because he does not give us the second-order (much less 
third-order) principles necessary for determining our obligation overall, when 
prima facie obligations conflict."8 Again, the suggestion is that a complete 
deontological theory implies a method for deriving practical directives for 
action that are as deontological in character as the substantive theory of value 
itself. 
 
1.3. Kant's Mixed Theory 
 But there is no reason why consequentialist value theories need to be 
linked with practical consequentialist decision-making methods, nor why 
deontological value theories need to be linked with practical deontological 
                                                
7Frankena, op. cit. Note 3, pp. 14-15. 
8Brandt, op. cit. Note 4, pp. 393-394. 
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decision-making methods in the way these writers assume. One may, for 
example, adopt a consequentialist value theory that defines the good as 
welfare for all sentient beings, and the right as those actions that promote this; 
but not decide what action to perform on the basis of whether its actual 
consequences are in fact likely maximally to effect this goal. Instead one may 
use this initial characterization of the good and the right to develop a list of 
types of action that, under specified circumstances, would ideally constitute 
maximizing the welfare of all sentient beings (such as: when driving in the 
country drive slowly and observe wild animal crossing signs; when in city 
parks, feed the pigeons; when making more than four times a subsistence-
level salary per year, distribute at least an eighth to relief funds; etc.), and 
perform these actions when the circumstances obtain, irrespective of their 
actual expected outcomes. Thus the consequentialist value-theoretic 
conception of the good would be linked to a practical deontological account of 
right action. The result would be a theory of moral action that attempts 
noncausally to realize a conception of the good by acting in the way the 
constituents of this conception itself seem to require, rather than in the way its 
causal achievement seems to require.  
 Kant's normative theory can be understood to have such a form.  
Although his conception of the highest good includes happiness, defined as a 
pleasant feeling, the supreme condition of the highest good and its most 
important component is virtue, i.e. the worthiness to be happy.9 But the 
concept of virtue is then explained to be that of a will – the good will – all of 
whose maxims conform to the moral law (2C, Ac. 32-33), i.e. all of whose 
resolutions to action could serve as universal laws.10 Kant then maintains that 
to require that an agent's maxim, or resolution to act, be capable of serving as 
a universal law is the same as to require that the maxim be such as could 
serve as law in a kingdom of ends, i.e. of rational beings: these are just two 
different formulations of one and the same categorical imperative, the 
supreme principle of morality (G, Ac. 434, 436). Thus the highest good 
includes a will whose maxims, or resolutions to act, could effectively operate 
as law in a community of beings, each of whose will conforms to the same 
conditions. Now the concept of a good will, all of whose maxims satisfy this 
requirement can only be an ideal toward which human beings strive (2C, Ac. 
32). And indeed Kant claims that we can only seek the highest good in the 
                                                
9Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York, 
N.Y.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), Ac. 110. Henceforth all Academy Edition references to this 
work are parenthecized in the text, preceded by “2C.” For purposes of this chapter I 
confine myself to what Kant says, leaving aside the question of why, and whether he 
ought to have said it. I take up these matters in greater detail elsewhere. 
10Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York, 
N.Y.: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), Ac. 402. Henceforth all Academy Edition references to 
this work are parenthecized in the text, preceded by “G.” 
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concept of an intelligible or supersensible world of fully rational beings (2C, 
Ac. 21, 68, 114-115, 119), which is identical to the concept of a kingdom of 
ends (G, 452, 458). 
 Thus Kant directs us to adopt as a final end an ideal of action. This ideal 
is part of an ideal end-state, i.e. the law-governed kingdom of ends, which is 
in turn one characterization of the supreme moral requirement we must 
actually aim to satisfy in all our actions. This requirement on action is claimed 
in turn to be constitutive of the end-state, i.e. the highest good, which is 
achieved by satisfying it. 
 So when Kant enjoins us to regard ourselves qua rational beings as 
making laws in a kingdom of ends which is possible through freedom of the 
will, and then argues that "morality consists in the relation of all action to the 
making of laws whereby alone a kingdom of ends is possible (G, Ac. 434)," he 
can be interpreted as making two claims. First, the kingdom of ends is indeed 
an intrinsic good. For Kant its value is not contingent on any considerations 
extrinsic to that conception itself (G, Ac. 428; 2C, Ac. 87). Nor does the full 
characterization of the kingdom of ends invoke moral notions of what is in 
some further sense good or right. Moreover, like other purely value-theoretic 
consequentialist theories, actions are defined as right just insofar as they 
promote the realization of this conception: keeping promises, for example; or 
developing one's talents and capacities. But of course Kant does not practically 
prescribe the performance of those actions whose consequences might causally 
effect this conception. Rather, we are to perform those actions which 
themselves constitutively promote this conception, irrespective of their causal 
consequences. And we know which ones those are by submitting the maxims 
of our actions to the consistent universalization procedure described by the 
first formulation of the categorical imperative – a clearly deontological 
method of practical decision-making. In Section 3 of this chapter I argue that 
there is a sense in which any value-theoretic consequentialist theory must 
adopt some such brand of practical deontological decision-making method. 
 
1.4. Aristotle's Mixed Theory 
 Conversely, one may adopt a deontological value theory in conjunction 
with a practical consequentialist decision-making method. One may develop 
particular criteria of right action that do not depend on the good they can be 
expected to cause, but rather, for example, on what is required of a morally 
virtuous individual. Such a theory might prescribe as right those actions 
which such an individual would perform (courage in the face of danger, for 
example; or fulfilling one's responsibilities, or honesty), irrespective of the 
ends thereby effected. But in deciding what to do, one might adopt the 
practical consequentialist method of choosing to perform those actions the 
expected outcomes of which best promote the end of becoming such a morally 
virtuous individual, or of performing those actions such an individual would 
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perform. Here the result would be a value theory of right action the practical 
prescriptions of which enjoin those actions that maximally effect the 
performance of the morally required actions, rather than those morally 
required actions themselves. 
 In some cases, the prescribed action might then be one the description of 
which coincides with the favored description of the morally required action. 
For example, if the value theory makes telling the truth morally right, the 
practically prescribed action might consist in uttering a particular set of true 
sentences under certain circumstances. Here the desired consequence of the 
action – telling the truth – would be identical with the performance of the 
action itself, and therefore with that morally right action prescribed by the 
theory.11 Under other circumstances, however, the goal of telling the truth 
might necessitate a period of prolonged psychological self-scrutiny and 
intensive behavioral conditioning designed to negatively reinforce the 
tendency to lie compulsively. Or it might necessitate the uttering of a set of 
sentences some of which are true and some of which merely express favorable 
or unfavorable emotions and therefore have no truth value, together with 
those unambiguous behavioral attitudes that are often crucial to the 
distinction between uttering true sentences and telling the truth. In these cases 
the practically prescribed actions would not be identical with those specified 
as morally right by the value theory. 
 There is much in Aristotle's moral theory to suggest such a reading. 
Aristotle's claim that the good for human beings consists in the performance 
of that function proper to them, i.e. "an activity of the soul in conformity with 
excellence or virtue,"12 is fleshed out in Books II, III-IX of the Nicomachean 
Ethics to refer to the development and practice of the moral virtues, guided by 
practical wisdom and intelligence. Aristotle's conception of the good is 
therefore not defined independently of a prior conception of morally right 
action.13 This is evident from Aristotle's remark in Book II that the virtue or 
excellence of human beings (i.e. moral virtue) is what makes a person good 
and able to perform his function well (1106a15-23). To say that moral virtue 
makes a person good, that the final good is the exercise of moral virtue is to 
suggest that the final good to be aimed at is one's own moral goodness or 
excellence as expressed by one's character and one's actions – a moral ideal of 
right conduct that already has been defined by the deontological criterion of 
performing our proper human function.  
                                                
11Brandt recognizes this, but without explicating its implications for the 
consequentialist/deontological taxonomy.  Op. cit. Note 4, p. 354, n. 2. 
12Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985), 
1097b22-1098a17. Also see 1144a6-9. Henceforth citations are parenthecized in the text. 
13Here I ignore for the sake of argument the controversies surrounding the correct 
interpretation of Book X relative to the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole. In fact, I ignore 
Book X and the problems it raises altogether. 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception   197 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
 Indeed, the role of the cultivation and practice of the moral virtues in 
Aristotle's theory lends plausibility to the view that the notion of the good as 
so defined plays the expected teleological role only in the most superficial 
sense. For although Aristotle assures us on the one hand that virtuous 
conduct is that which is truly constitutive of happiness (1098b30, 1099b15-
1100a5, 1100b11-1123, 1101a12-21, passim), the final good at which all actions 
aim (1095a19, 1097a34-1079b20, passim), he takes great care to emphasize at 
the same time the fact that a truly virtuous individual performs noble acts for 
their own sake and not for the rewards they will bring (1120a22-25, 1140b6, 
1116b20-30, 1144a18-20, passim). A virtuous person continues to act virtuously 
when bad fortune has crushed her chances of supreme bliss (1100b17-
1101a14),14 in the face of death in certain forms (1115a32-35), and without 
regard to the pleasurable or painful consequences of action as such (1140b11-
20) – as we would indeed expect from a person whose actions were the 
consequence of traits of character deeply instilled by habituation.  
 Thus moral virtue is not prescribed simply as that means best suited to 
achieving the highest good of happiness. On the contrary, moral virtue is that 
brand of conduct which constitutes the ideal of happiness itself. Morally 
virtuous conduct for Aristotle both defines the final good and causes its 
achievement. And it generates a list of morally obligatory actions (e.g. 
courage, generosity, temperance, etc.) that are determined by the 
noninstrumental consideration of what our proper human function consists 
in, rather than the actual consequences they can be expected to effect.   
 Practically considered, Aristotle's normative theory is a consequentialist 
one. In deciding what to do, we are to choose those actions the expected 
outcomes of which promote the development in us of the moral virtues, and 
hence the highest good. Because truly virtuous action for Aristotle issues from 
deeply inculcated dispositions of character, the full description of the action 
we practically ought to perform coincides with that of the morally right action 
only in the limiting case, in which we have already achieved the ideal of 
moral virtue. Otherwise, Aristotle enjoins us to practice performing through 
imitation those actions which truly virtuous individuals perform in a virtuous 
way (1103b5-23, 1105a25-1105b8), to aim at the mean, or moderation, in 
cultivating virtuous dispositions to action and feeling (1106b5-7, 15), to avoid 
that extreme which is most opposed to the temperate feeling or action in 
question (1109a30-35), and to be particularly circumspect when considering 
actions to which we feel naturally inclined, or which afford us personal 
satisfaction (1109b2-12). Thus we are to act in ways that causally develop in us 
the capacity for performing the morally required actions that characterize the 
                                                
14Here Aristotle distinguishes clearly between happiness, of which noble action 
performed for its own sake is constitutive, and supreme bliss or contentment as a state 
of mind consequent on good fortune. 
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truly virtuous individual – a clearly consequentialist method of practical 
decision-making. In Section 3, below, I argue that there is a sense in which any 
value-theoretic deontological theory must adopt such a practical 
consequentialist decision-making method. 
 These readings may be thought to go against the grain of the received 
interpretations of Kant and Aristotle. Kant's theory at first glance resembles a 
purely deontological one because it practically prescribes the performance of 
certain actions without regard to their causal outcomes. But the value-
theoretic end that they nevertheless promote – rational nature as an end in 
itself – is what determines their moral worth. Similarly, Aristotle's theory at 
first glance resembles a purely consequentialist one because it practically 
prescribes those actions which causally effect the highest good. But the 
highest good is then value-theoretically characterized as virtue of character 
and action, the worth of which is not in fact contingent upon their effecting 
some further end. For as we have seen, these actions are to be performed even 
when the prospects of contentment, pleasure, and indeed continued life itself 
are dim. 
 So the identification of Kant's and Aristotle's normative theories as 
respectively deontological and consequentialist is plausible only if we ignore 
the distinction between the value-theoretic and the practical aspects of these 
theories. I next show in Sections 2 – 4 that when this second distinction is 
taken into account, no normative moral theory can be adequately described as 
either consequentialist or deontological. Anscombe's thesis propounds a 
distinction without a difference. 
 
2. Practice Re-examined 
 
2.1. Classical Utilitarianism 
 Now to examine consequentialist and deontological theories respectively, 
considered in their capacity as practical decision-making methods. Classical 
Utilitarianism is often taken to be the paradigm consequentialist theory, and 
Anscombeans will be quick to argue that it remains so even when the 
suggested value-theoretic / practical distinction is recognized. Value-
theoretically, the good is independently defined as the greatest possible sum 
of happiness, and morally right actions are defined as just those that promote 
this end. Practically, we cannot know the actual consequences of our actions 
with one hundred percent certainty, nor even their objective probabilities. 
Rather than concluding from this with Moore that therefore we can never 
know which of our actions are right,15 Utilitarianism commonly prescribes as 
morally right just those actions that we can reasonable expect to promote the 
                                                
15G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 149-
50. 
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very same end, i.e. the greatest sum of happiness – a clearly consequentialist 
practical decision-making method. Or so it is claimed.   
 But this claim is false. This practical prescription describes a 
deontological decision-making method that evaluates the moral rightness of 
actions independently of their consequences. For it is not whether some action 
actually promotes the greatest amount of happiness that determines its 
rightness, but rather whether it can be reasonably expected to do so. This 
means that the action is right even in case, contrary to reasonable expectation, 
it does not do so. This is as it should be. For surely a Utilitarian would hesitate 
to withdraw the appellation "morally right" in that one anomalous case out of 
a hundred in which retrospective information demonstrated that the action 
had not had best consequences after all. It would hardly be practically helpful 
to be able to assign moral rightness to actions only retrospectively, on the 
basis of the consequences they actually happen to have had, for this would 
furnish no guidance at all as to what we ought to do next. Indeed, given that 
we can never know the totality of the consequences of any action, this would 
make it impossible to assign moral value to actions with any degree of 
certainty at all. 
 This difficulty cannot be remedied by providing a Utilitarian theory of 
excuses, according to which actions at least could be characterized as 
praiseworthy or blameworthy in the event that we could never know whether 
they were objectively right or wrong.16 According to such a theory, we could 
then prescribe or proscribe actions based on their degree of moral culpability, 
rather than on their rightness or wrongness. But from the point of view of 
practical deliberation, this just locates the deontological feature of putatively 
consequentialist deliberation at a different point. For now we must base our 
decision of what to do not on a consideration of whether it can be expected to 
promote the greatest happiness or not, but rather on that of whether it can be 
expected to elicit praise or blame. And we can be wrong about this as well. 
Nor does the fact that the expected outcome – praise or blame – can be 
internalized as a motivation within the agent solve the problem. For in fact we 
are often motivated to act in just that way which we anticipate and hope will 
allow us to keep peace with our consciences – and find that we were 
mistaken. Here, too, it may be only a retrospective examination of the actual 
consequences of the action that reveals whether we are morally culpable or 
not, i.e. whether we ought to have been praised or blamed for performing it. 
 These considerations may not seem enough to transform the apparently 
consequentialist decision-making method into a deontological one. For the 
action's moral worth is still conferred by the good end defined by the theory. 
                                                
16See Richard B. Brandt, "A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses," The Philosophical Review 
LXXVII, 3 (1969), pp. 337-61. Brandt has identified himself (in conversation) as a 
deontologist. 
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That is, the action still appears to have no moral worth independently of its 
relation to this end, regardless of whether the relation is one of cause and 
effect or one of cause to expected effect. But this appearance is misleading. To 
perform an action because one expects it to have certain consequences, and to 
think that the performance of this act will effect those consequences, is to 
intend to bring about those consequences. To then claim that an act is morally 
right because of one's intentions in performing it and not because of what 
actually happens as a result of performing it is to make one's intentions, and 
not the action's consequences, the criterion of moral rightness. Thus the 
practical prescriptions of Classical Utilitarianism are deontological in 
structure because they make the moral rightness of an action contingent on 
considerations other than its consequences, i.e. on its intended consequences. 
That this holds true – indeed, must hold true – for any other purportedly 
“purely” consequentialist normative theory can easily be seen.   
 
2.2. Ross's Intuitionism 
 Next consider a supposedly pure deontological theory such as Ross's. The 
central value-theoretic claim is that we have certain general prima facie duties 
that rest on morally significant circumstances of action, and which are known 
immediately and intuitively to be true. They include, for example, duties of 
fidelity (such as keeping promises or telling the truth), of reparation (such as 
punishment), of gratitude (such as repaying a favor), of self-improvement, 
and so on.17 But because these prima facie duties may conflict under certain 
circumstances, and because we cannot be certain which should take priority, 
our practical duty under particular circumstances is not similarly self-evident. 
Here the best we can do is consider the situation carefully, weigh the 
alternatives, reflect on our moral intuitions, and finally act in conformity with 
that considered opinion as to what act is probably our duty to the best of our 
understanding. And in this case it does appear that the practical method of 
deciding what act to perform is as deontological in character as the value 
theory from which it derives. In both bases, actions are prescribed as morally 
right without reference to their consequences. 
 But appearances are misleading in this case as well. A theory that 
characterizes as morally right the fulfillment of some duty independently of 
its consequences at the same time makes the actual fulfillment of that duty the 
criterion of rightness, rather than any expectations or intentions one may have 
had in the particular action one actually performed. And then the rightness of 
the action actually performed depends on its consequences after all. If the 
action does not have the effect of fulfilling the prescribed duty, it was wrong; 
                                                
17W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 21. Henceforth 
all citations to this work will be parenthecized in the text. 
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and if it did, it was right. As Ross argues, in discussing the example of 
keeping a promise by returning a book through the mail, 
nonattainment of the result proves the insufficiency of the means – 
however carelessly I pack or dispatch the book, if it comes to hand I have 
done my duty, and ... if the book does not come to hand I have not done 
my duty.  Success and failure are the only text, and a sufficient test, of the 
performance of duty (45).18 
Again this is as it should be. A deontological theory that practically enjoined 
us only to attempt to keep promises and repay our debts to others could be 
followed successfully even though moral duties were never fulfilled. Indeed, 
such a theory would not even require us to adopt as a goal of action the 
fulfillment of these duties. We would be obligated only to try. But mere moral 
tryings cannot be the subject of moral prescription, for they need never enter 
into the description of any actual actions we perform. My trying to mail the 
book may consist in little more than a rebellious stirring of will that makes my 
actual act of throwing the book into the fireplace less than effortless or 
conflict-free. Here I could honestly say that I tried to mail the book and failed 
(because my effort of will was not strong enough). Thus such a theory would 
not prescribe moral actions at all, but rather moral motivation. And because 
good intentions are not the sort of thing we can immediately will ourselves to 
have, we would then be morally obligated to undertake the actions that 
would effect this change in character, rather than to fulfill the duties that the 
theory prescribes.19 
 So the practical prescriptions of a purportedly "pure" deontological 
theory are consequentialist in structure because they bid the performance of 
only those actions the actual outcome of which is the morally right action as 
specified by the theory. That this holds equally true for any deontological 
theory that practically prescribes certain kinds of action as morally right is 
easily seen. 
 
2.3. Consequences, Intrinsic Value and Moral Beliefs 
 But consider the following objection to this argument.20 Making the actual 
fulfillment of a moral duty an end to which particular actions are means does 
not suffice to transform practical deontological prescriptions into 
consequentialist ones, for the end in question is not defined in the way a 
consequentialist theory requires. A consequentialist theory, it might be said, 
does not evaluate an action merely by the positive character of its 
                                                
18In general the discussion of pages 30-36 support this point, Ross's intentions 
notwithstanding. 
19Ross recognizes this. See ibid., p. 405. 
20I owe this objection to Richard Brandt and Allan Gibbard. 
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consequences, but rather by how much intrinsic value it produces. Let us 
define intrinsic value as follows: 
 
X has intrinsic value =df. X would be rationally or fittingly desired 
for its own sake, independently of 
 (1) one's moral beliefs; 
 (2) its actual or believed consequences. 
 
Think of clause (1) as the Millian condition, following Mill's definition of higher 
pleasures as those which are, among other things, desired independently of 
one's moral beliefs about what one ought to desire.21 And think of clause (2) as 
the Kantian condition, following Kant's stipulation of that sole source of 
intrinsic value as having it independent of its consequences (G, Ac. 399-400). 
Take pleasure as the most uncontroversial example of an end that satisfies 
both conditions. The claim is then that a concern with consequences as such 
fails to turn a deontological view like Ross's into a consequentialist one, 
because such a view neither does nor can claim that the prescribed actions are 
worthwhile because of the intrinsic value of their consequences. 
 We may begin by conceding that no such purportedly deontological view 
does claim this, passing directly to the question of whether it should. I now 
answer the objection by showing that either it should, or else there is no such 
thing as intrinsic value. Consider the definition.  Clause (2) is prima facie 
unproblematic. Clause (1) is important, because we have moral beliefs about 
what we ought to do. If any of these beliefs figure in our conception of an 
intrinsically valuable end, then that end itself at least partially consists in 
some characterization of what we ought to do. In that case the conformity of 
deontological prescriptions to the consequentialist canons of intrinsic value is 
straightforward. So stipulating the independence of intrinsic value from our 
moral beliefs is important for maintaining the distinction between 
consequentialist and deontological decision-making methods. 
 But it is difficult to produce an example of intrinsic value that is not 
dependent on our moral beliefs. Pleasure would not seem to be a good 
example of this. In order for pleasure to be an intrinsic good, we must believe 
that it is at least permissible to seek pleasure. This in turn implies that if we 
desire pleasure, other things equal, we ought to seek it. But we identify this as 
a rational "ought" only because we believe that it is rational to satisfy our 
instinctive desires, other things equal. However, this belief is a moral one, 
grounded in the norms of Hellenic culture. On this general view, we behave 
most morally when we give full expression to our natural human capacities: 
for abstract thought, for self-determination, and for pleasurable experiences of 
                                                
21John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, Ed. George Sher (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co., 
1979), p. 8 
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certain kinds. To claim, as Aristotle does (1097b23), that the goodness of 
human beings consists in performing their proper human function implies 
that we morally ought to do that which most fully expresses our humanity. 
We in the West assume that this must give a prominent – if not dominant – 
role to the pursuit of pleasure. 
 Consider an opposing, but equally plausible set of beliefs about what it is 
rational to do; call it the Advaita Vedantic view.22 On the Advaita Vedantic 
view, the highest good is objective knowledge. However, to achieve this 
requires, not the full expression of human capacities as an end in itself, but 
rather their eventual transcendence. Abstract thought is criticized for 
reducing the richness of objective reality to manageable but solipsistic human 
categories, and true self-determination is seen as incompatible with the 
indulgence and gratification of our biological human desires. The pursuit of 
pleasure draws human beings even further into a world of illusion, ignorance 
and self-seeking because it limits our comprehension of reality to that which 
is consonant with our pursuit of sensory self-gratification. Hence it reinforces 
the illusion of individual ego-consciousness. Genuinely objective and 
nonillusory knowledge, according to the Advaita Vedantic view, can be 
achieved through ascetic practices, meditation, and detachment from the 
pleasures of the senses, i.e. through the renunciation of those sensory and 
psychological supports that sustain the illusion of the individual self. Hence 
not only does the Advaita Vedantic view deny that sensory pleasure is an 
intrinsic good that it is permissible to seek. It maintains that, on the contrary, 
sensory pleasure is a positive impediment to good that one ought strenuously 
to avoid. By contrast to the Hellenic view, which suggests that sensory 
pleasure is good because it expresses a human capacity, the Advaita Vedantic 
view maintains that pleasure is bad for precisely the same reason. On the 
Advaita Vedantic view, the pursuit of pleasure hinders that surrender and 
transcendence of individual selfhood that is a necessary condition of 
achieving objective knowledge. 
 Thus the conviction that pleasure is an intrinsic good depends upon 
moral beliefs about the value of expressing human capacities and satisfying 
human needs. Ultimately, it depends upon moral beliefs about the value of 
the individual self that these capacities and needs uniquely define, and so 
violates clause (1) – the Millian condition – of the definition of intrinsic value. 
So it seems that we must look elsewhere for some good that satisfies the above 
definition of intrinsic value, such that it can be rationally desired without our 
                                                
22The brief sketch in this paragraph of course does not do justice to the depth and 
complexity of Vedanta philosophy as actually elaborated in such texts as The 
Upanishads, Bhagavad Gita, Yoga Sutras, or Shankaracharya's commentary on the Brama 
Sutras. See the Bibliography for suggestions. Any reasonable translation of the Bhagavad 
Gita would be a good place to start; that by Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher 
Isherwood (New York: Mentor, 1972) is one of the most accessible. 
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believing that we morally ought, under certain circumstances, to pursue it. 
This enterprise seems unpromising. Or, we can relativize our judgments of 
intrinsic value to our moral beliefs, in which case the assimilation of 
deontologism is, as I have suggested, straightforward: The morally prescribed 
action is intrinsically valuable and, as in consequentialist theories, it confers 
moral worth on those actions necessary to realize it. 
 Ross's theory may be pursued instructively as an illustration of this point. 
Ross believes that the highest intrinsic value is a moral good, i.e. virtue (134, 
155).  After virtue comes happiness or pleasure (136-38) and knowledge (138-
40). Virtue is defined as having good motives and performing good actions, 
i.e. goodness of character (134, 155-56). Good motives are in turn 
characterized as, among other things, acting from a sense of duty, i.e. being 
motivated to fulfill our duties (134). But our duties include not only things 
like fulfilling promises and the like, but also cultivating virtuous motives such 
as benevolence and sympathy in ourselves, i.e. the "duties of self-
improvement" (21, 24, 160-61). To have a good character and so to be virtuous 
is to perform actions motivated in this way (155-60). Now Ross already has 
claimed that actions are right only if they succeed in producing the desired 
effects. And now we learn that the desired effects include the production of 
virtue – in addition to other intrinsic goods such as pleasure (or happiness): 
When we think of an act as right we think that either something good or 
some pleasure for another will be brought into being. When we consider 
ourselves bound, for instance, to fulfill a promise, ... [or] when we 
consider the other main types of duty – the duties of reparation, of 
gratitude, of justice, of beneficence, of self-improvement – we find that in 
the thought of any of these there is involved the thought that what the 
dutiful act is the origination of is either an objective good or a pleasure 
(or source of pleasure) for someone else (162; also see 134). 
Some of Ross' views undergo metamorphoses in his later Foundations of 
Ethics23, but that this is not one of them is clear from the following passage: 
An action will be completely good only if it manifests the whole range of 
motivation by which an ideally good man would be affected in the 
circumstances, a sensitiveness to every result for good or for evil that the 
act is foreseen as likely to have, as well as to any special prima facie 
obligations or disobligations that may be involved; and only if it 
manifests sensitiveness to all these considerations in their right 
proportions. But if the agent is responsible to all the morally relevant 
considerations in their right proportions, he will in fact do the right act. 
Thus no action will have the utmost moral excellence which an action in 
the circumstances can have, unless it is also the right action.24 
                                                
23(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939). 
24Ibid., p. 309. I am indebted to Richard Brandt for bringing this passage to my attention. 
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The consequentialism of Ross's purportedly "pure" deontological theory is 
evident. A deontological theory that failed to have such implications would 
be one that claimed there was literally nothing to be gained by performing 
morally obligatory actions. This would exemplify a dummy deontological 
theory, in that its only function would be to serve as the bull's eye for 
consequentialists at target practice. 
 
2.4. Prescriptive Indeterminacy  
 That we may apply the same reasoning in each of the two cases – the 
practical prescriptions of a "consequentialist" theory such as Classical 
Utilitarianism and the practical prescriptions of a "deontological" theory such 
as Ross' intuitionism – to the other is easily demonstrated. If the practical 
prescription to perform that action which can be expected to maximize 
happiness is deontological in character, we can just as easily argue that we 
must then in fact perform that action, or string of actions, which has the 
prescribed action as a consequence, since we will not always be able to 
perform that action which can be expected to maximize happiness directly. 
Hence the apparently consequentialist prescription, shown to be 
deontological, is in fact consequentialist in structure after all. Similarly, if the 
practical prescription to fulfill what we believe to be the moral requirements 
of right action is actually consequentialist in character, we can just as easily 
show that we must then in fact perform that action which can be expected to 
have the fulfillment of what we believe to be the morally required action as a 
consequence, since we cannot know with certainty the consequences of our 
actions before we perform them. So the apparently deontological prescription, 
shown to be consequentialist, is deontological in structure after all. Each of 
these arguments respectively can then be repeatedly reiterated for the 
conclusion to deontological or consequentialist structure respectively. 
 From this possibility the suspicion rapidly and justifiably develops that 
the practical prescriptions of consequentialist and deontological normative 
theories are themselves neither essentially consequentialist nor essentially 
deontological in structure. They can be formulated in either way, depending 
on what aspect of actually carrying them out we choose to emphasize. Call 
this the prescriptive indeterminacy thesis. The prescriptive indeterminacy thesis 
calls attention to the fact that it is true both that prior actions may need to be 
performed in order to achieve the performance of the prescribed one; and also 
that we can only choose actions on the basis of the outcome we can reasonably 
expect them to have – even when the outcome we want is the performance of 
the prescribed action itself. This is hardly an original observation: 
The maxim: "ignore the consequences of actions" and the other: "Judge 
actions by their consequences and make these the criterion of right and 
good" are both alike maxims of the abstract Understanding. The 
consequences, as the shape proper to the action and immanent within it, 
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exhibit nothing but its nature and are simply the action itself; therefore 
the action can neither disavow nor ignore them. On the other hand, 
however, among the consequences there is also comprised something 
interposed from without and introduced by chance, and this is quite 
unrelated to the nature of the action itself.25 
Anscombeans who actually study the historical record of de facto normative 
theories that moral and political philosophers have worked to elaborate might 
be persuaded of the inadequacy of the consequentialist/ deontological 
distinction to shed light on the practical prescriptions of any such theory. 
 
3. Value Theory Re-examined 
 Next let us consider more closely the value-theoretic parts of normative 
theories. Here Anscombe's thesis raises two questions. First, is there any 
intrinsic difference in content that distinguishes consequentialist from 
deontological theories? And second, is there any intrinsic difference in their 
structures? An Anscombean of course would answer both questions 
affirmatively. I propose to answer both negatively. In this section I turn to the 
first question, leaving the second for Section 3.3, below. 
 
3.1. Interchangeability 
 It may seem evident that there is a radical difference in the kind of 
content appropriate to consequentialist and deontological theories 
respectively. Here the basic issue on which the distinction turns is whether a 
moral theory is constructed so as to ascribe primary value to some end the 
realization of which serves as the criterion for evaluating the moral worth of 
actions or institutions that promote it; or whether it ascribes primary value to 
these actions or institutions themselves, independently of their outcomes. In 
the first case the end in question is commonly described as "good," and that 
which promotes it as "right." In the second case, the actions or institutions are 
held to be right on other grounds, and not just as means to some further end. 
But once again we will see that this distinction is not sufficient to distinguish 
between two normative value theories described as consequentialist and 
deontological respectively, for anything that can count as good in this sense 
can also be right, and anything that is right in this sense can also be good. So 
whether the right or the good is to have priority is of no importance for the 
substance of one's favored normative theory. 
 What confers moral value on whatever in the theory has worth or value? 
The consequentialist may claim that the end confers value on the actions and 
institutions that promote it, but that nothing further confers value on the end 
itself; it simply has intrinsic worth. We can describe this latter type of value as 
                                                
25G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (New York, N.Y.: 1975), 
paragraph 118, note. 
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primitive, meaning that the state of affairs in question is claimed to have 
intrinsic worth or value that is not dependent on its relation to any further 
end or condition. So, for example, Aristotle's concept of pleasure, although 
not instrumental to any further end, would not have primitive value in this 
sense, because it depends on other conditions – most notably, virtuous action 
– to confer value on it. Call final ends that have value in this sense carriers of 
primitive value, or CPVs. 
 Properties of CPVs can be cited in virtue of which the CPV has value. The 
utilitarian, for example, can point to the fact that happiness is something all 
human beings strive to achieve; the perfectionist can cite the fact that the final 
state of human perfection represents the full development and exercise of 
human capacities. But in neither case is this to supply some further condition 
or end that confers instrumental value on the ends in question. It is merely to 
explicate the relevant properties of these ends themselves that make them 
CPVs. Call these characteristics the value-conferring properties of CPVs. 
 Now the consequentialist's claim that the final end is the CPV has varying 
degrees of persuasiveness, depending on the final end involved. Moral 
theories that posit happiness, human flourishing, or survival as their final end 
can adduce the claim of primitive value somewhat more plausibly, perhaps, 
than those that posit pleasure or aesthetic appreciation. Those that posit 
riches, power, or security seem to hold considerably less title to this claim. Let 
us suppose that the metaphysical structure of some state of affairs specifies it as 
either a state or an event, and more specifically as a physical or a mental state, 
and as an activity or action, or an occurrence. Then we can see that among 
these theories, the plausibility of the claim of primitive value does not depend 
on the final end's being a mental state rather than an activity, or a physical 
state rather than an event. Happiness is as plausible a candidate for a 
consequentialist's value-theoretic final good as is the exercise of the human 
capacity for self-government; survival is as good a candidate as the 
achievement of ultimate self-knowledge. CPVs, then, must be distinguished 
by their content and not by their metaphysical structures. 
 The deontologist may answer the question of what confers worth or 
value on that in the theory which has value in much the same way as the 
consequentialist did with respect to the final good. The deontologist may 
begin by claiming that actions that fulfill moral duties, or fair democratic 
political institutions are also CPVs: They are inherently right and do not 
derive their worth from any further end or condition to which they are 
instrumental. It is nevertheless compatible with this claim for the deontologist 
then to go on to explain that the moral worth of fulfilling one's duties derives 
from its morally significant characteristics, as in Ross's theory (138), or from 
the fact that fulfilling one's duties expresses rational human nature, as in 
Kant's. Similarly, it might be argued that the morally important property of 
fair democratic political institutions is that these are institutions to which any 
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participant would explicitly agree upon careful reflection, or which would be 
chosen under certain intuitively acceptable ideal conditions. Again the value-
conferring properties are not further, independent ends or conditions that 
fulfilling moral duties or democratic political institutions are intended to 
effect. Other, more efficient ways of expressing rational human nature would 
not displace the moral importance of fulfilling one's duties nor would other 
matters on which people would rationally agree displace the moral 
importance of fair democratic political institutions. To cite these properties is 
not to confer moral worth on right action or just institutions only 
instrumentally, any more than to cite the fact that all human beings strive for 
happiness is to make the worth of happiness instrumental to the further end 
of having all human beings strive for it. To cite these properties is rather to 
explicate what it is about these actions and institutions themselves that make 
them valuable.  Thus deontological value theories have CPVs just as do 
consequentialist value theories. 
 Once again the plausibility of the deontologist's claim depends largely on 
what is value-theoretically asserted to be morally right. Fulfilling certain 
duties is a plausible candidate; as might be experiencing emotions such as 
guilt, remorse, shame, or resentment under certain appropriate circumstances; 
as might be, as well, social and political institutions that respect the privacy 
and freedom of its citizens. Less persuasive as CPVs might be, for example, 
consistently altruistic behavior; or feeling repentance for one's sins, or 
continuing political and social disequilibrium. Again the important point is 
that deontological prescriptions to bring about states of affairs perceived as 
inherently and self-evidently valuable need not be confined to morally 
obligatory actions. Once again that which is prescribed as right may as well be 
an activity as an emotion, an event as a state. What ought to be the case is 
neutral between these possibilities, and again it seems that CPVs must be 
distinguished by the their content and not their metaphysical structures. 
 But this then implies that any activity, mental or physical state, or event 
that can be a valued end relative to a consequentialist value theory can be, 
with respect to its metaphysical structure, the subject of a deontological value 
theory and vice versa. To experience happiness under the appropriate 
circumstances and to experience resentment under the appropriate 
circumstances are both states we can strive to experience as an end as well as 
states of which it makes sense to say we ought to experience. Hence both are 
states that can be constitutive of the consequentialist's final end as well as 
morally right on independent grounds. To express fully our human talents 
and to fulfill our obligations are equally activities that it might be good to 
perform as well as activities of which it makes sense to say we ought to 
perform them. Hence both are activities that can be constitutive of the final 
end as well as morally right. The achievement of universal suffrage and 
political reform are both events it might be a good thing to have occur as well 
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as events of which it equally makes sense to say they ought to occur. Hence 
both are events that can be constitutive of the final end as well as morally 
right. These examples merely illustrate the point that normative theories 
cannot be value-theoretically differentiated according to what I have called 
the metaphysical structure of their carriers of primitive value. 
 This is not to claim that all CPVs are interchangeable between any two 
consequentialist and deontological theories. A deontological theory such as 
Ross's that is couched in the stronger terminology of what is not only right but 
morally obligatory would intuitively rule out certain CPVs commonly 
associated with consequentialism. For example, it might be morally right to 
feel happy about certain things or under certain circumstances, but one would 
be hard put to find circumstances under which it would be morally obligatory 
to be happy. But of course the language of duty or moral obligation rules out 
certain deontological CPVs as well: Helping others is clearly the right thing to 
do under certain circumstances, but many would argue that the meaning of 
the word "obligatory" is such that it is never morally obligatory to do so. 
Similarly, a consequentialist that claimed of its final end that it was not only 
intrinsically valuable, but also the highest good, as Moore's Ideal 
Utilitarianism does, would rule out certain CPVs associated with both 
deontological and consequentialist theories of certain kinds. Thus we might 
be entitled to say that to feel remorse at the commission of a crime is 
intrinsically valuable as an expression of moral character; but it can hardly be 
described as part of the highest good. For it cannot be part of the highest good 
to have committed the crime in the first place. Similarly, a social Darwinist 
might plausibly claim that survival is inherently good, whereas the claim that 
it is the highest good would be considerably less persuasive. 
 However, it is nevertheless likely that for any CPV that is value-
theoretically attached as a final end to a consequentialist theory, a plausible 
deontological theory could be constructed to which it would attach as the 
subject of deontological prescription; and that for any CPV value-theoretically 
attached to a deontological theory as the subject of deontological prescription, 
a plausible consequentialist theory could be constructed to which it would 
attach as a final end. Call this the interchangeability thesis. One example of the 
interchangeability thesis might include friendship and aesthetic experience as 
CPVs in Moore's ideal utilitarianism. Both of these could be easily prescribed 
as activities in which we morally ought to participate within the relevant 
deontological theory. Another example might be Rawls's two principles of 
justice, expressed in the institutions of a well-ordered society as CPVs in his 
deontological theory of justice. These, similarly, might well find a place as 
intrinsic goods in a consequentialist theory of social change. So carriers of 
primitive value may not be interchangeable in the strong sense that any one 
such carrier might occupy the relevant slot in any indifferently 
consequentialist or deontological  normative theory. But they are value-
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theoretically interchangeable in that it is the specific content of the normative 
theory, and not its consequentialist or deontological classification, that 
determines the suitability of any particular CPV to that theory. 
 So just as CPVs must be distinguished by their content and not their 
metaphysical structures within consequentialist and deontological theories 
respectively, CPVs in turn serve to distinguish among normative theories by 
their content and not by the consequentialist or deontological structure to 
which they are value-theoretically attached. So there is nothing in the value-
theoretic content of CPVs that serves to distinguish normative theories into 
consequentialist or deontological.   
 
3.2. Metaethical Convention 
 – Nothing, Anscombeans might complain, beside the convention 
metaethicists have stipulated in order to differentiate between types of 
normative theory; and the interchangeability thesis fails to respect this 
convention. Certainly we can use the words "right" and "good" to refer to 
anything we like. But the fact is that there exists an accepted metaethical 
practice of describing the most highly valued state of affairs within one's 
normative theory as "right" or "good" according to whether it is an action (or 
set of actions constituting an institution) or an end-state respectively. This is 
the rationale for the consequentialist/ deontological distinction at the 
metaethical level. Certainly the convention could have been different. But it 
isn't, and that alone is reason to abide by it.26 
 But this convention is not nearly as settled as all that. The distinction 
between actions and end-states is not clearer than those further distinctions it 
is intended to buttress. We have already seen that friendship counts as an 
end-state – rather than a relationship divisible into a set of actions – in 
Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism; and the full development of human capacities 
and talents as an end-state – rather than a set of actions – in perfectionism; 
whereas Rawls's well-ordered society counts as a set of actions or institutions 
– rather than an end-state. If normative ethicists make no rigorous distinction 
between actions and end-states, clearly they do not and cannot use the terms 
"right" and "good" in ways that would reflect this rigor – as indeed the 
examples already cited confirm. So the existing practice is considerably more 
diverse than the above complaint would have us believe. Although there are, 
of course, particular normative theories that do take this distinction with 
varying degrees of seriousness, there is no such convention at the normative 
level – regardless of the metaethical claims Anscombeans are often are 
inclined to make. 
 Certainly there might arise such a convention. We could fix a canonical 
use of the word "good" to denote only mental or physical states that involved 
                                                
26I owe this objection to Allan Gibbard. 
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no actions – for example, thoughts and feelings, bodily states, particular 
distributions of resources, and so on. Similarly, we might stipulate the 
denotation of the term "right" to refer only to actions and sets of actions as 
that concept is understood in action theory. According to this convention, 
such things as happiness, shame, economic equality, knowledge, and physical 
fitness might be good on different normative theories. Neither friendship, 
human flourishing, or workers' control over the means of production could be 
good in this rigorous sense. These things instead would have to be designated 
as right, as would fulfilling – but not having fulfilled – one's duties, research, 
virtuous activity, and engaging in sex, sports, or other pleasurable activities. 
We would then have to say that, for example, virtuous activity was morally 
obligatory or right regardless of its consequences, as might be research, 
sports, or workers' control of the means of production; or that these were 
perhaps right only insofar as they resulted in happiness, knowledge, physical 
fitness, or economic equality respectively, and not otherwise. This certainly 
would be a very odd and counterintuitive convention. 
 So there is good reason for the existing heterogeneity of practice among 
normative ethicists with respect to what can be described as "good" or "right." 
It is that an interest in constructing a viable normative theory precludes the 
sacrifices of organization, content, and intuitive plausibility that strict 
adherence to the convention would require. The point can be generalized. We 
could, if we wanted, take the consequentialist/ deontological distinction as 
seriously as its more enthusiastic Anscombeans would like. But the resulting 
normative theories would be practically irrelevant and intellectually 
uninteresting. More on this in the following section. 
 
3.3. Structural Equivalence  
 Now I turn to the purported structural differences between 
consequentialist and deontological theories. All normative theories contain 
the following basic elements: 
 
(1) Activit(ies), i.e. actions, institutions, or practices; 
(2) Final ends, i.e. goals, objectives, or purposes; 
(3) Value-conferring propert(ies) of (2), i.e. those properties that we 
adduce to explain the value of the find end(s) of the theory. 
 
We represent the basic and general structural relationships among (1), (2), and 
(3) as follows: 
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relationship:   (α)    (β) 
 
 
element:  (1)      (2)    (3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
. 
. 
Figure 4. Structural Relationships among Basic Elements  
of a Normative Value Theory 
 
Figure 3 is a schematic representation of the fact that in any normative value 
theory, there is an end to be achieved that is taken to have moral worth (2) 
and actions, sets of actions, or programs of action that are prescribed to 
achieve it (1). In addition, there are properties of that end (3) that, when 
enumerated, explain why that end is morally worthwhile or valuable. 
 Different normative value theories tend to construe the relationships (α) 
and (β) between these elements (1), (2) and (3) differently. Utilitarianism, for 
example, makes a sharp distinction between the action (1) and the final end it 
is intended to promote (2); whereas, as we have already seen in Section 2.2, a 
theory of moral obligation such as Ross's makes the prescribed actions (1) 
themselves the final end (2). Similarly, Perfectionism throws into sharp relief 
the value-conferring property of that end (3), namely that human potential is 
thereby fully developed and exercised; whereas Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism 
makes aesthetic experience an intrinsically valuable end apparently 
independently of any further properties it may be presumed to have. Here the 
final end (2) as such is identical with its value-conferring properties (3). 
 In Section 2 I observed that normative value theories do not uniquely 
specify their internal structural relationships merely by using terminology 
such as "promotes," "conduces to," "furthers," "realizes," or "makes possible."27 
This is because all these terms are neutral between causal and constitutive 
relationships, and between the actions to be performed and the values 
stipulated by the theory that confers moral worth on these actions. We assume 
that if a theory identifies itself as consequentialist, relationship (α) is essential 
causal, and so that the terms just listed are to be understood causally or 
                                                
27This last is Kant's locution. 
act(ivity) final end 
(=CPV) 
value-conferring propert(ies)1 
value-conferring propert(ies)2 
value-conferring propert(ies)3 
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instrumentally. If the theory identifies itself as deontological, on the other 
hand, we assume that they are to be interpreted constitutively, so that 
relationship (α) is one of identity. Thus consequentialist value theories are 
thought to be distinguishable from deontological ones in virtue of the ways in 
which each construes the structural relationships (α) and (β) between 
elements (1), (2), and (3), although the major conflict concerns how (α) is to be 
construed. I first explicate in detail the structural properties that are assumed 
to distinguish consequentialist value theories from deontological ones. I then 
argue that these properties do nothing of the kind. Call this the structural 
equivalence thesis. 
 (i) In a consequentialist value theory, relationship (α) is usually described as 
(a) provisional, and/or (b) instrumental, and/or (c) causal. 
 
(a) Actions, institutions or practices (1) have only provisional value if 
the moral worth of performing or engaging in them is contingent upon 
their promoting the final end (2) specified by the theory. If they do not 
serve this end, they do not have moral value. 
(b) These activities promote their final end instrumentally if they are 
the means, medium, or instrument through which this end is achieved. 
(c) They promote their final ends causally if, roughly, they constitute 
a discrete set of physical conditions that produces a second discrete set of 
independently identifiable physical conditions, i.e. the end in question.28 
 
 (ii) In a deontological value theory, on the other hand, relationship (α) is 
typically characterized as (a) constitutive, (b) noninstrumental, and (c) 
noncausal. 
 
(a) Actions, institutions, or practices (1) have constitutive value if they 
are themselves the final end (2), or parts of the final end, which the value 
theory stipulates. This is, presumably, what is meant by saying that 
deontologically prescribed actions have intrinsic worth independent of 
their consequences. Thus in a deontological value theory element (1) is 
identical with element (2): the actions are "ends in themselves." 
(b) That relationship (α) is constitutive of the final end implies that it 
is noninstrumental: The action is not a means or instrument through which 
the carrier of primitive value is achieved. Rather it is itself such a carrier. 
                                                
28This sketchy characterization is intended to reflect the view that causally related 
events must be physically separable. Cf. Jaegwon Kim, "Noncausal Connections," Nous 
8 (1974), pp. 41-52; Richard Brandt and Jaegwon Kim, "Wants as Explanations of 
Actions," The Journal of Philosophy LX (1963), pp. 425-35; Alvin Goldman, A Theory of 
Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); A. I. Melden, Free Action 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961). 
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(c) Finally, if an action under a certain description is identified as the 
CPV, it does not cause that carrier to occur. It can be said to promote that 
carrier only in some weaker sense in which it perhaps expresses, 
exemplifies, or actualizes it. 
 
 (iii) Consequentialist and deontological value theories tend to agree in their 
characterization of relationship (β) as noncausal, noninstrumental, and 
nonprovisional; and also (a) value-conferring, (b) explanatory, and (c) 
ascriptive: 
 
(a) The relationship between elements (2) and (3) is value-conferring if 
it is the having of these propert(ies) that confers value on the final end (2) 
in question. 
(b) The relationship is explanatory if adducing these properties 
explains why the final end has primitive value. 
(c) The relationship is ascriptive if these properties can be ascribed to 
the final end as properties of it. 
 
Thus consequentialist value theories make relationship (α) causal and (β) 
noncausal, whereas deontological ones make both relationships (α) and (β) 
noncausal. 
 
3.3.1. Metaphysical Indistinguishability 
 Now to argue directly for the structural equivalence thesis, i.e. that these 
supposed structural distinctions between consequentialist and deontological 
value theories are largely illusory. First, note that according to the description 
of CPVs as those practices, states, or events that are claimed to be intrinsically 
valuable, those properties of CPVs which confer value on their carriers ((3)-
type elements) are themselves CPVs, in both consequentialist and 
deontological theories. Thus, for example, the morally significant 
circumstances on which intrinsically worthy actions rest in Ross's sense 
maybe plausibly claimed to have intrinsic worth or value of the same kind 
that doing our duty as a result of expressing them does; reflective 
equilibrium, or careful and reflective deliberation, or the intuitive 
apprehension of moral facts have intrinsic worth in just the same sense as 
their resultant principles do; rational human nature has the same kind of 
intrinsic value as the imperatives that express it do. These things have 
intrinsic value in the sense that we would accord them moral worth even if 
they were not related to other CPVs as their value-conferring properties, and 
independent of any valuable consequences they may or may not have. We 
think it is important for persons to be reflective and rational and for moral 
relations to obtain, even when the outcome is not one we would have chosen, 
just as we think it is important to be happy independently of the outcome 
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doing so may have. This is not to deny that we may need to abdicate any one 
of these states if the outcomes prove to be disastrous. But we would do so 
with reluctance, just as we would when forced to give up anything of intrinsic 
worth. That these properties themselves are intrinsically valuable, or could 
arguably be so relative to some theory, explains why they confer value on 
their carriers. 
 If these value-conferring properties of CPVs are themselves CPVs, there 
is no difference in metaphysical structure between these properties and any 
other CPVs. These too may have their value-conferring properties that may be 
either further intrinsically valuable characteristics, or other CPVs that can be 
ascribed to them as properties. Thus, for example, the fact that all human 
beings strive for happiness may confer primitive value or worth on happiness; 
that friendship and aesthetic experience are sources of happiness may confer 
primitive value on friendships and aesthetic experience. That fulfilling our 
obligations rests on morally significant circumstances may confer primitive 
value on fulfilling our obligations; and that morally significant circumstances 
reflect rational human nature may confer primitive value on morally 
significant circumstances; and so on. 
 Of course these properties always bear a special value-conferring 
relationship to those CPVs of which they are properties, as stipulated in some 
particular normative theory. And it is likely that, in general, no such carrier 
would be a carrier of primitive value without its particular value-conferring 
properties. Happiness, for example, would not be a CPV if it were not so 
important to people to attain it. Nevertheless, happiness is no more or less a 
CPV than the fact of people's aspiring to attain it, as in Hegel's normative 
theory.29 For both could occupy the role CPV within some normative theory. 
Both could confer value or worth on the actions, institutions, or practices that 
promoted them. 
 In general, that value-conferring property of a CPV which is itself such a 
carrier is no more or less of a carrier of primitive value relative to some value 
theory than that on which it confers value. Since value-conferring properties 
of CPVs are no more or less diverse in metaphysical structure than any other 
CPVs, such things as morally significant circumstances, the expression of 
rational human nature, that all human beings should strive for some one thing 
or state of affairs, and reflective equilibrium or deliberation can all serve as 
                                                
29Hegel's theory as explicated in The Philosophy of Right has often been interpreted as 
holding as carrier of primitive value not welfare, but the common aspiration to welfare 
on the part of all members of society (see the essays by Ilting and Plamenatz in Hegel's 
Political Philosophy, ed. Z. A. Pelczynski (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972). 
Central to Hegel's conception of the rational Will is the notion that all individuals 
concur in the adoption of this communality of purpose as itself the highest good; see 
Hegel, paragraphs 151-55, 257-61; and also my "Property and the Limits of the Self," 
Political Theory 8, 1 (February 1980), 39-64. 
Chapter V. A Refutation of Anscombe’s Thesis        216 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
intrinsically valuable ends as well as any others, and they can serve equally as 
the subject of deontological prescription as well as the content of final ends. 
For example, the expression of our rational human nature is just as plausible 
as a desired end we may wish to achieve as it is as that which we may view 
ourselves as directly obligated to do; reaching reflective equilibrium is as 
likely a candidate for a state we may strive to achieve as it is for a duty we 
must fulfill as part of action morally. We can express this general truth by 
saying that those CPVs that are value-conferring properties of other CPVs are 
indistinguishable in metaphysical  structure, or metaphysically indistinguishable, 
from other such carriers. Any constraints on their use or arrangements within 
some normative theory are a function of their content alone. So final ends (2) 
in Figure 3 are metaphysically indistinguishable from value-conferring 
properties (3). 
 But if it is characteristic of deontological theories that (1)-type elements in 
Figure 2 occupy position (2), and if (2)-type CPVs would not be such without 
their value-conferring properties (3), which are similarly CPVs, then 
relationship (β) in deontological theories is equivalent to relationship (α) in 
consequentialist ones. For deontologically prescribed actions, institutions, and 
practices ((1)=(2)) are only provisionally valuable relative to the further CPVs 
(in position (3)), just as consequentially prescribed actions are, relative to the 
ends they promote.  Thus we can adumbrate the structural equivalence of 
consequentialist and deontological theories as follows: 
 
    consequentialist:   deontological: 
relationship:       (α)     (β) 
 
 
element:  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Structural Equivalence of Consequentialist and  
Deontological Normative Theories 
 
Here we might characterize both relationship (α) in consequentialist theories 
and relationship (β) in deontological ones as "provisional on the promotion 
of." I omit independent treatment of (β) in consequentialist theories and (α) in 
deontological ones, since the arguments of Sections 3.1-3.a conjointly imply 
their susceptibility to the same line of reasoning. 
 So, for example, Utilitarianism implies that the commitment to keeping 
promises is to be abdicated if it does not lead to the greatest amount of 
happiness possible, whereas Rawls’s Social Contract Theory implies that the 
(1) 
act(ivity) 
(2) CPV 
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two principles of justice are to be abdicated if one would not choose them in a 
state of reflective equilibrium,30 and Ross's Intuitionism implies that the list of 
prima facie duties is to be abdicated if they do not in fact rest on morally 
significant circumstances (20-28). Just as the moral rightness of some state of 
affairs depends in a consequentialist theory on its relation to an independent 
CPV, similarly the moral rightness of some state of affairs depends in a 
deontological theory on its relation to a similarly independent CPV, namely 
that value-conferring property of the act, institution, or practice itself. 
 
3.3.2. Provisional Value 
 To the structural equivalence thesis one may object that even if structural 
similarity is conceded, structural identity must be denied. For a 
consequentialist normative theory construction stipulates a CPV as a final 
end, relative to which the value of morally right states of affairs are not only 
provisional, but irreducibly instrumental, whereas the morally right states of 
affairs prescribed by a deontological theory can never be merely instrumental 
in this way. To answer this complaint we need to scrutinize more closely the 
terms we used to describe relationship (α) in consequentialist value theories. 
 First: what does it actually mean to call morally right action instrumentally 
valuable over and above what it means to call it provisionally valuable in the 
sense already explained?  Does it mean that the actions, practices, or 
institutions promote or conduce to the further, independent CPV in a 
consequentialist theory but not a deontological one? Surely this is not what it 
means.  Just political institutions, for example, that may be claimed to be 
intrinsically valuable because they express rational human nature, 
noncausally promote or conduce to that value which they express, just 
because they express it. Keeping one's promise, if intrinsically valuable 
because doing so can be consistently willed as a universal law of nature, 
noncausally promotes the value of consistently willing the maxims of action 
as universal laws of nature, just because it exemplifies this value. As we have 
already seen, "to promote something" need not mean only "to cause it to come 
into existence." I can promote good music by playing it, or promote the 
display of affection by displaying it myself, even if neither action has any 
further causal consequences that are relevant to its promotion. And if I do not 
cause my action to come into existence, I do not cause that which it promotes 
to do so either. This is just to repeat that things can be promoted by being 
expressed, realized, or exemplified, as well as by being caused (cf. (3.3.ii.c). 
This has nothing to do with instrumental value. 
 Earlier something described as instrumentally valuable was characterized 
as a means or instrument through which its CPV was realized. Fulfilling one's 
obligations is not, strictly speaking, a means or instrument through which 
                                                
30Rawls, op. cit. Note 4, pp. 19-20. 
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morally significant circumstances are expressed. But what would count as 
instrumental value strictly speaking? Sidgwick claims that friendship was an 
important means to the Utilitarian end.31 But friendship cannot be strictly 
speaking a means or instrument through which happiness is achieved. Only 
genuine instruments, such as machines that stimulate the pleasure centers of 
the brain, can be means or instruments in the strict sense. Certainly we are 
free to view friendship in this way, metaphorically speaking; and in Chapters 
X.6 through XII I look more closely at some metaethical views that conceive 
certain key activities similarly. But the same metaphoric liberality then entitles 
us to view fulfilling our obligations as a means or instrument through which 
morally significant circumstances are expressed as well. And we need not be 
consequentialists to do so. 
 So it appears that so, far, there is reason to suppose a structural 
equivalence between consequentialist and deontological value theories after 
all. In both cases, the moral value of action, institutions, and practices have 
only provisional value relative to their carriers of primitive value – whether 
the favored normative theory is consequentialist or deontological. 
 
3.3.3. Causation 
 Earlier, consequentialist theories were represented as insisting upon a 
causal relation between that which is morally right and the CPV it promotes 
(3.3.i.c), whereas a deontological theory was supposed to make this relation 
noncausal and constitutive (3.3.ii).  But a consequentialist value theory must 
accommodate a noncausal constitutive relation between a morally right state 
of affairs and its independent CPV, and a deontological theory must 
accommodate a causal relation between a morally right state of affairs and its 
CPV. If a consequentialist value theory ruled out all such noncausal and 
constitutive relations, it could not be morally right within a consequentialist 
theory to promote happiness through friendship, or to make someone happy 
by32 arousing his competitive tendencies at chess, or to promote human 
perfection by developing and exercising one's talents. In each such case, the 
morally right action is related to the carrier of primitive value as a constitutive 
part and not as a causal antecedent. But a reasonable consequentialist will 
rightly exhort its performance nevertheless. 
 Indeed a consequentialist value theory that consisted only of causal 
relations would be impossible because it would require us to cause the 
desired end, but never to participate in it through our own actions or 
experiences. For example, we might cause happiness to occur, but could do 
nothing that would be constitutive of being happy. This would imply, first, 
                                                
31Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (New York, N.Y.: Dover, 1966), p. 437. For a 
discussion of this claim see Chapter XI. 
32in Goldman's sense (op. cit. Note 28, pp. 5-6, 20-21). 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception   219 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
that we would not be permitted to cause ourselves to be happy; second, that 
no other agent who consciously accepted this theory could permit herself to 
be caused by anyone else to be happy, since in either case the effect of the 
action would be that precisely those agents who are only to cause happiness 
themselves participate in happiness. This is ridiculous. Hence no 
consequentialist value theory can plausibly rule out constitutive relationships 
between elements (1) and (2), and this means that (α) must include identity 
relations, just as do deontological theories. 
 Similarly, if a deontological value theory ruled out all causal relations 
between morally right states of affairs and their independent CPVs, it could 
not prescribe as morally right an action because it effected rather than 
expressed the theory's CPV. If such a theory contained no causal relations 
between its primary elements at all, we would be prevented from making any 
appeal to consequences that were also value-conferring properties of the CPV 
in order to decide what to do. For example, suppose the obligations to tell the 
truth and to refrain from harming others were to conflict under certain 
circumstances. Suppose also that refraining from harming others caused 
rational human nature – the agent's, the potential victim's, and the potential 
victim's associate's – to be expressed; whereas telling the truth under these 
circumstances merely caused human malevolence and spitefulness to be 
expressed. In deciding what to do, we would be unable to appeal to these 
consequences even as a tie-breaker. No consideration of the form, 
If fulfilling moral obligations is intrinsically valuable because doing so 
expresses rational human nature, then to choose between two such 
conflicting obligations that one which, under the circumstances, causally 
undermines the expression of rational human nature vitiates the point of 
fulfilling moral obligations. So I should choose the other one. 
would be acceptable. This, too, is ridiculous. A normative theory that rules 
out this kind of reasoning is not one that any deontologist – no matter how 
pure – would be likely to adopt.33 Hence no plausible deontological value 
theory can rule out causal relationships between elements (2) and (3). This 
makes the relationship (β) comparable to relationship (α) in consequentialist 
theories. 
 Thus the consequentialist can no more claim a value-theoretic monopoly 
on causal relations between morally right actions and their CPVs than the 
deontological can on noncausal, constitutive relations between them. The 
particular character of the relation (α) is not determined by whether a theory 
is consequentialist or deontological in form, but once again only by the 
content of that theory. Any such value theory must contain both kinds of 
                                                
33Cf., for example, Ross, The Right and the Good, op. cit. Note 17, p. 31. 
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relation in order to be normatively viable.34 These considerations taken 
together suggest that if structural equivalence between consequentialist and 
deontological value theories is in fact lacking, some further, nonshared 
property needs to be adduced to demonstrate this. And of course it must also 
be demonstrated that this property is not itself particular to the content of 
some one such theory. 
 
4. Two Metaethical Attitudes 
 All along, the focus has been on the structure and content of normative 
theories, independent of the metaethical attitudes and pronouncements 
ethicists make about those theories. If my treatment of Anscombe's thesis has 
been correct so far, the basis for the consequentialist/ deontological 
distinction is not to be found in any property of normative theories 
themselves, but rather in those metaethical attitudes expressed by 
Anscombeans. So I now want to consider those attitudes. I show that they are 
based on mistaken beliefs about the applicability of this distinction to 
normative theory, and on psychological attitudes that would be better 
expressed in a very different distinction. 
 Anscombeans often seek support in the self-evident fact that there is, 
after all, a disagreement between someone who thinks it is always wrong to 
                                                
34Some think the telling difference between consequentialist and deontological value 
theories consists in the status they accord to moral injunctions, whether causal or 
constitutive. They think a consequentialist theory treats them as disposable rules of 
thumb, whereas a deontological theory regards them as universally binding laws. Peter 
Railton expressed this view. But it applies only to dummy consequentialist and 
deontological theories respectively, not to any real ones; and even then only to their 
practical, not their value-theoretic parts. We have already seen that the value-theoretic 
part of a normative theory supplies no action-guiding directives on how we should 
promote or realize that which has moral worth, much less on how often we should do 
so. On the other hand, the practical part of any viable consequentialist theory must 
recognize that certain actions are in fact always morally obligatory, not only because in 
fact they might always best promote the value-theoretic good; but also because they are 
most reliable in cases where we cannot know what act would do so – which, as we have 
already seen, is itself a permanent feature of practical consequentialist injunctions. So 
practical consequentialist prescriptions are frequently universal in character (Sidgwick 
and Moore are particularly explicit about this). Similarly, practically viable 
deontological prescriptions recognize that value-theoretically prescribed duties cannot 
always be successfully fulfilled. As we have already seen, they may conflict or they may 
fail to be completed successfully. In these cases a practicing deontologist is prepared to 
perform that action which on the whole best conforms to the theory's value-theoretic 
prescriptions, and also to revise her conduct in case it turns out not to serve this 
purposes. So practical deontological prescriptions frequently have the character of rules 
of thumb (cf. Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 30-32). That both consequentialist and 
deontological practical prescriptions must include both universal laws and rules of 
thumb follows directly from the prescriptive indeterminacy thesis. 
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lie, regardless of the causal consequences of doing so, and someone who 
thinks it is only wrong to lie when lying does not promote general welfare. 
Similarly, those who care more about conforming their behavior to clear-cut 
moral prescriptions that about making themselves and other people happy 
are clearly at odds with those whose priorities are the reverse. From these 
facts it is often concluded that there is a genuine disagreement between 
consequentialists and deontologists after all. 
 But this conclusion does not follow. That is, it does not follow from the 
fact that people have different moral priorities, or accord greater or lesser 
moral value to different states of affairs, that they must make a commitment 
to consequentialism or deontologism. For as we have seen, any such content 
may figure in consequentialist or deontological theories indifferently; and 
their respective structural relationships are equally unhelpful in classifying 
one's moral convictions in one way rather than the other. So it will not do to 
argue here that it is just my preferring never to lie rather than effecting the 
general welfare that makes me a deontologist. For my adoption of the value of 
never lying is as such neutral between adopted ends and the means to their 
achievement, and neutral between carriers of primitive value and those states 
of affairs that promote them. 
 So our disagreements about the relative importance of performing 
different actions or achieving different ends shed no light on the 
consequentialist/ deontological distinction. All it proves is that people do 
indeed differ about whether it is more important to tell the truth than to be 
happy, to distribute goods and service justly than to satisfy desires, and so on. 
But this fact is uncontroversial. All these possibilities are metaphysically 
indistinguishable values to which different individuals may assign different 
weights without thereby providing evidence for their consequentialist or 
deontological proclivities. This is not to argue that people do not have such 
proclivities. Psychologically and professionally, a great deal may turn on 
whether one fancies oneself to be a consequentialist (tough, hard-nosed, 
practical but idealistic) or a deontologist (stern, uncompromising, virtuous 
but not intolerant). It is just to claim that such self-conceptions find support in 
neither the values nor the structure of the normative theory any such 
individual is likely to hold. 
 Of course part of the intensional attitudes of some such ethicists include 
not only these values, but in addition the conviction that some particular 
value is an end to be achieved, or a means to some such end, or descriptive of 
an intrinsically valuable action irrespective of the ends it may promote. Such 
an individual may maintain an explicit lack of interest in, say, the 
consequences that particular prescribed actions may promote, or, 
alternatively, in the particular means undertaken to achieve some desired 
end, and identify herself respectively as a deontologist or consequentialist on 
these grounds alone. But if the analysis offered in Sections 1 through 3 of this 
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chapter are correct, those intensional attitudes toward the components of 
moral action are simply confused. 
 However, Anscombeans may then cite the very clear differences in ethical 
sensibility that often motivate adherence to consequentialism or 
deontologism.35 Self-styled deontologists often regard their own imperfect 
attempts to do what they believe to be right as challenge enough, without 
incorporating any vision of what would be good for other people into their 
moral program. They may believe that their primary task is to attend to their 
own moral behavior, while relying on the essential humanity and rationality 
of other people as sufficient evidence that they will do the same. This 
conviction may be explained by the assumption that these two characteristics, 
of rationality and humanity, are sufficient conditions for inclusion in a general 
moral community whose continued existence is dependent on the capacity for 
moral autonomy, i.e. for generating and regulating one's actions in accordance 
with universal moral laws. Those who exercise this capacity for immoral 
purposes are then viewed as fully responsible agents to be condemned or 
punished, but never remade or reprogrammed in ways that would be thought 
to violate their essential personhood. Deontologists may thus regard as both 
arrogant and manipulative the consequentialist's eagerness to assume 
responsibility, not only for his own behavior, but for events and states of 
affairs that may be only remotely causally contingent on it; and to take on the 
project of the moral reform of others on a grand scale as part of one's personal 
moral program. 
 Self-styled consequentialists, on the other hand, often believe that a 
healthy sense of sympathy and compassion for other people profoundly 
demands a commitment to their welfare that may even outstrip one's 
commitment to one's own. This sentiment may be justified by a broader 
conception of the moral community that includes all sentient beings, or 
perhaps all beings with complex central nervous systems. Thus they may be 
less inclined to differentiate between moral agents based on degree of 
competence or rationality. They may therefore find unthinkable a morality 
that requires them to ignore the fact that all moral agents and their behavior 
are mutually interdependent within a common sociopolitical and causal 
network, just as all beings and events are within the larger common physical 
network. They may view as selfish and irresponsible the deontologist's 
preoccupation with her own moral probity, and willingness to sacrifice the 
well-being of other people on the altar of moral law. 
 These are serious attitudinal differences indeed. But they bear no relation 
to the substance of anyone's ethical views. We have already seen that 
disagreements over actual normative priorities do not force the commitment 
                                                
35Stephen White's insights and critical comments have helped this and the following 
paragraph.  
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception   223 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
to consequentialism or deontologism. A perfectionist defines the moral 
community in much the same way as the deontologist supposedly does; 
deontologists often extend the scope of their moral concern just as broadly as 
the consequentialist (as, for example, in Nozick's theory of animal rights). 
With the possible exception of those ethicists who hold and act on just that 
false belief which I am attacking, i.e. that adopting some substantive 
normative value or priority implies a consequentialist or deontological 
commitment, there is no evidence to support any correlation between these. 
 Now the deontologist ascribes moral arrogance and manipulativeness to 
the consequentialist because of the latter's assumption of moral responsibility 
for events over which, it seems, only an omnipotent being could have control; 
and also because of his concern with effecting the welfare of other people, 
independently of their prima facie wishes or collaboration. In Chapter XII I 
develop in depth this criticism of Classical Utilitarianism specifically. But the 
deontologist's own aspiration to perfect adherence to the moral law, and 
apparent disregard for inherent human imperfection and irrationality, may 
just as easily provide fuel for the accusation of moral arrogance, as may the 
conviction that the preferred set of moral principles are innately superior to 
any that are either incompatible with them, not a product of Western culture, 
or both.36 Deontological manipulativeness may be similarly demonstrated in 
the insistence on systematic moral education in case one is not inclined to 
adopt the favored principles. Here the reasoning may be that one merely 
needs to, for example, develop one's capacity for moral intuition, achieve a 
higher level of rational or moral development, or be taught to respect the 
moral law, in order to estimate these principles at their proper worth. 
 On the other hand, the consequentialist criticized as selfish and 
irresponsible the deontologist's concern with personal moral virtue at the 
expense of general human welfare. But the consequentialist's own selfishness 
might be just as easily evinced by his insensitivity to the very real desire of 
other people to determine freely and without outside interference the course 
of their own lives, and to pursue their own conceptions of the good. Similarly, 
the consequentialist might demonstrate moral irresponsibility in his 
willingness to discount or sacrifice the claim of an innocent life if doing so will 
further social welfare.   
 The general point is clear. Moral arrogance, manipulativeness, 
selfishness, irresponsibility, and indeed a host of other vices one might have 
occasion to ascribe to particular ethicists are not the exclusive preserve of any 
one type of normative theory, any more than is the moral humility, respect for 
others, altruism, or sense of responsibility by which the accusers would – and 
could – presumably characterize their own normative views. These qualities 
                                                
36Some evidence of this conviction can be gleaned from passages in Kant, Ross, 
Kohlberg, and Rawls.  
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describe attitudes and psychological dispositions that individuals may or may 
not have. And these attitudes and dispositions may or may not infect the 
expression of one's moral convictions. But these convictions themselves are 
logically independent of both the personality problems and character traits of 
the individuals who hold them, and of the consequentialist/ deontological 
taxonomy. So neither these convictions nor the personal traits that supposedly 
accompany them reflect the supposed difference in moral sensibility that 
Anscombeans claim. 
 Now there are certain criticisms of deontological and consequentialist 
theories often made by members of the opposing camp that have a common 
ring to them. Consequentialists often claim that deontological theories are 
guilty of "rule worship," and are essentially unconcerned with people; for they 
inflexibly prescribe certain actions without regard to how others are affected. 
They fail to recognize the importance of human well-being as an intrinsic 
value.37 Deontologists then typically retort that it is the consequentialist who 
exhibits an essential lack of concern for people. For consistent consequentialist 
theories require the sacrifice of the innocent for the sake of some "greater 
good,"38 subordinate human rationality and autonomy to the pursuit of this 
good,39 and fail to respect personal integrity.40 
 Note that, as usual, the criticisms could be reversed. One could just as 
easily fault consequentialist theories for paying insufficient attention to 
human welfare on the grounds that they subordinate individual well-being to 
the general welfare. One might then go on to argue that a theory that places 
individual welfare in jeopardy threatens and thereby diminishes the welfare 
of each individual in the community, hence diminishes general welfare. One 
could similarly criticize deontological theories on the grounds that a 
thoroughgoing commitment to general principles of moral obligation 
undermines the opportunity to exercise individual rationality and autonomy 
in decision-making on particular occasions, since individual inclinations are 
in each case subordinated to the principle of conformity to these general 
normative prescriptions.41 
                                                
37J. J. C. Smart makes this objection in "An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics," in J. 
J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 5-6, 72. Also see Jonathan Bennett, "Whatever 
the Consequences," Analysis 26 (1966), pp. 83-102. 
38H. M. McCloskey, "A Note on Utilitarian Punishment," Mind 72 (1963), p. 599. 
39Thomas Nagel, "Subjective and Objective," in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
40Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in Smart and Williams, op. cit Note 
37; also see Rawls, op. cit. Note 4, Sections 5 and 30. 
41W. D. Falk makes essentially this criticism in "Morality, Self, and Others," in Judith J. 
Thomson and Gerald Dworkin, Eds., Ethics (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); 
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 That the objects of these criticisms can be interchanged so easily suggests 
that it is in fact not the consequentialist or deontological structure of these 
theories that is under attack, but something else. These criticisms have in 
common the reproach that the theory under fire is what we might call 
insufficiently person-regarding, i.e. that it ignores or devalues the importance of 
certain human needs and requirements that are centrally important from the 
point of view of normative theory: that we should be happy and not 
miserable, that we should be permitted and encouraged to determine the 
course of our lives, that the value of different conceptions of individual 
welfare should be recognized and respected, and that we should be able to be 
both rationally self-directing and also fully committed to the plans and 
projects to which we attach value. Unlike the epithets consequentialists and 
deontologists usually hurl at one another, this reproach is a serious one, for it 
touches on the most basic rationale for adhering to or constructing a 
specifically normative theory in the first place. If fulfillment of these needs 
and requirements is of central significance for human beings, and if the whole 
point of a normative moral theory is to regulate relations among human 
beings in a rational and practically effective way, then a theory that is 
insufficiently person-regarding in this sense can claim very little title to 
support at all. 
 Avowed Anscombeans often acknowledge that this criticism presents 
genuine difficulties for their respective metaethical allegiances. Some 
consequentialists may respond by incorporating the values of rationality, 
autonomy, integrity, or respect for persons into the characterization of human 
welfare as the carrier of primitive value, or as empirically necessary means to 
the realization of this end. They then worry about how to square the 
importance of such values with the consequentialist structure of their favored 
theories. Some deontologists may respond by insisting that as a matter of 
empirical fact, adherence to moral principles of action conduce to human 
welfare, while attempting to defuse the suspicion that they have thereby 
sullied the deontological purity of their theories with a consequentialist 
justification. 
 Not all Anscombeans have this response. Some consequentialists accept 
the charges of scapegoatism, paternalism, or alienation with a shrug, claiming 
these unfortunate flaws to be the necessary price of practicability. Similarly, 
some deontologists accept the charges of rule-worship or lack of human 
sympathy as the necessary concomitants of consistency. 
 Thus this disparity of response to the criticism does not parallel, but 
rather cuts across the consequentialist-deontological distinction. On the one 
side, we find those who attempt to restructure their normative theory so as to 
                                                                                                     
reprinted in Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian, Eds. Morality and the 
Language of Conduct (Detroit: Wayne State University press, 1963). 
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fully accommodate the missing values. The resulting "mixed" views, like the 
four traditional ones discussed in this chapter, are comparable in emphasizing 
an essentially person-regarding orientation at the expense of easy taxonomic 
classification. On the other side, we find those who believe that an essentially 
nonperson-regarding, or not fully person-regarding orientation is a small 
price to pay for structural clarity and methodological rigor. We might 
describe such views as theory-regarding, meaning by this that their proponents 
are prepared to accept without further argument the devaluation of certain of 
the above-listed needs and requirements – the satisfaction of desire, for 
example; or personal integrity – because of a deeper commitment to what they 
perceive as the distinctive structure and method of their theory. 
 Now the question whether the satisfaction of desire is more or less 
important than personal integrity, or whether autonomy is more or less 
important than happiness, is a normative issue to which I attempt no answer 
in this project. I am not sure it can be answered. But if Anscombe's thesis is as 
superfluous as I have tried to show, those theory-regarding views that opt for 
this brand of theoretical purity at the expense of any of these centrally person-
regarding values are defending a dummy theory, in more ways than one. 
 
5. "Consequentialism" and the Humean Conception of the Self 
 So far we have seen that Anscombe's consequentialist/ deontological 
distinction is too superficial to capture the richness and conceptual 
complexities of actual normative theories. When we examine such theories in 
detail, the abstract generalizations Anscombeans tend to make about them 
evaporate on contact. But this is not to claim that Anscombe's thesis has no 
significant application at all. On the contrary: it points to a deeper distinction 
in metaethical content that normative theories presuppose. Specifically, as I 
now argue, Anscombe's use of the term "consequentialist" in fact denotes 
normative theories that presuppose the Humean conception of the self. For 
so-called "consequentialist" normative theories presuppose a motivational 
model based on desire rather than one based on intention and will, and a 
structural model correspondingly based on the maximization of utility as the 
basic criterion of rationality.  
 Consider first the desire basis of such theories, beginning with our 
conception of action. Intention-descriptions are semantically equivalent to act-
descriptions: they differ in their referents, but not in their meaning. So 
although we know the metaphysical difference between an intention (a goal-
directed mental – i.e. intensional – state) and an action (an extensional 
physical event consisting in overt behavior), the contextually isolated 
statement that denotes one in one context can equally well denote the other in 
a different one. This means that when we are describing an action, we are 
thereby describing the agent's intention in performing the action: to take a 
walk, for example; or to feed the cat. Since the description of an action 
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actually performed necessarily includes a description of its most immediately 
intended effects – i.e. the intensional goal of the action, a motivational model 
based on intention and will in some cases equates the two: the action actually 
performed will be the same as the immediate effects its agent intended.  
 A Kantian, so-called "deontological" normative theory assigns moral 
value to certain act-types in virtue of their immediately intended effects: 
telling the truth, for example; or helping others – even though the immediate 
actual or more remote actual effects of such act-tokens may backfire. The 
description of these intended effects fixes both the goal of the action, and 
thereby the identity of the action actually performed, or act-token. A Kantian 
normative theory thus depends on the semantic equivalence of act-
descriptions and intention-descriptions in identifying its set of morally 
valuable acts. It stipulates certain kinds of intentions as the primary object of 
moral worth, irrespective of their actual immediate or remote effects. So, for 
example, if I intend to tell the truth but garble my actual utterance so badly 
that I am unintelligible to those around me, I have still performed the right 
action because of the intention behind my behavior. On this view, an action 
actually performed is morally valuable if and only if the effects it immediately 
intends are. 
 By contrast, a "consequentialist" normative theory purports to require a 
sharp distinction between an action's intended effects and its actual effects in 
all cases, because it must retroactively evaluate the moral worth of all actions 
with reference to the value of the effects they have actually achieved, 
regardless of their intention. Of course it accepts the conceptual equivalence 
of act-description and intention-description, since this equivalence is a 
conceptual truth; and so the conceptual identification of the physical action 
performed with its immediately intended effects. If there is a piece of lettuce 
caught in your beard, then my utterance, 
 
There gibt une stuck kopfsalat stuck in your barbe 
 
can be described as my telling the truth. But in a "consequentialist" normative 
theory, an action's immediately intended effects are neither sufficient nor 
necessary for determining its moral value. Instead, such a theory stipulates as 
a source of moral worth something that stands outside this equivalence, 
namely the actual effects the agent's physical behavior has caused. The 
question is not whether my garbled warning about the lettuce in your beard 
counts as telling the truth, but rather whether my telling this truth has 
beneficial or harmful consequences. If these consequences are beneficial 
according to the values of the normative theory in question, then the action is 
worthwhile, irrespective of the agent's intention in performing it. If they are 
not beneficial according to the values of that normative theory, then the 
agent's good intentions cannot make them so. 
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 An intention- or will-based model of motivation does not satisfy this 
requirement. But a desire-based model does, because it observes in all cases 
the distinction between intended effects and actual effects, and utilizes this 
distinction in a metaethical criterion for ascribing value to action that is 
independent of the agent's intention. This criterion begins with desire. I can 
desire the effects of an action without intending them, and I can intend the 
effects of an action without desiring them. An example of desiring the effects 
of an action without intending them would be desiring so desperately to stop 
smoking that I would welcome a neurological implant or stroke that might 
effect this; but lack the resolve to do anything that might have this effect 
myself. Here I desire certain actual immediate and more remote effects of an 
action or action-plan, but because I have no intention of carrying it out, I 
intend no effects of either kind. An example of intending the effects of an 
action without desiring them would be deliberately greeting my enemies in 
the halls every day, even though it makes me physically nauseous to do so 
and I know it will have no beneficial consequences (they will hate me more, 
not less, for my apparent equanimity, and I will have to contend with chronic 
gastric disturbance). In this case I intend some of the immediate effects of the 
action but desire none of its actual effects, whether immediate or remote.   
 The former case is one in which I do desire certain actual immediate or 
remote effects of action, whereas the latter case is one in which I do not desire 
them. By contrast, in the former case I do not intend the effects I desire, 
whereas in the latter case I do intend effects I do not desire. So in both cases, 
the intensional objects of my desire are conceptually independent of the 
intensional objects – or effects – I intend by acting. Indeed in these particular 
cases, the objects of desire and the objects of intention are at odds. But in all 
cases, desire provides the first half of a conceptually contingent criterion for 
assigning value to the actual immediate and remote effects of an action that is 
independent of the agent's intention in performing it.   
The remaining half of that criterion of value is the notion of satisfaction. 
The criterion of desire-satisfaction – actual desire-satisfaction, regardless of 
intention or resolve – furnishes the standard against which the actual 
consequences of action are evaluated by the “consequentialist.” Of course the 
kind and content of desire will vary with the “consequentialist” theory in 
question: The Classical Utilitarian evaluates uncorrected desire, whereas the 
Millian Utilitarian evaluates educated desire, the Brandtian Utilitarian 
therapeutically informed desire, and the Marxist ideologically enlightened 
desire. The Act-Utilitarian desires individual happiness- or pleasure-events, 
whereas the Rule-Utilitarian desires happiness- or pleasure-producing social 
rules, the Marxist the classless society, and the Perfectionist the full flowering 
of human capacities.  
It is because actual desire-satisfaction can be distinguished and detached 
from the agent’s intention in acting – regardless of her motives – that it can 
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provide a criterion for evaluating act-consequences that appears agent-
independent. And it is the seeming agent-independence of this criterion that 
makes plausible the conviction that any such actual consequence – happiness, 
pleasure, the classless society, human perfectibility – has value independent 
of what any human being might think about it. It is this conviction, in turn, 
that rationalizes the manipulative social strategies I dissect in Chapter XII 
below. I do not here take a position on whether or not intrinsic values exist; 
they may well exist. My claim is a more modest one: That an actual 
consequence of action satisfies an agent’s actual, uncorrected, educated, 
therapeutically informed, or ideologically enlightened desire, independent of 
that agent’s intention, does not by itself suffice to demonstrate the 
independent value of that consequence. That the criterion of desire-
satisfaction evaluates act-consequences independent of agent intention does 
not lend the resulting values agent-independent authority. 
It is because a desire-based motivational model requires us to distinguish 
between the intention behind an action and the value of its actual effects, 
whereas an intention- or will-based model does not, that the Humean belief-
desire model of motivation implicitly stands behind all such normative 
"consequentialist" views. Desire-satisfaction provides a conceptually 
contingent criterion for evaluating the moral worth of an action that is 
independent of the agent’s intentions in performing it, and thereby lends it an 
aura of independent value simpliciter. I pursue further the contrast between 
the intention-based analysis of action that grounds the Kantian tradition in 
action theory and the desire-based analysis that grounds the Humean 
tradition in Chapter IX.3.4 below. 
 In theory there are, of course, other conceptually contingent candidates 
for the metaethical criterion of value-ascriptions to action besides desire-
satisfaction – for example, what God commands, what is human, natural, 
rational, or divine. But for so-called "consequentialists," these alternatives will 
not do unless they provide a necessary motivational correlate; and desire and 
intention are the only two plausible candidates for motivation. Without an 
equivalence between what is valuable and what motivates action, so-called 
"consequentialists" cannot make hortatory appeal to the valued consequences 
of action they prescribe as reasons for performing it. Of course such 
"consequentialists" might believe there were such reasons, even if they 
recognized that these reasons had no motivational appeal to human agents. 
They then would have, not only no viable normative theory, but no viable 
reasons for action in their metaethical arsenal. Given the already shaky 
metaethical standing of "consequentialism," it needs internalism to enhance its 
credibility. 
 This means that the metaethical criterion for assigning normative value to 
outcomes – whether that assigned value is happiness, pleasure, human 
perfection, or a classless society – has to be the same as the criterion for 
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assigning causal efficacy to human motivation – whether that motivation is 
passion, desire, emotion, or sentiment – to pursue those outcomes. Among 
human passional states, only desire (and those states reducible to it) can 
satisfy this dual role, of functioning both as a conceptually contingent source 
of value and a conceptually necessary source of motivation. For unlike 
excitement, anger, happiness, fear, joy, shame, or other passional states, desire 
is the only one that necessarily and always carries an intentional object. Only 
desire, among such states, can always be relied upon to provide intentional 
direction to human behavior. The desire-state itself is stipulated to confer 
value on the intentional object, and the valued intentional object in turn is 
stipulated to motivate the action believed most efficiently to realize it. This 
just is the Humean belief-desire model of motivation already examined in 
Chapter II. 
 The inference to the necessity of a utility-maximizing model of rationality 
of the kind discussed in Chapters III and IV for so-called "consequentialism" is 
straightforward. If obtaining more valued consequences of action and 
minimizing the expenditure of resources in their service were not better, this 
would imply some further constraint relative to which the value of those 
consequences themselves were restricted. This further constraint itself would 
have to be, ex hypothesi, nonconsequentialist in nature. This, in turn, would 
contradict the "consequentialist" first principle that actual consequences alone 
determine the moral value of actions. So "consequentialism" presupposes both 
the belief-desire model of motivation and the utility-maximizing model of 
rationality. It thus presupposes the Humean conception of the self. Contra 
Anscombe, it is this view that is the anachronistic one; and in what follows I 
argue that those who seek to found their moral theories on its basis effectively 
shoot themselves in the foot.   
 
  
Chapter VI. The Problem of Moral Motivation 
 
 
 I have just argued that Anscombe’s consequentialist/ deontological 
distinction is without substance, and further that the actual metaethical 
foundation of so-called "consequentialist" normative theories is in fact the 
Humean conception of the self. The remainder of this volume of the project 
therefore scrutinizes in greater detail those leading moral theories that 
presuppose this conception. In Chapter I, I also claimed that arguments 
defending the centrality of rationality in the structure of the self presuppose 
the value of rationality as the self's defining element; and that thus valuing 
rationality entails one's readiness, first, to recognize it as definitive of the self; 
and second, to valorize its character dispositions. The Humean conception of 
the self takes an analogous valuational stance toward desire. It views desire as 
the defining element in the self and valorizes its character dispositions (to feel 
satisfaction, frustration, satiation, discontent, pleasure, pain, etc.) accordingly. 
But I argued in Chapters II through IV that to be defined and moved by desire 
alone was to be defined and moved by essentially egocentric considerations. 
This chapter examines desire, its centrality in the structure and motivation of 
the self on the Humean conception, and the first of three central and in theory 
insurmountable problems in metaethics to which the Humean belief-desire 
model of motivation gives rise. The first of these three problems is that of 
moral motivation.  
Section 1 formulates the problem, namely, that on the Humean 
conception it seems impossible to be moved to act in others’ interests on the 
basis of moral considerations alone. By distinguishing between personal and 
impersonal desire on the one hand and between self-interest and self-
direction on the other, it then refutes Bernard Williams’ and Annette Baier’s 
claim that we can be motivated by desire without being motivated by self-
interest. Section 2 examines Rawls’s distinction between object-dependent, 
principle-dependent, and conception-dependent desires; and rejects his more 
fundamental distinction between motivational force and psychological 
strength on which the account of principle-dependent desires is based. It 
concludes that this complex set of distinctions neither solves nor escapes the 
problem of moral motivation that besets all Humean accounts. Section 3 
recurs to the distinction between personal desire-satisfaction, which is 
inherent in the belief-desire model of motivation, and pleasure, which is only 
contingently related to it; and rejects the thesis that personal desire-
satisfaction entails that other-directed desires are reducible to self-directed 
ones. Section 4 examines other-directed desires that are selfish or self-
indulgent without being self-directed. Finally, Section 5 considers what it 
would mean to be motivated by other-directed considerations that are 
independent of desire-satisfaction. It introduces the example of the 
unprotected whistleblower as a paradigm case of this sort of genuinely 
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disinterested type of motivation, and rebuts the Humean attempt to reduce 
such an example to a rather less inspiring case of concealed egoism. It thus 
prepares the way for a more in-depth treatment of the whistleblower in 
Volume II, and a more satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon in 
transpersonally rational terms.  
 
1. Self-Interest and Other-Direction 
 The belief-desire model of motivation generates the problem that moral 
motivation in any meaningful sense does not seem to be possible within the 
designated constraints of this model. "Moral motivation" usually means non-
egocentric motivation: motivation independent of self-interested or personally 
opportunistic considerations such as comfort, convenience, profit, or 
gratification. Non-egocentric motivation is by moral considerations alone – 
transpersonally rational appeals to intellect and conscience – that inspire us to 
act in others' interests even when this requires sacrificing or ignoring our 
own. Since the Humean conception stipulates desire as the sole conative 
impetus to action, it is on the face of it hard to see how or where such moral 
considerations might effectively function. It would seem that self-interested 
motivation is the only kind the belief-desire model recognizes.   
 A motive is self-interested if it includes an interest the self takes in its own 
condition. Some Humeans, such as Bernard Williams and Annette Baier, 
argue that one can be motivated by desire without being motivated by self-
interest.1 Since desire can take a variety of objects, including other-directed 
ones, one can be motivated by altruistic desires such as benevolence or 
compassion that are not self-interested at all. Or so the reasoning goes (in 
Volume II, Chapter VI.4 I offer an analysis of compassion that disputes this.).  
But self-interest, in turn, can be dissected into short-term personal gain 
(i.e. immediate self-interest) and long-term personal gain (i.e. prudence). 
Satisfying a desire is one kind of personal gain, and the frustration of a desire 
is one kind of personal loss. To anticipate the satisfaction or frustration 
respectively of personal desire is one kind of anticipation of a short- or long-
term personal gain or loss respectively, and we have already seen in Chapter 
II that without such anticipation we cannot be said to desire the object or state 
of affairs in question. Since such anticipation is, in turn, one kind of interest 
the self may take in its own condition, the satisfaction of personal desire is one 
kind of self-interested motive. So the Humean conception of the self in effect 
asserts that only self-interest can motivate us to act to promote others' 
interests. It therefore "solves" the problem of moral motivation by in effect 
denying that genuinely moral motivation is possible. 
 
                                                
1Williams' and Baier's views are examined in greater depth below, in Chapters VIII and 
XIII respectively. 
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1.1. Personal vs. Impersonal Desire 
 A Humean may attempt to evade this conclusion by claiming that other-
directed desires such as benevolence or (on one analysis) compassion are 
impersonal rather than personal desires. An impersonal desire would be one 
whose object is desired independently of any personal relation it or its 
realization might or might not bear to the agent who desires it. However, 
even to state the definition reveals its incoherence. If the agent does indeed 
desire that object, then it necessarily bears a personal relation to the agent as 
that which satisfies that agent's desire. Of course the agent might not know 
that the object of his desire has been satisfied; or might not be instrumental in 
realizing the object of his desire. But that the agent bears no epistemic or 
causal relation to the object of his desire does not imply that he bears no such 
personal relation. If I desire that American white supremacist youth groups 
see the error of their ways, then if they do, my desire is satisfied even if I have 
not yet learned of it. And if I have, then I will be personally satisfied even if I 
had nothing to do with bringing this desired consequence about. 
 Thus any desire an agent has is a personal one, including altruistic desire. 
Any such desire is personal rather than impersonal because it compels the 
subject's attention to her own state of personal insufficiency (or, literally, 
want) in relation to an envisioned object she desires; that is part of what 
motivates her to ameliorate this insufficiency by acting to satisfy the desire. 
This is true whether the object of desire is a jelly doughnut, the alleviation of 
another's pain, or ascertaining once and for all the age of the universe. In all of 
these cases, the desire draws one's attention to something that is missing (or 
wanting) in one's present state: the taste of a sweet, sticky pastry, or the 
awareness of another's restored comfort, or the knowledge of an important 
fact, respectively.  
 So in all such cases, the experience of desiring thereby grounds an agent's 
point of view in a relation between his personal awareness of his present 
condition at a certain time and place at which the desire occurs, and an 
envisioned state of affairs that he locates at a future time and place at which 
his desire is satisfied. Desires and their objects situate us as agents in a 
comprehensive space-time matrix at two or more points which we traverse 
through the actions we take in order to realize them. Desires always embed us 
– and sometimes trap us – in the personal point of view. That is why, 
regardless of their content, they can cloud or bias our attempts at impersonal, 
impartial, or objective – i.e. transpersonal – judgment. I described this 
condition in Chapter II as “funnel vision.” 
 
1.2. Other-Direction 
 Humeans might concede that all desires are personal, yet deny that 
satisfying other-directed desire is a species of self-interested motivation. They 
might say that if it is the other-directed object of desire itself, and not the 
Chapter VI. The Problem of Moral Motivation         234 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
satisfaction one experiences by realizing it, that one is motivated to obtain, 
there is then nothing self-directed about it. But first, drawing too sharp a 
distinction between the object of desire and the satisfaction of that desire can 
lead to conceptual confusion. After all, an object of desire is not an object of 
disinterested contemplation that somehow draws one toward its realization as 
though it were a magnet, such that the agent has no conative personal 
investment in that realization. If it is an object of desire, then one does have a 
personal conative investment in its realization, namely that one's desire for it 
be satisfied. Certainly this is consistent with an agent's intensional focus on 
the realization of that object rather than on the personal experience of 
satisfaction that results. Second, my claim that the satisfaction of personal 
desire is a species of self-interest in any case does not thereby equate personal 
desire with self-directed desire. Whether a desire is self-directed or other-
directed depends on the intensional content of the object of desire.  
 A desire is self-directed if its object represents as desirable some aspect of 
one's self. It is other-directed if its object represents as desirable some aspect of 
something other than one's self. Of course an object of desire may include 
representation of both aspects. But I confine investigation to the simpler, 
unipartite case. Both self-directed and other-directed desires may be either 
benevolent or malevolent. An example of a benevolent self-directed desire 
would be the desire to prosper. An example of a malevolent self-directed 
desire would be the desire to degrade oneself. So a malevolent self-directed 
desire would still be self-interested because it would include an interest in the 
self's own condition. A desire can be both self-interested and self-destructive, 
since the interest the self takes in its own condition need not be healthy. 
 Similarly, other-directed desires may be benevolent, as when one desires 
that one's loved ones prosper; or malevolent, as when one desires that one's 
enemies be crushed; or neutral, as when one desires that the age of the 
universe be settled once and for all. What links all of them, both self- and 
other-directed, benevolent and malevolent, as motivationally effective is the 
anticipation of the desired object as a source of personal satisfaction – i.e. of 
wholeness and sufficiency restored; and its absence as a source of personal 
frustration. It is the desire that this object be realized that moves one to action 
in its service (respectively, for example, to invest in mutual funds for oneself, 
or for one's loved ones; or sell worthless junk bonds to one's enemies; or write 
an irate letter to Scientific American).  
 That the object of an other-directed desire is envisioned as a source of 
personal satisfaction does not imply that one desires the experience of 
satisfaction rather than the particular object of desire itself, or more than that 
object, or as much as that object, or even anywhere near as much as that 
object. Just to make the point makes the distinction as clearly as we need to 
make it.   
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On the other hand, merely to envision something as a consequence is not 
the same as desiring it, even if one envisions it as in some way satisfying to 
oneself. I can envision something as satisfying without being moved to 
achieve that satisfaction (right now, for example, I am envisioning the 
satisfaction of floating in the shallow water of the beach at Negril, but actually 
I am completely satisfied sitting here at my computer). But I cannot be said to 
desire that thing if I am not so moved. 
 However, that the object of an other-directed desire is envisioned as a 
source of personal satisfaction does imply that if no such satisfaction were 
anticipated, one also could not be said to desire that thing. Even if one assigns 
no value to the satisfaction itself (and of course one can be satisfied by 
something, such as a chocolate-covered cherry, without valuing it), it is still 
conceptually impossible to desire that object unless one anticipates the 
satisfaction as a concomitant of it. So I can envision a satisfaction without 
desiring it, but I cannot desire a satisfaction without envisioning it as such. 
Envisioning an object or state of affairs as personally satisfying is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition of desiring it. This is true by definition of 
"desire," and holds whether the desire is self-directed or other-directed, 
benevolent or malevolent.   
 
1.3. Interest in vs. of a Self 
 In this sense the satisfaction of all such desires do fall under the rubric of 
personal gain (similarly, one can gain something, such as rental property, 
without valuing it), and so more generally under the rubric of self-interested 
motivation (therefore, it can be in one's interest to gain something, such as a 
painful lesson about human nature, without valuing it). According to this 
classification, to realize an other-directed desire is, at the very least, a short-
term personal gain because of the personal satisfaction this will bring, even if 
it also requires personal sacrifice. So, for example, a person who desires to 
devote her life to the liberation of her country receives personal satisfaction 
from doing so, even if she loses her life in the effort. And because she 
anticipates receiving this personal gain, her devotion is self-interested. One 
can be self-interestedly motivated to satisfy an other-directed desire that 
demands the sacrifice of one's life because survival is not necessarily the only, 
or the most important, or the highest interest in the condition of one's self one 
can take. Interests in the condition of one's self that may outweigh one's 
interest in its survival may include interests in its integrity, rectitude, or 
surrender. Indeed, even one's interest in an anticipated personal gain may 
conflict with one's interest in survival, as when one endangers one's life for 
the sake of a high-risk but high-paying job. Similarly, the self may take an 
interest in satisfying its other-directed desires which is just as strong as, or 
stronger than, its interest in satisfying its self-directed desires. The sense in 
which the Humean model of motivation implies self-interest as the most 
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plausible explanation of why we ever act to promote another's interests does 
not thereby confine that explanation to a single, monolithic motive.  
 The interest a self takes in the satisfaction of its other-directed desires is a 
genuine interest in the self, and so is distinct from what John Rawls calls 
interests of a self.2 These are discussed at greater length in Chapter X. But 
briefly, interests of a self include other-directed interests and beliefs that do 
not necessarily involve desires at all. Particular moral or religious or political 
convictions might be among the other-directed interests of a self that bear no 
necessary relation to the self's interest in satisfying its other-directed desires. 
So, for example, a belief in the welfare state, or in retributive justice might be 
among the interests of one's self, yet bear no necessary connection to one's 
interest in satisfying one's other-directed desire that one's friends prosper.  
 However, interests of the self that are also interests in the self need not be 
interests in satisfying the self's desires. They can also be interests in adhering 
to the self's abstract convictions. Even though such beliefs are not specifically 
self-directed in content, they can be of interest to the self because they are its 
own. In such a case the self takes an interest in them because it authors and 
owns them. Since authorship and ownership of a belief is a condition of the 
self, the self is taking an interest in its own condition even when the content of 
the conviction is not specifically self-directed. Therefore one can have a self-
interested motive in adhering to abstract or other-directed conviction. 
 For example, Michael Walzer distinguishes between a would-be leader of 
the oppressed whose actions are justified by his ideology, and one whose 
actions are justified by the acceptance of her ideology by the oppressed as a 
set of terms in which their interests are adequately expressed.3 The first, he 
points out, is obligated only to himself and those who share his commitment, 
whereas the second is obligated to the oppressed group from whom she seeks 
ideological legitimacy. Both leaders are motivated by interests of a self and 
neither is motivated by desire. But the first leader takes an interest in the 
condition of his self, namely that its ideology furnish the justification of his 
actions. The second, by contrast, takes a greater interest in the condition of 
other selves, namely that the oppressed accept her ideology as adequately 
expressing their interests. The first is inspired to lead by his interest in his 
ideology; the second by her interest in the legitimacy of her ideology among 
those she leads. The first is motivated to action by an interest that is of and in 
the self, whereas the second is motivated by an interest of the self that is 
other-directed. Walzer's distinction shows that there is nothing inherently 
sacred either about interests of a self that are not desires, or about beliefs that 
                                                
2 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
127. 
3 Michael Walzer, "The Obligations of Oppressed Minorities," in Obligations: Essays on 
Disobedience, War and Citizenship (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 
55. 
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are abstract or other-directed in content. Some self-interested desires – 
specifically, certain other-directed benevolent desires – might well outweigh 
them in moral and political value. 
 
2. Rawls on Moral Motivation 
In Rawls’s later Political Liberalism4, he distinguishes three kinds of desires 
that enter into the reasonable moral psychology of citizens as free and equal 
persons in a suitably idealized well-ordered society: object-dependent, 
principle-dependent, and conception-dependent desires. These are, 
respectively, desires which take states of affairs as their objects, those which 
take principles as their objects, and those which take as their objects the 
conceptions or ideals that hierarchically ordered sets of principles constitute 
and articulate. These amplify the moral powers of such citizens – the capacity 
for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good, and include the 
intellectual powers of judgment, thought and inference necessary to exercise 
the moral powers. (81) All three cut across his earlier distinction between 
interests in and of a self, in that all three can take either self- or other-directed 
objects. In what follows I focus on the first two, since the implications for my 
concerns about the third then follow straightforwardly. 
 
2.1. Object-Dependent Desires 
Object-dependent desires are those, Rawls says, which can be described 
without invoking moral or rational principles or concepts. Examples would 
include bodily desires for food, sleep, or pleasure; socially conditioned desires 
for wealth, status, power, glory, or property; as well as emotional 
attachments, loyalties and devotions, and vocational commitments. (82) Rawls 
thinks these sorts of desires are some of those which a person can have 
whether or not he understands the principles that identify them. Rawls might 
say that an agent can desire such objects unselfconsciously, i.e. without 
theorizing about them to himself. Most of the desires he lists are 
straightforwardly self-directed. But among these, the last four mentioned – 
emotional attachments, loyalties and devotions, and vocational commitments 
– are most flexible in their orientation toward self or other. For example, my 
emotional attachment to you is other-directed if it is based in disinterested 
admiration and affection for your personal qualities. It is self-directed if it is 
based in your physical likeness to me, or your success in satisfying my need 
for a father figure, or your practice of flattering my vanity. Similarly, your 
loyalty and devotion to me are other-directed if they are based in your 
perception of me as trustworthy and kind. They are self-directed if they are 
based in your expectation of receiving a tidy inheritance in recompense for 
                                                
4 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). All page 
references to this work are paginated in brackets in the text. 
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your attentions, or your fear of my revenge should you betray me. Finally, 
your vocational desire to become a lawyer is other-directed if you believe 
lawyers are guardians of justice, or that studying the law is an intrinsically 
honorable and worthwhile activity. It is self-directed if you believe lawyers 
have social cachet, or can pull down six-figure salaries during the first year 
out of law school. 
In Chapter II.2, I offered an analysis of desire that questioned whether 
any desire could be conscious without being conceptualized in some minimal 
sense. Rawls does not deny that here. When he identifies such desires as 
object-dependent and describable independent of any moral or rational 
conception or principle, he means rather to exclude such desires from any 
necessary dependence on normative criteria of evaluation, i.e. on principles 
and conceptions relative to which such desires might be interpreted, criticized 
or thought worthy of revision. Such desires are object-dependent in the sense 
that it is the envisioned state of affairs that motivates us to achieve it, rather 
than our attachment to any principle or conception that state of affairs may or 
may not instantiate.  
 
2.2. Principle-Dependent Desires 
Rawls defines principle-dependent desires as those which are  
 
(1) dependent on the principle in question for an accurate description 
of the object or end we desire to realize (82);  
(2) such that the “force, or weight” of the desire is a function not of 
its psychological strength, but rather of the principle needed to describe it 
(82-3, fn. 31);  
(3) such that the evaluative priority of the desire is similarly “given 
entirely by the principle to which the desire is attached, and not by the 
psychological strength of the desire itself;” and  
(4) are of a kind that only a rational or reasonable agent who can 
understand and apply such principles can have (82).  
 
In this definition, (2) and (3) above seem to be equivalent, i.e. the motivational 
force of the desire is a function of its evaluative priority in the agent’s ordinal 
ranking. A desire to do the right thing, or to discharge one’s responsibilities 
efficiently, or to preserve one’s integrity, or to conserve energy, or to advance 
the common good, might exemplify principle-dependent desires.  
He distinguishes two kinds of principle-dependent desires, depending on 
the kind of principle invoked to describe them: rational principles are those 
denoted by what I have described as the egocentric principles of rationality 
that characterize the Humean conception of the self. He identifies as reasonable 
those which “regulate how a plurality of agents (or a community or society of 
agents), whether of individual persons or groups, are to conduct themselves 
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in their relations with one another.” (83) Rawls’s notion of reasonable 
principles as providing rules of interpersonal coordination would count as a 
subset of what I have described as principles of transpersonal rationality that 
characterize the Kantian conception of the self I elaborate in Volume II.  
However, Rawls’s assumptions about what a Kantian conception of the 
self requires is quite at odds with the one I have so far sketched only in 
outline. He claims that  
(A) A person with a good will, to use Kant’s term, is someone whose 
principle-dependent desires have strengths in complete accordance with 
the force, or priority, of the principles to which they are attached. (83, fn. 
31) 
Let us first examine Rawls’s characterization, before we consider whether it 
makes any sense to ascribe such a characterization to Kant. As we see, in 
analyzing principle-dependent desires, Rawls uses the terms force, weight 
and priority more or less interchangeably, and contrasts them with 
psychological strength. The former, he claims, provides the important 
quantitative measure of the motivational strength and evaluative status of the 
desire, to which its psychological strength is irrelevant. He does not claim that 
principle-dependent desires have no psychological strength; on the contrary.  
(B) This strength I assume to exist and it may enter into explanations of 
how people in fact behave but it can never enter into how they should 
behave, or should have behaved, morally speaking. (83, fn. 31)  
So in passage (A) quoted above, his assertion that to have a good will is to 
have principle-dependent desires whose “strengths [are] in complete accord 
with the force, or priority, of the principles to which they are attached” must 
be interpreted as expressing the thought that the principles to which the 
desire is attached are the measure of its motivational strength; for he has just 
claimed in passage (B), which directly precedes it, that its psychological 
strength is irrelevant to morally obligatory action. In the idealized conception 
of the well-ordered society to which the reasonable moral psychology of its 
citizens is pertinent, only how people should behave, morally speaking, is to 
be considered; considerations of the psychological strength of various motives 
play no role. Rawls’s thesis, then, is that such citizens are motivated by 
rational and reasonable principle-dependent desires to act in accordance with 
those principles whose priority, or weight, or force, is strongest under a given 
set of circumstances, regardless of their psychological strength. The basic idea 
is that ideally, my principle-dependent desire to, for example, do the right 
thing, or conserve energy, takes motivational priority over self-serving or 
wasteful object-dependent desires that may have greater psychological 
strength for me. 
On the face of it, it is difficult to understand the distinction Rawls seems 
to want to draw between psychological and motivational strength. If the 
strength of my motivation to do something is not to be understood 
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psychologically, and does not enter into my psychological state, how does it 
manage to propel me into action? But if it does not manage to propel me into 
action, what is the point of talking about it? On the other hand, if, as one 
might hope, my motivation does after all affect me psychologically, then in 
what respect is motivational strength inherently different from psychological 
strength? Why distinguish between them at all? Why not just say that we 
often have many different desires, of different psychological strengths, some 
of which are greater and some less, such that the strongest is motivationally 
overriding and such that principle-dependent desires can occupy that role? 
For unless there is some more comprehensive internal principle that weighs 
and evaluates psychological and motivational strength relative to each other, 
we are then susceptible to making some rather peculiar decisions as to what 
to do. 
Thus suppose I have a principle-dependent, rational desire to maximize 
utility and I determine, after careful reflection, that this requires maximizing 
my personal wealth (thus this is not an object-dependent desire for wealth 
itself). Suppose that on this basis, I ascribe higher priority to being a rich 
dentist than to being a poet (thus being a rich dentist is similarly not an object-
dependent desire in my scheme of things, but rather embedded in my 
principle-dependent desire to maximize utility). My desire to become a rich, 
utility-maximizing dentist satisfies Rawls’ fourfold definition of a principle-
dependent desire, in that  
 
(1’) it is dependent on the utility-maximization principle for an 
accurate description of the end I desire to realize by becoming a rich, 
utility-maximizing dentist;  
(2’) the “force, or weight” of my desire in my moral psychology is a 
function not of its psychological strength, but rather of the utility-
maximization principle needed to properly describe it;  
(3’) the evaluative priority of my desire to become a rich, utility-
maximizing dentist is similarly given entirely by the utility-maximization 
principle to which that desire is attached, rather than by its psychological 
strength; and  
(4’) the desire is of a kind that only a rational agent who can 
understand and apply the utility-maximization principle can have.  
 
Suppose that I then devote myself to the vocational end of becoming a rich, 
utility-maximizing dentist, even though being a poet has greater 
psychological strength for me, and even though I have no object-dependent 
desire to be a rich, utility-maximizing dentist. That my principle-dependent 
desire to be a rich, utility-maximizing dentist should override my object-
dependent desire to be a poet seems counterintuitive at best, psychologically 
unhealthy at worst.  
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Next consider my principle-dependent, reasonable desire to tell the truth, 
such that I determine, again after careful reflection, that this requires 
criticizing my supervisor’s fashion choices, despite the dangers to my 
continued and future employment. Again a review of Rawls’s fourfold 
definition of a principle-dependent desire will show that this desire satisfies 
its criteria. Then suppose that on this basis I ascribe higher priority to 
truthfully criticizing my supervisor’s fashion choices, and so boldly speak out 
on this score, even though securing my continued and future employment has 
greater psychological strength for me, and even though I have no object-
dependent devotion to my supervisor’s sartorial self-improvement. Again this 
commitment to my higher-priority, principle-dependent desire at the expense 
of a psychologically stronger, object-dependent one that violates it seems 
misguided. 
What is wrong, in both cases, is that an object-dependent desire of 
greatest psychological strength is subordinated to a principle-dependent 
desire having strongest normative priority, even though commonsensical 
rationality would seem to rest with the desire thus subordinated: If I want to 
be a poet I should be one, even though satisfying this object-dependent desire 
violates my principle-dependent desire to maximize utility. Similarly, if I 
want to keep my job I should murmur, politely but unintelligibly, in response 
to my supervisor’s bright question, “Well, how do I look?” – even though this 
object-dependent desire is incompatible with my higher-priority principle-
dependent desire to tell the truth. What is lacking – for Rawls here as well as 
for the other Humeans to be considered in Chapter VIII – is a higher-order 
principle of rationality that would enable us to adjudicate sensibly between 
these conflicting desires. 
What is more deeply wrong, however, is Rawls’s separation of 
psychological strength from normative priority in the first place. He wants to 
claim that a consideration having highest normative priority can thereby have 
greatest motivational strength independent of its psychological strength. He 
wants to reserve the psychological strength of a desire for de facto causal 
explanations of motivation, in which agents are by definition moved by that 
desire that has the greatest psychological strength for them at that moment, as 
the Humean belief-desire model requires. Normative priority (or weight, or 
force), on the other hand, is supposed to determine the relative status of the 
desire in the agent’s ideal ordinal ranking, such that the highest normative 
priority (or weight, or force) of a desire under particular circumstances is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of that desire’s counting as the best all-
things-considered reason for acting. Greatest psychological strength can 
diverge from highest normative priority, because the desires on which agents 
do in fact act can diverge from the desires that give them most reason to act. 
Rawls attempts to close this gap by ascribing greatest motivational strength to 
that desire with highest normative priority, independent of its psychological 
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strength. Rawls’s idealization stipulates that citizens of the well-ordered 
society always act on those desires that most give them reason to act, 
regardless of the psychological strength of any desires that may or may not 
conflict with them. 
But this merely rehearses the Humean externalist’s strategy against 
which – as we see in the next chapter – Thomas Nagel fought so hard. 
Humean externalists need a distinction between psychological strength and 
normative priority, in order to explain how a desire can be recognizably 
rational yet fail to inspire one to act on it. Rawls’s idealized moral psychology 
does not need a separate and mysterious concept of motivational strength to 
close the gap between reason and action, because in the well-ordered society, 
there is no reason why normative priority should not directly determine 
psychological strength in the moral psychology of its citizens. What he should 
have said was simply that in citizens of the well-ordered society, principle-
dependent desires with the highest normative priority under given 
circumstances therefore have the greatest psychological strength as well, and 
that such citizens therefore act without conflict to satisfy such desires.  
 
2.3. Rawls versus Kant 
What Rawls should have said about principle-dependent desires is 
similar to what Kant does say about principles dependent on reason, when he 
speaks to the difference between how we are actually motivated and how we 
ideally would be motivated: 
A perfectly good will would thus stand quite as much under objective 
laws (laws of the good), but it could not on this account be conceive as 
necessitated to act in conformity with law … ‘I ought’ is here out of place, 
because ‘I will’ is already of itself necessarily in harmony with the law. 
(G, Ac. 414) … for this ‘I ought’ is properly an ‘I will’ which holds 
necessarily for every rational being – provided that reason in him is 
practical without any hindrance. (G, Ac. 449)5 
These two passages from the Groundwork assume what Rawls in passage 
2.2.(B) above denies, that the psychological strength of one’s rational motive 
can enter into how one should behave, morally speaking. Kant speaks to the 
psychological strength of one’s rational motive by noting that the factor of 
necessitation, the sense of obligation or duty to act in accordance with the 
moral law, is absent in the ideal case. Ideally, when reason motivates us 
“without any hindrance,” our psychological state is one of “harmony with the 
law,” and reason itself has the greatest psychological strength. In this case, it 
is moral obligation – “oughts” and “shoulds” – that is irrelevant to Kant’s 
                                                
5 Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York, 
NY: Harper Torchbooks, 1964). Academy Edition reference to this work are paginated 
in the text, preceded by “G”. 
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ideal. Whereas Kant’s is an ideal of motivational harmony between 
psychological strength and rational requirement, Rawls’s is an ideal of 
motivationally effective moral obligation. We can think of moral theorizing 
about action as including three levels of idealization: first, the non-ideal 
reality, in which desire often runs rampant; second, the ideal of desire 
subordinate to the demands of moral obligation; and third, the ideal of desire 
in spontaneous rational harmony with moral principle. These correspond 
very roughly to Aristotle’s typology of the akratic, the enkratic, and the agathos. 
In this hierarchy, Rawls’s conception of moral motivation occupies the second 
level of idealization, whereas Kant’s perfectly good will occupies the third. 
Moreover, these two passages from the Groundwork deny what Rawls in 
passage 2.2.(A) above assumes, that this rational motive for the perfectly good 
will might be equated with desire rather than reason. For Kant, “reason … is 
practical without any hindrance” when it is without the hindrance of desire 
(unless of course reason is to be equated with desire – an unprecedented and 
even more radical extension of the concept of desire into vacuity that Rawls 
would surely reject). Kant’s ideal of moral motivation is one in which 
principles of reason themselves have all the motivational force and 
psychological strength needed to effect the required action. For Kant, it is the 
tension between reason and desire that engenders the sense of duty, the 
“necessitation” that marks moral obligation. Kant’s assertion that moral 
obligation is irrelevant in the ideal case therefore entails that desire is, too. 
Thus Rawls’s invocation of Kant’s notion of the good will is, in effect, a 
non sequitur. Kant’s question is basically the one with which I began this 
project in Chapter I, as to whether or not we have the capacity to act 
according to the dictates of reason, even when this conflicts with our personal 
desires and interests. He answers in the affirmative, by arguing that reason 
itself, independent of desire, can indeed be motivationally effective. Kant’s 
solution to the problem of moral motivation thus stipulates two sources of 
motivation within the self, reason and desire; and requires a convincing 
argument that reason can outcompete desire in moving the agent to action. By 
contrast, Rawls assumes from the outset not only that Kant’s argument does 
not convince, but furthermore that no revision of it that respects Kant’s 
bipartite conception can.  
Now Rawls takes pains to emphasize the “obvious non-Humean 
character of this account.” (84)6 He justifies his description of his account as 
“non-Humean” on the grounds that 
                                                
6 I take it that Rawls in this section of Political Liberalism means to, among other things, 
defend himself against my description of him as a Humean in my "Instrumentalism, 
Objectivity, and Moral Justification" (American Philosophical Quarterly 23, 4 (October 
1986), 373-381). However, it is difficult to tell, as Rawls does not cite this or any other 
papers of mine in the text, even when his words on the page echo their theses with 
near-perfect fidelity. I believe I make clear in both places my definition of the term, 
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it runs counter to attempts to limit the kinds of motives people may have. 
Once we grant – what seems plainly true – that there exist principle-
dependent and conception-dependent desires, along with desires to 
realize various political and moral ideals, then the class of possible 
motives is wide open. … How is one to fix limits on what people might 
be moved by in thought and deliberation and hence may act from? (84-
85) 
How, indeed? Precisely the problem we repeatedly encounter with the 
Humean belief-desire model of motivation is that it fixes no limits whatsoever 
on what can count as a desire, and therefore no limits that might enable us to 
distinguish meaningfully between desire and any other type of motive. And 
so one answer to Rawls’s rhetorical question here might be simply to allow 
people to be moved by thought and deliberation themselves, while limiting 
the conceptual reach of desire to the nonvacuous. I develop this answer in 
Volume II. 
Rawls thus implicitly accepts the Humean conception of the self as 
authoritative, despite his protestations; and with it the Humean model of 
motivation that stipulates desire as the sole explanatory variable. Rawls 
contents himself with offering subtle distinctions in the types of desire on 
offer. These distinctions are useful. There certainly is a difference between 
wanting a thing or state of affairs, wanting to conform one’s actions to a 
principle, and wanting to conform one’s actions to principles that define an 
idealized self-conception or social conception. Nevertheless it is true of all of 
these different types of desire that they are, at the end of the day, desires; i.e. 
wants – represented lacks that the agent acts to replenish. Since Kant’s ideal of 
the perfectly good will already does, always and necessarily, act in 
spontaneous harmony with principles of reason, it is in theory and by 
definition impossible for the perfectly good will to be motivated by any such 
want. 
So Rawls’s account of moral motivation does not escape the problem of 
moral motivation that besets all Humean accounts, because he is irrevocably 
committed to desire as the sole motivation of action. His three-fold distinction 
among object-dependent, principle-dependent, and conception-dependent 
desires does not alter this commitment. And so it is true of all such desires, as 
for all the others, that if I happen to lack such a desire in the non-ideal case, I 
                                                                                                     
“Humean;” and make it even clearer in my "Two Conceptions of the Self," (Philosophical 
Studies 48, 2 (September l985), 173-197; reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual VIII (1985), 
222-246), drawn from the dissertation I wrote under Rawls’ supervision. Rawls’ 
treatment of desire in all of his works, starting with A Theory of Justice, squares nicely 
with this definition. If Rawls really means to “dissolve the line between [Williams’] 
allegedly Humean view of motivation and Kant’s view, or ones related to it” (85, fn. 33) 
as he claims, then he should have no objection to being called either a Humean or a 
Kantian indifferently. 
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then have no motivation to achieve the end in question; that I do have 
motivation to achieve the end in question only if doing so brings me some 
measure of personal satisfaction and not otherwise; and that therefore, 
desiring to achieve the end in question, whether self-directed or other-
directed and whether object-, principle-, or conception-dependent, is a self-
interested motive. Moral motivation, as we ordinarily understand that term, 
seems just as out of reach on Rawls’s account of it as it does for that of any 
other committed Humean. 
 
3. Desire-Satisfaction and Personal Gain 
 
3.1. Pleasure 
 However, from the thesis that all desires, including other-directed and 
principle-dependent ones, entail anticipated personal satisfaction, it does not 
follow that all desire-satisfaction entails pleasure. We have just seen in Section 
1, and more fully in Chapter II.2 above, that the satisfaction of a desire is the 
provision of something experienced as lacking – literally, wanting. The 
experience of satisfaction is the experience of sufficiency restored. One may 
satisfy a desire without obtaining pleasure – even a small one – if the 
satisfaction of that desire instead causes one boredom, or discontent, or pain. 
In this case what was wanting has been supplied, thereby restoring 
sufficiency – only to cause, in turn, further things to be wanting: interest, or 
contentment, or the cessation of pain.   
 An example of a desire whose satisfaction might cause one boredom 
rather than pleasure is the desire not to waiver in one's morning routine: 
ablutions, calisthenics, walk the dog, boiled egg and coffee, off to work. In this 
case the restoration of sufficiency involved in adhering to one's morning 
routine creates monotony: a want of – i.e. for – stimulation and variety. An 
example of a desire whose satisfaction might cause one discontent rather than 
pleasure is the final seduction of a distant and longstanding crush, whose 
proximity and detail destroy the romantic illusion of perfection. How can the 
desire-satisfaction itself cause dissatisfaction? A short answer is that the object 
as desired – i.e. the intentional object – is not the same as the actual object to 
which the desire refers, and it is in measuring the gap between them that 
insufficiency is to be found. A longer answer was offered in Chapter II. 
 An example of a desire whose satisfaction might cause one pain rather 
than pleasure is the desire for public recognition, which may bring envy, 
enmity, betrayals, and harassment in its wake. Here the achievement of the 
object of desire creates the further desires for friendship, trustworthiness, and 
privacy – all of which are now wanting precisely and only because the 
original object of desire no longer is. In all of these cases, we take an interest in 
satisfying our desires, whether self- or other-directed, because of the personal 
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gain in satisfaction we thereby obtain, even where we may neither value nor 
focus on that satisfaction.  
Satisfying our own desires, then, can be an object of interest for us – i.e. it 
can be an interest we take in the condition of our selves, even when it is not 
itself an object of pleasure, or even itself an object of desire – i.e. even when 
we do not envision the prospect of satisfying our desires as itself satisfying. 
For example, we might be disgusted or embarrassed by our desires, and 
envision their satisfaction with distaste or horror: we visualize ourselves at 
the moment of satisfaction, collapsing, weak-limbed, under the intense 
pleasure of long-deferred gratification; and realize that we are, in this state, 
not only abject and debased but also ridiculous.  
 
3.2. Self-Direction vs. Self-Interest 
 Classifying other-directed desire-satisfaction as an instance of personal 
gain and self-interest because of the anticipated personal satisfaction it entails 
does not in turn imply a view popular in some contemporary psychotherapy 
circles. According to this view, a "co-dependent" is a person, motivated by 
other-directed desires for another's well-being, to sacrifice his health, peace of 
mind, and/or financial security to care for that other, in order to obtain a 
sense of control, power, or self-esteem. This analysis treats ostensibly other-
directed behavior as not only self-interested but also ultimately self-directed, 
i.e. as fueled by a quest for personal control, power, or self-worth. It identifies 
the desire for another's well-being as instrumental to the satisfaction of an 
ultimate and motivating desire for personal control, etc. It thus reduces 
apparent altruism to actual egoism. I do not doubt that this analysis holds 
true for certain personalities under certain circumstances. But it would not be 
plausible to generalize this analysis into full-blown Psychological Egoism, i.e. 
into a thesis that all agents at all times, regardless of the ostensible content of 
their ends, are ultimately motivated by such desires for personal advantage, 
as Hobbes tried to do (on pain of contracting all the elementary theoretical 
objections to which Psychological Egoism is subject).  
 By contrast, the thesis that all desire is a species of self-interested 
motivation can be so generalized, because it is entailed by a sharp distinction 
between desire and interest, plus a conceptual analysis of what a desire is. To 
summarize very briefly the analysis offered in Chapter II.2.1, a desire, 
regardless of content, is a motivationally effective psychological state whose 
object is envisioned as a source of personal satisfaction, such that the 
envisioned satisfaction of the desire is what moves one to achieve it. A 
Humean might be tempted to object that in addition to the satisfaction, surely 
the content of the object of desire itself, independently, also plays a role in 
moving us to achieve it. But it is only the fact that this content is part of the 
object of desire, and so conceived as wanting by the agent, that confers any 
special conative power on it. Aside from the agent's envisioning of the object 
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as satisfying a lack, nothing about the object considered independently of its 
status as an object of desire might motivate the agent to realize it. At least not 
within the constraints of the belief-desire model of motivation strictly 
understood. A significant modification of this model is considered in Chapter 
XI.  
 I have already pointed out that one can envision an object as satisfying 
without having the desire to achieve it. To this can be added that in fact, one 
can envision an object as satisfying although it is the intensional object of a 
completely different kind of motivation, such as an intention or resolution. 
For example, I might resolve to organize my time more efficiently, envision 
the resulting state of order and control as deeply satisfying, yet be motivated, 
not by the desire for that satisfying experience of order and control, but rather 
by that very resolve, which in turn is driven by the conviction that efficient 
time-management is a necessary condition of personal autonomy – which I 
experience, not as a source of satisfaction, but rather as a source of self-
realization (self-realization is not necessarily satisfying because the aspects of 
the self one realizes may be deeply troubling – or trouble-making). Of course 
the belief-desire model of motivation would deny the accuracy of this 
description, and claim instead that it denoted a desire for self-realization in 
disguise. 
 The thesis that all desire is a species of self-interested motivation does not 
distinguish between the actual and ostensible content of a desire, as the 
Freudian variant on the belief-desire model would, because this distinction 
does not require any modification in the basic definition of a desire. The 
Freudian variant is thus merely a special case of the more general thesis. Nor 
does this thesis then go on to claim, as the Freudian variant would, that all 
actual desire is ultimately self-directed, for the Freudian variant is in fact 
merely a subvariant of the Hobbesian one, with all of its attendant problems. 
Instead, this thesis respects the distinction between self- and other-directed 
desires all the way down. The thesis is simply that if it is indeed a desire that 
motivates one, then regardless of the content of that desire, one anticipates 
personal satisfaction from obtaining its object. This is just a roundabout way 
of elaborating on the truism that we are motivated to satisfy our desires, and 
that we are motivated to satisfy our desires.   
 
3.3. Criterion-Satisfaction 
 Humeans who dislike the moral implications of this thesis may complain 
that I have phenomenalized to excess the concept of desire-satisfaction. 
Desire-satisfaction, they may argue, is less like the chops-licking, warm-glow 
phenomenal sense of satisfaction-as-fullness one experiences after a good 
meal, and more like the satisfaction of a criterion. That is, like criterion-
satisfaction, desire-satisfaction merely supplies in reality a condition or state 
of affairs required by the desire itself. Understood in this sense, satisfaction 
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does not imply personal gain. Therefore, Humeans may argue, there are no 
grounds for grouping other-directed desire-satisfaction under the rubric of 
self-interest.   
 But first, it is not obvious that this much weaker interpretation of desire-
satisfaction conclusively rules out the implication of personal gain, because 
there are cases in which one may gain personally from the satisfaction of a 
criterion. For example, a job applicant may gain – or lose – from satisfaction of 
the unstated criterion governing a job search that the successful applicant look 
and behave just like everyone else in the organization. In such cases, desire-
satisfaction (here, satisfaction of one's desire to be hired) is a special case of 
criterion-satisfaction more generally (here, satisfaction of the criteria a 
successful job applicant must meet). 
 A fortiori, just because the satisfaction of my self-directed desire for a rich 
and anonymous benefactor contains no phenomenal component (let us 
suppose I believe, rather, that I am simply receiving a surprisingly high rate of 
return on my investments), this does not entail that I receive no personal gain. 
My anonymous benefactor's charitable contributions to my money market 
account are my personal gain, regardless of what I believe about where they 
come from. Nor does the absence of a phenomenal component in the 
satisfaction of my other-directed desire for a rich and anonymous benefactor 
for my best friend (here I assume rather that she is merely doing unusually 
well with her investments) entail that I receive no personal gain. My personal 
gain here is her increased income, even if I am mistaken about its origins and 
ignorant that this other-directed desire of mine is, in fact, being satisfied. I can 
receive personal gain without being phenomenally aware of it, as when I 
inherit a rental property without knowing it. Whether I am aware of it or not, 
if I get what I want – literally, what I conceive myself to lack – then I gain 
what I have gotten, even if it is the thing gotten rather than the fact of my 
getting it that holds my attention. Therefore even other-directed desire-
satisfaction is a species of self-interested motivation.   
 But in any case, thirdly, it won't do simply to deny that desire-satisfaction 
is phenomenal and replace it with an imaginative conceptual analogy, as this 
argument tries to do. This begs the question. If the satisfaction of a 
compulsion, appetite, or craving for a good meal include a phenomenal 
component, it is difficult to understand why a desire for one would not. And 
if the satisfaction of a desire for a good meal includes a phenomenal 
component, it is even harder to see why the satisfaction of desires for many 
other things should not.  
 Finally, the imaginative conceptual analogy itself as stated fails to 
distinguish among different psychological "criteria" which the supplied object 
is supposed to "satisfy". The object or state of affairs that satisfies the desire for 
x may, but need not be, identical with that which satisfies the resolve to do y, 
the will to z, the intention to do w, or the craving for r. On this weaker 
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interpretation of "satisfaction", the satisfaction-relation that holds between the 
desire, resolve, will, intention, and craving, and the objects x, y, z, w and r 
respectively that are supposed to satisfy each intentional state as enumerated 
would be the same. But the satisfaction-relation is not exactly the same for 
each: y and w must be an action, whereas x and z need not be and r is highly 
unlikely to be. If the stipulated satisfaction-relation cannot distinguish 
between the requirements of a desire, a resolve, a will, an intention, and a 
craving, what good is it? 
 
4. Malevolent Other-Directed Desires 
 Like self-directed desires, other-directed desires can be selfish or self-
indulgent without being ultimately self-directed. An other-directed desire is 
selfish if the agent accords more value to the gain its satisfaction brings him 
than to the gain its satisfaction brings to the others to whom it is directed. This 
is consistent with the object of the desire's being the other in question rather 
than the concomitant experience of satisfaction that outweighs it in value. 
Any malevolent or spiteful desire would serve as an example, since in these 
cases the value of the gain its satisfaction brings oneself is inversely 
proportional to the value of the gain its satisfaction brings to the other (and 
directly proportional to the value of the other's loss): If you want me to fail in 
my ambitions, then the less satisfaction I obtain from my strivings, the more 
you obtain by thwarting them, and the more I fail, the better you like it.7  
 But benevolent other-directed desires can be selfish, too, if the agent 
accords higher value to the gain its satisfaction brings her than to the gain its 
satisfaction brings the other to whom it is directed. Someone who takes great 
satisfaction in charitable fundraising but is comparatively indifferent to the 
gains this activity will entail for its recipients would be an example. Here 
selfishness might manifest itself as deep-seated frustration or resistance to the 
discovery that its recipients are harmed rather than helped by it.  
 An other-directed desire is self-indulgent if its satisfaction is impulsive and 
self-destructive to the agent, even if it is beneficial to the other at whom it is 
directed. For example, someone who satisfies five times a day his impulsive 
desire to call his partner at work may be indulging a caring impulse that may 
gradually undermine his autonomy, even if it is directed at making his 
partner feel loved and succeeds at doing so.  
 
4.1. Brutalization 
 Like benevolent desires, malevolent other-directed desires can be self-
indulgent if their satisfaction is not only self-destructive but also impulsive. I 
shall refer to malevolent other-directed desires, i.e. desires to deliberately 
                                                
7On the existence of bona fide malevolent desires, see Michael Stocker, "Desiring the 
Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology," The Journal of Philosophy LXXVI, 12 (December 
1979), 738-753. 
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inflict harm on others, as sadistic. A sadistic person finds satisfaction, not 
merely in others' suffering – such a person would be more properly described 
as spiteful or schadenfroh; but rather in actively inflicting that suffering on 
others. A sadistic person takes satisfaction both in the other's suffering itself; 
and, just as important, in being the instrument of that suffering. Michael Slote 
argues that sadism, like other inherently vicious pleasures, such as drug 
addiction, as well as wealth and power, may be personal goods for the 
virtuous agent who has them, even if they violate the constraints of morality 
and therefore provide no reason for the virtuous agent to act.8 
 Against Slote’s view, I contend that satisfying sadistic desires is always 
self-destructive, and at least as destructive as the experience of externally 
inflicted harm on its victims.  Consider first the latter case. Through externally 
inflicted harm, its victims thereby accumulate experiences and memories of 
aggression directed against the self, and these experiences and memories in 
turn have a harmful conditioning effect on the integrity of the self. They 
disrupt the equilibrium and coherence of the self by disrupting the 
equilibrium and coherence of the external order the self experiences, and 
replacing it with affective images of aggressively inflicted pain, violence, or 
disorder. Just as we speak of the corruption of a text that is rendered unsound 
and tainted by external interpolations and emendations, we may speak 
similarly of the corruption of a self that is rendered unsound and tainted by 
the interpolation of external, destabilizing and disruptive experiences of 
aggression directed against it.  
 The more numerous and familiar these corruptive experiences become, 
the more they vitiate the equation of well-being with stability and order, and 
the more they desensitize the self to the danger they represent to its stability 
and integrity. Aggression repeatedly directed against its victim habituates the 
victim's self to a condition of disintegrity, and so to a lack of interest in the 
self- or other-destructive consequences of its behavior. There is thus a 
continuum of damaging consequences to the self of externally inflicted harm – 
and a corresponding continuum of corrigibility – with simple insensitivity at 
one end, and pervasive and uncontrolled brutality at the other. 
 Individuals who are brutalized by the violence or abuse they experience at 
others' hands are – by definition – more capable of inflicting similar violence 
or abuse on others in turn. Indeed, whenever one witnesses another person's 
brutality, whether physical or psychological, it can be useful to ask oneself 
where and from whom the other learned to behave that way. It would be a 
mistake to think of brutalization as a process requiring physical violence. The 
self can be brutalized in more subtle ways through verbal, emotional and 
psychological abuse and manipulation as well, which in turn may cause 
                                                
8 Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), Chapter 
V. 
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physical harm. Associating or fraternizing with brutal people can have a 
similarly corruptive effect.   
 
4.2. Sadism and Self-Brutalization 
 Actively inflicting harm on others – and so satisfying sadistic desires – is 
thus an expression of brutality that accelerates this brutalizing process even 
more. Just as with externally inflicted harm on oneself, inflicting harm on 
others accumulates in one experiences and memories of aggression and harm, 
and these experiences and memories have a similarly harmful conditioning 
effect on the integrity of the self. They similarly disrupt the equilibrium and 
coherence of the self by disrupting the equilibrium and coherence of the 
external order the self experiences, and replacing it with affective images of 
pain, violence, or disorder. And just as with externally inflicted harm, the 
more numerous and familiar these corruptive experiences become, the more 
they vitiate the equation of well-being with stability and order, and the more 
they desensitize one to the danger they represent to the stability and integrity 
of one's self.  
 But to these already brutalizing effects, inflicting harm on others adds 
self-brutalization: the infliction on oneself of the experience of inflicting harm 
on others. Quite aside from the effect of any moral emotions such as guilt, 
shame, remorse, or self-dislike, or justified retributions one may or may not 
experience as the result of having inflicted harm on others, the experience of 
inflicting that harm further desensitizes one to the self- and other-destructive 
consequences of one's behavior. Unlike the experience of being harmed, the 
experience of inflicting harm on others is actively self-initiated. It habituates 
one, not only to the experience of external aggression directed against one's 
self, but to the experience of actively directing that aggression against the 
external world that provides the conditions of coherence of one's self. To 
inflict harm on the world as one views it is thereby to inflict on one's self the 
same harmful experiences and memories of pain, violence, and disorder. One 
further desensitizes oneself as one further habituates oneself to these 
experiences and memories, by originating, performing, and repeating them. 
Since one's own infliction of harm on others is itself an experience that issues 
from and reinforces the sense of self one already has, further self-brutalization 
is inevitable. So satisfying sadistic desires is finally more destructive of the 
self than being their victim, because it absorbs, reinforces, and accelerates the 
brutalizing process of corruption, destabilization, and desensitization of the 
self to external factors that destroy its integrity. 
 
4.3. Malice 
 But in addition to being necessarily self-destructive, satisfying malevolent 
other-directed desires can also be impulsive rather than deliberate. Such 
desires are not sadistic but rather malicious. Lying, hypocrisy, spiteful gossip, 
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verbal, emotional, or physical abuse, battering, or destruction of persons or 
property are just a few on the continuum of impulsive malevolent acts that 
may both be unpremeditated and also satisfy a malevolent other-directed 
desire. Where these acts are genuinely impulsive rather than compulsive, they 
are also self-indulgent – though their malevolence may overshadow their self-
indulgence in our judgment of them. Malicious desires always include a self-
indulgent component, because their satisfaction is impulsive and self-
destructive to the agent for the reasons mentioned above. 
 Like benevolent desires, malevolent desires can also be genuinely other-
directed without being ultimately self-directed. So, for example, one may have 
a straightforwardly sadistic or malicious desire to inflict harm on another, and 
receive personal satisfaction from doing so, without the object of that desire's 
being conceived as a means, either consciously or unconsciously, to a sense of 
power, control, or self-esteem in oneself. In fact, one may gain satisfaction 
from inflicting harm on the other at the same time that this satisfaction 
undermines one's sense of power, control, or self-esteem. So, for example, the 
feeling of satisfaction may diminish one's self-esteem if it illuminates too 
clearly for comfort one's distasteful motives. Or the action that causes this 
feeling – infliction of the actual harm the other experiences – may reduce one's 
sense of control by surprising one with the full extent and force of one's 
cruelty. In any such case, the object of one's desire may well be inflicting the 
harm rather than the personal gain in satisfaction one obtains by inflicting it. 
That one anticipates obtaining this personal gain is what makes satisfying a 
malevolent other-directed desire a species of self-interested motivation 
nevertheless. 
 
5. Desire-Satisfaction and the Moral Interests of a Self 
 
5.1. Moral Considerations 
 Now if one is sure that we are motivated to satisfy our desires, whatever 
they are, and doubts that we are motivated by anything else, then a fortiori one 
doubts that moral considerations alone can motivate us to act in others' 
interests. From this perspective there are two things wrong with moral 
considerations alone: First, they are not desires; and second, therefore, they 
cannot be brought under the rubric of self-interested motivation, whether 
immediate or long-term, although they may coincide with either. We have 
seen in Section 1.3 that moral considerations alone would be among what 
Rawls calls the interests of a self; and may call upon us not only to disregard, 
but maybe even to sacrifice completely our interests in our selves – including 
our interest in satisfying both self- and other-directed desires.  
 For example, moral considerations alone may require a parent to ignore 
her benevolent other-directed desire to provide for the material security in 
perpetuity of her children, on the grounds that this will stunt their capacity 
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for growth, independence, and initiative. A parent may be secretly attracted 
to the idea of thus reining in the ungrateful little squirts; of securing her 
children's best interests despite their precarious and (to her) ill-considered 
lifestyle predilections – drugs, tattoos, scarification, pierced lips, and the like. 
Yet purely moral considerations may require her to let them sink or swim on 
their own, and suffer the consequent anxiety and concern in silence. 
Alternately, moral considerations alone may require us to sacrifice our self-
directed desire for material security in perpetuity for ourselves, on the 
grounds that it is excessive given the scarcity of material and social resources 
available over all. Indeed, moral considerations alone may permit us to heed 
our self-or other-directed desires only under the most limited and innocuous 
circumstances.  
 To think it is psychologically impossible for us to observe any of these 
strictures without a desire to do so, is to accept the familiar Humean, belief-
desire model of motivation, according to which all action is motivated by the 
agent's desire to realize a certain object or state of affairs and the agent 
performs that action he believes will most efficiently achieve this goal. This 
model of motivation implies that rational appeals, argument and dialogue are 
in theory insufficient to reform attitudes, change minds, create desires, or 
inspire action because, on the Humean model, desire is the only 
motivationally effective cause of action there can be. Desires can chain-react to 
prior desires, as instrumental desires are caused by the ultimate desires they 
effect. And desires may arise from physiological causes, as a drop in blood-
sugar level may cause a desire for sweets. But no psychological state other 
than desire has motivational efficacy on this view.  
 Hence according to this model, moral dialogue and justification more 
specifically are equally impotent to reform the culpable. Publications by 
normative moral philosophers that propose substantive casuistical solutions 
to such pressing problems as abortion, euthanasia, cloning, or racism are best 
understood as engaging in abstract philosophical exercises that can have no 
independent practical import. Similarly, the conferences and symposia on 
pressing political issues we organize with a sense of the urgency of finding 
viable solutions reduce to little more than exercises in group self-stimulation 
and professional networking. This implication will be of little concern to those 
who regard moral philosophy as nothing but an amusing game.  But those 
who pursue it with an eye to practical re-evaluation and reform have cause 
for worry if the Humean conception of the self is the correct one. 
 
5.2. Whistle-Blowers, Etc. 
 There is a problem of moral motivation only on the assumption that the 
Humean conception of the self is the correct one. Obviously, a motivational 
model that stipulates desire as the only motivationally effective cause of 
action rules out the possibility of action not motivated by a desire for some 
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state of affairs; and therefore, I have argued, rules out the possibility of non-
self-interested action. But the problem of moral motivation arises because on 
the face of it there seem to be many such actions – actions we are motivated to 
perform even though we anticipate not only no satisfaction from their 
outcome, but even, in some cases, considerable frustration and suffering.   
Consider, for example, the whistleblowers of the 1970s and 1980s, before 
government incentives and protections for federally employed whistleblowers 
were written into law; as well as those legally unprotected whistleblowers in 
the private sector up to the present time. This brand of whistleblower is 
motivated to expose organizational or institutional injustice, and so end it, 
even though she could have gained everything of value to her by permitting 
it, and even though she can realistically anticipate losing everything – job, 
reputation, close relationships, financial well-being, perhaps even her country 
or her life – by exposing it to public condemnation.  
 In some such cases, a whistleblower may well take actual satisfaction in 
seeing justice done or helping others.9 In these cases, it would be appropriate 
to describe him as motivated by a desire to see justice done, despite the 
hardships he suffers in retaliation for his action. But in most cases, the 
whistleblower may not take any satisfaction in seeing justice done. In some of 
these other cases, although not all of them, she may at least take consolation 
from seeing justice done. But this is by hypothesis a mere compensation for 
her losses. It is not the provision of a want – or lack – she has gained.10 By 
hypothesis, there are no such personal gains.   
 Such whistleblowers cite very different explanations for their actions: 
disgust or outrage with others' arrogance and dishonesty;11 a belief in open 
information, truth, justice, or reason;12 loyalty to the public;13 conscience or 
personal ethical or religious principle;14 a sense of personal responsibility or 
                                                
9See Myron Peretz Glazer and Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers: Exposing 
Corruption in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 209-215, 217. Also 
see Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Survey of Whistle Blowers Finds Retaliation but Few 
Regrets," The New York Times (Sunday, February 22, 1987), page ?. 
10Not all lacks are losses because some lacks – desires among them – do not necessarily 
presuppose prior privation. The creation of desire is discussed at greater length in 
Chapter II.  
11Glazer and Glazer, op. cit. Note 9; page 19, 100, 122, 138, 223, 246. Also see Mary 
Schiavo, "Flying into Trouble," Time (March 31, 1997), pages 52-62. 
12ibid. pages 33, 43, 70,  96, 107. Also see Philip J. Hilts, "Why Whistle-Blowers Can Seem 
a Little Crazy," The New York Times (Sunday, June 13, 1993), Section 4, page 6). 
13Ibid., pages 17, 40, 45, 129. 
14Ibid. pages 43, 70, 88, 96, 101, 103, 104-5, 117, 119, 122, 141, 248-9. Also see Clyde H. 
Farnsworth, op. cit. Note 9; and "In Defense of the Government's Whistle Blowers," The 
New York Times (Tuesday, July 26, 1988), page B6. 
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obligation to others.15 Yet they are motivated to blow the whistle anyway – 
even though they have everything to lose and nothing, not even the 
satisfaction of a desire, to gain. Indeed, whistleblowers very often express the 
belief that they had no choice, that they were forced or compelled to expose 
the corruption of their organizations.16 Socrates, the most famous 
whistleblower of them all, offers these considerations in defense of exposing 
to public ridicule the ignorance and pretentiousness of his fellow citizens: 
Perhaps someone will say: 'Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of leading a 
life which is very likely now to cause your death?' I should answer him 
with justice, and say: 'My friend, if you think that a man of any worth at 
all ought to reckon the chances of life and death when he acts, or that he 
ought to think of anything but whether he is acting justly or unjustly, and 
as a good or a bad man would act, you are mistaken.'  … Wherever a 
man's station is, whether he has chosen it of his own will, or whether he 
has been placed at it by his commander, there it is his duty to remain and 
face the danger without thinking of death or of any other thing except 
disgrace. … [I]t would be very strange conduct on my part if I were to 
desert my station now from fear of death or of any other thing when the 
god has commanded me – as I am persuaded that he has done – to spend 
my life in searching for wisdom, and in examining myself and others.17 
I do not offer a full account of what might motivate a whistleblower to act in 
these cases until Volume II, Chapter VI.8. But if it is psychologically plausible 
that a human agent might be motivated by such transpersonally rational 
considerations to blow the whistle even though she has nothing to gain and 
everything to lose by doing so – if, that is, there is more to human motivation 
than can be calculated in a cost-benefit analysis – then there is more to it than 
can be explained by the belief-desire model of motivation.  
 It appears that there must be. There is a great deal of ordinary behavior – 
not only transpersonally rational moral behavior – that we are motivated to 
perform, not by a desire for their ends, but rather by deeply instilled 
characterological dispositions to such behavior. Thus, for example, I may 
regularly dress before leaving the house. I may do so intentionally, 
                                                
15Ibid., pages 70, 88, 117, 122, 123, 124-5, 129, 130-1. Also see Liz Hunt, "Whistleblowers 
'put their health under threat'," The Independent (Friday, 10 September 1993), Section 1, 
p. 6. 
16Ibid., pages 77, 86, 101, 105, 109, 110, 118, 121, 122. Also see N. R. Kleinfeld, "The 
Whistle Blowers' Morning After," The New York Times (Sunday, November 9, 1986), 
Section 3, page 1; and Don Rosendale, "About Men: A Whistle-Blower," The New York 
Times Magazine (Sunday, June 7, 1987), page 56. 
17 Plato, Apology XV.28 – XVII.29, in Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Trans. F. J. Church and 
Robert D. Cumming (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), 34-35. I am particularly fond of 
this translation because its introduction alludes indirectly to the mid-century American 
political repression of whistleblowers – i.e. McCarthyism – taking place at that time. 
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deliberately, and consciously. But not because I have any dispositional or 
occurrent desire to do so. (Suppose, for example, that I live in a singularly 
tolerant community in a warm climate, and have sufficient power in it so that 
others will accept uncomplainingly my choice to appear in public unclothed, 
as did Lyndon Johnson at his Texas ranch.) I may dress before leaving the 
house out of a socially instilled disposition simply to act on the social 
principle that people are to appear dressed in public. Here my action is 
caused by a perception of certain external circumstances that actualizes the 
disposition in question. I may experience consciously no affective 
motivational state whatsoever. 
 Another, transpersonal example: I may contribute time and money to 
Amnesty International, in order to help restore the civil rights of certain 
political prisoners. But not because I want to, nor even from any benevolent 
desire to increase the well-being of the prisoners involved. Indeed, I may 
know perfectly well that in fact their convictions and attitudes toward life 
represent values I deplore and would actively discourage if they were in the 
position to promulgate them. Nevertheless, I may find their torture or 
imprisonment morally unacceptable, and act to prevent it out of sheer moral 
indignation that their civil rights are being so severely abridged. Here these 
feelings constitute an affective motivational state. But they need not make me 
want to aid them. They may simply make me do so. 
 In neither case is an intervening desire required to explain my behavior. 
All that is required is a disposition to act on certain principles – of publicly 
acceptable self-preservation, or of the inalienability of individual civil rights – 
that is internalized deeply enough to motivate certain responses under certain 
circumstances. There are other, more mundane examples: Must I desire to 
brush my teeth each morning in order to do so? Or to say "Hello?" each time I 
answer the telephone in order to say it? Evidently not. I just do these things 
reflexively. 
 These actions, and others like them, are also relatively unproblematic 
from the point of view of motivation. Typically, the process by which we are 
socialized includes instilling a broad range of characterological dispositions to 
emotion and action deeply enough so that the mere recognition of a situation 
as requiring a certain kind of behavior suffices to elicit that behavior more or 
less automatically.18 Deeply internalized dispositions to such behavior shape 
                                                
18We can think of the social processes by which characterological dispositions are 
instilled as not unlike the process Aristotle describes in the Nicomachean Ethics as 
habituation (Book II; trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985). We learn to 
mimic repeatedly, under similar circumstances, the like behavior of elders or peers with 
whom we identify, or whose approval we seek. The more frequently we rehearse the 
behavior and are socially reinforced for doing so, the more natural and reflexive it 
becomes. Thus I mean to use the word "disposition" here in the narrower, psychological 
sense that denotes a settled and regular tendency to behave or respond in a certain way 
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our character, not by making us want to, e.g. say "Hello?" when we answer 
the phone, but by making us do it. 
 To say that we may be moved to perform such actions by perceptions, 
emotions or dispositions that are independent of the action's intentional object 
is not, of course, to deny that the action must have an intentional object; nor 
even that we may in some sense "visualize" that object to ourselves prior to 
performing the action directed at it. It is merely to deny that the impetus to 
perform such an action must invariably come from a desire or "pro-attitude" 
(in the revisionist sense examined in Chapter II.1) towards that object. Our 
dispositions to act and react in certain ways under certain circumstances often 
impel us to perform intentional actions towards the intentional objects of 
which we have no evaluative attitudes whatsoever.  
 Hence it would be a mistake, on this account, to suppose that we could 
distinguish a bona fide case of action from unintentional behavior according 
to how deliberate or reflexive it is respectively. The prominent examples of 
reflexive action we are most likely to identify as such are those that stand out 
by their social impropriety: thus one "loses one's head," or "goes off 
half-cocked" in performing some "ill-considered" action. But we should not 
ignore the large body of reflexive but nevertheless genuinely intentional 
actions we regularly perform without needing to "consider" them -- because 
the disposition to perform them has been socially instilled and is therefore 
socially unremarkable. 
 Now there are many ways of coming to have such dispositions. The 
easiest way, when a society's social and legal institutions are in good working 
order, is to be brought up that way. Then if one accepts those social practices 
one will require no special desire to behave in accordance with them. Merely 
the recognition of the situation as being of a certain kind will suffice to elicit 
the normatively appropriate emotions and behavior. We can describe 
principles that govern the behavior of each, or most, of the members of a 
community in this way as socially operative. 
 Consider, for example, the woman who is raised from childhood to be a 
wife and mother, whatever else she is, in a society that accords high social 
status to women in this role; and who therefore anticipates, without 
reluctance, that she will eventually become a wife and a mother. To suppose 
automatically that she therefore desires to be a wife and a mother does not do 
justice to the complexity of her feelings. For even supposing she can discern 
anything like desires beneath such a heavy layer of social conditioning, it is 
far from obvious that whatever desires she may have necessarily underwrite 
that conditioning. Nevertheless, she may believe, with good reason, that most 
women, herself included, should be wives and mothers. She may also be 
                                                                                                     
under certain recurrent kinds of circumstances, rather than in the more inclusive sense, 
that denotes an entity's structural propensity to react in a certain way to certain kinds of 
causal-counterfactual conditions, even if those conditions never obtain.  
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moved to satisfy her own parents' desires for grandchildren, and to affirm to 
them her gratitude for their parenting of her, by becoming a wife and mother 
herself. She may also believe that she brings special talents to these roles and 
would fulfill them with outstanding success. In conjunction with her deeply 
internalized dispositions to view herself as a future wife and mother, these 
reflective beliefs may motivate her to become one, even though her desires 
speak against it. Having taken on these roles, she may find them pleasurable 
and satisfying. But these feelings need not represent the satisfaction of her 
desire to become a wife and a mother. For there may well have been no such 
desire. 
 
5.3. Psychological Egoism Again 
 Unsophisticated Humeans are sometimes inclined to try to explain away 
counterexamples such as that of the whistleblower, the Amnesty International 
contributor, or the altruistic wife and mother on grounds of self-deception or 
unconscious repression: One may think one is acting disinterestedly, they 
contend; but in fact one is always satisfying some desire or other: for 
approval, perhaps, or martyrdom, or for that truly sublime sensation of self-
righteousness. This response trivializes and debases all cases of altruism or 
principled self-sacrifice, such as that shown by Martin Luther King or Nelson 
Mandela, by depicting the best of us as no better than our worst motives. It 
also misrepresents as symptoms of false consciousness actions that could be 
understood equally well as unique and authentic expressions of our widely 
underdeveloped capacity for genuinely transpersonal rationality.  
 Third, this response thereby begs the question. It commits the elementary 
mistake of turning what was supposed to be a matter of contingent 
psychological fact into a vacuous conceptual truth (we have already seen in 
Chapters II and III that there are deep reasons for this). An agent who is 
motivated by political conviction to devote his life to the eventual liberation of 
his country, which he fully understands will not occur in his lifetime, can 
always be interpreted as acting, rather, to satisfy some temporally proximate 
desire or other. But then either there is a fact of the matter about whether 
desire or conviction is doing the actual motivational work, or else the concept 
of desire is being applied so broadly that the distinction between desire and 
other kinds of motivation is lost. 
 More sophisticated Humeans may wonder why, if not all desire-
satisfaction causes pleasure, so that desires may involve satisfaction without 
pleasure, altruistic actions should not be explained in terms of them. They 
may then wonder what, if other-directed benevolent desires can exist, remains 
to be explained. But as we have just seen in most whistleblower cases, not all 
actions need involve even satisfaction, even of the most minimal kind, to the 
agent who performs them. An act may be fully intentional, deliberate, and 
other-directed without providing the agent any satisfaction or pleasure 
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whatsoever. The belief-desire model of motivation "explains" such actions by 
either ignoring them or defining them out of existence. 
 Thus the problem of moral motivation cannot be solved within the 
constraints of the Humean conception of the self. It cannot be solved by 
characterizing some desires as impersonal; nor by observing that some desires 
are other-directed; nor by agreeing that not all desire-satisfaction brings 
pleasure. These emendations to the belief-desire model of motivation do not 
solve the problem because they are all consistent with the self-interested 
nature of all desire. The alternatives are then either to insist on the universally 
self-interested character of all human motivation – thus defining the 
possibility of moral motivation out of existence; or else to revise our model of 
human motivation – and restrict the scope of the belief-desire model 
accordingly – so as to accommodate its actuality. In the next chapter I examine 
Thomas Nagel’s attempt to navigate between the two. 
 
 
 
Chapter VII. Nagel's Internalism 
 
 
 With Chapter VI’s account of the Humean problem of moral motivation 
in hand, I now look more closely at the most sustained attempt so far, within 
the constraints of the belief-desire model, to solve it; and thereby to meet the 
challenge posed by cases of seeming altruistic action such as whistleblowers. 
Internalism is the view that moral principle can be a motivationally effective 
reason for action. It thus would seem to take for granted what Humeans 
categorically deny: that something other than desire can move us to action. 
However, most internalists are Humeans. They believe that one's desire to 
perform an action or advance certain ends by means of it is what provides one 
with both a motive and a prima facie reason for that action. So if one has a 
benevolent desire, or a desire to be moral, or to act on principle, that desire 
can be a motivationally effective reason for moral action, provided that such 
action is deemed likely to satisfy one's desire. Humeans believe, then, that 
moral principle can motivate us to act – provided that it is the object of a 
desire so to act.  
 Externalism, by contrast, is the view that a moral principle may provide 
one with a reason for action without thereby motivating one to act on it. 
Externalism may find expression in the familiar response, "Your arguments 
are convincing, but they don't make me care." Hence where motivation is 
concerned, the externalist may need to invoke the expectation of reward or 
punishment – and thus finally appeal to considerations of self-interest, desire, 
or aversion – in order to impel the agent to do what the balance of moral 
reasons prescribes. Most externalists – as we have just seen, Rawls among 
them – purport to be non-Humeans, because Hume stipulated desire and 
moral sentiment, not principle, as both the motivational and the justificatory 
basis for moral action. But in fact most externalists are Humeans, because they 
tend to agree with Hume that only desire can be motivationally effective. 
Since, they assume, only desires can move one to action, moral principles can 
provide one with reasons for action even if they provide one with no desire, 
and therefore no motivation, to act on them. Externalism is a position of 
desperation, a fallback strategy for preserving the importance of moral 
principle despite being persuaded by the Humean valorization of desire. It 
does this by ascribing to moral principle the status of a reason even if it cannot 
have the status of a motive. 
 Humean internalists and externalists therefore do not disagree on the 
essentials. Both believe that only desire is motivationally effective. They differ 
only on whether something other than a causally effective motive can be a 
not-necessarily-motivating reason for action. Humean internalists think it 
cannot, whereas Humean externalists think it can. 
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 Thomas Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism1 is the first and only post-war 
attempt in the Anglo-American tradition to furnish an extended, genuinely 
non-Humean internalist account of moral motivation. Several decades after its 
publication, it remains the unsurpassed modern classic of Kantian rationalist 
moral psychology. However, it does not carve out a clear and identifiable 
alternative to the belief-desire model of motivation, nor does it mean to. 
Nagel's stated project is to articulate the rational ethical criteria by which the 
rationality of desire can be evaluated. What he actually does is to attack the 
premise that desire of any kind must motivate action – without, however, 
explicating a clear alternative to replace it. But Kantians such as Nagel who in 
effect accept the Humean model are hard pressed to explain how we can be 
morally motivated at all in its absence. Without such an alternative, it is 
unclear how the rational ethical criteria for evaluating desire Nagel develops 
might, as a precipitating cause of action, occurrently influence the desires we 
happen to have. In this case externalism looms, and the Humean is free to 
reassert the primacy of desire as the only plausible candidate for human 
motivation. 
Because Nagel rejects the hypothesis that only occurrent desire-states are 
motivationally effective in causing action, but declines to supply an 
alternative account of how actions may be caused, he has only one choice: to 
modify the belief-desire model so as to accommodate the motivational 
efficacy of reason within it. Nagel distinguishes between "unmotivated" 
desires that just assail us, such as appetites, and "motivated" desires that may 
be caused by prior desires, reasoning, or deliberation. He then argues that 
motivated desires are desires only in the vacuous sense, since whatever 
explains them also explains the actions they purportedly cause. Among the 
factors that may explain them, he claims, are certain impartial rational 
principles expressive of one's self-conception as one temporally extended 
agent among many, i.e. principles of prudence and altruism. However, Nagel 
does not explain how a self-conception, or the principles that express it, can 
occurrently cause one to do something. In the absence of some such 
recognizably causal factor, the Humean is free to retort that since we are not 
rationally required to accept this self-conception, the principles that express it 
can be motivationally effective only if one desires in the unmotivated sense to 
accept it. Then not only have these rational principles not been shown to be 
motivationally effective independent of desire; they have not been given a 
nonarbitrary rational justification, either. Nagel's project does contain the 
resources for an identifiable alternative to the Humean model, however: What 
Nagel could and should have said was that the description of a motivated 
desire may denote a particular episode of reasoning as a motivationally 
                                                
1(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). Henceforth all page references to this work will be 
parenthecized in the text. 
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effective mental event whose causal influence depends on its intentional 
content. I do say this at length in Volume II, Chapter V.3.1. 
Section 1 sketches the dilemma for a self-described Kantian who believes 
in the rational necessity of moral principle as a motive to action on the one 
hand, and in the universality but subjective contingency of desire on the 
other. I contrast Nagel’s with Kant’s solution to this dilemma: Both ground 
moral principle in a rationally inescapable self-conception that thereby 
motivates us to act on it. I evaluate the viability for this role of the particular 
self-conception that each proposes. Section 2 situates Nagel’s analysis of 
prudential reasons for action in the context of his commitment to 
transpersonal rationality. Through analysis of his distinctions between 
timeless versus dated reasons on the one hand, and tenseless versus tensed 
judgments on the other, it traces his argument for the rational and therefore 
motivational inescapability of prudential reasons independent of any present 
or intermediary desires. Section 3 looks at Nagel’s extension of his analysis of 
prudence to the analysis of altruism, the case in which the person on whose 
behalf one undertakes action is remote in space rather than in time. It 
examines his distinction between objective and subjective reasons, and 
evaluates the thesis that objective self-interested reasons give one reason to act 
on behalf of the person whose interests they denote. Nagel offers a second 
distinction, between the impersonal perspective on ourselves as one 
individual among many; and the personal, perspectival vantage point to 
which my analysis of funnel vision in Chapter II is often indebted. Here I 
examine Nagel’s analysis of altruism as presupposing necessary connections 
among objectivity, impersonality, and universality; and his corresponding 
rejection of solipsism. I consider whether this argument yields the rational 
inescapability of ethical principle on which his thesis rests; and conclude that 
it does, at least, provide the conceptual resources for such an inference. 
 
1. Nagel versus Kant 
 
1.1. The Kantian Dilemma 
 The basic aim of Nagel's discussion is to show that to be rational is, 
among other things, to be capable of being motivated directly by altruistic 
principles and considerations – not merely by a desire of which these 
principles are the object. This aim expresses the transpersonal Kantian 
assumption that reason can be motivationally effective; not that desire is not, 
but merely that desire is not the only, and certainly not the most important, 
motivationally effective element in the self.  
Nagel's idea is that if we are rational, altruistic principles and 
considerations themselves can inspire us to act on them; indeed, that this is 
part of what it means to be rational. By "altruistic" Nagel does not mean only 
acts of extraordinary heroism or self-sacrifice, but "any behavior motivated 
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merely by the belief that someone else will benefit or avoid harm by it." (16, 
n.1; cf. 79) These also include any act of "mundane considerateness which 
costs us nothing, and involves neither self-sacrifice nor nobility – as when we 
tell someone he has a flat tire, or a wasp on his hamburger." To demonstrate 
that altruism is a condition of rationality, Nagel tries to demonstrate that 
principles that prescribe such acts are as rationally "inescapable" as the laws of 
logic. He thereby means to show that moral principles themselves, broadly 
construed, rationally necessitate action; and therefore are motivationally 
effective. 
 I agree with Nagel's aim. But there are other ways of achieving it. My 
strategy, in Volume II of this discussion, is to analyze, not the inescapability of 
the principles, but rather their centrality in defining and exemplifying what 
transpersonal rationality is. Whether transpersonal rationality itself is 
inescapable is a moot question (but I doubt it).2 
 Nagel's way of approaching the problem of moral motivation encounters 
a dilemma almost immediately. He says, 
It may be thought that this excludes from an essential role in the 
foundation of ethics the factor of desire (although it is a mystery how one 
could account for the motivational source of ethical action without 
referring to desires). The problem about appealing ultimately to human 
desires is that this appears to exclude rational criticism of ethical 
motivation at the most fundamental level. As ordinarily conceived, any 
desire, even if it is in fact universal, is nevertheless merely an affection 
(not susceptible to rational assessment) to which one is either subject or 
not. If that is so, then moral considerations whose persuasiveness 
depends on desires depend ultimately on attitudes which we are not 
required to accept. On the other hand, the picture of human motivational 
structure as a system of given desires connected in certain ways with 
action is a very appealing one, and it can seem that any persuasive 
justification of ethical conduct must find its foothold in such a system (5). 
In this passage Nagel's ambivalence towards the belief-desire model of 
motivation is evident. On the one hand, he literally cannot imagine how we 
could explain action without reference to desires; on the other, he accepts the 
Humean view of desires as too subjective and contingent to be subject to 
rational assessment and criticism. Yet the prevailing conception of motivation 
as a system of desires causally connected with action is plausible and 
appealing.  
 The dilemma for Nagel is that moral motivation must be as rationally 
inescapable as the truths of logic, if moral principles are to have the same 
stringency as rationality in general. By contrast, the Humean conception treats 
                                                
2Thus my argument does not conflict with the important work of Kahneman, Tversky, 
et. al., that shows that actual agents do not reason decision-theoretically.  
Chapter VII. Nagel’s Internalism           264 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
desires as universal on the one hand, but as idiosyncratic, arbitrary, 
contingent, and impervious to rational assessment on the other. Because 
desires, on the belief-desire model, are universal, any account of moral 
motivation must refer to them. But this implies that any account of moral 
motivation as rationally inescapable must therefore refer to a type of 
motivation that is not subject to rational assessment at all. 
 Nagel's dilemma is one with which any Kantian rationalist can 
sympathize. On the one hand, moral principles need to be universally 
applicable, objectively valid, and logically or conceptually necessary (or at 
least "inescapable," to use Nagel's term), if they are to do the necessary work 
of coordinating the behavior of different individuals and resolving conflicts 
among their disparate interests. After all, one wants to be able rationally to 
require of moral agents not only that they behave rightly, but also that they 
behave reliably. On the other hand, one wants an internalist account of 
reasons that will explain how these principles can causally effect action. These 
two desiderata seem prima facie incompatible. Although it is not inconceivable 
that some set of principles might satisfy the conditions of universality, 
objectivity, and necessity, our adherence to them need satisfy none of these 
conditions. Then how can we resolve the universality, objectivity and 
necessity of moral principle with the sporadic and seemingly nonrational 
motivation of particular agents to act on it? 
 Simply declaring that moral principle provides one with a reason for 
action is not enough, if the reason is not one the agent has in mind, or is one 
that has no compelling force for her even if she does. The externalist agrees 
that moral principle provides one with a reason for action; he denies merely 
that this reason in fact must motivate the agent to act. Even stipulating the 
agent's cognizings of the principle seems insufficient:  the externalist can 
either deny that cognizings are motivationally effective mental events; or, 
even if they are, that they are any less arbitrary, contingent, transient, or 
idiosyncratic than desires. If cognizings and desires are similar in this regard, 
then in their absence, it is hard to see how we can be obligated to act on a 
principle of which we are, at least for that moment or circumstance, unaware, 
or by which we are uninspired, no matter how universal and necessary it is.  
 Kant's solution to the dilemma was to show consistent adherence to 
universal, objective and necessary moral principle to be a necessary condition 
of transpersonal rationality. He argued that agents who fail the requirement 
of consistent adherence could be shown to be defective in reason as well: 
[I]f reason solely by itself is not sufficient to determine the will; if the will 
is still subordinated to subjective conditions (certain drives) which do not 
always agree with the objective ones; if, in a word, the will is not in itself 
completely in accord with reason (as is really the case for human beings); 
then actions which are recognized to be objectively necessary are 
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subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will in 
accordance with objective laws is necessitation.3  
Here Kant acknowledges the force of the externalist's claim, that reasons may 
have objective validity without our being moved to act on them; but also 
suggests that our recognition of their objective rational validity may compel or 
necessitate us to act on them despite our resistance. When our actions fail to 
accord with what reason requires, it is because "certain drives" interfere.  We 
will see that something like this line of reasoning is attractive to Nagel, too. 
 Nagel begins by describing two possible solutions to the dilemma. The 
first is to reject and replace the belief-desire model of motivation. That is the 
solution I choose in Volume II of this discussion. The second is to retain the 
belief-desire model of motivation, but find a basis for distinguishing those 
desires that are susceptible to rational assessment from those which are 
merely arbitrary inclinations. This is the alternative Nagel chooses.  He 
describes his task as follows: 
I shall propose that the basis of ethics in human motivation is something 
other than desire; but this factor will itself enable us to criticize certain 
desires as contrary to practical reason (5). 
It is important to get clear about what Nagel is and is not saying in this 
passage. He is not saying that moral motivation is something other than 
desire. He is saying that the basis of moral motivation is something other than 
desire. This basis, whatever it turns out to be, can then be used to criticize 
desires as contrary to or in conformity with reason. But the first clause does 
not commit Nagel to repudiating the belief-desire model of motivation as he 
renders it ((a), 5), and the second clause suggests that he embraces it. Thus it 
seems that this basis of ethics will not provide an alternative motivational 
model for moral action. It will instead propose a new criterion for 
distinguishing those desires which are rational from those which are not. This 
introductory statement of Nagel's project does not portend a rejection of the 
Humean model, but rather an improvement on it. 
 What does Nagel mean by a "basis of ethics" such that it might have such 
a critical and rational role in evaluating desires? He characterizes it as a set of 
"motivational requirements on which to base ethical requirements" (5); and as 
"susceptible to metaphysical investigation", as carrying "some kind of 
necessity"(6). He also insists that the hold of these motivational requirements 
on us must be deep, and essentially tied to the ethical principles themselves 
                                                
3Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten Herausg. von Karl Vorländer 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1965) Ac. 412-413. Since I now comment on what I 
believe Kant actually to have said, rather than – as in Chapters I and V – on what other 
philosophers have gleaned from (to my mind faulty) translations of Kant's writings, I 
now work directly from the German original and offer my own translations. Henceforth 
page references to the Academy Edition of this work are parenthecized in the text, 
preceded by “G”. 
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and to the conditions of their truth (6). The basis of ethics that serves as a 
standard for criticizing desires, then, consists in a set of independent 
requirements on desires which are metaphysical and in some sense necessary, 
and intrinsically connected to the ethical principles they ground. They also 
impose certain requirements that ethical motivation must meet. 
 However, the basis of ethics Nagel has in mind is not a justification of 
altruistic principles. For justification implies persuasion, and this depends on 
particular, arbitrary and idiosyncratic influences that get people to change 
their minds. Nagel, by contrast, means to show the inescapability of these 
principles regardless of the particular empirical influences at work. He means 
to furnish a psychologically pervasive foundation for ethics that demonstrates 
the rational pervasiveness of the principles it engenders. Thus he rejects any 
account of moral motivation that requires a prior, externalist motivational 
influence independent of moral principle itself. The foundation he seeks will 
explain the motivational influence of moral principles on action by putting 
those "principles themselves at the absolute source of our moral conduct." (11) 
 Nagel suggests that the rational inescapability of a moral principle can be 
shown by our inability to reject it once we become aware of it. But there are 
several arbitrary desires I might list that I would be equally unable to reject 
once I became aware of them (so I won't call them to mind by listing them). 
The rational necessity, or inescapability, of moral principle requires more than 
this. It requires, not only our inability to reject it once we become aware of it, 
nor even, in addition, that this inability be explained by our cognitive grasp of 
its content; but also that this inability – and corresponding action in 
accordance with it – be explained by our recognition of the rationality of its 
content per se. In this case, Nagel faces the daunting task of explaining how an 
abstract object of thought – the property of being recognizably rational – can 
causally influence anything at all; and, supposing it can, why it should 
influence an agent's consciousness and action at one particular time and place 
rather than some other. 
 
1.2. Two Self-Conceptions 
 Nagel must, then, defend a foundation for ethics that has the following 
four features. First, it does not replace desire as the primary motive of action. 
Rather, second, it grounds and evaluates desires with an eye to their rational 
conformity to normative moral principle. Third, it thereby exerts some 
motivational influence on action. And fourth, it satisfies the rationality 
requirements of necessity, ethical connectedness, etc. listed above. 
 Nagel's chosen model for providing such an account is Kant's ethics. Kant 
is an internalist without being a Humean, because he insists both that moral 
principle is motivationally effective, and also that motivationally effective 
moral principle does not presuppose any desire of which it must be an object. 
Kant's idea is that moral principles express the agent's self-conception as free. 
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They are motivationally effective because we accept them, and we accept 
them because they express a self-conception with which we identify. By 
accepting a certain self-conception, we accept the corresponding moral 
obligations that follow from it, and are motivated by them to act accordingly. 
 Nagel assigns the same, psychologically central role to a particular self-
conception in order to explain the motivational influence of the principles 
derived from it. Just as, in Kant's view, we are inescapably committed to our 
self-conception as free, similarly in Nagel's view, we are inescapably 
committed to our self-conception as merely one person among many, equally 
real ones. This self-conception explains the occurrence of altruistic behavior 
just as, in Kant's view, our self-conception as free agents explains our 
governance by the categorical imperative. In both views, the existence of 
genuinely moral conduct is presupposed rather than called into question. 
Therefore, an explanation of its existence, rather than a justification of its 
possibility, is what is required. 
 It is important to note that Nagel appeals to a self-conception, rather than 
to a conception of the self as those notions were distinguished in the General 
Introduction, above, to explain the fact of moral or altruistic conduct. That is, 
Nagel cites a pervasive way in which we think of ourselves, rather than a 
theory of what we are like in fact, to explain why we sometimes act to benefit 
others. The difference is important. The validity of a conception of the self is 
determined by its capacity to explain the psychological facts, generate testable 
hypotheses, and accrue confirmation from the results. Thus it gains or loses 
support depending on the plausibility of the link it proposes between what 
human agents are and what they do; and its truth or falsity is independent of 
what any particular individual thinks about it. So, for example, if the true 
conception of the self is a Humean one, according to which action is always 
motivated by desire-satisfaction, then at least a certain kind of altruistic action 
such as that performed by some whistleblowers discussed in Chapter VI.5.2 – 
i.e. that which involves no satisfaction at all to the agent who performs it, is 
impossible in theory. On the other hand, if a Kantian conception of the self is 
the correct one, then we may receive with skepticism Abraham Lincoln's 
protest that he was only saving the piglets from drowning in the mud in order 
selfishly to insure his peace of mind. 
 By contrast, the role Nagel assigns to a self-conception in his scheme is 
dependent on how individuals think of themselves, i.e. on whether or not 
they hold a certain belief. If they believe of themselves that they are no more 
or less real than other human agents, then they may invoke this belief to 
evaluate the integrity of their desires in relation to it. If those desires diverge 
from the agent's self-conception as one among many equally real agents – if, 
for example, one desires to use others in ways that overlook their capacity for 
emotions and thoughts as complex as one's own, then they express a belief 
that the agent is more real than others. This, for Nagel, is practical solipsism, 
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and it represents an internal dissociation from the impersonal standpoint 
expressed by that self-conception. Nagel will argue later that such an internal 
bifurcation in the self is irrational, contrary to practical reason. 
 But how rationally inescapable can this particular belief be? Compare the 
analogous role of Kant's proposed self-conception with Nagel's.  According to 
Kant,  
it is impossible to conceive a reason with its own consciousness in 
relation to its judgments that receives guidance from outside, since then 
the subject would ascribe the determination of its power of judgment not 
to its reason, but instead to an impulsion. Reason must view itself as 
author of its principles, independently of foreign influences; 
consequently, as practical reason or the will of a rational being, it must be 
viewed by itself as free. (G, Ac. 448) 
Kant's idea is that conceiving ourselves as self-determining is inherent in the 
nature of reason itself. To reflect or make a decision rationally is, according to 
our prereflective conception of these activities, to act voluntarily, without 
external coercion. In fact there is no behavior identifiable as an action we can 
perform that we do not experience as performed freely in this sense. So all 
deliberate actions, not just altruistic ones, are performed under the 
presumption of freedom. Moreover, they are performed under the 
presumption of freedom because that is the way reason operates. To experience 
ourselves as coerced or compelled is automatically to ascribe the source of 
causal determination to something other than reason, something external and 
nonrational. So for Kant, our self-conception as free is both universal, in that it 
governs any deliberate action whatsoever, and also inextricably connected to 
our rationality, in that it is a consequence of the proper functioning of reason 
itself. 
 By contrast, Nagel's proposed self-conception as one among many 
equally real individuals cannot be supposed to govern all actions, just 
altruistic ones. My own preoccupations may well take a back seat while I am 
being moved to warn you about the wasp in your hamburger; but while I am 
doing my tax returns they surely do not. By itself this is unproblematic. 
Similarly, the fact that modus ponens does not govern all forms of inference 
does not undermine its rational necessity. However, it is not obvious that 
Nagel's proposed self-conception is inherently connected to the functioning of 
reason in the way that Kant claims for our self-conception as free. Empiricism 
adduces rational arguments that Nagel's proposed self-conception is 
unfounded, and solipsism adduces further rational arguments that it is false. 
Moreover, it has been argued convincingly that the arguments for solipsism 
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are, strictly speaking, irrefutable.4 If solipsism is rationally justified, as 
Descartes suggests, then the solipsist's dissociation from the impersonal 
standpoint may be rationally justified as well. So the inherent connection of 
this proposed self-conception with rationality must be demonstrated rather 
than merely asserted.  
 Furthermore, it is not clear that we are inescapably committed to this self-
conception. Pathological narcissism is a pervasive psychological malaise in 
which precisely what is lacking is a conception of other people – their needs, 
feelings, and interests – as just as real as one's own. I argue in Chapter 
VIII.3.2.4 below that a narcissist may accept a self-conception such as the one 
Nagel proposes, without any vivid sense of the reality of the actual people she 
is thus conceiving. Nor are we always cognizant of this self-conception under 
relevant conditions, even supposing we are in some sense committed to it: It 
may be more vivid when my self-esteem is low or I am feeling humble, and 
weaker when I am preoccupied with my own interests or feeling self-
important. All our experiences are bounded by the requirements of logical 
consistency, but not all our actions are governed by our self-conception as one 
individual among many equally real ones. Hence Nagel needs to explain the 
sense in which we are inescapably committed to this self-conception. 
Otherwise this commitment itself will be as vulnerable to the charges of 
contingency, idiosyncracy, and transience as the Humean desires it is 
intended to replace. 
 Now Nagel might reply that there is a difference between psychological 
inescapability and rational inescapability. That we very often fail to reason 
according to the rules of rational inference does not undermine the rational 
inescapability of modus ponens. Similarly, he might say, the fact that we often 
fail to conceive others as just as real as we are does not undermine the rational 
inescapability of doing so. If we are being rational, then, he might claim 
(following Kant's strategy), we must conceive others in this way. This would 
make the task of demonstrating the connection of this self-conception to 
rationality all the more pressing. 
 Finally, suppose we are inescapably committed to this self-conception. 
Does it inherently connect with altruistic behavior in the way Nagel claims? 
Nagel's compelling insight is into the connections among a certain kind of 
unselfishness, objectivity, and impersonality. My experience of the reality of 
another's interests both overrides, for the moment, my preoccupation with my 
own, and also, thereby, enables the interests that are a reason for him to act to 
become a reason for me to act on his behalf. Viewed from the impersonal 
standpoint, these interests are equally compelling regardless of which one of 
                                                
4John Wisdom, "Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, " in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Los 
Angeles: University of California, 1969), 169-180; also Other Minds (Los Angeles: 
University of California, 1965). 
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us I happen to be. These interests acquire objective validity – and thereby, 
rational inescapability – because their status as a reason for me to act is not 
diminished by the priority I subjectively accord to my own. It is the 
combination of these three elements that rationally compel me to action: At 
the moment I spy the wasp alighting on your hamburger, my own concerns 
recede into the background. The thought that you may bite down on it 
occupies my attention totally, and the necessity I feel of preventing you from 
doing so feels overwhelming and unquestionable. According to Nagel, this is 
because I impersonally recognize your interests as just as real, vivid and 
worthy of promotion as my own. 
 But may it not also happen, when I am feeling vulnerable and assaulted 
by the reality of my situation, that this vivid reality impels me to wince and 
withdraw into solitude or privacy? In fact, does it not often happen that we 
feel assaulted, overloaded, overwhelmed and even exploited and 
manipulated by vivid awareness of another’s need, misfortune, or imminent 
danger? In such cases, my self-conception as one among many equally real 
individuals may cause me to feel invaded, and to restrict or muffle rather than 
respond to the reality of the other. The worry then surfaces that despite the 
rational content of this self-conception, my actions may depend on other 
psychological events only contingently connected with it that may diminish 
or subvert its motivational influence on me. In order to show that altruism is a 
rational requirement on action, Nagel eventually will need to put all of these 
worries to rest. 
 
2. Prudence 
 
2.1. Transpersonal Rationality and Action 
 Altruistic reasons, as Nagel points out, are parasitic on self-interested 
ones:  In order for me to act to benefit your interests, you must already have 
such interests. So, Nagel reasons, the form of altruistic reasons for action will 
depend on the form of prudential ones. Therefore, an answer to the prudential 
question of whether our future interests provide us with present reasons to 
secure them, should precede the answer to the altruistic question of whether 
others' interests provide us with our own reason to secure them. Nagel's first 
task, then, will be to show that our own future interests give us rational 
motives for present action to secure them, without any temporally 
intermediate or present desires interposed between them. 
 But the metaphysical analogy Nagel proposes between altruism and 
prudence has even broader ramifications than this. In defending both altruism 
and prudence, Nagel implicitly rejects two defining elements in the Humean 
conception of the self. The first has to do with my spatial relation, as a 
bounded three-dimensional subject, to other discrete subjects who inhabit the 
same space. To whose interests should I give priority? Does the spatial 
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proximity and intimacy of my own interests and desires give me reason to 
accord them motivational priority as well, as I argue in Chapter XIV that 
Hume himself suggests? By defending the possibility of altruism, Nagel 
rejects the thesis that each human subject necessarily views her own interests 
as overriding in importance the interests of spatially discrete and relatively 
remote others.  
 The second defining element in the Humean conception of the self has to 
do with my temporal relation, as a bounded temporal subject, to past and 
future subjects who successively inhabit the same continuous time-line. 
Again, to whose interests should I give priority? Should I satisfy my present 
desires simply because of their temporal proximity to me? By defending the 
possibility of prudence, Nagel rejects the doctrine of pure time preference, 
that I should view satisfaction of my present desires as overriding in 
importance, because of their temporal proximity, the satisfaction of my future 
desires. Thus Nagel proposes to defend a conception of human action as 
guided by a transcendent, impersonal perspective on its own spatiotemporal 
limitations; that is, by transpersonal rationality. 
 It is possible to understand this transpersonal, spatiotemporally 
transcendent perspective as the very embodiment of rationality, according to 
one early analysis of what rationality is. According to Jonathan Bennett,5 this 
perspective is what distinguishes human agents as rational from other 
animals who appear to execute meaningful sequences of intentional actions 
that promote their common, long-term welfare, as bees do. Bennett argues 
that bees' behavior is biologically programmed stimulus-response behavior, 
independently of a genuine ability to conceive intentionally the elaborate 
sequence of plans that their behavior in fact carries out. By contrast, what 
makes us rational is our ability to make dated and universal judgments; to 
conceive any such act as a spatiotemporally localized instance of an abstract 
type of action which itself is not restricted to the spatiotemporal location of 
any particular token. This enables us, first of all, to range in thought over all 
such possible tokens, backward and forward in time and space; i.e. to connect 
conceptually what occurs in the indexical present to a possible or actual past 
and future, and to spatial locations other than this one. Second, it thereby 
enables us to abstract any such event or state of affairs from any particular 
spatiotemporal location at all, i.e. to understand it as a genuine and consistent 
abstract concept and apply it back to concrete circumstances accordingly. To 
do this, Bennett argues, is to exercise our capacity for theoretical reason: 
This is what generalizing and talking about the past have in common: 
they are both departures from that which is present and particular. This 
common feature is what links them with rationality. The idea of 
rationality is that of the ability, given certain present and particular data, 
                                                
5Rationality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1964). 
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to unite or relate them with other data in certain appropriate ways. This 
is the Kantian idea of concepts as unifiers, binders-together, creators of a 
multum in parvo. For there to be a 'multum' one must at one time 
intellectually possess more particular data than are present to one at that 
time, and for it to be 'in parvo' one must have rules or universal 
statements under which the particular data of which one is possessed can 
be subsumed. Thus: dated judgments and universal judgments.6  
Thus Nagel's defense of prudence and altruism can be understood as an 
attempt to exhibit and defend the connection between our ability to think 
abstractly and impersonally, and our ability to act, against two views – 
externalism and Humeanism – that deny that there is any such connection. 
The great challenge for such a project is to articulate this connection in such a 
way as to clarify how the abstract objects that we think about or believe – 
propositions, principles, concepts, reasons – might enter into a motivational 
explanation of concrete and particular actions.  
 
2.2. Nagel's Version of the Belief-Desire Model of Motivation 
 The anti-prudential and anti-altruistic view Nagel targets is recognizable 
as the belief-desire model of motivation. Nagel describes this model as 
asserting that  
all motivation has desire at its source. The natural position to be opposed 
is this: since all motivated action must result from the operation of some 
motivating factor within the agent, and since belief cannot by itself 
produce action, it follows that a desire of the agent must always be 
operative if the action is to be genuinely his. Anything else, any external 
factor or belief adduced in explanation of the action, must on this view be 
connected with it through some desire which the agent has at the time, a 
desire which can take the action or its goal as object. So any apparently 
prudential or altruistic act must be explained by the connection between 
its goal – the agent's future interest or the interest of another – and a 
desire which activates him now. Essentially this view denies the 
possibility of motivational action at a distance, whether over time or 
between persons. It bridges any apparent gaps with desires of the agent, 
which are thought to supply the necessary links to the future and to 
external situations. (27-8) 
The view Nagel means to criticize, then, consists in the following, Humean 
line of reasoning:  
 
(1) All action must be caused by some (present) motivating event;   
(2) belief by itself cannot cause action;  
(3) therefore desire must cause action, and  
                                                
6Ibid., 85. 
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(4) any other factor that may explain the action must be connected 
with a desire the agent has at the time of the action to perform that action 
(or achieve its goal).  
(5) Therefore, any prudential or altruistic act must be explained by 
connecting its goal with a present desire of the agent.  
 
Nagel depicts the belief-desire model as assuming that either a present desire 
must motivate action ((3)), or else there can be no present event to motivate 
action at all, since belief is impotent to do so ((2)). The alternative to a present 
motivating desire, as he sees it, is "motivational action at a distance, over time 
or between persons."  
 Now this alternative needs to be scrutinized very carefully. At first 
glance, it appears that Nagel is proposing to explain human action in terms of 
a kind of causation that is highly controversial regardless of the type of 
phenomena to be explained. That is, it appears that by "motivational action at 
a distance," Nagel means to refer to a species of causation at a distance: a 
remote mental event that has a proximate causal influence on my action with 
no intervening causal variables. In the case of altruism, the remote cause 
would be someone else's interest or occurrent desire as a proximate causal 
influence on my action. But in the case of prudence, the remote cause seems 
even more implausible. It would have to be my own future interest or desire 
as a future cause of my present action. This would be to advocate reverse 
causation.  Call this the implausible scenario.   
 
Figure 6. The Implausible Scenario 
 
This way of describing both cases raises the same questions you might raise if 
I were to tell you that a certain book had strongly influenced my actions, 
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without clearly indicating that I had actually read the book: What exactly, you 
might naturally ask, was my mode of access to its influential content? Did I in 
fact read it? Or did someone throw it at my head, effecting in me a brain 
concussion that explains my newly gentle and considerate behavior? 
 Similarly with the stipulated influence of someone else's – or my future – 
desire as a cause of my present action. The question naturally arises: Of what 
sort might my access to this spatially or temporally remote desire be? In the 
altruistic case, did you communicate your desire to me in a linguistic 
utterance, or through body language? Or does your desire have some special 
power to move me independent of these mundane ways of getting people to 
do things for us? In the prudential case, am I simply expecting or predicting 
my own future desire? Or do I have some special ability to foresee my future? 
Or do my future desires have a mysterious power to reach back through time 
and affect my present behavior? In either case, how likely is it that any such 
remote desire might influence my action, without my having any of the usual 
modes of epistemological access to it at all?  
 The fact of altruism is not adequately explained by hypothesizing a 
causal connection between your desire and my action, without at least one 
intervening causal factor, namely my apprehension of your desire – i.e. my 
occurrent, true belief that you have it. Similarly, the fact of prudence is not 
adequately explained by hypothesizing a causal connection between my 
future desire and my present action without at least one intervening causal 
factor, namely my occurrent, true belief that I will have it. Nor is it feasible to 
concede the necessity of such an intervening factor while denying it causal 
efficacy by fiat. In any plausible scenario, my present apprehension of the 
relevant desire is a necessary link in the causal chain connecting that desire 
with my present action directed to its satisfaction: 
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Figure 7. The Plausible Scenario 
 
 If Nagel were to grant this much, the question then would become 
whether it was the intentional content of the apprehension, or the event of its 
occurrence, or both, that was doing the causal work. If it were the mere event 
of its occurrence that had motivational influence, then it would be subject to 
the same contingent and idiosyncratic causal influences as any other mental 
event. On the other hand, if it were the intentional content that was supposed 
to be motivationally effective, then rational considerations should motivate 
action just in case I correctly apprehended that intentional content as rational, 
and not otherwise.  
For if I do not apprehend an intension as rational when in fact it is, then 
either I will be motivated to act on it for irrelevant reasons, or else there is no 
guarantee that I will be motivated to act on it when and whenever I 
apprehend it. And if I do apprehend it as rational when in fact it is not, then I 
may be motivated to act on it when and whenever I apprehend it, but this 
regularity itself will be causal without being rational. In each of these cases, 
moral motivation will depend on contingent cognitive influences independent 
of the rational inescapability of the intension itself; and it will then be the 
contingent event of my apprehension of the intension as rational, not the 
rationality of the intension itself, that is doing the causal work. Then moral 
motivation will depend on the unpredictable occurrence of this contingent 
mental event, i.e. of apprehension, and will be no more rationally inescapable 
than before. So, more specifically, in order for the rational content of a desire 
to be doing the requisite causal work, I must be motivated to act on it when 
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and only when I apprehend it as rational; and I must, other things equal, 
apprehend it as rational when and only when it is. 
 But initially to grant the assumption, that my apprehension of your or my 
future desire is a necessary intervening link in the causal chain connecting 
that desire with the action motivated by it, is to reject part of Nagel's stated 
project. That is, it is to agree with the first premise of the belief-desire model 
that Nagel claims to attack, i.e. that all action must be caused by some present 
motivating event. Premise (1) does not stipulate that this event must be a 
desire; conceivably it might be an apprehension, recognition, belief, or 
perception instead.  
 We shall see, however, that in explicating his own view, Nagel himself 
sometimes uses such locutions that implicitly support premise (1), and 
sometimes explicitly rejects it. Although Nagel will distinguish clearly 
between the motivational conditions governing dated, present-tense 
judgments and tenseless judgments of what we have reason to do, he does, 
nevertheless, introduce such intervening causal factors at several points in the 
course of his own analysis of each. Hence he himself sometimes concurs with 
this premise of the belief-desire model. Nagel's analysis in fact constitutes an 
attack, not on premise (1), which he implicitly accepts for his own account (as 
he does premises (4) and (5)); but on premise (2), that belief by itself cannot 
motivate action, and on premise (3), that desire must. Although he claims to 
show that the structure of means-end reasoning itself can influence action, I 
propose that this is not where the true force of his arguments lay. Instead, 
they suggest that certain kinds of occurrent belief – i.e. about what reason requires 
and about what kind of beings we are – can motivate action, namely those beliefs that 
have the status of reasons. So it is in Nagel's implicit assumption that occurrent 
belief rather than desire might motivate action that his analysis does, in fact, 
suggest the outlines of a genuine alternative to the belief-desire model. 
 I say that Nagel's account contains the resources for such an alternative. 
But this is not the project he explicitly undertakes. He claims to attack premise 
(1), that all action must be caused by some (present) motivating event, and so 
to defend the possibility of literal "motivational action at a distance." This 
degree of divergence from the belief-desire model will be difficult to defend, 
for it suggests that not only are present desires unnecessary to motivate 
action; any other kind of present mental event is equally unnecessary. Thus it 
implies that our own future interests, or those of another, could cause us to act 
at the appropriate time and place, without our being in some sense 
occurrently aware of them at the time of action. I have described this scenario 
as implausible, and not only because Nagel offers no alternative mode of 
epistemological access to these interests. In addition, he offers no alternative 
factors to explain why one performs a particular action at a particular time 
and place on behalf of those interests, rather than a slightly different one half 
an hour later or two blocks away.  
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 Nagel attends to each of the first three premises of the belief-desire model 
at different points in the text without clearly marking his intentions. He 
sometimes addresses premise (1), sometimes premise (2), sometimes premise 
(3), and sometimes neglects to distinguish among them. In working through 
this complex analysis, it will help to ask the following questions repeatedly: 
What present, causally effective mental event is in fact being invoked at any 
particular point to explain the agent's prudential or altruistic action? And if 
none is, what is being assumed to explain why it occurs precisely when and 
where it does? 
 
2.3. Motivated versus Unmotivated Desires 
 Nagel argues that premise 2.2.(3) of the belief-desire model, that desire 
must cause action, is the consequence of a failure to distinguish between 
motivated and unmotivated desires. An unmotivated desire is one that "just 
assails us," such as an appetite or emotion. It has causal antecedents, as, for 
example, the causal antecedent of hunger is lack of food. But an unmotivated 
desire has no cognitive motivational antecedents, as, for example, a desire to 
go shopping may be preceded by a pang of hunger plus a belief that there is 
no food in the house. "The issue," Nagel observes, "is whether another desire 
always lies behind the motivated one, or whether sometimes the motivation 
of the initial desire involves no reference to another, unmotivated desire" (29). 
Nagel thinks it clear that not all actions need include unmotivated desires 
among their antecedents. But to establish this, he will need to establish an 
alternative foundation in the requirements of rationality for our temporally 
extended and impersonal self-conception as one person among many. He will 
have to show that this self-conception is not just another contingent and 
transient object of an unmotivated desire that assails us in moments of 
vulnerability or the need to escape the burden and intensity of our immediate 
and particular circumstances. Otherwise some other mental events – 
deliberating, reflecting, considering – that express this self-conception would 
be little more than the object of such an unmotivated desire – and so would 
come and go as they do. 
 Nagel defines a motivated desire as one caused by some prior 
psychological event. The event may be an antecedent unmotivated desire, 
such as hunger; or an antecedent motivated one, such as the desire for certain 
recipe ingredients; or it may be a decision or belief or judgment itself arrived 
at as the conclusion of a process of deliberation; or some combination thereof. 
Nagel's claim is that the explanation of a motivated desire is identical to the 
explanation of the action it causes. So, for example, my desire to take the 
LSATs is explained by my prior desire to go to law school, plus my belief that 
passing the LSATs is a necessary condition of admission to law school. My 
desire to take the LSATs is a motivated desire, in that what explains my actual 
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action of taking the LSATs is not my desire to take the LSATs, but rather my 
prior desire to go to law school plus my beliefs about how best to get there. 
 Nagel's point is that whenever we invoke a desire to perform act A in 
order to explain why someone performs act A, we have not really explained 
the performance of act A until we have an explanation for why the person 
desired to perform act A. And when we have that latter explanation, 
adverting to the desire to perform act A itself becomes irrelevant. Thus 
Nagel's claim constitutes an attack on the belief-desire model principle that 
we can explain a person's pursuit of a certain goal by ascribing to her a desire 
to pursue that goal. His argument is that it is trivially true, by definition of 
pursuing a goal, according to the belief-desire model, that the agent has a 
desire to pursue that goal; the presence of that desire is a conceptual truth. As 
we have seen in Chapter II, this is my complaint exactly about the belief-
desire model. Therefore, Nagel goes on, in achieving a substantive 
understanding of why someone does something, we can effectively disregard 
her desire to do that thing as redundant, and concentrate on the antecedent 
conditions – the reflection, deliberation, beliefs, judgments, or prior motivated 
or unmotivated desires – that cause the action:   
That I have the appropriate desire simply follows from the fact that these 
considerations motivate me; if the likelihood that an act will promote my 
future happiness motivates me to perform it now, then it is appropriate to 
ascribe to me a desire for my own future happiness. But nothing follows 
about the role of the desire as a condition contributing to the motivational 
efficacy of those considerations. It is a necessary condition of their 
efficacy to be sure, but only a logically necessary condition. It is not 
necessary either as a contributing influence, or as a causal condition (29-
30). 
 Now if motivated desires are only conceptual truths, then they have no 
motivational efficacy; and their antecedents are doing the only real causal 
work in precipitating action. Since unmotivated desires need not be present as 
causal antecedents of action, certain occurrent cognitive events – believings, 
considerings, recognizings or acceptings of principles or judgments – would 
seem, by a process of elimination, to suffice to motivate some actions. This 
possibility, if developed, would constitute an attack on both premise 2.2.(2) 
and premise 2.2.(3) of the belief-desire model. For by furnishing 
motivationally effective antecedent psychological events other than desire, it 
would not only challenge the thesis that desire must cause action (premise 
2.2.(3)), but dispute the thesis that belief by itself cannot (premise 2.2.(2)).  
 However, even if motivated desires are not only conceptual truths but 
identifiable mental events as well, other such occurrent cognitive events 
would still have motivational efficacy as causal antecedents of action. For 
where unmotivated desires are absent, these motivated desires themselves 
would have to be the effect of prior acts of deliberation or evaluation. I show 
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in Chapter XI that this is precisely the status Richard Brandt assigns the 
concept of rational desire; and consider further the question whether this 
makes Brandt a Kantian or Nagel a Humean.  
 The textual evidence for the ontological status of motivated desires is 
ambiguous. The above passage denies that motivating desires play a 
necessary role in causing action. But shortly thereafter Nagel remarks that 
"[o]ften the desires which an agent necessarily experiences in acting will be 
motivated exactly as the action is. If the act is motivated by reasons stemming 
from certain external factors, and the desire to perform it is motivated by those 
same reasons, the desire obviously cannot be among the conditions for the 
presence of those reasons" (30; italics added). From this latter passage we can 
infer that the agent necessarily experiences motivated desires that really are 
motivated by prior psychological events. This means that they cannot be 
merely conceptual truths; they are substantive experiences as well. And later, 
in discussing the motivational role of present-tensed practical judgments that 
one has reason to act, Nagel says, "This judgment possesses motivational 
content, for one then regards the undertaking as justified, and this is sufficient 
to explain one's wanting it to happen, be happening, or have happened.  Such 
a desire will form even if one does not know what time it is" (70-71; italics 
added). Again the implication is that a practical judgment can cause a 
motivated desire, considered as an occurrent mental state, to exist.  
 Similarly, when Nagel later discusses the implications of trying to apply a 
subjective principle from the impersonal perspective, he remarks that 
although one may then be able to identify those of the agent's acts justified by 
the subjective principle, "this is a mere classification without motivational 
content – without the acceptance of a justification for wanting anything" (122; 
italics added). Here Nagel equates motivational content with the acceptance 
of a justification for wanting something, from which we can infer that the 
justified want has motivational influence. This, too, makes it more than only a 
conceptual truth. From all four passages taken together, it would seem to 
follow that motivated desires do not necessarily play a causal role, but do 
necessarily play an experiential role. From this it would follow, in turn, that 
we necessarily experience certain mental events, namely motivated desires, 
that do not necessarily have causal impact on action. But how a consciously 
experienced mental event could fail to affect us causally in some way – if only 
to alter our brain chemistry slightly – remains obscure. 
 Nagel has averred more recently that "sometimes a motivated desire is a 
conscious mental state or event, even though its motivational force depends 
on the reasons behind it." He also characterizes it as a "propositional attitude, 
and therefore an intentional state."7 These statements imply that a motivated 
desire can be (but is not necessarily) a mental event denoted by a sentence of 
                                                
7Private communication of 20 September 1991. 
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the form, "I desire that P," where "P" is the description of my performing the 
action in question; and that this mental event has motivational force only if 
the practical judgments that cause it to form do. So a motivated desire is 
among the causal antecedents of action only if  
 
(1) it is a mental event; and either 
(2) it is preceded by a motivationally effective practical judgment or  
(3) it is preceded by unmotivated desires.   
 
 We have already seen that unmotivated desires (2.3.(3)) are unnecessary 
as causal antecedents of action. Let us then consider 2.3.(2). Nagel claims that 
practical judgments that one has reason to do something always have 
motivational efficacy, so motivated desires that are mental events preceded by 
such judgments always do as well. If practical judgments that one has reason 
to act always have motivational content, then they have it whether or not that 
judgment itself is well founded. So it is the occurrence of the judgment rather 
than the recognition of its rational content as rational that motivationally 
influences action. It is then possible that the occurrent cognitive mental events 
that precede a motivated desire might consist in mental ruminations, 
associations, and imaginings that cause the desire but do not justify it; and 
that on the one hand do not just assail us, but on the other provide no reasons 
for the actions we take in response to them, either. So as yet we cannot regard 
that content as a rationally inescapable requirement on action.  
So far no link has been established between the actual rationality of a 
judgment and its motivational efficacy. The conjunction of 2.3.(1) and 2.3.(2) 
leaves open the possibility that an irrational or nonrational judgment might 
cause an equally irrational or nonrational motivated desire, which in turn 
might issue an irrational or nonrational action. Judgments of this kind cannot 
provide criteria for the rational evaluation of desire, nor, therefore, for 
rational altruism in action. 
 Finally, consider 2.3.(1). A motivated desire may, according to 2.3.(1) 
alone, be a mental event that is in itself causally impotent. But it is also 
possible that it may be causally effective because preceded only by causally 
effective occurrent cognitive events such as believings, considerings, or 
deliberatings. So even if motivated desires are more than mere conceptual 
truths, Nagel's view implies that practical judgments, and the occurrent 
cognitive events they involve, may be the sole motivationally effective 
psychological antecedents of action in some cases.  
 Nagel has intimated something of this kind all along. For example, he 
earlier defined altruistic action as "any behavior motivated merely by the belief 
that someone else will benefit or avoid harm by it” (16, n. 1; italics added). He 
also characterized his own position as "one which ties the motivation to the 
cognitive content of ethical claims, [and] requires the postulation of 
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motivational influences which one cannot reject once one becomes aware of them" 
(8; italics added).  Similarly, in his critique of G. E. Moore's internalism, he 
concluded that 
if one wishes to tie the requirement of motivation influence to the truth-
conditions of moral claims, with the consequence that if someone recognizes 
their grounds, he cannot but be affected accordingly, then a stricter 
motivational connection will be required (9; italics added). 
These are only a few of the many passages in which Nagel seems to 
acknowledge that conscious beliefs – or rather, believings – and recognizings 
may be occurrent psychological events that can motivate an agent to action, 
just as desires may, and even where no desires are present. 
 This is enough to put a serious dent in the belief-desire model of 
motivation, despite Nagel's more modestly reformist intentions. Nagel will 
have vanquished premises 2.2.(2) and 2.2.(3). He will have shown that desires 
need not cause action, and that other kinds of things besides unmotivated 
desires can cause action in those cases where motivated desires do not. This is 
not, after all, merely to furnish a rationally critical ethical basis for such 
desires. It is potentially to eliminate them altogether from the causal account, 
and replace them – at least in some explanations – with states that are not 
desires at all.  
 But what kinds of states? Other kinds of physical events? Or abstract 
objects of thought? The following passage does not resolve this question: 
If considerations of future happiness can motivate by themselves, then 
they can explain and render intelligible the desire for future happiness 
which is ascribable to anyone whom they do motivate (30). 
Are "considerations" identical to occurrences of "considerings"? If so, it is not 
farfetched to entertain them as identifiable motivational influences on action, 
and thereby to repudiate premise 2.2.(2). Or by "considerations" does Nagel 
mean "the propositions or principles considered"? In this case, we really do 
need to know how Nagel explicates the causal relations between the rational 
content of such abstract principles and the actions they are presumed to 
motivate. 
 In order to see how Nagel resolves this question, we must find out more 
about what differentiates rational desires from nonrational ones. Identifying 
this criterion will enable us to decide whether it itself can be motivationally 
effective, or whether it merely enables us to cull the bases of altruistic action 
from those of self-interested action. Nagel seems to have the latter possibility 
in mind, when he draws an analogy between beliefs as the material for 
theoretical reasoning and reason itself as its inference structure, on the one 
hand, and desire as providing the material for practical reasoning and 
"something besides desire" that "explains how reasons function" on the other 
(31). He says, "This element accounts for many of the connections between 
reasons (including the reasons which stem from desires) and action. It also 
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explains those general desires which embody our acceptance of the principles of 
practical reason" (31; italics added). 
 There are at least two important points to be drawn from these passages. 
First, Nagel clearly thinks our acceptance of the principles of practical reason 
are embodied in desires of a certain sort. This may mean either that  
 
(4) we express our acceptance of these principles by having certain 
desires;  
 
or that  
 
(5) our acceptance of these principles are motivated by such desires.   
 
2.3.(5) would surrender the field to the Humean for all practical purposes, so 
to speak. But even 2.3.(4) concedes to the Humean entirely too much. For if 
what our acceptance of these principles comes to is just that we have certain 
sorts of desires, then by definition these desires must be unmotivated, not 
motivated desires. And then whatever action follows from thus accepting 
them cannot exclude unmotivated desires from being among its motivational 
influences. In this case, unmotivated desires – to reason, reflect, or deliberate – 
are necessary causal antecedents of those occurrent rational activities, and 
hence are no more or less rationally inescapable than those activities 
themselves. And it did seem that Nagel meant to resist this conclusion in the 
passage from pages 29 to 30, quoted earlier. 
 The second point to notice in these passages is Nagel's description of 
something that plays the same, formal role for desire that principles of 
theoretical reason play for belief. Nagel believes that a reason in itself must be 
able to motivate action, not because it contains some further, independent 
motivational factor (like a desire) among its conditions of application. Again, 
on the face of it, this is controversial at the very least. A reason, like a 
proposition or principle, is an abstract object, a "consideration" with rational 
content. Abstracts objects are not a species of causal event. So it is not easy to 
see how by themselves they might make any such event occur – or, in case 
they might, how they might bring it about that the actions they cause occur at 
just the spatiotemporal locations they do. 
 
2.4. Means-End Reasoning and the Extraordinary Interpretation 
 Nagel proposes that the motivational efficacy of reasons derives from 
"the principle governing their derivation from" the "conditions for their 
existence" (32), i.e. the principle of means-end reasoning; and that "[a]ny 
acceptance of a reason for action must conform to the general principle 
concerning means and ends" (35). By this he means that certain ends of action 
provide reasons for undertaking the actions required to bring them about. For 
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example, if I have a long-term interest in becoming a lawyer, then I have a 
reason for passing the LSATs and so a reason for taking them. The principle 
that governs this inference says, roughly, that I have reason to take the means 
that will advance my ends. This principle expresses clearly the basic idea 
behind the utility-maximization model of rationality that I have already 
examined in Chapters III and IV.  
 But notice that, here as in Chapters III and IV, this principle of means-end 
reasoning is structurally independent of the belief-desire model of motivation, 
since forward-looking propositional pro-attitudes toward my ends are not the 
only motives this model of rationality can accommodate. Forward-looking 
propositional attitudes as such, containing no favorable or unfavorable 
evaluation of their objects – anticipation or resolution, for example, combined 
with backward-looking motives such as moral conviction, concern, or fear 
may also motivate means-end deliberation about which actions will best 
achieve the ends in question. I discuss this distinction between forward- and 
backward-looking motives at greater length in Volume II.  
Nagel argues that my recognition of the application of this principle, i.e. 
that my action is a means to the achievement of my ends, makes my reason 
for passing the LSATs – that it will help me become a lawyer – motivationally 
effective. This is a "general principle concerning means and ends" (35), namely 
that "[r]easons are transmitted across the relation between ends and means, 
and that is also the commonest and simplest way that motivational influence 
is transmitted. No further desires are needed to explain this phenomenon" 
(33).8   
 By the claim that reasons are transmitted across the relation between 
ends and means, Nagel means, then, that the end or goal provides a reason for 
taking the means to achieve it. Thus the circumstance of having a particular 
end furnishes a reason for that action identifiable as a means to its 
achievement (and not for actions that are not thus identifiable). And by the 
claim that this is also the way motivational influence is transmitted, Nagel 
means that the end in question also – thereby – provides the agent with a 
motive for achieving it.  
 Now if we interpret this thesis in the ordinary way, Nagel is observing 
simply that the occurrent thought of the end I wish to achieve motivates me to 
achieve it. This would provide a genuine alternative to the belief-desire model 
because it would not require that I have a desire of any sort, whether 
motivated or unmotivated, to achieve that end. Instead I might be motivated 
antecedently by the voice of conscience, or recognition of moral obligation, or 
a sense of compassion, or a reflective resolution to formulate and then achieve 
the end in question. However, my thought of my end is in the present; only 
                                                
8However, not any end can furnish a reason for action, according to Nagel. Ends that 
are merely objects of desire do not. 
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the prognosticated end itself – i.e. the object I represent in my thought – is in 
the future. By having denied the necessity of a presently motivating mental 
event, denied that beliefs (or thoughts) can motivate action, and committed 
himself to defending motivational action at a temporal distance, Nagel has 
committed himself to the following, extraordinary interpretation of the above 
thesis: that it is not my present thought of the end that now moves me to act, 
but rather the future end itself that transmits motivational influence back to me 
in my present state! 
 
Figure 8. The Ordinary vs. the Extraordinary Interpretation 
 
 As frequently occurs in this complex text, Nagel offers us an exegetical 
choice at this juncture. First, we may refuse to take Nagel at his word, and so 
reject the extraordinary interpretation by turning our attention to turns of 
phrase that indicate that Nagel implicitly intends to advance the ordinary 
interpretation instead. For example, Nagel says, "The problem is how any 
considerations about the future, about the long-range outcomes of alternative 
courses of action, can affect an individual's behaviour in the present" (37). 
Again on the same page, he states, "The issue, by now a familiar one, is 
whether the effect on present action of beliefs about my future interests must 
be explained by an intervening desire, or whether the connection can be made 
through a requirement of practical reason by which actions are governed." In 
both of these passages – in addition to many others that could be cited, Nagel 
deploys phrases – "considerations about the future," "beliefs about my future 
interests" - that lend themselves to the ordinary interpretation, i.e. that a 
present mental event, namely an occurrent belief (or "considering") about my 
future, governed by requirements of practical reasoning, motivates me to act 
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so as to secure my future wellbeing. (Also see pages 36, 39, 40, 44, 45, passim, 
where Nagel uses the term "expectation" in the same sense.)  
The problem with the ordinary interpretation already has been 
mentioned: To construe beliefs, considerings, or expectations as nothing but 
motivationally effective present mental events is to divest them of any 
necessary connection with rational rather than merely causal sequences of 
thought and action. In this case, prudential (and altruistic) action would be no 
more or less rational than motivation by unmotivated desires – unless Nagel 
can supply an account of how rational content motivates moral action with 
rational inescapability.  
 Second, we may opt for the extraordinary interpretation and see how far 
we can take it. The extraordinary interpretation requires us to make sense of 
the thesis that a future end – my securing of my wellbeing along some 
particular dimension – by itself affects me motivationally in the present. How 
could this possibly happen? Nagel's answer is that if an end is a genuine 
reason, then it is a timeless reason: It is a reason not just for one particular act-
token, but instead for a class of act-types that promote that end; and that class 
contains no explicit temporal restrictions on when the act-token must be 
performed. Of course it must bear a certain kind of temporal relation to the 
end itself: the act-token cannot temporally succeed the end it is supposed to 
promote. But this relation itself is perfectly general, in that it does not restrict 
the occurrence of the act-token to any one temporal domain. Since a timeless 
reason applies to a temporally unrestricted domain of act-tokens, it cannot 
explain why a particular act-token that is justified by it is performed at the 
particular moment it is. By contrast, a dated reason is one derived from a 
timeless reason that obtains in the present at the time of action. Nagel also 
argues that dated reasons, in turn, imply timeless reasons plus a statement 
relating the reason to the time of utterance; and that to accept only dated but 
not timeless reasons demonstrates a failure to identify oneself as unified 
through time. Note that a dated reason as such does not entail a dated, 
occurrent event. 
 Thus Nagel explains the transmission of motivational influence from an 
end "backwards" in time to the action taken to secure it, by elevating the end 
in question to a general and unitemporal, or timeless, status. As Nagel 
expresses it, 
If there is a reason to do something on a particular occasion, it must be 
specifiable in general terms which allow that same reason to be present 
on different occasions, perhaps as a reason for doing other things. All 
such general specifications, whatever else may be true of them, will share 
a certain formal feature. They will never limit the application of the 
reason to acts of one sort only, but will always include other acts which 
promote those of the original kind. (35) 
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Figure 9. Timeless vs. Dated Reasons 
 
So, for example, if becoming a lawyer is a reason for me to take the LSATs, it 
is also a reason for me to pass them, and also to go to law school. Moreover, it 
is a reason for me to work as a paralegal not just today, when I am feeling 
ambitious, but all summer, although the weather is pleasant and the outdoors 
beckons. Similarly (to take Nagel's own example), if my future vacation in 
Italy is a reason for me to learn Italian now, it is also a reason for me to speak 
it fluently when I am there. Finally, my future vacation in Italy, by virtue of 
being a reason for me to learn Italian now, becomes a reason for me to now 
enroll in Conversational Italian, Level I at the university.  
 Thus it is a consequence of what Nagel describes as the "timeless 
generality of reasons" that my future ends give me not only present, dated 
reasons to perform acts that promote them (e.g. to take the LSATs), but 
present reasons to perform acts (e.g. to work as a paralegal) for which I expect 
there to be a reason in the future. If my future end is indeed a reason, then it is 
always a reason; and a fortiori, it is a reason now. 
 But is this enough to defeat the unpalatable implications of the 
extraordinary interpretation? Even if Nagel is right about the timeless 
generality of reasons (and I think he is), conferring this status on certain ends 
is not sufficient to motivate one to act in their service without some further 
element, such as an occurrent thought, belief, or expectation about them, that 
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connects them to me in my present state and gives me epistemological access 
to them. Without some such element, Nagel is reduced to the externalist's 
claim that I have a reason for certain actions even if I do not know or believe 
that I do, and a fortiori even if I am not motivated to perform them. And 
indeed there are passages in the text that invite this reading. For example, 
when he says that "if the event is future this principle has the consequence 
that one has a present reason to promote it simply because there will be a 
reason for it to happen when it happens, and not because of any further 
condition which obtains now" (48), he implies that one has a present reason to 
promote this future event irrespective even of one's present beliefs about this 
event, and a fortiori irrespective of whether or not one knows one has a reason 
to promote it. This is another passage in which Nagel seems to mean to attack 
premises 2.2.(2) and 2.2.(3), under the guise of attacking premise 2.2.(1). 
 Nagel supplies one such an element by embedding my future interest in a 
self-conception as unified over time, which, he thinks, I have at any particular 
time. To view my future end as a timelessly general reason for present action, 
I must now believe I will be the same person then as I am now, and hence that 
my future interests are in some sense my present interests as well. Thus I gain 
epistemological access to my future interests and desires by embedding them 
in a self-conception I now believe holds true of me both now and later. He 
says, 
The hypothesis that all links to the future are made by present desires 
suggests that the agent at any specific time is insular, that he reaches 
outside himself to take an interest in his future as one may take an 
interest in the affairs of a distant country. The relation of a person to 
temporally distant states of his life must be closer than that. His concern 
about his own future does not require an antecedent desire or interest to 
explain it. There must already be a connection which renders the interest 
intelligible, and which depends not on his present condition but on the 
future's being part of his life (38-9; also see 42-3). 
According to Nagel, it is because, from a standpoint of temporal neutrality, I 
identify with all past and future, equally real stages of myself as forming a 
single life that future, reason-providing interests provide timeless reasons for 
me now to act, even though those interests themselves are to be fulfilled in the 
future. So part of the ethical (strictly speaking, metaethical) foundation Nagel 
proposes for evaluating the rationality of desire is the conception of oneself as 
unified through time, such that timeless reasons express values that define the 
self and in turn generate dated reasons to act at appropriate moments. If the 
motivationally effective desires one has at such a moment are justified by 
those reasons, then those desires are rational. 
 Is this enough to answer the questions raised about our relation to our 
future interests? In order for timeless reasons to explain why I now act on 
behalf of my future interests, Nagel's stipulation of an underlying self-
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conception of myself as the same person later that I am now implies that I 
conceive myself as a person whose interests later are equally, therefore, my 
interests now. The first question would be whether this self-conception is 
accurate, i.e. whether I am in fact the same person later that I am now. But 
assume it is accurate. This does not necessarily imply that my interests later 
are the same as my interests now. Surely I can change my mind about at least 
some centrally important matters without renouncing my personal identity. 
Indeed, recall the argument from Chapter IV, that minimal psychological 
consistency requires only one long-term preference not subject to revision in 
ranking status on each occasion on which pairwise comparisons are made. 
But let us give Nagel the benefit of the doubt here as well. 
 Nagel does not claim, but the plausible reading of his argument suggests, 
that I now must know what those future interests are, in virtue of knowing 
my self-conception, in order for them to now motivate my present action. If 
my future interests are my present interests because my future self is as much 
part of my life as my present self, then my future interests are, at the very 
least, also my present interests. If they are also my present interests, then there 
is no great mystery as to why they should now motivate me to act to secure 
their future satisfaction, but also no reason to deny premise 2.2.(1), since this 
account is compatible with it. What motivates me to secure my future 
interests is the present desire to secure interests that are both present and 
future (or, on the broader, ordinary interpretation, perhaps the presently 
motivating thought of those interests as equally my interests now). 
 To ignore or repudiate this self-conception, Nagel argues, is to act only on 
those dated reasons that I acknowledge to obtain at the time of action – in 
which case I have neither reason to prepare for future eventualities, nor 
reason to regret those I have ignored, nor reason to repudiate later those I 
now know I will want to repudiate then (40, 42, 58). So even if such 
indifference to other stages of myself were possible, it would express a 
dissociation so radical as to subvert future-directed action altogether.  
 
2.5. Tensed versus Tenseless Judgments  
 Nagel effectively concedes the necessity of a present mental event, 
alternative to desire, which can serve to motivate my present action, by 
introducing the distinction between tensed and tenseless judgment. He argues 
that a temporally dissociated (or pure time-preferential) self makes only 
present-tensed judgments about what it now has reason to do. These reasons 
will refer to ends or interests the agent now wishes to promote. Hence tensed 
judgments embed dated reasons in present mental acts of judging what one 
now has reason to do. However, Nagel argues, any such tensed judgment 
implies a tenseless one made from a standpoint of temporal neutrality – the 
standpoint of a self unified over time. This judgment embeds a timeless 
reason that applies derivatively to the particular act-token that now promotes 
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the ends or interests in question (49, 54). The tenseless judgment itself occurs 
at the particular moment the tensed judgment is made, but it does not refer to 
that particular moment any more than to any other. Thus its derivative status 
unfits it for explaining why the act-token occurs precisely when it does. For 
that we need the tensed judgment that implies it. So the present mental event 
alternative to desire that motivates my present action is an occurrent act of 
judging that I now have reason to perform that action. 
 
Figure 10. Tensed vs. Tenseless Judgments 
 
 Nagel considers the objection that a tenseless truth about a future time 
may not be true in the present, if the event to which the tenseless judgment 
refers is not one we now have reason to foresee:  
[I]t may be true on 15 May that there is an airline strike. But it may not 
yet be true on 1 May that on 15 May there will be an airline strike, and in 
that case how can it be even tenselessly true on 1 May that there is an 
airline strike on 15 May? And if that is not true on 1 May, how can it 
create a reason on 1 May to arrange alternative land transportation to 
Chicago for 15 May (54)? 
Nagel considers two solutions to this question. The first would be the 
externalist's solution. It would be that in fact there is a tenseless truth about 
the future and a derivative, dated reason for acting in the present, but that the 
agent cannot know this. Just as the externalist would avow the existence of 
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reasons that do not motivate, he would similarly avow the existence of 
reasons the agent cannot know or recognize.  
 A strong reading of the externalist's solution would rely on the 
assumption of causal determination of the future, independently of the 
agent's ability to predict or know it. It would assume that there is a fact of the 
matter about whether there will be an airline strike on 15 May, independently 
of whether anyone, including the strikers, knows this; and therefore that 
reasons for arranging alternative land transportation to Chicago at a certain 
time themselves may exist timelessly, independently of when or whether 
anyone knows that the conditions they cite will obtain.  
  A weaker reading of the externalist's solution would say merely that, 
once the union decides to hold an airline strike on 15 May, there is a fact of the 
matter about whether there will be one, independently of whether the agent 
planning her trip knows this; and therefore, that once the union's decision is 
made, that her reason for arranging alternative transportation exists, 
independently of whether she in fact knows that the conditions it cites will 
obtain. Note that that Nagel's concept of a timeless reason strictly requires the 
first, stronger reading of the externalist's claim, because the weaker reading 
temporally localizes the reason to the actual existence of the conditions it cites. 
I do not regard the commitment to causal determinism inherent in the 
stronger reading as problematic. I mean only to point out that Nagel's concept 
of a timeless reason requires it.9 
 A second possible solution – the one Nagel accepts – is to say that the 
agent "has no reason to promote an end until it is true that the reason-
predicate holds or will hold of that end" (54-55). This is in fact consistent with 
the first, externalist solution, because it observes the distinction between there 
being a reason for action and the agent's consciously having a reason for 
action. Nagel's solution proposes that a necessary precondition of consciously 
having a reason for action is that the agent's end provide her with that reason.  
 Now the strong externalist would say that an end that provides a bona fide 
reason for action is an end she has – timelessly, regardless of when she 
consciously adopts it. The weak externalist would say that she must 
                                                
9Nagel later (62, n. 2) attempts to dispose of the objection that his view precludes the 
existence of future contingencies not determinable from present conditions, by 
proposing tenseless judgments of probability (or, as he puts it, the relative 
"definiteness" of a future event) for the existence of conditions that supply reasons for 
action. The problem is that the expected existence of such conditions must be assigned a 
certain degree of probability before they can become reasons for action; and that that 
assignment will change, according to the information about its probability available at 
the time. Hence judgments of probability are implicitly tensed judgments that become 
tenseless in proportion as p approaches 1. This presents a problem for Nagel's view only 
if it is implausible to assume the operation of causal determinism at the macro-level of 
action. I do not think it is. 
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consciously adopt that end before she can have it – and so before that end can 
be a reason for her action, whether or not she then recognizes it as such. But 
the internalist would reply that she cannot adopt that end – i.e. to get to 
Chicago despite the airline strike – until she knows about the airline strike on 
15 May. Once she knows about the airline strike, she deliberately adopts the 
end of getting to Chicago despite it. But once she does that, she recognizes it 
as a reason to arrange alternative land transportation. So there is a reason, in 
this case, if and only if she has a reason; and she has a reason when and only 
when she consciously adopts it. So despite claims Nagel makes elsewhere 
(55), internalism, even of a not-obviously-Humean variety, does locate her 
reason for action within a particular temporal domain, i.e. between the time 
she learns of the pending airline strike and the time it occurs. Timeless 
reasons, on Nagel's account, are not timeless strictly speaking. Rather, they 
obtain within a specific temporal domain of a temporally restricted self, 
unified throughout that restricted time. 
 These two solutions thus reopen the Kantian dilemma, i.e. the conflict 
between the Kantian rationalist's requirement that reasons be universal, 
objective and necessary, and the internalist's that they be motivationally 
effective for a spatiotemporally localized and contingent agent. What Nagel 
needs here is a way of retaining the (relative) timelessness of the reason itself 
consistently with the agent's epistemically limited access to it. He should 
accept the strong externalist's solution and simply add that a reason itself can 
be (relatively) timeless even though the agent's epistemological access to it is 
dated. Nagel suggests but does not develop something like this possibility 
when he avers that 
although the conditions which confer a reason on an event have been 
conceded not to be timeless, the value which that reason embodies is still 
timeless, and can transmit its influence from future to past, once it is clear 
that the reason will be present (55; italics added).10 
 
2.6. Motivational Content and the Extraordinary Interpretation 
 A tenseless statement expresses the sense of an assertion that may be 
made at different times and in different tenses; it expresses "what is asserted 
in common by past, present, and future [tensed] statements about the same 
circumstance or state of affairs" (61). It thereby expresses the standpoint of 
temporal neutrality that regards each stage of the speaker's life as equally real 
and equally a part of that person's life. We have seen that this conception of 
oneself as temporally extended then may be invoked as a criterion of 
adequacy for reasons for action: 
                                                
10 Elsewhere I argue that a distinction between the dictates of reason themselves as 
abstract objects and particular instances of reasoning in accordance with them is also 
part of Kant's solution to the question of how universal and necessary reason can cause 
particular act-tokens that conform to its moral prescriptions. 
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I contend that one can ask of a practical principle or a reason for action 
whether it is consistent with the conception of oneself as a person 
extended in time, or whether the acceptance of it must be dissociated 
from that conception. Some principles and reasons are in accord with the 
conception, but others, I believe, are not, for their acceptance is not 
compatible with the neutrality of viewpoint toward different times whose 
possibility I have argued is essential. (63) 
Accordingly, tenseless judgments made from the perspective of temporal 
neutrality that are reasons for action are judgments "that certain acts or 
desires on my part will be justified at that time." The judgment that 
 
^certain acts and desires on my part will be justified at tk^ 
 
is itself an example of such a judgment. 
 Nagel claims that a tenseless judgment "has motivational content. To 
accept a reason for doing something is to accept a reason for doing it, not 
merely for believing that one should do it" (64). This is the basis on which 
action and desire is to be rationally criticized (64-5). What is motivational 
content? The motivational content of a judgment involves a "commitment to 
act, or to desire" (64). In fact, Nagel says that a judgment that I have reason to 
do A itself includes the acceptance of a justification for doing it (65); and later 
defines motivational content as the acceptance of a justification for doing or 
wanting something (109). So a tenseless judgment that I have reason to do A 
itself includes, not only a justification for doing A, but also the acceptance of 
that justification for doing A; and this acceptance of a justification, Nagel 
argues, can be motivationally effective. Thus according to Nagel, tenseless 
practical judgments that I have reason to do A have causal efficacy built into 
them.  
 But is it true that tenselessly acknowledging that I have reason to do A 
can move me now to do A? Nagel first addresses the motivational content of 
present-tense judgments: judgments that I now have reason to perform some 
action. He argues that to deny the motivational content of present-tense 
judgments is to open the door to an infinite regress of justifications for doing 
what it is justified to believe one should do, and none of which then count as 
the conclusion of practical reasoning, namely that one should act accordingly. 
He acknowledges that motivational content does not necessarily imply 
motivational efficacy in every case, since "motivational interference" in the 
form of weakness of will, cowardice, laziness, etc. is always possible. But he 
goes further, by claiming that if no such interference is present and the agent 
still fails to perform the justified act, doubt is cast on the supposition that he 
actually accepts the judgment in the first place: 
It is undeniable that someone may acknowledge a reason for action and 
fail to act. Indefinitely many circumstances may explain this. Indeed, I 
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believe that a practical judgment can sometimes fail to prompt action or 
desire without any explanation. Not every case of irrational behavior 
need be comprehensible. But in what sense can a judgment possess 
motivational content if its motivational efficacy can be blocked in 
indefinitely many ways (65)? ... If such judgments are too frequent – if 
without explanation an individual rarely or never acts on practical 
judgments adducing the presence of a certain type of reason – then we 
shall conclude that he is merely paying lip-service to the view that it is a 
reason, and does not really accept it as such (66). 
Nagel's reasoning here bears certain similarities to Kant's answer. It is because 
we are beset by an imperfectly human nature, misled by inclination and 
clouded by self-interest, Kant tells us, that we do not always act as reason 
prescribes; and if these "motivational interferences" were to be removed, we 
would act naturally and effortlessly in accordance with it, as do perfectly 
rational beings (Ac. 412-414). 
 But for Nagel to reason similarly is to come dangerously close to begging 
the question he originally raised for discussion. Nagel answers the question of 
how motivational content can become motivationally effective by stating that 
either it can, other things equal, or else the agent does not really accept the 
justification for the action in the first place. But first, it is hard to see how this 
could happen on Nagel's account, since this acceptance is built into the 
judgment. This means that if the agent makes the judgment, she accepts the 
justification by definition. Second, therefore, this is to claim motivational 
potential for the justification of an action, other things equal, by definition. It 
is to claim that, in the absence of irrationality or extenuating circumstances, it 
is a conceptual truth that an agent can be motivated to act by her acceptance 
that she has a reason to act. But in order to refute externalism, the claim that 
the acceptance of a justification for action can motivate action must be 
defended, not presupposed. 
 Nagel's reasoning here is analogous to the belief-desire model theorist's 
claim, that it is true by definition that an agent performs the act he most 
desires to perform, other things equal. This was the criticism on the basis of 
which Nagel concluded that reference to such motivated desires could be 
factored out of a causal explanation of action. If his criticism is valid of the 
belief-desire model, then it applies equally to the alternative he presents:  If 
the acceptance of reasons for action can motivate action by definition, other 
things equal, then this principle is merely a conceptual truth and can be 
factored out of a causal explanation of action. In order to identify genuine 
causal antecedents of such action, we then must advert to the antecedents of 
this acceptance. 
 This objection is not devastating for Nagel's view. Not only acceptings, 
but believings, cognizings, considerings, reflectings, deliberatings, and 
concludings are, as we have seen, equally subject to interpretation as 
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occurrent mental events, and therefore could occupy the requisite causal role, 
whether they were expressed in well-formed present-tense judgments or 
not.11 In these latter cases, it would remain an open question whether, on any 
particular occasion of action, such an event could precipitate it, or whether 
other factors might override it, or whether the action, if performed, were 
overdetermined or not. But these possibilities would be matters for empirical 
investigation. They would not be motivators by definition. 
 Nagel then goes on to suggest that if the agent does, however, act on the 
belief that a present-tense judgment provides a reason for action, then while 
this belief "does not necessarily imply a desire or a willingness to undertake 
that action; [while] it is not a sufficient condition of the act or desire", it is 
sufficient, "in the absence of contrary influences, to explain the appropriate 
action, or the desire or willingness to perform it" (67). Certainly the belief that 
an action is justified does not imply a motivated desire to perform the action. 
Nor could it – any more than any other mental state by itself, independently 
of the conjunction of concomitant necessary conditions for action – could 
provide a causally sufficient condition of the action. Nevertheless, Nagel can 
claim that under these circumstances, "in the absence of contrary influences,” 
the belief is, as a matter of fact, motivationally effective as a precipitating cause 
of the action. Of course this claim is subject to empirical confirmation. But this 
is a benefit rather than a disadvantage, for it enables him to avoid the charge 
of conceptual triviality he leveled against the belief-desire model. If this is the 
preferred strategy, then Nagel has not finally defended the extraordinary 
interpretation after all, but rather the ordinary one that accepts premise 2.2.(1) 
but denies premises 2.2.(2) and 2.2.(3). For on this account it is the occurrent, 
present-tense judgment or belief that one now has a reason for action, i.e. that 
the action is justified, that is motivationally effective, not those timeless, 
temporally neutral reasons by themselves.  
 But Nagel then wants to argue that if a present-tense judgment about 
what I have reason to do has motivational content, so does the tenseless 
judgment that it implies. So, for example, if I accept that my present action of 
arranging alternative transportation to Chicago on May 15 is justified by the 
airline strike that will occur on that day, then I must accept that Piper's action 
on May 1 of arranging alternative transportation to Chicago on May 15 is 
equally justified. This is because acceptance of the present-tense, occurrent 
judgment implies acceptance of the tenseless judgment plus a [n occurrent] 
belief that the time of action – i.e. May 1 – is now (68). In both cases, 
motivational content is provided by my acceptance or acknowledgment that 
the act is justified (69). The tenseless judgment has motivational content in 
that my acceptance of it explains why in retrospect, I will want to have acted 
at the appropriate moment in the past; why at the moment, I want to be acting 
                                                
11I take up this controversial issue in greater detail in Volume II, Chapters II and V. 
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in the present: and why, in forecasting my future, I will want to act at the 
appropriate moment later (70). That is, the tenseless judgement implied by the 
tensed one provides a timeless rather than a dated reason for action. 
 Nagel's defense of this claim is that acceptance of a dated reason for 
action without accepting its timeless counterpart entails dissociation from 
future stages of oneself, which leads to the self-defeating paradoxes of future 
planning earlier described. This is to say that making only the tensed 
judgments that embed dated reasons without acknowledging the tenseless 
judgments – and embedded timeless reasons – they imply would be to exhibit 
a pathological lack of interest in one's future well-being. But Nagel does not 
argue, nor should he, that dissociation in turn entails motivational impotence 
if that dated reason is true for the present moment. What he does point out is 
that dissociation precludes a dated reason from having motivational content 
at any other time besides that which it specifies, whereas a timeless reason has 
motivational content at all of them.  
 The problems for Nagel's thesis are those already noted. First, if a 
timeless reason has motivational content at all times, then it cannot explain 
why I perform the relevant action now without invoking the dated one. The 
dated reason surely can, but even if it does, as Nagel claims, imply the 
timeless reason, the timeless reason must somehow reciprocally imply it. For 
without it, the timeless reason cannot explain the actual action I perform. 
 Second, in either case, it is unclear which is doing the causal and 
motivational work in the judgments that embed these reasons: the acceptance 
that the action is justified, or the acceptance that the action is justified. In the 
former case, one could be motivated to act on this basis even if the action were 
not justified in fact, even if the agent had made glaring mistakes in reasoning, 
and indeed even if he had not reasoned about the action at all. In this case, the 
occurrent mental event of acceptance would not be inherently connected to 
the rationality of the justification accepted, and so would fail to escape the 
charges of contingency, transience and arbitrariness Nagel leveled against the 
belief-desire model. In the latter case, Nagel would need to furnish an account 
of how an abstract propositional object can have motivational influence, 
which he does not explicitly do. But in either case, an occurrent mental event 
of acceptance or acknowledgment of a justification is a necessary causal 
prerequisite to action; hence so is an occurrent, tensed judgment that embeds 
a dated reason. So it remains the ordinary interpretation of Nagel's project – 
the one which accepts premise 2.2.(1) but denies premises 2.2.(2) and 2.2.(3), 
rather than the extraordinary one which rejects premise 2.2.(1), for which the 
textual evidence is most persuasive. 
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3. Altruism 
 
3.1. Motivational Action at a Distance 
 Our task now is to determine whether Nagel's analogous argument for 
the possibility of altruism offers any remaining considerations that might 
support the extraordinary interpretation, i.e. that argue persuasively in favor 
of the rejection of premise (2.2.1) of the belief-desire model of motivation; or 
whether, on the other hand, Nagel's account of how another's interests can 
motivate us to act on her behalf relies crucially – albeit implicitly – on mental 
events of the sort already examined. Nagel defines pure altruism as 
the direct influence of one person's interest on the actions of another, 
simply because in itself the interest of the former provides the latter with 
a reason to act. If any further internal factor can be said to interact with 
the external circumstances in such a case, it will be not a desire or an 
inclination but the structure presented by such a system of reasons. (80) 
As it stands, this definition implies either externalism or motivation at a 
distance as per the implausible scenario and the extraordinary interpretation, 
since it permits a person's interest to provide me with a reason to act on her 
behalf without my being aware of it. Externalism would mean that I might 
have reason to act but not know it and therefore not act; motivation at a 
distance would mean that the other's interest might motivate me to act 
without the intervention of the mental event of my recognizing or 
acknowledging the other's interest as a reason. Nagel is committed on 
principle to rejecting externalism and advocating motivation at a distance, so 
we must suppose him to mean the latter. 
 Nagel reiterates his rejection of premise 2.2.(1) again for emphasis in the 
discussion immediately following. He represents the Humean view as 
asserting that "[w]ith regard to altruism, the corresponding intuition is that 
since it is I who am acting, even when I act in the interests of another, it must 
be an interest of mine which provides the impulse," and refutes it as follows: 
The same prejudices are in operation here which have been observed to 
influence discussions of prudence: the conviction that every motivation 
must conform to the model of an inner force; the view that behind every 
motivated action lies a desire which provides the active energy for it; the 
assumption that to provide a justification capable also of explaining 
action, an appropriate motivation, usually a desire, must be among the 
conditions of the justification (81). 
Clearly, then, Nagel wishes not only to reject the assumption that there must 
be a desire behind every motivated action, but the further assumption that 
there must be any sort of "appropriate motivation," considered as an "inner 
force," that "provides the active energy for it." In this passage he explicitly 
disavows the existence of any such causally efficacious mental event of any 
kind. As in the case of prudence, he replaces this with a motivated desire 
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whose causal efficacy is conferred by "reasons which the other person's 
interests provide" (81), and again the same objection applies: In order for these 
reasons themselves to be causally effective, I must apprehend them, as per the 
plausible scenario and the ordinary interpretation. And then it is either my 
recognition of the rationality of these reasons, or the mere fact of my 
apprehension of their intentional content that is doing the causal work. In 
either case, Nagel does not escape the necessity of a tensed and dated mental 
event that "provides the active energy" for the action it is presumed to 
motivate. The question that remains to be answered is whether his analysis of 
genuine reasons as objective and impersonal succeeds where earlier 
arguments have not. 
 
3.2. Objectivity and Impersonality 
 Nagel's analysis begins with the distinction between objective and 
subjective reasons or principles. Objective reasons are reasons that express 
objective value, such that the ends and interests they cite give everyone 
reason to promote them. Objective self-interested reasons include, for 
example, personal survival, or happiness; objective non-self-interested 
reasons might include, for example, fighting injustice, an end which everyone 
has reason to pursue independently of their personal interests. Nagel's 
primary concern is with objective self-interested reasons, because these justify 
altruistic action on the behalf of the agent whose interests are at stake. So, for 
example, my happiness – a function of my self-interest – is an end of mine 
which you and others have altruistic reason to promote, just as I have 
altruistic reason to promote yours and others'. Of course this end will not give 
everyone reason to perform exactly the same action in order to promote it. I 
might promote your happiness by tutoring you on the LSATs, whereas 
someone else might promote it by referring you to a physical therapist. The 
point is that anyone has reason to promote your happiness, because everyone 
recognizes the rational value of individual happiness as such. 
 By contrast with an objective reason, a subjective reason cites an interest or 
end that has value for some agents and not others; specifically, for the agent 
or agents whose end or interest it is. We may think of a subjective reason as 
expressing a "for me" value. Thus, for example, neatness at all costs may be a 
value for me but not necessarily one for you. Hence citing it in an explanation 
of why I spent an hour arranging my books and papers, sharpening pencils, 
and doing my roommate's laundry while studying for the LSATs may enable 
you to understand my behavior without necessarily endorsing it. This 
example shows that subjective reasons need not cite self-interested or self-
directed ends, although of course they might. But they always cite ends and 
interests that are of value specifically to the agent who holds them, and not to 
others who do not.   
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Figure 11. Objective vs. Subjective Reasons 
 
 Nagel's thesis is that if an end or interest is a genuine value, then it is an 
objective value. That is, it provides a reason for everyone to promote it, for 
one another as well as for oneself. Therefore, the only acceptable reasons are 
objective. When we cite some consideration as a reason for doing something, 
we implicitly regard that consideration as having objective value – value not 
just for us, but for anyone similarly situated. We regard such ends or interests 
as potentially common rational pursuits for everyone.  
 This is, in part, a consequence of our impersonal conception of ourselves 
as one inhabitant of the world among many. Nagel distinguishes between the 
impersonal and the personal perspective as follows. The personal point of view 
on anything (including ourselves) is the view from the subject's particular 
vantage point within the world. Expressing the personal point of view usually 
requires using the first person singular ("I") or token-reflexives such as "this 
person." Just as in the discussion of prudence a tensed judgment implied a 
corresponding tenseless judgment plus a statement relating that time to the 
time of utterance (61), similarly in the discussion of altruism a personal 
judgment, such as that I need a laptop, implies a corresponding impersonal 
judgment, such as that Piper needs a laptop, plus a basic personal premise 
identifying the speaker, such as that I am Piper (103).  
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 Thus the impersonal point of view is the view on something or someone 
irrespective of one's particular relation to it. To view the world impersonally 
is to view it without regard to one's location in it. Anything that can be said in 
the first person from the personal point of view can be recast in an impersonal 
description of that person. Hence the impersonal perspective can 
accommodate all the facts of the personal viewpoint within it. From this 
perspective, any statement about a person, including oneself, is such that it 
can be applied to others under similar circumstances, changing proper names 
but not propositional meaning. This is the sense in which the impersonal 
perspective yields the view of oneself as merely one person among others. 
 To say that we regard our ends as having objective value, i.e. for 
everyone and not just for ourselves, is to say that our evaluation of a 
particular end as valuable is an evaluation we implicitly assume anyone could 
make. Thus our relation to that end is impersonal, not in the dictionary sense 
of our bearing no personal relation to it at all; but rather in the sense of 
bearing a relation that is not specific to our personal situation or limited to our 
own evaluation. For purposes of evaluating the end in question, we are, as 
individuals, interchangeable with any other equally real inhabitant of the 
human social world. To view ourselves impersonally, then, is implicitly to 
view ourselves as subject to universal principles consistently applied to any 
individual whose situation is picked out by the perfectly general terms of the 
principle.  
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Figure 12. The Personal vs. the Impersonal Points of View 
 
 This connection between objectivity, impersonality and universality is the 
one Nagel needs in order to answer the question raised in Section 1.2, as to 
whether he could successfully demonstrate the rational inescapability (not the 
psychological inescapability) of this impersonal conception of oneself as one 
among many equally real persons. If we think of transpersonal rationality in 
the weakest possible sense, as requiring consistency and impartiality in the 
formulation and application of principles or statements of whatever kind, 
then an impersonal self-conception as one among many possible subjects of 
universal principles or statements is a self-conception specifically as someone 
who is a subject of transpersonally rational requirements. And these 
requirements can be motivationally effective in so far as one truly believes 
oneself to be the person this self-conception describes. This, I think, is why 
Nagel emphasizes the efficacy of such principles as a litmus test of whether 
the agent really "accepts" them: If one experiences no divergence between the 
person one is and the person for whom conformity to these principles is 
required, they will be motivationally effective, other things equal. Hence this 
self-conception is rationally inescapable, not in the sense that we cannot avoid 
attending to it, but rather in the sense that it expresses a conception of 
transpersonal rationality as binding on one's thought and action. This is much 
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closer to the view I defend in Volume II than it is to some of the explicit 
pronouncements Nagel actually makes. 
 His project constitutes a rejection, if not a refutation of practical 
solipsism, understood as the view that one is more real than others. Practical 
solipsism presupposes that a strictly and narrowly first-personal perspective 
on the world is the only available one, and that from that perspective only 
one's own existence – as Descartes' thinking being, perhaps – is ascertainable. 
From this perspective, universal judgments are at best bogus, assuming they 
have sense at all, since they can be applied only to oneself. By contrast, Nagel 
contends that in order to make sense of the ways we actually use language 
and conceive of ourselves as jointly inhabitants of a shared world, the 
conception of others as equally real must be assumed at the outset: 
The avoidance of solipsism requires that the conception of other persons 
like oneself (not necessarily the belief that there are any) be included in 
the idea of one's own experiences from the beginning. This is achieved by 
a conception which permits every feature of one's own situation and 
experience to be described and regarded, without loss of content, from 
the impersonal standpoint (106). 
To embrace solipsism is to forego the possibility that universal principles are 
meaningful, since they can apply only to oneself. It is also to forego the 
possible that some values are objective, since there are then no others to 
whom they can supply reasons to act. It is to imprison the interpretation of 
one's experience within the narrow conceptual constraints of concrete 
subjectivity; and to confine the governing principles of one's actions to 
particularistic recommendations as to what this person should do to achieve 
ends that have value only for her. Nagel rightly argues that we avoid this by 
adopting the impersonal standpoint on oneself. 
 
3.3. Objectivity and Motivational Content 
 Nagel contends that from the impersonal standpoint, only objective 
reasons, and not subjective ones, can motivate action (116-117). To see why, 
consider the difference between impersonal judgments about subjective 
reasons and impersonal judgments about objective reasons. Examples of 
impersonal judgments about subjective reasons would include the following: 
 
(1) Piper has reason to promote her interests. 
(2) Each person has reason to promote his or her own interests. 
 
3.3.(1), according to Nagel, justifies for Piper her promotion of her own 
interests, but does not justify for anyone else their promotion of Piper's 
interests. Since I am merely someone from the impersonal standpoint, 3.3.(1) 
does not justify for me my promotion of Piper's interests, unless the personal 
premise, that I am Piper, is added. Similarly, 3.3.(2) justifies for each person 
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his or her promotion of his or her own interests, but does not justify for just 
someone that very someone's promotion of each or any person's own 
interests. Since I am merely someone from the impersonal standpoint, 3.3.(2) 
does not justify for me my promoting each or any person's own interests, even 
though I am in fact one of those persons. 
 By contrast, impersonal judgments about objective reasons function 
differently: 
 
(3) Everyone has reason to promote Piper's interests. 
(4) Everyone has reason to promote a person's own interests. 
 
To register the term, "everyone," is to recognize my own inclusion in its scope 
of application. Since everyone has reason to promote these interests, I as one 
among everyone also have reason to do so. Objective reasons can motivate us 
from the impersonal standpoint because they are reasons for anyone to act on 
them. 
 This is Nagel's argument. Its success, however, depends on implicitly 
restricting the motivational content of an impersonal judgment about a 
subjective reason to the agent whose subjective reason it is; and it is not 
necessary to do this. The judgment that Piper has reason to promote her 
interests, when made to you, may give you derivative reason to promote 
Piper's promotion of her interests, and perhaps even those interests 
themselves directly, just in case you think that Piper's having a reason to 
promote her interests legitimates Piper's promotion of her interests. That she 
has a bona fide subjective reason to promote her interests, and not just an 
unmotivated, valueless desire to do so, may legitimate her promotion of her 
interests to you, even if you do not share her reason – i.e. even if it is not 
objective, and therefore do not regard her promotion of her interests as 
strictly, i.e. objectively justified. So, for example, suppose Piper wants to go to 
law school in order to become a lawyer – in order, in turn, to fight injustice. 
Even if you think lawyers are crooks who are incapable even of recognizing 
injustice, and therefore that Piper's desire to become a lawyer does not justify 
her spending all that time and money on law school, you may have derivative 
reason to promote Piper's going to law school if you acknowledge her desire 
to become a lawyer as a genuine reason, in her eyes, to do what this end 
requires.  
 Analogously, Piper might have reason to believe P of herself and thereby 
give you derivative reason to believe P of Piper, even though you do not share 
her reason for believing P of herself and therefore do not regard her belief that 
P is true of her as strictly justified. So, for example, suppose Piper believes of 
herself that she is impatient, because she gets annoyed when put on "hold" for 
more than three minutes. You may agree that three minutes is far too long to 
be put on "hold", and so dispute Piper's characterization of herself as 
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impatient as too harsh. Yet you may accept Piper's reason for believing she is 
impatient as evidence for your also believing that she is, in fact, impatient, 
even though you don't think this evidence by itself is sufficient for concluding 
that she is (in addition, you notice that she leaves if you are only five minutes 
late for a lunch date, expects you to return her calls within twenty-four hours, 
completes your sentences for you so as to get you to the point more quickly, 
and so on).  
 In both of these cases, we might say that our judgment that the agent has 
a subjective reason for action (or belief) gives us reason to believe in her – to 
respect or have faith in her judgment of what is rational for her, and thereby 
derivatively to support the fulfillment of her projects. What this shows is that 
there is a difference between having a conscious, motivationally effective 
reason to act (or believe something) and that act's (or belief's) being strictly, 
i.e. objectively justified. This corresponds, roughly, to Nagel's distinction 
between a subjective and an objective reason, such that the former can be 
distinguished, in turn, from a mere desire. Suppose that a subjective reason is 
not merely an arbitrary desire but rather has some claim to rational 
intelligibility. Then an impersonal judgment about subjective reasons can 
provide one with some motivation to act on the agent's behalf, provided that 
that agent's subjective reason to act itself gives one derivative reason to 
promote that agent's action or end – irrespective of whether or not one 
regards that agent's subjective reason itself as strictly, objectively justifying 
her action. And in the limiting case, in which one is in fact the agent whose 
subjective reasons are being impersonally considered, one will regard that 
agent's subjective reasons as at least strongly legitimating her action or end – 
and so will have considerable motivation to promote them. 
 Nagel does not intend his account of objective reasons to be a criterion for 
identifying objective reasons, since he will later go on to say that it  
only places a formal condition on reason of whatever kind – the condition 
of objectivity. No restrictions have yet been placed on the content of those 
reason and principles which may satisfy this formal condition (125). ... It 
is clear, in fact, that any catalogue of values can be put into objective form 
(126). 
His reasoning is that any reason for action can be formulated in such a way as 
to be objective, universally binding, and acceptable from the impersonal 
standpoint; and that "[w]hatever one may regard as a legitimate goal of action 
might in principle be regarded as an objective goal – one which anyone had 
reason to promote" (126).  
 Nagel should not have conceded this. It implies that for example, 
Howard Hughes' goal of remaining in bed, unwashed, and narcotized by 
morphine while screening old movies can be formulated as an objective value 
that everyone has reason to promote. This is to abdicate Nagel's stated 
intention of providing a rational criterion for evaluating the moral status of 
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desires. Nagel should have distinguished between veridical and nonveridical 
objective formulations of subjective reasons, such that not all objective 
formulations of subjective reasons are, in fact, of a kind that everyone has 
reason to promote. So, for example, we may be able to say, 
 
^Everyone has reason to promote Howard Hughes' morphine 
addiction.^ 
 
But that does not make it true. Since not everyone values Howard Hughes' 
morphine addiction, not everyone has reason to promote it. Therefore it is not 
an objective reason, even though it has been formulated as one. 
 Moreover, Nagel's account of what an objective reason is suggests that 
the way any particular individual may regard or formulate her ends is in fact 
irrelevant to the factual question of whether that end gives everyone reason to 
promote it. We have already seen that, in order to avoid externalism and the 
unpalatable implications of the extraordinary interpretation, the notion of a 
end's "giving everyone reason to promote it" must not mean merely that 
everyone has a reason even if they don't know it; nor that they have a reason 
if they know it but are not motivated to act on it; nor that they have a reason if 
they are motivated to act on it without knowing what the reason is. Instead, 
an end gives someone reason to promote it if and only if  
 
(5) it justifies their actions;  
(6) it motivates their actions; and  
(7) it motivates their actions because they know it justifies their actions.  
 
That is, it is the recognized rational content of the end that is doing the 
motivational work. I take 3.3.(5) – (7) to be the necessary and sufficient criteria 
of rational evaluation of desire implicit in Nagel's account of objective 
reasons. According to these criteria, there will not be very many objective 
reasons, but this is as it should be. The promotion of happiness or self-interest, 
fairness, honesty, the honoring of contracts, mutual aid, fighting injustice, and 
refraining from harm are some of the familiar candidates likely to appear on a 
substantive list of goals or values that everyone, in their rational moments, 
will have reason to promote.  
 A fuller account of the substantive normative moral theory implicit in 
Nagel's account would need to say more than Nagel does about the implicitly 
interpersonal and social enterprise of justification; about what is involved in 
recognizing rational content as rational; and about the connection between 
these two and viewing oneself as merely one person among many others. But 
these issues can be elaborated. There is no need to concede the normative 
ground to a Humean or Hobbesian "procedure of objectification," as Nagel 
seems to do in his concluding chapter. Nagel's account contains ample 
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resources to preserve his distinctions between objective reasons, subjective 
reasons, and desires that are not reasons at all. And he needs these 
distinctions in order to explain why practical solipsism is a real condition to 
be avoided, and not just a linguistic practice that can be evaded through 
reformulations of principle. 
 So in order fully to assess Nagel's claim that only impersonal judgments 
about objective reasons have motivational content, we need to re-examine his 
claim that such judgments include acceptance of a justification for acting. If I 
accept a justification for acting every time and only when I judge that I have 
objective reason for action, then it is hard to see how such an objective reason 
might ever be outweighed by countervailing subjective ones in fact, and 
therefore how I might ever justify refraining from altruistic action when an 
objective reason for such action can be given. Since it always can, it would 
seem that altruism is not only possible, or even rationally inescapable, but 
rationally required in all cases. This is far too strong. 
 
3.4. Accepting a Justification  
 Earlier Nagel argued that first-person present-tense practical judgments 
that one has reason to act possessed motivational content, understood as "the 
acceptance of a justification for doing or wanting something" (109), such that 
that this content is sufficient to explain the corresponding action or desire 
when it occurs; and that 
it must be present in first-person practical judgments, made from the 
standpoint of temporal neutrality, and hence also in judgments 
employing tenses other than the present. I shall now attempt to show by 
a similar argument that it must be present in impersonal practical 
judgments as well, and hence in judgments about what others should do 
(109). 
Thus the trajectory of Nagel's argument has been to begin with present-tense 
judgments made from the personal perspective, then proceed to temporally 
neutral judgments made from the personal perspective, and finally now to 
temporally neutral judgments made from the impersonal perspective. His aim 
has been to show that if the first-mentioned type of judgment can be 
motivationally effective, then the second can, too, and so, too, the third. From 
this it follows, according to Nagel, that the third-personal judgments about 
what others should do that characterize altruistic deliberation can be 
motivationally effective as well. 
 He says, 
[W]hat my argument is intended to settle, is whether any motivational 
content attaches to the impersonal judgment that T. N. has a reason to 
remove his foot [from under the heel of the man who is about to step on 
T. N.'s gouty toes], or whether it enters only with the addition of the basic 
personal premise, 'I am T. N.' (112). 
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Nagel rightly argues that if the impersonal judgment is supposed not to be 
motivationally effective, whereas it becomes so with the addition of the 
personal premise, then since the reason or justification for the action is 
contained in the impersonal judgment, it cannot be that impersonal reason or 
justification that is doing the motivational work. This would be what he calls 
practical solipsism, "[f]or it means that an essential aspect of the first-person 
judgment, namely the acceptance of a justification, is not present in the 
impersonal correlate of the same judgment" (113). 
 There are at least two ways in which this last inference can be interpreted. 
On one interpretation of it, Nagel is considering the case in which the 
impersonal judgment that one has reason to act does not, after all, despite his 
earlier claim (65) include its own acceptance as a justification. This seems 
right, for we have just seen that once an agent agrees that she has a reason for 
action, she must then be able to evaluate the force of that reason based on her 
assessment of its merits. Not even the most rational judgment can be thought 
to be rationally inescapable in the sense of compelling one's acceptance of it as 
a justification by its content. Since the reason is a propositional object whereas 
its acceptance as a justification is a psychological event, it is not even clear 
what it would mean to attempt this. 
 A stronger interpretation, however, would have Nagel observing that to 
say that the impersonal judgment has no motivational content, or is not 
motivationally effective, is, in effect, to say that it has no justificatory force at 
all; that the reason that is its content is not capable of inspiring an agent to 
accept it as a justification and hence to act on it. And this immediately invites 
the question, which Nagel himself asks rhetorically, of where this justificatory 
force could then possibly come from. So we can provisionally agree with 
Nagel's inference, if this second interpretation is the correct one, that unless 
the impersonal correlate of the first-personal judgment is supposed to have 
the same justificatory force, the result must be an irrational and solipsistic 
dissociation from the rational content of judgments that locate one in the 
world as one person among many. 
 But does dissociation from the impersonal standpoint strictly imply 
solipsism itself? Why not just the sort of externalism expressed in the two 
following assertions? 
 
(1) Someone really ought to clean up the garbage in this 
neighborhood. 
(2) That someone is me. 
 
I might fervently believe 3.4.(1) without its motivating me to act, unless it is 
accompanied by a belief in 3.4.(2), such that my belief in 3.4.(1) alone contains 
no motivational content for me. In this case I could make such assertions from 
the impersonal point of view without their having such motivational content, 
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because I fail to view myself as merely "someone." I may not grasp that 3.4.(1) 
implicitly refers to me because I am someone; it may be that I regard me as 
me, and others as "someone." Yet I may have strong feelings of empathy and 
sympathy toward them, and have a strong sense of their reality. On the one 
hand, this would be insufficient for impersonal altruism, because these beliefs 
would lack universality and necessity; but on the other, it would be sufficient 
to defeat the assumption of solipsism, because it would repudiate the view of 
others as less real than myself.  
 So it appears that even if my self-conception is of myself as one person 
among many others, this by itself does not give 3.4.(1) motivational content. 
Dissociation from the impersonal standpoint does not necessarily mean I 
recognize no connection to others at all. It may just mean that my self-
conception is grounded in emotional responses to others, rather than in my 
human and spatiotemporal relation to them. However, Nagel strictly needs 
only the weaker claim, that if one does accept an impersonal standpoint on 
oneself, this undermines at least the epistemic, if not the ontological 
presuppositions of solipsism. In this he is surely right. 
 This second interpretation yields another, less happy implication. For 
although we may agree that impersonal judgments should have the same 
justificatory force as personal ones, we must also recall that whether or not an 
agent actually accepts this judgment as a justification must remain an open 
question which is not decided by the rational content of the judgment, any 
more than it is by its impersonal formulation. An agent's acceptance of a 
justification is a first-personal, contingent psychological event, even though 
the reason that constitutes that justification itself may be embedded in an 
impersonal, rationally inescapable judgment. And so it now seems clear that it 
will be possible to raise the same objection about this third stage in the 
argument that has been raised for the first two: In each case, it seems, it is the 
dated, first-personal mental event of accepting the reason as a justification 
that is doing the motivational work, no matter how spatiotemporally neutral 
or impersonal the rational content of that justification must be.  
 Nagel has not, then, succeeded in rebutting premise 2.2.(1) of the belief-
desire model of motivation. He has not shown that we do not require a 
present mental event to motivate action. What he has at least suggested is that 
that mental event need not be a desire. It may be an intentional attitude that is 
somewhat more susceptible to the persuasive effects of rational content. 
 
3.5. Rational Inescapability and the Kantian Dilemma 
 It remains to be considered whether Nagel's framework contains the 
resources for actually solving the Kantian dilemma. Is it possible to retain 
rational, objective and universal reasons for acting, given the contingent and 
transient motives on which we act? Are beliefs, considerations, recognitions, 
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and so forth, any better candidates for "rational inescapability" than desires 
have been shown to be?  
 Surely they are at least just as good. The Humean dictum that only 
desires and not beliefs can cause action seems to be based in the uncritical 
conception of desire as of what Nagel calls an "unmotivated" desire: one that 
simply assails us with such force that its causal influence is impossible to 
withstand. But there are beliefs that simply assail us, whose causal influence is 
impossible to withstand, too. For example, I cannot help but act as though my 
dispositional belief in the law of gravity is justified, even though it may not 
be. I am similarly helpless against my occurrent belief that there is a wasp in 
my hamburger, however much I may desire – in a nontrivial sense – to take it 
up and eat it. The inspirational belief that Elvis lives functions with a similar 
force for some. None of these beliefs happen to satisfy the requirement of 
rational inescapability. But all of them are competitive with desires in 
motivational influence, and surpass them at least as candidates for rational 
inescapability. Beliefs are the kinds of mental entities that can be rationally 
inescapable, whereas desires do not even stand a chance. 
 Nagel's arguments do not directly address the contingency problem of 
belief-states as transient and idiosyncratic mental events. But this problem is 
not necessarily insoluble within the terms of his discussion. Truly held 
occurrent beliefs include accepting their content as true. An act of acceptance 
is an occurrent mental event, whereas the content accepted, as an abstract 
object, is not. The question then becomes a very large one: What causes an 
agent to accept certain content as true? Nagel would need only a partial 
answer to this question, namely that when and only when our rational faculties 
are properly functioning, the rationality of certain belief-contents itself compels our 
acceptance of them, i.e. that the recognition of their rationality is itself 
motivationally effective (this is recognizable as Kant's answer, to be explored 
further in Volume II, Chapter V.5 and elsewhere). The question would be not, 
as Nagel frames it, whether we truly can be said to accept a practical judgment 
that we have reason to act in the event that we are not motivated to act on it 
(66). It would be, rather, whether we are thinking clearly in the event that we 
are not motivated to act on it. At least some cases of moral failure then would 
be a demonstration of mental dullness, not one of bad faith. This is an 
advantage if you believe that at least some people behave badly because they 
are stupid rather than evil.12 Of course this thesis would need to be supported 
by careful distinctions between, for instance, recognizing a belief as rational 
and mistakenly believing it to be so; between believing P, accepting P as true, 
                                                
12This does not resolve the question of moral accountability one way or the other, since 
one can cultivate dullness through deliberate habituation, as I have suggested in 
Chapter VI.3.2. I revisit this matter in greater detail in Volume II. 
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and recognizing P as true; between recognizing P as true and recognizing P as 
rational; and so on. But these are not obviously insurmountable tasks. 
 This is to assign causal efficacy to certain abstract objects, but only under 
certain conditions: Our rational faculties must function unobstructedly, our 
attention must be upon the relevant matters, we must be receptive to the 
assaultive experience of insight, and so on. When these conditions are 
satisfied, there is a powerful argument to be made that belief-states with 
rational moral content – for example, that a certain set of considerations 
constitute a conclusive justification for action – are motivationally effective in 
causing moral action whenever they occur because of the rationality of their 
content, i.e. that rationality itself has a certain pull on us. Nagel could then 
stipulate rational content as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
motivational efficacy of the intentional attitude of which it is the object, such 
that that attitude was motivationally effective only if the content of its object 
were rational, and not otherwise (in the manner of criteria 3.3.(5) – (7)). In this 
case, this content would fail to move us to action only if we failed to recognize 
its rationality, but would invariably move us to action whenever we 
succeeded. Thus rational content could be a precipitating or contributing but 
never sufficient cause of action. Also required would be my attention to that 
content, my recognition of its rationality, and a disposition to act on 
recognizably rational beliefs. 
  If Nagel could show this, he would furnish strong evidence for the 
motivational efficacy of rationally inescapable requirements of altruism on 
action indirectly. For even if the occurrence of those particular belief-states 
were themselves sporadic and contingent rather than rationally inescapable, 
their effect on action once they occurred might be regular, reliable, and 
perhaps even necessary. Analogously, in the case of theoretical reason, it 
might argued, it can be true both that our reasoning does not always take the 
form of modus ponens (when we reason at all), and also that when it does take 
that form and we are reasoning clearly, we always infer Q from P  Q and P, 
other things equal. Physically acting on the basis of a rational belief that a 
certain set of considerations constituted a conclusive justification for action 
would be like the mental act of inferring Q on the basis of the belief that P  
Q and P. Thus the rational content of such belief-states would function 
analogously to the rational content of modus ponens. In both cases, it would be 
the rationality of the content, not merely the occurrent mental event of belief, 
that was motivationally effective; and in both cases this content could be 
described as universal without being ubiquitous, and necessary without being 
compulsive. This is not a possibility that Nagel pursues. But his discussion 
provides some of the resources on which I draw in order to address it in 
Volume II, Chapter V of this project. 
 
 
 
Chapter VIII. The Problem of Rational Final Ends 
 
 
 I said in Chapter I that a conception of the self consisted in two models. 
The first was a motivational model. I examined the Humean motivational 
model itself in Chapter II, the problem of moral motivation it engendered in 
Chapter VI, and Thomas Nagel’s attempt to solve that problem in Chapter 
VII. I proposed as the second element in a conception of the self a structural 
model that describes the conditions of rational coherence and equilibrium 
within the self, a model that calls for a theory of rationality to satisfy its 
requirements. I examined the Humean structural model – the utility-
maximizing model of rationality – in Chapters III and IV. In the present 
chapter I examine the problem of rational final ends that the structural model 
of utility-maximization engenders for the Humean conception of the self; and 
I evaluate the attempts of four leading twentieth century Humeans – 
Frankfurt, Watson, Williams and Slote – to solve it. 
Section 1 defines the problem of rational final ends that arises from the 
Humean model of rationality: that rational criticism or justification of the ends 
we happen to have – much less revision of those ends in light of alternative 
conceptions of the good we might develop philosophically – is impossible. 
Section 2 considers Harry Frankfurt’s solution to this problem. Frankfurt 
distinguishes between free and unfree actions, according to whether or not 
they are motivated by desires that are themselves the object of higher-order 
desires that rationally evaluate them. Frankfurt’s view implies that an action 
is free if the desire that motivates it is rational. But it is not easy for a Humean 
to say what makes a desire rational. Frankfurt's attempt raises the problems 
simultaneously of self-evaluation and moral paralysis: If we lack desire-
independent terminating criteria for evaluating rationally our first-order 
desires, then on what nonarbitrary grounds do we commit ourselves to any 
n+1-order desires as themselves authoritative evaluators of our first-order 
ones? And without such terminating criteria, how can we ever decide what to 
do with any degree of moral conviction? That we sometimes succeed in doing 
so suggests that the Humean conception is not adequate to the psychological 
facts.  
Section 3 considers three main responses to Frankfurt’s dilemma. Gary 
Watson proposes a bipartite conception of the self, according to which reason 
and desire are two independent sources of motivation within the self, as Plato 
thought. Watson accepts the belief-desire model of motivation. But he also 
argues that reason is the source of value, of what is genuinely good for the 
agent, and so enables the agent to assess on which of her desires she should 
rationally act. But since this Humean/Platonic conception of the self stipulates 
two independent sources of motivation within the self, it must be an open 
question not only which does take motivational and evaluative precedence on 
any particular occasion of action, but also which should. And in the event that 
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neither does take motivational and evaluative precedence within the self, the 
problems of self-evaluation and moral paralysis will not have been solved, but 
rather exacerbated.  
Bernard Williams offers a different bipartite conception of the self to 
solve Frankfurt’s problem, one that also consists in reason and desire as 
independent sources of motivation within the self. But Williams’ variant 
stipulates exactly the reverse order of priorities from Watson’s: that 
motivational and evaluative precedence is to be accorded those central desires 
he calls "ground projects," to which considerations of transpersonal rationality 
are subservient. Williams’ demotion of transpersonal rationality is buttressed 
by Michael Slote’s defense of pure time preference, the principle that we 
should give highest priority to those desires and ends that happen to have the 
closest temporal proximity to us. Both views assign to such desires and ends 
the moral importance that substantive criteria for rational final ends would 
confer. Williams then argues that to sacrifice these desires to the requirements 
of impersonal moral principle is to alienate oneself from those commitments 
and attachments that are most deeply expressive and definitive of the self. But 
detailed scrutiny of Williams' and Slote’s claims strongly suggest that they, 
too, beg both the question of which source in fact has motivational and 
evaluative precedence within the self, and the normative question of which 
source should have it. A personal commitment to rational and impartial moral 
principles not only does not imply moral alienation; the ability to formulate 
ground projects, goals, and personal attachments presupposes it. Hence 
Williams' concept of a centrally definitive ground project does not displace 
the need for substantive criteria of rationality according to which those 
ground projects can be reflectively evaluated; and Slote’s defense of pure time 
preference provides no such independent criterion of evaluation. The problem 
of rational final ends remains unresolved within the constraints of the 
Humean conception of the self. 
 
1. The Structural Model 
In the utility-maximizing model of rationality, desires structure the self in 
two ways. First, through the distinction into first- and second-order desires,
1
 
                                                
1
See Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," The Journal of 
Philosophy LXVIII, 1 (January 1971), 5-20. Frankfurt's main thesis is similar to Wright 
Neely's apparently independent treatment in "Freedom and Desire," The Philosophical 
Review LXXXXIII, 1 (January 1974), 32-54. 
 Although Neely emphasizes the contrast between the ordinary sense of "desire" as 
one motive to action among many and the extended philosophical sense that includes 
all such motives to action, he makes it equally clear that the advantage of the 
philosophical sense is that it implies means for analyzing all the multifarious motives 
for the action in terms of "desire" in something like the ordinary sense. Thus he seems to 
Chapter VIII. The Problem of Rational Final Ends        312 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
they determine our evaluation of the other elements of personality: our 
emotions, beliefs, impulses, and so on. First-order desires are desires for 
particular states of affairs conceived as external to the self: for unilateral 
disarmament, for example, or for a slice of carrot cake. Second-order desires 
are desires for certain first-order desires, hence for their attendant thoughts, 
feelings and dispositions. Second-order desires are desires that one be (or 
become) a certain kind of person: they constitute a desired self-conception. 
For example, suppose I have a central first-order desire for sex, drugs, and 
rock and roll. This desire may fulfill a second-order desire to be the kind of 
person who desires such things. Or it may frustrate a second-order desire to 
be the kind of person who pines only after beauty, truth and goodness. The 
actual first-order desires that constitute the self either buttress or undermine 
our desired self-conception. Our second-order desires tell us what that 
desired self-conception actually is. 
 According to the utility-maximization model of rationality, the self is 
structured by its desires in a second way. The importance of instrumental 
rationality as a defining feature of the self consists in its ability to provide 
hierarchical order and consistency to the totality of desires one has on any 
particular occasion: to ensure their mutual consistency with one another, to 
rank them in order of importance, to schedule a plan for their satisfaction with 
respect to value, probability, spatial and temporal proximity, duration, and 
comprehensiveness, and finally to facilitate their satisfaction through 
maximally efficient action.
2
 The structural components of the self are desires, 
and the rational self is one in which these desires are ordered according to the 
canons of instrumental reason. Theoretical reason itself is thus a subordinate 
means for maximizing the satisfaction of our desires.
3
 
 The structural model of the Humean conception generates a problem 
about rational final ends because on it, rationality is purely instrumental. It 
says nothing about which objects of desire are themselves rational, not merely 
                                                                                                     
mean "desire" in the technical sense to cover or substitute for duties, purposes, intentions, 
and volitions – as would similarly technical terms like "conation" and "appetition", each 
of which could be interepreted or analyzed in terms of "desire" in a more ordinary sense 
– as Neely's examples of duty and wellbeing illustrate. If this interpretation can be 
carried through, such that each motive to action can be claimed to include a desire in 
the ordinary sense, then using "desire" in the technical sense to denote all such motives 
has obvious advantages over terms like "conation" and "pro-attitude." 
2
The Humean conception of the self as structured by the principles of instrumental 
rationality is explicated in greatest detail in Chapter VII, "Goodness as Rationality," of 
John Rawls' Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). See 
especially Sections 63-64 and the bibliography cited there. I discuss this work in Chapter 
X, following. 
3
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), Book II, 415. 
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as a means to some further end, but in themselves. It contains no resources for 
answering that question, nor does it quite acknowledge that the question itself 
is legitimate. It regards ends such as howling at the moon, counting blades of 
grass,
4
 or lying unwashed in bed in an anonymous hotel room consuming 
nothing but codeine and old Hollywood movies and being waited upon by 
lavishly paid employees who also manage one's financial empire,
5
 as at most 
pathological in some psychiatric sense, but otherwise outside the scope of 
rational evaluation. It thus finds no connection between behavioral pathology 
and irrationality. The problem, of course, is that there does seem to be a 
connection. The psychological fact that howling at the moon or counting 
blades of grass or drinking codeine might be ultimate objects of desire for 
particular individuals does not excuse them from rational scrutiny, as the 
Humean rationality model seems to imply. But how can we say what is 
irrational about these ends, and rational about some others, within the 
constraints of a rationality model that is silent on what constitutes a rational 
final end in the first place?  
Can we then call on transpersonal rationality to function in a different 
and noninstrumental capacity? Can it identify any alternative final ends – for 
example, altruistic or principled moral ones, independent of those objects we 
in fact happen to desire, that it would be rational for us to adopt? Can it 
justify the adoption and pursuit of a final end that does not satisfy a desire the 
agent already has? According to the Humean model of egocentric rationality, 
it cannot do any of these things. In the end, only the prospect of satisfying an 
ultimate desire the agent has can justify an extended course of action in the 
service of the final end which is its object. Relative to this ultimate object of 
desire, reason can seek out and discover efficient means to that end, and so 
spark instrumental desires to make use of them. But reason cannot by itself, 
independently of any such ultimate desire, justify action in the service of 
principle alone.   
 So the Humean rationality model implies that, in particular, 
philosophical reasoning is incapable of articulating persuasively viable 
alternative conceptions of the good – i.e. conceptions we would be justified in 
adopting – that diverge from those we already have been conditioned or 
hard-wired to accept. Philosophical discussion of principles or objects of value 
– or, for that matter, alternative goals or ends – that do not correspond to 
those we actually have is pointless, since no such discussion can justify such 
alternatives. The ends and values we happen to have effectively outcompete 
any of those proffered as philosophical alternatives, merely because of their 
                                                
4
This is Rawls' example. Op. cit. Note 2, page 432. 
5
Donald L. Bartlett and James B. Steele, Empire: The Life, Legend and Madness of Howard 
Hughes (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1979). 
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seeming self-evidence. Indeed, they may be so deeply ingrained that we 
unselfconsciously view them as part of the world rather than as part of our 
value system. Against them, alternative philosophical theories of the good do 
not stand a chance. The Humean conception of the self implies that normative 
moral philosophers who devote their energy to elaborating such alternative 
final ends are best understood as salaried daydreamers. Those who find much 
to criticize in the desires we now happen to have – or aver, at least, the in-
principle importance of rational criticism or justification of those desires – will 
find this state of affairs less than satisfying.  
 
2. The Infinite Regress: Frankfurt's Humeanism 
 
2.1. Self-Evaluation 
 The problem of rational final ends is not just about how moral 
philosophers may be most gainfully employed. It has practical ramifications 
for the capacity for self-evaluation, as both proponents and opponents of that 
conception have recognized.
6
 The difficulty comes from the assumptions that 
the self is structured by first- and second-order desires, and that second-order 
desires provide criteria for evaluation of the motivationally effective desires of 
the self. The question immediately arises of why we should accept as 
authoritative criteria these second-order desires. Why should we not subject 
them, in turn, to the critical scrutiny of third-order desires, and so on, ad 
infinitum? Frankfurt's answer is that "it is possible ... to terminate such a series 
of acts without cutting it off arbitrarily," by identifying oneself decisively with 
one of one's first-order desires. This means that questions regarding higher-
order desires are not to arise: 
The decisiveness of the commitment [one] has made means that [one] has 
decided that no further question about [one's] second-order volition, at 
any higher order, remains to be asked.
7
 
But surely whether any questions remain to be asked about something is not a 
matter one can simply decide. If the state of affairs is unresolved, or suspect, or 
insufficiently analyzed, then it will raise questions to the discerning observer, 
regardless of what one has decided; and no amount of mere "decisiveness" 
will make them go away. If there are no rationally persuasive grounds for 
halting the ascent to higher-order desires, then the decisive commitment one 
has made would seem to be arbitrary after all. That I lack the stamina or 
interest necessary for performing acts of higher-order self-evaluation does not 
confer authority by fiat on the n+1-order desires beyond which I refuse to 
                                                
6
Op. cit. Note 1. Also See Gary Watson, "Free Agency," The Journal of Philosophy LXXII, 8 
(April 1975), 205-220. 
7
Frankfurt, ibid. Note 1, 16. 
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look, any more than my refusal or inability to consider your point of view 
settles authoritatively the question of who has prevailed in our disagreement. 
If an authoritative termination of the infinite regress of orders of desire is to 
be contrasted with an arbitrary one, we shall need a better reason for doing so 
than that we are too tired, or unwilling, to press further the hard task of self-
evaluation. What we need is some criteria by which to identify certain objects 
of desire – or ends – as rational in some ultimate and noninstrumental sense. 
We need criteria of rational final ends. 
 Hence if the Humean conception of the self is the correct one, we should 
experience some difficulties in performing the task of self-evaluation. For any 
set of desires and interests to which I decisively commit myself is likely to 
seem arbitrary upon reflection. No action can then fully express my self 
because none can satisfy the desires of my self. And none can satisfy the 
desires of my self because there are no n-order desires with which I can fully 
identify. The consequence is a desired self-conception attenuated by doubts 
about the worth and authority of that desire, and so about the action it is 
assumed to motivate. Leaving unsolved the problem of rational final ends 
thereby exacerbates the problem of moral motivation already discussed.  
 
2.2. Moral Paralysis 
 This calls into question the extent to which a self, on the Humean 
conception, might be motivated to action at all. If the infinite regress of desires 
prevents one's rational self-identification with any n-order set of desires, then 
there can be no actions to which one can commit oneself wholeheartedly and 
without reservation – not necessarily because one has conflicting impulses, 
but rather because the worth of any such impulse is automatically subject to 
doubt. That I am not in fact left with a continuing case of moral paralysis that 
vitiates my capacity for decisive and principled action suggests that the 
Humean model of rational equilibrium does not render accurately the 
psychological facts. 
 Some proponents of the Humean conception seem to embrace moral 
paralysis as a sign of authenticity. Charles Taylor,
8
 for example, seems to 
believe that it is both irresponsible and self-deceptive to presume that one's 
chosen action might successfully and conclusively quell the stirrings of 
conscience. He accepts without reservation the implication that dogged and 
continuing reevaluation of the choices made by the self, and the principled 
doubt that any such reevaluation is itself adequate, must be permanent 
features of an authentic self.  
                                                
8
in "Responsibility for Self," in A. O. Rorty, Ed., The Identities of Persons (Berkeley: The 
University of California Press, 1976). 
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Such continuing re-evaluation would require moral paralysis for a subject 
for whom thought and action were fully integrated, since such a subject 
would never reach the conclusion that the act in question was justified and so 
never perform it. A subject with an unintegrated self would perform the act, 
but without the endorsement of practical reason carried to its final conclusion; 
without conviction at best, without due consideration at worst. 
 The idea that there are, and should be, in theory no terminating criteria for 
evaluating the worth of any desire one might have, nor of any action one 
might undertake, is unsatisfactory. For then either the whole point of 
ascending to the self-reflective stance of second-order desires in the first place 
seems to have been lost; or else continual self-reevaluation and principled 
doubt about the success of one's continuing efforts gain a prominence and 
normative standing in the life of the mind that is not easy to defend from a 
moral standpoint. Is it really preferable that we never act out of settled 
conviction? That we always second-guess our own best moral efforts as to 
whether they were really good enough? Taylor's conception of moral 
authenticity seems to court precisely that stereotype of the philosopher as 
dithering wimp from which the enemies of liberalism obtain so much mileage. 
 Others may feel no qualms about simply digging in their heels and 
coupling a forceful assertion of their intrinsic desires – reinforced, perhaps, 
with whatever resources of force are needed and available to satisfy them – 
with a bald refusal to give any further justification of those desires. Only the 
very forceful indeed have this luxury. Nietzsche would approve. But even if 
such stonewalling or intimidation tactics succeeded in silencing our 
interrogation of a person's intrinsic desires, they nevertheless would fail to 
address the question of whether or not such terminating criteria have been 
met. We are ready to accept such a stance only when they, have, in point of 
fact, been met: The familiar intrinsic desires for friendship and intellectual 
stimulation resist further regress, whereas the anomalous or capricious 
desires to spend one's evenings howling at the moon, or for continuing self-
obliteration invite one. The diversity of our responses to such cases may, of 
course, be purely fortuitous. But it is more likely that the former objects of 
desire are rationally intelligible whereas the latter are not; and that both sets 
are susceptible to terminating criteria of rational final ends that the former set 
satisfies and the latter set violates. However, to explicate these criteria and 
their relation to the lower-order desires they evaluate requires us to move 
beyond the scope of the Humean conception of the self. For by definition, the 
concept of a higher-order desire is insufficient to supply such an explanation; 
and this is all the Humean model of rationality has to offer.   
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2.3. Unthinkability 
 Harry Frankfurt has addressed these criticisms in a more recent 
discussion, "Rationality and the Unthinkable,"
9
 by offering further refinements 
on the Humean conception of the self. He distinguishes between wanting and 
willing to perform an action (182, n. 5), and means to make the concept of 
volition central to his analysis. Indeed, he sometimes uses the term "will" as 
interchangeable with "intention," (187) which would seem to distance him 
from the Humean conception entirely. But there are other passages in which 
he uses the term "will" interchangeably with "want" (184), despite having 
distinguished them earlier. So his Humean allegiances remain in evidence 
nonetheless, and I shall treat them as such here. 
 In this essay Frankfurt approaches the challenge to develop a criterion for 
identifying those ends of action that are nonrevisable in light of higher-order 
criteria from the opposite direction. Rather than insist on the "decisive" 
finality of second-order desires, as he did in "Freedom of the Will and the 
Concept of a Person," he considers the case of a person – a Utilitarian – for 
whom no higher-order criterion of rational final ends is unrevisable and for 
whom, therefore, any end of action must be counted as a real possibility. He 
describes the resulting condition of moral paralysis this way: 
If the restrictions upon the choices that a person can make are loosened 
too far, he may become disoriented and uncertain about what and how to 
choose. ... When he confronts the task of evaluating a large number of 
addition alternatives, his previously established appreciation of what his 
interest and priorities are may well become less decisive. ... [S]uppose 
that now every possible course of action is available and eligible for 
choice, including those courses of action that would affect the person's 
preferences themselves. ... But how, then, is he to make any choice at all? 
What preferences and priorities are to guide him in choosing, when his 
own preferences and priorities are among the very things he must 
choose? ... A person like that is so vacant of identifiable tendencies and 
constraints that he will be unable to deliberate or to make conscientious 
decisions (177-8). 
This is also Rawls' criticism of Utilitarianism, on which Frankfurt explicitly 
focuses: that in the service of maximizing well-being, a Utilitarian must be 
prepared to view any end, value, preference or priority as in theory 
dispensable or revisable – including those which most essentially define her 
                                                
9
Harry G. Frankfurt, "Rationality and the Unthinkable," in The Importance of What We 
Care About: Philosophical Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 177-190. 
Henceforth references to this essay are paginated in the text. 
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as a distinct and particular individual.
10
 In this kind of case, no "decisive" 
identification with some set of higher-order desires or ends is possible.  
 To anticipate Bernard Williams' locution (see below, Section 3.2), such an 
individual lacks personal integrity (178-9).  Because any such identification 
must be conditional on the requirement that the ends in question serve the 
further end of maximizing utility, no such identification can be unconditional; 
and therefore no commitment to such ends can centrally define her. Such a 
person can be said to be alienated from her most centrally definitive ends and 
values, in the sense that her commitment to them is mediated and vitiated by 
the necessity of subjecting them to the further requirement of utility-
maximization. It is this requirement that provides the terminating criterion of 
self-evaluation for the utilitarian. But this is no criterion at all. Any 
substantive end whatsoever – including substantive final ends such as 
knowledge, happiness, or friendship – can be evaluated by the further 
criterion of whether or not it maximizes utility in particular circumstances to 
achieve it. And we have already seen in Chapters III and IV that the concept 
of utility is either vacuous or inconsistent regardless of how it is interpreted. 
So Utilitarianism in effect generates the same infinite regress as does 
Frankfurt's original conception of second-order desires.   
 This means that there are no ends and values that stabilize such a self in a 
state of rational equilibrium. The subject fluidly adapts his desires and value 
commitments to the requirements of maximizing utility under the 
circumstances in which he finds himself, and changes them as those 
circumstances do. In the limiting case, such a subject may lack even the 
minimal psychological consistency that we saw in Chapter IV.3.1 was 
essential for preserving a sense of moment-to-moment personal continuity. 
Without independent terminating criteria of rational final ends that determine 
at what it is rational for that agent to aim, any and all actions and ends can be 
justified as potential candidates for the maximization of utility. 
 Now Frankfurt thinks Rawls – and, by extension, Williams, and I – are 
wrong to draw such a conclusion. He thinks that if a Utilitarian with a specific 
set of personal values realistically estimates the likelihood of having to revise 
or adjust certain central desires and capacities as being extremely small, 
[t]here is no reason why [he] should not make to them a commitment that 
is just as wholehearted as his expectation that he will never encounter 
circumstances in which maintaining those values would require him to 
sacrifice well-being (180). 
And how wholehearted is this? 
                                                
10
See John Rawls, "Social Unity and Primary Goods," in Amartya Sen and Bernard 
Williams, Eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 180. 
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If his expectation concerning this is unqualified, his commitment also 
need not be equivocal or at all reserved. ... The possibility that one's 
expectations are wrong means only that there is a risk in basing a 
wholehearted commitment on them. It does not imply that taking the risk 
is either impossible or unjustified (180). 
But first, it is not obvious how a Utilitarian could ever come to have such 
specific values and desires in the first place, unless as mere vestigial remnants 
of a pre-enlightened moral attitude. How would such values and desires ever 
get a grip, given the constant reminder that they were to be regarded as 
conditional on their maximization of utility? 
 Second, even if they could find a stable place in my overall scheme of 
values, they would be, in fact, unjustified. If my expectation that I will never 
have to revise my central desires is unqualified by the acknowledgment that I 
risk being mistaken in my estimate of the relevant probabilities, then surely I 
have failed to consider adequately the risk involved in wholeheartedly 
committing myself to them. And then my wholehearted commitment surely is 
unjustified, for I have failed adequately to anticipate the likelihood of having 
to modify it. In Frankfurt's earlier attempt to solve the problem, the vehement 
emphasis on the decisiveness of one's commitment to one's higher-order 
desires was insufficient to carry the weight of the argument he gave it. In this 
more recent attempt, his emphasis on the wholeheartedness of one's 
commitment suffers the same defect. 
 Frankfurt offers the concept of unthinkability as a way of understanding 
what wholeheartedness (or decisiveness) of commitment involves. His 
argument is that if an agent finds that she cannot bring herself to perform 
some action that she is in a good position to perform, has reason to perform, 
and has a desire to perform, then that action violates a wholehearted 
commitment to some end or value (181). He analyzes this as a case in which 
the agent cannot will to perform the action in question; and later explains this 
inability as an unwillingness to will performance of the action, and, in the same 
paragraph, as the agent's not really wanting to perform it (184). The inability to 
"go through with" the action thus stems from value commitments that are so 
deep and centrally formative of the self that their violation is effectively 
outside the agent's physical capacity. In this case, the readiness required of the 
Utilitarian to abandon any such values or ends contingent on their 
maximization of utility must remain entirely a theoretical matter, even when 
she justifiably believes that utility-maximization in this instance requires it. 
Frankfurt seems to think this kind of case demonstrates that even committed 
Utilitarians may have personal integrity, for there are circumstances in which 
they seemingly cannot abdicate their most essential commitments even if they 
want to. 
 But such a case does not demonstrate this. It demonstrates that one may 
falsely believe she is prepared to do anything for the sake of utility-
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maximization, but discover in the event that there are for her more important 
considerations that override this one. That is, it demonstrates that one may 
believe of oneself that one is a Utilitarian yet, when one's convictions are put 
to the test, turn out not to be one after all. Unthinkability cases show that 
some agents are, in fact, constrained in their actions by their non-Utilitarian 
values and ends. But it does not show that a genuine, wholehearted Utilitarian 
can be. 
 However, the larger problem for Frankfurt's second attempt to meet the 
infinite regress criticisms is that he no more offers independent, formal 
criteria for determining what values should finally and authoritatively 
override others than he did the first time. He offers no terminating criteria for 
determining which values and ends are rational objects of a wholehearted 
commitment such that they therefore can receive an agent's fully justified and 
fully grounded endorsement. He alludes to such criteria by distancing himself 
from Hume's hyperbolic claim that "'[t]is not contrary to reason to prefer the 
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger etc." To this 
Frankfurt rightly protests that a person who really believes this must be crazy; 
and that surely to say of someone that he is crazy is to evaluate negatively his 
rationality. But he does not try to explicate the analysis or criterion of 
rationality according to which we might perform such a negative evaluation.   
 Instead Frankfurt uses interchangeably the terms "rational" and 
"reasonable" (185) – a distinction on which Rawls and others have long 
insisted;
11
 equates the irrational with the abnormal (186); asserts a 
"convergence" among the concepts of the insane, the unnatural, and the 
irrational (186, n. 8); and observes that "we do sometimes take what we find 
unthinkable as defining a criterion of normality" (186; also see 187-188). He 
also argues that 
[r]ationality belongs distinctively to the essential nature of a human 
being. If we regard a judgment or a choice as opposed to human nature – 
that is, if it strikes us as unnatural or inhuman – we are inclined to think 
of it as therefore involving a defect of reason (186). 
Frankfurt is of course correct to observe that many people believe that actions 
or behavior they regard as abnormal, unnatural, or inhuman are for that 
reason irrational. But this factually accurate report on the vagaries of human 
judgment does not constitute an argument that what people view as 
abnormal, unnatural, or inhuman is in fact irrational. Such epithets have been 
applied to literate blacks, working women, practicing homosexuals, 
innovative artists, and observant Jews, to name just a few. Frankfurt would 
                                                
11
 Rawls, ibid., 17. Although Rawls later traces this distinction back to Kant (Political 
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 48-49), his use of it seems to 
owe a great deal to the analysis of W. M. Sibley, “The Rational Versus the Reasonable,” 
Philosophical Review 60 (October 1953), 554-560. 
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surely agree that the conclusion to irrationality in at least some of these cases 
would be false. 
 Finally, he outlines an argument that a person may act rationally when 
she is acting against her judgment, if her judgment directs her to do what is 
practically unthinkable for her. We can well imagine such a case: I judge, after 
long and careful reflection, that in fact I really need only two articles of any 
kind of clothing (pants, dresses, T-shirts, socks, suits, blouses, shoes, etc.) – 
one to wear while the other is being cleaned; that it would serve the cause of 
helping the needy to donate the rest of my clothes to charity; and so conclude 
with full conviction that I should give the rest of my clothes to the Salvation 
Army. Yet I find that I cannot bring myself to do it. My emotions, my desires, 
and my values simply revolt. Frankfurt is surely right to suggest that 
rationality may be on the side of my emotions rather than my judgment in this 
case. But he then goes on to conclude that  
it is precisely in the particular content or specific character of his will – 
which may salubriously lead him to act against his judgment – that the 
rationality of a person may in part reside (190). 
– without, however, suggesting any criterion by which we may identify such 
rational content.  Surely there remains a question to be answered, in the above 
hypothetical case, as to whether it is my judgment or my emotions that are in 
fact closer to what rationality requires. Leaving myself with only two articles 
of each type of clothing may be a very austere, unsociable, and inconvenient 
way to live. But that does not demonstrate that it is irrational under 
circumstances in which so many people have no clothes of their own at all.   
 Frankfurt thus leaves us with a searching analysis of unthinkability as a 
force that may practically constrain behavior under certain circumstances, and 
therefore may constrain judgment, desire, or will. This force may thus play the 
practical role that an authoritative criterion of rational judgment, desire, or 
will would play in guiding, justifying, and motivating action in the service of 
certain identifiably rational final ends. But it is not the same as such a 
criterion, nor does it apply coextensively, nor does it suggest what such a 
criterion would be. In the end, Frankfurt does not supply the rationality 
criteria that would justify a decisive identification with one's n-order desires – 
or will, or judgments, or intentions – at any level. He thus leaves the 
fundamental problems of self-evaluation and moral paralysis unsolved. 
 If there are rational grounds on which decisive identification with one's 
n-order desires (etc.) can be made, this will ensure the authority of the 
decision to terminate the regress at some particular point in the series, but 
only by sacrificing the evaluative authority of second-order desires. For 
whatever the grounds on which we justify our decisive commitment to some 
set of n-order desires, those grounds cannot themselves be desires of any 
order. If they were, the regress could be reopened, merely by asking for 
reasons why we should be impressed with the authority of those n+1-order 
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desires. Here it will not do simply to point out that these are the desires we 
happen to have, or even that these are the final or intrinsic desires which 
confer urgency on all those that are instrumental to their satisfaction. For that 
we have desires does not demonstrate that they are non-arbitrary from the 
perspective of rational justification (suppose, for example, that my most 
urgent intrinsic desire just is to spend my evenings howling at the moon). A 
fortiori, it does not demonstrate that they constitute rationally authoritative 
and nonarbitrary terminating criteria of self-evaluation. Hence any such 
criteria to which we may appeal successfully must be independent, not only 
of the desires we actually do have, but also of those we should have. For part 
of the function of such criteria of rationality will be to furnish conclusive and 
compelling reasons why we should have precisely those desires rather than 
some others. The Humean model of rationality, even with Frankfurt's more 
recent refinements, is incapable in theory of furnishing these criteria. 
 
3. Two Bipartite Conceptions of the Self 
 
3.1. Moral Paralysis: Watson's Platonism 
 Gary Watson
12
 has proposed a conception of the self that addresses this 
requirement. He suggests that we distinguish reason and appetite as two 
independent sources of motivation, as Plato did. On Watson's view, reason is 
the source of evaluative judgments about "those principles and ends which 
[one] – in a cool and non-self-deceptive moment – articulates as definitive of 
the good, fulfilling, and defensible life."
13
 These constitute rational values 
which are motivationally effective and from the standpoint of which the 
worth of our motivationally effective desires can be assessed. Since rational 
evaluations are of the first order too, the infinite regress – with all the 
attendant problems already enumerated – does not arise. 
 Or does it? Watson's picture of rational values suggests that the regress is 
to be blocked by demonstrating that the ends "definitive of the good, 
fulfilling, and defensible life" are authoritatively justified, i.e. that it would be 
absurd or irrelevant to raise any further doubts about the rational value of 
those criteria. This much seems to follow by definition of "defensible." But this 
characterization thereby begs the question. For we can agree that the rational 
defensibility of certain final ends renders them immune to the pressure to 
push the regress of justification one step further. But merely calling them 
defensible does not make them defensible. Without knowing what Watson 
intends by "good," and to whom and under what conditions a life is 
"defensible," there is no reason why my most favored activity of howling at 
                                                
12
Op. cit. Note 6. 
13
Ibid. page 215. 
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the moon should not be definitive of the "good, fulfilling, and defensible life" 
for me. And however ready you may be to accept my chosen way of life, 
surely you are justified in entertaining further doubts about its rationality. If 
Watson's rational values are truly rational, then we should be able to give 
persuasive reasons for holding them, and for according them precedence over 
the promptings of desire. That is, we should have some reason to believe that 
we are capable of evaluating ourselves correctly. Otherwise, Watson succeeds 
only in shifting the infinite regress from appetitive desires to "rational" values, 
rather than terminating it. 
 Watson not only does not furnish such criteria. In fact, he cannot. For in 
fashioning a bipartite conception of a self that includes two independent 
sources of motivation, he leaves open the psychological question of which 
source is in fact authoritative for any particular self, and begs the 
philosophical question of which source should be. He is concerned to 
emphasize that the reason-appetite distinction does not commit us to any 
necessary or inevitable split between reason and desire, since, for example, we 
may value certain activities such as eating or sex precisely because of the 
desires they satisfy. 
But the distinction does commit us to the possibility of such a split. If 
there are sources of motivation independent of the agent's values, then it 
is possible that sometimes he is motivated to do things he does not deem 
worth doing.
14
 
However, even this much understates the case. For if there are two, mutually 
independent sources of motivation within the self, then surely it must be an 
open question with which source the agent identifies on any particular 
occasion, hence which constitutes her self-conception or (in Watson's 
terminology) "standpoint."
15
 Watson seems to take it for granted that an agent 
                                                
14
Ibid., page 213. 
15
Wright Neely makes this point in anticipation of Watson's analysis (op. cit. Note 1, 42). 
Watson does not use the term "standpoint" as I do the term "self-conception." He means 
"the point of view from which one judges the world." (216) He doubts the validity of the 
Humean conception of the self as scrutinizing and evaluating the worth of its first-order 
desires. Rather, he believes that 
[agents need not usually] ask themselves which of their desires they want to be 
effective in action; they ask themselves which course of action is most worth 
pursuing. The initial practical question is about courses of action and not about 
themselves. 
But this seems part of a general plan to throw out the baby with the bathwater. For in 
denying that we evaluate our first-order desires from the perspective of second-order 
ones, he seems to want to deny as well that we act self-reflectively at all. But surely one 
consideration that favors any action we deem worth performing is that it is consistent 
with actions performed by the kind of person we aspire to be. The "point of view from 
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must be identified with the values that come from reason, and dissociate 
herself from any desires or actions that do not conform to them. But this 
assumption underestimates the role of action as expressive of the self. When I 
perform genuine action, there is a state of affairs that I envision as its 
outcome, intend to bring about, and work to bring about. The "I" in the 
preceding sentence is not neutral between reason and desire. Whichever 
source of motivation is causing the action is the one that, for that moment, 
expresses my self. If desire is motivating the action, and reason disapproves of 
it, then so much the worse, for the time being at least, for reason. And if the 
conflict persists over the long term, so much the worse for the unity of the self. 
 Hence the problem of moral paralysis resurfaces in the form of a dilemma 
for the Platonic bipartite self: Which part of the self ought to have 
motivational priority on any particular occasion? And who – or what – ought 
to settle this question? If I act on my desires at the expense of reason, reason 
can reproach me with incontinence; or, at worst, Aristotelian self-indulgence. 
If my rational values take motivational precedence over my desires, the 
approval of conscience may be insignificant in the face of the frustration, 
regret, and alienation contingent upon ignoring the acknowledged demands 
of desire.
16
 If I am unlucky enough to be torn by equally strong but conflicting 
tendencies from reason and desire, I may be as fully paralyzed as Buridan's 
Ass, and for much the same reason. If not, I will be in any case unable to 
exercise my agency in determining my behavior, and so will suffer the 
disquieting experience of being propelled into action by forces external to my 
will, regardless of the course of action on which I finally embark.
17
 Under such 
conditions of perpetual internecine conflict, it is a wonder that we manage to 
do anything at all. 
 And so for Watson's Platonic conception of the self, the practical problem 
of moral paralysis is not resolved but exacerbated. This conception fails to 
resolve the problem because it contains an unexplicated assumption about 
which feature of the self has rational authority – and therefore motivational 
priority. Hence his proposed solution to the problem of self-evaluation suffers 
accordingly. If reason and desire must vie for control of the self as the original 
picture seems to suggest, then to appeal to rational values to terminate the 
                                                                                                     
which one judges the world" is the point of view of a certain kind of self whose 
capacities for critical scrutiny are exercised as often on itself as on other objects. 
16
Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard 
Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973); 
"Persons, Character, and Morality," in Rorty, op. cit. Note 8. W. D. Falk makes a similar 
point in "Morality, Self, and Others," in Judith J. Thomson and Gerald Dworkin, Eds., 
Ethics (New York: Harper and Row, 1958). 
17
Frankfurt makes this point about intentional action without agency (op. cit. Note 1, 
page 16), without seeing its implications for the Humean model of rationality. 
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proliferation of orders of desire is no less arbitrary than it would be to appeal 
to any appetitive desire to do so. But in the absence of any further, highest 
court of appeals within which these conflicting demands can be adjudicated, a 
rationally and morally imperfect agent who nevertheless acts decisively and 
well much of the time must remain a theoretical enigma.  
 Thus if we cannot provide, even in theory, some such terminating 
rational criteria for self-evaluation, it is unclear why we should bother to 
evaluate ourselves in the first place. Without an authoritative justification of 
the ends, values and norms on which we both act and rely for criteria of self-
evaluation, there is no non-arbitrary reason why we should commit ourselves 
to those values rather than to some others. Then it is not easy to explain how 
or why our actions and character should matter, either to us or to anyone else, 
at all. 
 
3.2. Moral Alienation: Williams' Anti-Rationalism 
 Bernard Williams has offered the most sustained defense of the position 
that not only are no authoritative criteria for rational final ends needed; no 
such criteria are desirable. His view is that appeal or attention to such criteria 
corrupt moral integrity and promote moral alienation, for they require one to 
subordinate one's "ground projects" – i.e. one's most centrally definitive final 
ends – to the requirements of an impartial, universalistic moral point of view 
that accords those projects no special priority in deciding what one ought to 
do. I shall call this Williams' thesis.  
 As we have just seen, Williams' thesis and Rawls' elaboration of it 
constituted the target of Frankfurt's counterargument, just considered, for 
unthinkability as a terminating criterion of rationality – at least in some cases 
– that nonetheless would not imply the subordination of one's central ends 
and values to any external, alienating principle. We have also seen that 
Frankfurt's counterargument failed because it depended on a case-by-case 
treatment that declined to specify in general terms when unthinkability is 
rationally justified and when it is not. Without an explicit, general criterion of 
rationality, Frankfurt's analysis of unthinkability collapsed into an elaboration 
of Williams' thesis, rather than standing as an alternative to it. 
 Williams' thesis does not deny the justificatory function or motivational 
efficacy of rational principles of morality or justice. Instead it questions their 
authority to legislate an agent's ends, and their consequent conduciveness to 
the agent's moral wellbeing. In effect, Williams' thesis is a sustained defense 
of the claim that final ends do not require rational justification at all. From it I 
conclude, however, that the moral point of view at which Williams directs his 
criticisms is either a straw man, or else a foil for a very real problem that is 
nevertheless unconnected to the enterprise of Socratic metaethics. 
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3.2.1. Williams' Thesis 
 
3.2.1.1. Ground Projects 
 What, exactly, is a "ground project"? Williams develops this notion in a 
series of papers that focus on particular normative moral theories rather than 
on their metaethical foundations. Consistent with his Humean Anti-
Rationalist convictions, his exposition is unsystematic, as it always is with 
rationally consistent Humean Anti-Rationalists. My avowedly rationalist 
reconstruction of Williams' thesis attempts to systematize it.  
 In "A Critique of Utilitarianism,"
18 Williams reproaches Utilitarianism 
with treating our moral feelings "just as unpleasant experiences," [CU, 103] 
when in fact they are more accurately "regarded as indications of what [one] 
thinks is right and wrong." [CU, 103] These feelings, and the "sense of what 
we can or cannot 'live with',
19
"partly determine our moral relation to the 
world, and so cannot properly be understood as "happenings outside one's 
moral self." [CU, 104] Moral feelings, then, are much more complex and 
integral to moral agency than Utilitarianism according to Williams 
acknowledges. 
 Williams accuses the Utilitarian of a similarly simplistic concept of desire, 
as consisting solely in "egoistic inclinations and necessities at one end, and 
impersonally benevolent happiness-management at the other." [CU, 112] But, 
he argues, one may desire things for oneself, and for "one's family, one's 
friends, including basic necessities of life, ... objects of taste," as well as "... 
pursuits and interests of an intellectual, cultural, or creative character." [CU, 
110] These latter may be different because "some people's commitment to 
these kinds of interests just is more thoroughgoing and serious than their 
pursuit of various objects of taste, while it is more individual and permeated 
with character than the desire for the necessities of life." [CU, 111]  
 Now I argued in Chapter VI that all such desires are a species of self-
interested motivation; and Williams' characterization of some of them as 
different, more thoroughgoing and serious, and more individual and 
permeated with character does not explicitly contradict this. However, each of 
these desires are what Williams calls "first-order projects," [CU, 110] as is 
                                                
18
 In J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973). Henceforth page references to this essay will be in 
the text, preceded by CU. I adopt the same convention for other essays by Williams 
discussed here, as follows: "Persons, Character and Morality, " in Moral Luck (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981) = PC; "Utilitarianism and Moral Self-Indulgence," 
also in Moral Luck = UM;  "Morality and the Emotions," in Problems of the Self  (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1973) = ME; and Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) = EL. 
19
Here we find the inchoate origins of Frankfurt's analysis of unthinkability. 
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one's support of a cause, or those that "flow from some more general 
disposition towards human conduct and character, such as a hatred of 
injustice, or of cruelty, or of killing." [CU, 111] None of these desires need 
include, or be identical with, the pursuit of happiness or pleasure as such. 
[CU, 112-113] On the view defended in Chapter VI, all of these other-directed 
desires entail and envision personal satisfaction, and so are no less egocentric 
than self-directed ones. 
 A project, then, on Williams' thesis, is an object of desire. Objects of desire 
identifiable as projects range from the egoistic through the social, cultural, 
aesthetic, and political to the straightforwardly altruistic or benevolent. These 
objects may be expressive, to varying degrees, of the agent's character and 
seriousness of purpose, and of his relations to others. Those objects of desire 
that flow from his moral feelings, e.g. his hatred of cruelty, partly determine 
his moral relation to the world. Williams sometimes uses the term "project" 
interchangeably with the term "commitment" [CU, 112, 113] but also describes 
"commitments" as a special kind of project, i.e. "those with which one is more 
deeply and extensively involved and identified ... [and] which in some cases 
[one] takes seriously at the deepest level, as what [one's] life is about." [CU, 
116] 
 Projects or commitments thus differ from Williams' version of the 
Utilitarian concept of desire in three ways. First, the object of a project or 
commitment may be more intentionally complex than a mere feeling, and 
more psychologically and socially complex than the object of a universal 
benevolent desire. Second, the motivation for adopting a project or 
commitment may be more complex than a simple egoistic or benevolent 
impulse. It may also include feelings that are themselves expressive of our 
moral convictions, and dispose us in various ways towards our own and 
others' conduct. Third and most importantly, an agent seriously and 
extensively identifies with those projects or commitments that give meaning to 
her life. 
 This third aspect of projects or commitments is elaborated more 
extensively in "Persons, Character and Morality." There Williams introduces 
the notion of a categorical desire as a desire or project which does not depend 
on the assumption of the agent's existence [PC, 11] – as does, for example, the 
desire for a sedate lifestyle. Instead, a categorical desire settles the question of 
whether she will continue to exist or not, i.e. whether she has anything to live 
for. A categorical desire thus may be relatively humble or taken for granted 
[PC, 12], as might be, for example, the desire to see one's children reach 
adulthood. Nevertheless, in promising the agent a source of happiness that 
prevents her questioning the assumption of her existence, categorical desires 
"propel" her forward into the future, and thus "not only provide the reason for 
an interest in what happens within the horizon of one's future, but also 
constitute the conditions of there being such a future at all." [PC, 11] 
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 Categorical desires are ordinarily formed within and by "the dispositions 
which constitute a commitment to morality." [PC, 12] Nevertheless, the 
possibility of a radical conflict with morality exists.  A categorical desire that  
 
(1) is closely related to an agent's existence;  
(2) gives meaning to and a reason for his life in the sense just 
described;  
(3) thus provides the motive force that propels him into the future; 
and  
(4) may radically conflict with morality  
 
is what Williams calls a ground project. [PC, 12-13] Ground projects, he tells us, 
need not be selfish or self-centered. They may be altruistic, or require self-
sacrifice on the part of the agent. [PC, 13] Or they may be more like an 
involvement with one particular other person. [PC, 16] The main idea of a 
ground project is that the agent identifies with some complex object of desire 
outside himself, with which he is thoroughly involved, and which gives his 
life meaning. [CU, 113] To have such projects is to have what Williams calls a 
character. 
 Williams' notion of identification and thoroughgoing involvement with 
certain central ends and values is very similar to Frankfurt's notion of a 
decisive and wholehearted commitment to such ends and values. Both are 
intended to convey the idea of ends and values that are so deeply embedded 
in an agent's psychology that they effectively govern her entire existence, 
whether they are morally or rationally justified or not. So deeply embedded 
are they, the implication seems to be, that they render the problems of the 
infinite regress, self-evaluation, and moral paralysis either practically 
irrelevant or a symptom of pathology. 
 
3.2.1.2. The Moral Point of View 
 By contrast, Williams understands the notion of an impartial, moral point of 
view as connected with the Utilitarian's higher-order project of maximizing 
desirable outcomes [CU, 114], and describes it as sub specie aeternitatis. [CU, 
118] Williams also characterizes the moral point of view as  
 
(1) different in kind from a self-interested point of view;  
(2) impartial;  
(3) indifferent "to any particular relations to particular persons." [PC, 2]  
 
Moreover, the moral thought that presumably issues from the moral point of 
view "requires abstraction from particular circumstances and particular 
characteristics of the parties, including the agent, except in so far as these can 
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be treated as universal features of any morally similar situation." [PC, 2]
20
 
Finally, the motivations of a moral agent who acts from the moral point of 
view "involve a rational application of impartial principle." [PC, 2] In this 
respect, Williams argues, they are different from nonmoral motivations for 
treating certain individuals differently from others because of one's interests 
or feelings towards them. Moral motivation does not thereby exclude such 
treatment; but it does claim a "special dignity or supremacy" which nonmoral 
motivation seems to lack. Moral motivation and the moral point of view thus 
involve a "detachment ... from the level of particular relations to particular 
persons, and more generally from the level of all motivations and perceptions 
other than those of an impartial character." [PC, 2] In particular, they therefore 
involve a detachment from what Williams has defined as the agent's 
character. [PC, 14] 
 Clearly, the notion of impartiality plays a central role in Williams' 
conception of the moral point of view and the motivation that characterizes it. 
But it is not easy to understand the use he makes of this notion. Impartial 
means "unbiased, unprejudiced, just, fair, or equitable," according to the OED; 
but Williams seems to mean something different. His talk of detachment, 
indifference to, and abstraction from particular relations, persons, 
circumstances, characteristics, feelings, motivations, and perceptions suggests 
that he means by "impartial" what the OED defines as impersonal, i.e. "having 
no personal reference or connection." And indeed he seems to dismiss Rawls' 
suggested distinction between them. [PC, 5] By an "impartial moral point of 
view," then, Williams would seem to mean a point of view of the sort Thomas 
Nagel elaborates (see Chapter VI.3.2, above), from which one ignores any 
personal reference or connection the object viewed may have to oneself as a 
social and affectional agent. Henceforth I shall refer to this notion as an 
impersonal moral point of view, for the sake of precision. 
 The principles or theory that govern one's behavior and relation to others 
from this point of view can be described as universalistic, to use Williams' 
own, more recent terminology, if they are  
 
(4) universal in that they apply to all subjects and objects similarly 
designated as within their scope (.e.g. persons, moral agents, sentient 
beings, etc.);  
                                                
20
In this respect, the difference between a Kantian and a Utilitarian view must be one of 
degree rather than, as Williams seems to suggest, one of kind. For presumably the 
empirical information on the basis of which the Utilitarian calculates the best action in a 
particular case will yield the same calculation in other, morally similar cases. What 
seems to distinguish Utilitarianism is the large amount of empirical information 
relevant to determining the moral similarity of different cases. 
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(5) general in that they include no proper names or definite 
descriptions;
21
 and  
(6) impartial in the strict sense, in that they accord no special privilege 
to any particular agent's demands or requirements that cannot be 
justified under requirements (4) and (5). 
 
Further evidence for this reading can be culled from Williams' later Ethics and 
the Limits of Philosophy. For example, he characterizes a reflective question as 
general, "because it asks how to live," [EL, 19], and timeless, in that "it invites 
me to think about my life from no particular point in it." [EL, 19] A reflective 
question that can be asked by or of anybody is one that is asked from, and 
leads us to an answer from, the "impersonal standpoint." [EL, 20] This 
characterization of the impersonal standpoint squares well with Nagel's 
conception, as well as with the dictionary definition of impersonality cited 
above.  
 Similarly, Williams describes the "outside point of view" of one's ethical 
dispositions as one in which one may try to "abstract [one]self totally from 
those dispositions, and to think about [one]self and the world as though [one] 
did not have them." [EL, 51] This would seem to be a case of regarding oneself 
and the world from an impersonal standpoint. Later, Williams characterizes 
"the standpoint of impartiality" as that from which an agent reflects on herself 
qua agent, hence sees herself "as one agent among others." [EL, 65] The agent 
thus "stands back from [her] own desires and interests, and sees them from a 
standpoint that is not that of [her] desires and interests. Nor is it the 
standpoint of anyone else's desires and interests." [EL, 66] Again, this is a 
standpoint on oneself "having no personal reference or connection."  
 Finally, Williams proceeds to argue that there is a radical asymmetry 
between theoretical and practical deliberation that Kant's account of rational 
freedom ignores. By contrast with practical reasoning, in which "the first 
person is not derivative or naturally replaced by anyone," [EL, 67] theoretical 
reason is essentially third-personal. For the "I" occurs only incidentally in such 
factual statements as "Wagner never met Verdi." Here the prefix "I believe ..." 
is a "derivative, merely reflexive counterpart to the thoughts that do not 
mention me. I occur in them, so to speak, only in the role of one who has this 
thought." [EL, 67] From the premise that, unlike theoretical deliberation, 
practical deliberation is essentially first-personal, Williams infers – contra 
Nagel – that no "necessary impartiality" can be imposed on it: "[P]ractical 
deliberation ... involves an I  that must be more intimately the I of my desires 
than [Kant's] account allows." [EL, 67] So Williams seems to want to claim that 
the "I" who has these desires is personal, whereas the "I" who has these 
thoughts is impersonal. The idea would then be that to impose the 
                                                
21
 Rawls, op. cit. Note 2, Section 23. 
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requirement of impersonality on the viewpoint of an agent engaged in 
practical deliberation produces a psychologically unnatural distortion of what 
is essentially a personal endeavor. 
 This last argument is a peculiar one to level against a philosophical view 
that centrally includes the thesis that factual propositions would be 
unintelligible unless they could be ascribed at least implicitly to the "I" who 
has the thoughts they describe.
22 Kant's thesis would seem to suggest that the 
"I" of practical reason and the "I" of theoretical reason must stand or fall 
together with respect to their personal connectedness. But perhaps Williams' 
silence on this major thesis of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is intended to 
dismiss rather than overlook it. In any case, Williams' remarks here support 
the suggested interpretation of his notion of impartiality as, more precisely, 
impersonality in the dictionary sense, since factual statements sans intentional 
operator lack personal reference or connection. He seems to want to rebut 
Nagel's analysis of practical reasoning, but without giving it the degree of 
scrutiny Nagel's complex analysis requires. 
 Williams' claims regarding the universality of moral principle support 
the connection described above and in Chapter VII.3.2, between the 
impersonality of one's standpoint and the universality of the principles that 
then may be supposed to govern one's behavior. For example, he argues that 
the Kantian ideal of moral theory is too universalistic to fit our ethical 
intuitions: "We can less and less appropriately rely on those intuitions that 
belong distinctively to the local we, since the theory is now to be a theory for 
an us that includes agents existing far away from our local folkways;" [EL, 
103] that "the universalistic perspective will not determine the content of the 
ethical theory for a given group;" [EL, 104] and that the notion of a 
"universalistic standpoint" involves a mistaken "Platonic assumption that the 
reflective agent as theorist can make himself independent of the life and 
character he is examining." [EL, 110] This would be to examine critically one's 
dispositions "from the outside, from the point of view of the universe." [EL, 
110] But the point of view of the universe, Williams thinks, just is not the 
point of view of human beings. [EL, 118] These comments conjointly imply 
that  
 
(7) the moral point of view is the "outside," "third-personal," 
impersonal point of view of the universe, that includes no personal 
reference or connection to the agent whose view it is;  
(8) the principles of conduct that govern this point of view are 
universal, general, and impartial in the sense explained; and  
                                                
22
Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Herausg. Raymund Schmidt (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1976), A116-117, 123-124, B 131-140, 155-159, passim. 
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(9) the moral point of view and its governing principles are therefore 
detached from the ground projects, character, and human point of view 
of individual human agents. 
 
3.2.1.3. Integrity and Alienation 
 What, then, are "moral integrity" and "moral alienation"? The foregoing 
conclusions enable us to answer this question relatively straightforwardly. 
Moral integrity is a state of the agent in which the agent views the world from 
what Nagel would call the subjective perspective, i.e. that of his own projects 
and ground projects. From this perspective the agent is disposed to act on the 
patterns of feeling and desire that constitute those projects, and does so 
unselfconsciously, i.e. without formulating universalistic principles to which 
he intends his behavior to conform. Williams articulates the concept of moral 
integrity most explicitly in "Utilitarianism and Moral Self-Indulgence." There 
he characterizes integrity as neither a virtue nor a disposition nor a motive. "It 
is rather that one who displays integrity acts from those dispositions and 
motives which are most deeply his, and has also the virtues which enable him 
to do that." [UM, 49] In this sense, moral integrity may conflict with 
universalistic moral principles, such as those definitive of Utilitarianism. [UM, 
51] And in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, he describes with approval 
Aristotle's ideal of the life of practical reason as including "certain excellences 
of character or virtues, which are internalized dispositions of action, desire, 
and feeling [EL, 35] ... It is an intelligent disposition. It involves the agent's 
exercise of judgment, ... and so it is not simply a habit. It also involves 
favorable and unfavorable reactions to other people, their character and 
actions." [EL, 36] These last passages are important, for they suggest that 
Williams' concept of moral integrity does not involve a lack of rational 
reflection, just an absence of "universalistic principles." [UM, 52] Rational but 
nonuniversalistic deliberation presumably would deploy particular instances 
of universal principles of means-end reasoning such as,  
 
  In order to get into law school, I will have to pass the LSATs.  
 
The rational reflection of a morally integrated agent is characteristically 
directed at the object of his desires or projects, not at himself as subject of 
them. [UM, 48; EL, 10] 
 Moral alienation, by contrast, is a state of the agent in which the agent 
views the world and her projects from the impersonal moral point of view, is 
disposed to sacrifice them to the requirements of moral principle, and does so 
with a self-conscious awareness of conforming to those requirements. Thus 
we are alienated from our moral feelings if we "come to regard those feelings 
from a purely utilitarian point of view, that is to say, as happenings outside 
one's moral self." [CU, 104] We are alienated from our actions if, "when the 
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sums come in from the utility network which the projects of others have in 
part determined," we suppose that we "should just step aside from [our] own 
project and decision and acknowledge the decision which Utilitarian 
calculation requires." [CU, 116] We are alienated from others to whom we have 
deep attachments if our reactions to them are motivated by "one thought too 
many," [PC, 18] namely that moral principle condones (or disapproves) those 
reactions. [Also ME, 227] Moral alienation is, for Williams, the consequence of 
a purist moral attitude that insists on "abstracting the moral consciousness 
from other kinds of emotional reaction or social influence." [EL, 195] For 
under these conditions, impersonal moral consciousness detaches us both 
from our personal responses and thereby from ourselves. Now we saw that 
Nagel reproached the personalism and subjectivism of the Humean Anti-
Rationalist with the charge of solipsism. Williams’s response is to reproach 
the impersonalism and objectivism of Kantian and Utilitarian Rationalists 
with the charge of moral alienation. Thus each levels the charge of 
dissociation against the other. 
 
3.2.2. Moral Theory 
 
3.2.2.1. Structure 
 First some preliminary remarks on the structure of Williams' thesis. As 
we have seen, Williams' concept of a desire as a project is reformatory in 
nature. Desires, he wants to say, are considerably more various and complex 
entities than many moral theories have recognized. He does not question the 
basic Humean dictum that all action is motivated by desire; thus, for example, 
his argument that not every desire aims at pleasure because if it did we could 
make no distinction between ethical and hedonistic motivations [EL, 49-50] 
presupposes that desire is the only sort of psychological entity that can 
motivate at all. But he does claim for desires or projects as "first-order 
motivations" [UM, 46] that they are not "dissociated" from complex thoughts 
and judgments we may make about their objects [UM, 52; EL, 36] Thus, for 
example, he characterizes the Aristotelian account as one in which "my 
reflection, even if it is about my dispositions, must at the same time be 
expressive of them. I think about ethical and other goods from an ethical point 
of view that I have already acquired and that is part of what I am ... [i.e.] 
someone in whom the ethical dispositions he has acquired lie deeper than 
other wants and preferences." [EL, 51]
23 
 Opposed to desires of this more complex kind is what I have described as 
the Nagelian impersonal moral point of view, i.e. the view we take of 
ourselves and others sub specie aeternitatis, as one agent among others, 
                                                
23
 Also see EL, 112 and 116, and the discussion of "thick" ethical concepts at 140-142, 200. 
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independent of any personal relations or connections, from which Williams 
supposes "universalistic" principles to be generated. Universalistic principles 
are appropriate to scientific theory, because it "looks characteristically for 
considerations that are very general and have as little distinctive content as 
possible, because it is trying to systematize and because it wants to represent 
as many reasons as possible as applications of other reasons." [EL, 116-117] By 
contrast, the "critical reflection" appropriate to the enterprise of ethics "should 
seek for as much shared understanding as it can find on any issue, and use 
any ethical material that, in the context of the reflective discussion, makes 
some sense and commands some loyalty." [EL, 117] This is because, as we 
have just seen, such reflection must express our motivational dispositions and 
projects rather than detach us from them. Hence we can understand Williams' 
thesis as admonishing us not to assume a stance that is, in fact, part of our 
selves, but that leads us astray when we are trying to solve practical 
questions. 
 Williams' thesis thus depends on a bipartite conception of the self that, 
like Watson’s, draws upon the Platonic distinction between reason and desire. 
On one side are the impersonal point of view and the universalistic principles 
expressive of it, appropriately deployed in scientific but not ethical theorizing. 
On the other side are the more complex and reflective desires that Williams 
calls "projects", from the perspective of which we appropriately survey the 
world and engage with it ethically. Thus unlike Plato and Kant, and twentieth 
century philosophers such as Thomas Nagel, but much like Hume and 
twentieth century philosophers such as Richard Brandt, John Rawls, and 
Harry Frankfurt, Williams claims authority for desire over theoretical reason 
in the structure of the self. Williams' contribution to this Humean conception 
of the self is to have pointed out that if a psychologically adequate concept of 
desire cannot depict it merely as an "original ... modification of existence ... 
[that] contains not any representative quality,"
24
 then there is no reason 
whatsoever to suppose that objects of desire must be limited to personal 
gratification on the one hand and universal happiness on the other. 
 Theoretical reason, in turn, according to Williams' thesis, has two parts: 
the impersonal point of view and the universalistic principles that govern that 
point of view. The passages already examined show that Williams – like 
Nagel – thinks of these two as necessarily interconnected, but this is mistaken. 
An agent may adhere to universalistic principles without adhering to an 
impersonal point of view, and may adhere to an impersonal point of view 
without adhering to universalistic principles. If either of these possibilities can 
determine ethical behavior in a psychologically and socially healthy way, then 
Williams, like Watson, has effectively begged the psychological question of 
                                                
24
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Ed. L. A, Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1968), 415.  
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which aspect of the bipartite self is in fact central to the structure of actual 
selves, as well as the normative philosophical question of which aspect should 
be. 
 
3.2.2.2. Personal Investment (Attachment Revisited) 
 Consider the first possibility, that an agent adheres to universalistic 
principles without adhering to an impersonal point of view. Suppose you are 
personally invested in a moral theory that contains various universalistic 
prescriptions of fairness, sympathy, honesty, compassion, and so forth. Also 
suppose that there are clear psychological reasons for your personal 
investment, deeply rooted in your personal history. Perhaps, in addition to 
having had a sound moral upbringing, you discovered early on that these 
deeply instilled principles were your only resource for coming to terms 
psychologically with repeated personal injustice, or confusing or threatening 
personal encounters. Suppose further, then, that your investment in these 
principles informs your entire social and personal life. You try to do what is 
right, to be fair and honest in your dealings, to understand and sympathize 
with others, and to respond to them compassionately and without prejudice, 
as your moral convictions prescribe. These principles also inform your private 
life: You attempt to secure and maintain good physical health, to live 
modestly but tastefully, and not to deceive yourself about who you are or to 
what you aspire. The moral prescriptions that guide this conduct are universal 
in that they apply not only to you, but to all rational human agents. They are 
also general in that they include no proper names or definite descriptions. 
Moreover, they are impartial, for they require you to accord no special 
privilege to your personal requirements, merely in virtue of the fact that you 
are the agent whose behavior you are evaluating. Of course your moral theory 
includes provisions for different circumstances and social relations, for 
example that the elderly deserve special respect for their wisdom and 
experience, that one has special obligations to family and loved ones, and so 
on. Nevertheless, it applies universally, generally and impartially, for there is 
nothing in it tailored to fit your particular situation. 
 Now if this moral theory entailed an impersonal or dissociated point of 
view, then since this point of view is the symptom of moral alienation, we 
would be forced to conclude from your overriding investment in this moral 
theory that you were alienated from those of your central desires and ground 
projects thus overridden. But surely you are so alienated only if your personal 
investment in your ground projects outweighs your personal investment in 
the moral theory with which they may conflict; and surely this is a moot 
question. I shall say that an agent A is personally invested in some state of 
affairs x if  
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(1) x's existence is a source of personal pleasure, satisfaction, or 
security to A;  
(2) x's nonexistence elicits feelings of dejection, deprivation, or 
anxiety from A; and  
(3) these feelings are to be explained by A's identification with x.  
 
A identifies with x if A is disposed to identify x as personally meaningful or 
valuable to A. This definition of personal investment is the same as the 
definition of attachment in Chapter II.2.4. Renaming it “personal investment” 
here highlights that dimension of attachment that involves giving over some 
part of oneself to the object of attachment, with the expectation of return or 
reciprocation from it.  
According to these criteria of personal investment, you are alienated from 
your central desires and ground projects if, because you identify with them, 
sacrificing the possibility of their realization when your moral view so 
prescribes elicits the feelings of profound loss described by (2). You are 
alienated from your moral theory, on the other hand, if, because you identify 
more completely with this theory, these feelings of loss result from pursuing 
your central projects at the expense of your moral theory. For in this case, it is 
your moral theory that is the focus of your personal investment, not your 
desires and ground projects. 
 Williams does not speak directly to the importance of something like the 
criterion of person investment in determining when, whether, or from what a 
person is morally alienated. He seems on the one hand to recognize it, by 
referring to that from which he presumes agents to be alienated as 
"commitments," and that with which they "identify." On the other hand, 
Williams views as evidence for an agent's moral alienation his regarding his 
desires and ground projects with detachment – i.e. without these feelings of 
loss. But it does not follow from the fact that the abdication or sacrifice of 
certain things with which we identify fails to elicit profound feelings of loss 
from us that we are alienated from those things. For they may have been of 
only peripheral importance to us to begin with.  
 Consider another, analogous conflict between reason and desire. Suppose 
you have a settled, long-standing, and recurring desire to smoke. You also 
hold wholeheartedly the universal, general and impartial conviction that it is 
both unhealthy and inconsiderate to others to smoke. Although you are 
frequently tempted to smoke, the force of your conviction usually enables you 
to resist this temptation. Your unqualified personal investment in the view 
that smoking is a moral evil leads you to fear your desire to smoke, and to 
anticipate its onset with anxiety at the possibility that you may give in to it. 
When it occurs, you are simultaneously torn by craving for a cigarette, and by 
self-disgust at your inability to rid yourself of this craving once and for all. 
When the desire passes, you rejoice, relax, and hope that you have seen the 
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last of it. Of course you experience temporary feelings of deprivation, 
dejection, and anxiety at not smoking when the desire to smoke overtakes 
you. But these feelings are to be explained by your physical addiction to 
smoking, not your identification with it. Though you often desire to smoke, 
you have no personal investment in smoking. If you have no personal 
investment in smoking, it is inappropriate to describe you as alienated from 
your desire to smoke, even though that desire may be a long-standing, 
central, and powerful one. 
 If one is not commonly assumed to be alienated from the desire to smoke 
when one withstands it in favor of the universalistic prescription not to 
smoke, it is unclear why one should be assumed to be alienated from any 
other desires when one sacrifices them in favor of a universalistic prescription 
to, say, treat others fairly. Williams' supposition of an agent's personal 
investment in his projects at the expense of rational principle needs to be 
demonstrated, not taken for granted. 
 Williams might reply to this that a closer scrutiny of such apparent 
counterexamples would reveal that one's investment in fact is in the moral 
content of the theory, i.e. that one do what is right, fair, compassionate, etc. 
and not in the theoretical or universalistic formulation of that content. But this 
might be difficult to demonstrate. For, first, part of the appeal of aspiring to 
conform to such universalistic prescriptions may well be their depiction of 
oneself as a member of a larger rational community, self-governed by 
principles shared in common. If one is personally invested in this conception, 
then to require conformity to these prescriptions only of oneself and not 
others would be to invite the feelings of profound loss described above (thus 
are high-minded misanthropists born). To invest oneself in this conception of 
rational community is not necessarily to abdicate the personal perspective for 
an impersonal one, any more than I do by investing myself in my conception 
of my family. To do the latter is at least to identify myself as a member of my 
family; but this is to see myself from the perspective of my self as I identify it, 
and not from some other perspective. Similarly, one would think, if I identify 
myself as a member of the rational community. 
 
3.2.2.3. Universalistic Principles  
 In fact, central desires and ground projects can take prima facie 
motivational precedence over rational principle only if rational principle takes 
de facto precedence over desire. In order for us to pursue our desires at the 
expense of Williams' moral point of view, we must have beliefs about what 
those desires are. Call these desire-identification beliefs. According to the 
representational analysis of desire offered in Chapter II.2, a desire is a 
particular conventional and theory-laden object of conscious representation. A 
desire-identification belief is a species of conscious representation that 
identifies such an object as having certain specific properties. 
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In order for desire-identification beliefs to facilitate rather than obstruct 
the pursuit of our desires, at least some of them must be logically consistent in 
content. In order for them to reidentify a desire as the same from one occasion 
to the next, distinguish among conflicting desires, and rank desires relative to 
one another in order of priority, at least some of these desire-identification 
beliefs must be general in the sense explained in Section 1.2, above. For if each 
of them contained either proper names or definite descriptions, we would 
lack that generic concept of a desire that enables us to identify each of them as 
being of a certain kind, comparable to or contrastable with others.   
 But desire-identification beliefs that are both general and logically 
consistent apply impartially to all the states of affairs to which they refer, 
without regard to whose state of affairs they designate. Thus, for example, the 
proposition that a certain kind of agitation in the presence of a cigarette is a 
cigarette-craving applies impartially to my own as well as others' 
symptomatic agitations. In order for me to identify my desire for a cigarette 
when and if it occurs, I must believe this general proposition consistently. 
Similarly with the desire-identification belief that cigarette cravings are 
unhealthy. And similarly with the desire-identification belief that the desire to 
live an addiction-free life is worth pursuing. To be moved by desires about 
which we had no such transpersonally rational beliefs, or by desires about 
which the beliefs we had failed the transpersonal rationality criteria of 
generality, impartiality, and consistency, would be to behave blindly and 
reactively, without conceptual self-awareness. That we usually find such 
reactive behavior cause for concern or modification confirms the suspicion 
that the alternative to impartial rationality is not moral integrity but 
conceptual oblivion. A considered commitment to one's central desires and 
ground projects presupposes rather than pre-empts transpersonally rational 
principle. 
 One might protest that this notion of rational principle appears to be 
much broader than the one Williams meant to target. For it is unlikely that 
Williams would want to deny the compatibility of moral integrity and 
abstract conceptual thought. Williams' criticism is presumably intended to 
address certain narrower, standard moral theories – specifically Kantian and 
Utilitarian ones – that he finds deficient in some respect. But the deficiency 
cannot lie in the universalistic or impartial character of these theories. For any 
theory or concept applies impartially to all subjects designated as within its 
scope, including Williams' own. 
 However, the impartial application of Williams' own principles renders 
them self-defeating. This is because Williams' criticism implies either that we 
should either (a) act out of a commitment to our central desires and ground 
projects, not from the universalistic prescriptions of theory; or else that we 
should (b) avoid theorizing about our moral condition, alienated or otherwise. 
Since (b) would immediately obviate the point of advancing Williams' thesis 
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in the first place, assume for the moment that (a) is the correct implication of 
his criticism. Since (a) applies impartially to all subjects addressed by the 
imperative, it accords no special weight to the desires and projects of any 
particular subject who holds it. It requires that each of us evaluate our 
motives and behavior impartially, with an eye to their conformity to (a). 
Hence it appears that (a) is equally susceptible to Williams' critique of moral 
theory. That is, it would seem that I am alienated from my central desires and 
emotions by virtue of my commitment to (a), from the detached perspective of 
which I survey the variety of my motivational states, in order to determine 
which should cause action. For it is only as the result of successfully 
withstanding the scrutiny of the detached perspective expressed by (a) that 
my desires and projects are legitimated as motives for action. Williams' notion 
of alienation would seem, then, to be an unavoidable consequence of thinking 
conceptually, in the universal, general and impartially applied terms which 
language necessitates, about the particular actions we take. 
 This in turn implies that (b) can have the desired outcome only if we fail 
to heed it. We can follow this suggestion only by not following it 
deliberately.
25
 In some moral theories, this apparent impasse is often resolved 
by appeal to an Aristotelian theory of habituation, according to which we are 
to cultivate certain dispositions in ourselves by repetition, imitation, and any 
other available behavior modifiers, so as to reach the point at which we are 
naturally and reflexively inclined to act in the prescribed way, without having 
to be motivated consciously by the prescription. Analogously, for example, 
we might be happier by cultivating the dispositions of generosity, 
cheerfulness, and curiosity, than by continually cogitating about which action 
available to us would maximize our happiness.
26 
 However, both (a) and (b) present special obstacles to this program. For 
the attempt deliberately to cultivate the dispositions they prescribe is also 
self-defeating. In order for me to conform to (a), I must conform to (b). But in 
order to cultivate the disposition to conform to (a), i.e. to act out of a 
commitment to my central desires etc., I must be prepared to behave in that 
way whenever the occasion for practice arises. In order to attain this state of 
psychological readiness, I must think about it – i.e. violate (b). In order to 
know that I am succeeding in cultivating the favored disposition, I must also 
think about it. And every time I think about it, thus violating (b), I am 
undermining the disposition I seek to cultivate, i.e. (a).  
                                                
25
This argument is defended in Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," The Journal of Philosophy 
LXXIX, 8 (August 1982), 419-438. 
26
Henry Sidgwick advocates this strategy in The Methods of Ethics (New York: Dover 
Press, 1968), Book II, Chapter II, Sections 2-3, pp. 136-40. 
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It appears, then, that in order for me to cultivate this disposition 
successfully, I must do so unintentionally. In order not to undermine it, my 
program of moral self-improvement must consist in acting blindly as I please, 
comforted by a self-serving Utilitarian argument that it is at least possible that 
my behavior may have the outcome I wish. Adherence to Williams' theory 
requires one deliberately to reject it. With a target of criticism as inclusive as 
that of universalistic rational principle, it is difficult to avoid shooting oneself 
in the foot. 
 This conclusion suggests that to characterize the rational perspective as 
alienated because it prescribes general and impartially applied norms of 
behavior – which of course describe particular states of affairs under 
particular circumstances – is no more convincing than it would be to 
characterize one's general desires for love, friendship, and physical comfort as 
alienated because they do not as such exhaustively specify the particular 
states of affairs that contingently fulfill them. But Williams' thesis commits 
him to this. It seems that on his view, we are caught between moral alienation 
and conceptual oblivion. So it could not be, in fact, the universalistic 
formulation of the content of moral theory as such that is objectionable. For 
any principle that lacks a proper name or definite description applies 
universally, generally, and so impartially in the sense defined to all subjects 
designated as within its scope, including Williams’ own. There is reason to 
doubt that universalistic principles as such engender moral alienation, and 
hence that they are necessarily interconnected with the impersonal point of 
view. 
 
3.2.2.4. Slote on the Rationality of Pure Time Preference 
 We have seen that Williams’ attack on universalistic moral principles had 
particular relevance to Nagel’s earlier defense of altruism. But Nagel also 
defended prudence, and prudence is governed by universalistic principles 
just as thoroughly. Fellow Humean Anti-Rationalist Michael Slote targets 
Nagel’s universalistic defense of prudence in the same way that Williams 
targeted Nagel’s case for altruism. But in his argument against the 
irrationality of pure time preference,
27
 Slote confronts the same dilemma of 
self-defeat as did Williams.  
Slote formulates the view he means to target as that which claims that 
“different (properly articulated) times of life are of (roughly ) equal 
importance in determining the goodness of lives” (13), and identifies Thomas 
Nagel, John Rawls, Amartya Sen, Charles Fried, and Henry Sidgwick as all 
proponents of this view. Against them, Slote wants to argue that “we typically 
and naturally think of some times of life as more important than others” (13). 
                                                
27
 Michael Slote, Goods and Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), Chapter I. 
Henceforth references to this work are paginated in the text. 
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He makes his case by pointing out, first, that a human life naturally divides 
into periods: infancy, childhood, adolescence, young adulthood, maturity, old 
age, and, second, that “such a division into ‘times of life’ tends to be 
accompanied, in most of us, by a sense of the greater importance or 
significance of certain times of life in comparison with others” (14). He 
maintains, for example, that “we have a definite tendency to discount 
youthful misfortune or success” (14), as well as the achievements and failure 
of senescence (18-21), as unimportant in comparison to those of mature 
adulthood. Slote contends that “Rawls, Sidgwick and others who have 
assumed the equal status of all times of life have not taken this sort of 
common judgment sufficiently into account” (15). 
 It is difficult to know, however, quite what to make of this empirical 
generalization about how we in fact view different periods of our lives (if it is 
a fact), without some degree of higher-level theorizing which Slote does not 
provide. Can Slote mean to say that the fact that we do view periods in our 
lives this way shows that it is rational so to view them? For surely Nagel et al. 
can concede that we may typically think of some periods of life as more 
important than others, without undermining their thesis that “rationality 
implies an impartial concern for all parts of our life. The mere difference of 
location in time, of something’s being earlier or later, is not in itself a rational 
ground for having more or less regard for it.”
28
 Nagel et al. might explain our 
typical behavior in one of at least two ways. Either we may irrationally view a 
period of our life as more important than others, i.e., by exhibiting a time-
preferential bias in that very judgment, or else we may view that period as 
more important than others, not because of its mere temporal location, but 
because of other concomitant factors contingently connected with its temporal 
location. Call these contingency reasons. In neither case would Slote be 
affirming a claim with which Rawls et al. would take issue. 
 Consider the first possibility. Doubtless the trials and tribulations of 
childhood and adolescence seem of momentous significance at the time, just 
as a burgeoning sense of self-confidence may lead the young adult to devalue 
the accumulated wisdom, insight, and tolerance of the aged. We may, indeed, 
typically overestimate the significance of temporally proximate states of 
affairs at every time of life, just because of their temporal proximity. But 
clearly it would be a mistake for Slote to maintain that from the temporal 
perspective of maturity, we take more seriously the successes and failures of 
maturity because of their temporal proximity to us. That would merely 
illustrate his claim that we have a pure time preference, not that it is rational 
to have it. Hence the perspective from which we evaluate a pure time 
preference as rational cannot be itself time preferential.  
                                                
28
 Rawls, op. cit. Note 2, 293; italics added. 
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 Moreover, it is not obvious that we do exhibit time preference in such 
cases as those Slote describes, even if he is right about the judgments we 
typically make. For (and this is the second possibility) there may be 
contingency reasons that explain why we take the achievements and failures 
of a particular period of life more seriously than others; for example, that they 
are the outcome of the full flowering of one’s physical or mental capacities. If 
this occurred in human beings between the ages of two and five (say) as it 
does in dogs, we might favor a person’s achievements and failures at that age 
instead. Thus these authors’ answer to Slote might be that the reason we take 
a person’s mature successes and failures more seriously than those of 
adolescence is because the former are her mature successes and failures, not 
because of the temporal location at which maturity occurs. 
 Slote appears to acknowledge this, when he says, “[W]hat we have so far 
defended is not ‘pure’ time preference, if by that one means the favouring, 
say, of earlier or nearer times of life as such. Rather, it is a preference for the 
goals and interests characteristic of certain states or periods of life rather than 
others, and these goals and interests are from a logical standpoint perhaps 
only contingently related to what comes earlier or later in time” (23). But the 
“logical standpoint” cannot be so casually dismissed, if Slote intends his 
readers to consider seriously the logical force of his thesis. If “the goals and 
interests characteristic of certain states or periods of life” may occur at any 
time of life (psychological lore has it, for instance, that intellectual maturity 
comes between eighteen and thirty for the mathematician, but between fifty 
and sixty for the historian), then Slote’s empirical observations about our 
preference for those goals and interests are simply a non sequitur in relation to 
the philosophically compelling issue of pure time preference that Nagel et al. 
address. 
 When Slote then purports to turn his attention to this issue directly, he 
defends what he takes to be an even more radical thesis about the rationality 
of pure time preference. He claims that “even such pure time preference can 
be found (ironically) not in any favoring of the temporally nearer or earlier, 
but rather in a precisely opposite preference for what comes later in life” (23). 
But again the same difficulties arise: Does Slote mean to claim that, from the 
perspective of youth, we favor the experiences of old age? In our society this 
seems clearly false, but what would it show it if were true? For Nagel et al. it 
would show only the irrationality of youth. Or does Slote mean that from no 
particular temporal perspective at all, i.e., irrespective of our temporal location, 
we favor “what comes later in life?” This seems prima facie incoherent, since, 
when we make a judgment irrespective of our temporal location, we discount 
the temporal location relative to which the temporal location of any other 
event can be identified as “earlier” or “later” than it. Or, lastly, does Slote 
mean that, irrespective of our temporal location, we favor what comes later in 
our life as such, whenever that is, more highly than what comes earlier? In this 
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case, our judgment would be made, irrespective of our temporal location, 
about the significance of a certain kind of temporally characterized state of 
affairs, irrespective of its temporal location; call this a temporally indeterminate 
judgment. A temporally indeterminate judgment cannot provide evidence of 
any sort of time preference at all. 
 Slote neither addresses these questions nor furnishes the sustained 
conceptual analysis that might dispel them. Instead, he appeals to our 
intuitive responses to two cases: the individual who achieves great success 
only late in life and dies “while still ‘in harness’ and fully possessed of his 
powers” (23) versus the individual who achieves the same degree of success 
in her youth and then loses it permanently. His implicit question to us, then, 
is whether we would prefer to be what I shall call a late bloomer or an early 
achiever. Now suppose for the sake of argument that we would prefer to be a 
late bloomer, as Slote maintains. As before, there are at least two possible 
explanations for why we would, neither of which would controvert the 
irrationality of pure time preference. The first possibility is that we might be 
evaluating these two alternatives from the temporal perspective of already 
mature individuals who themselves enjoy or can anticipate great success only 
later in life, if at all, and so may be expressing a pure-time-preferential bias in 
our judgment of them. In this case, Slote’s appeal to our intuitive response to 
these alternatives would beg the question. A second possibility is that our 
intuitive response might depend on contingency reasons. For instance, we 
may consider the late bloomer more fortunate because we envision his early 
failures as consoled by faith in his abilities, whereas we envision the early 
achiever’s repeated failure to sustain her early success as exacerbated by her 
own deepening self-doubt and the pressure of others’ disappointed 
expectations. But it might just as easily happen that the early achiever is an 
athlete, hence instead is both permitted and expected to rest on her laurels 
and to content herself thereafter by sportscasting or running a restaurant. 
Similarly, it might happen that the late bloomer is a mathematician, whose 
early failure to achieve success undermines his self-confidence and so poisons 
his life that his late, unexpected, and anomalous success provides insufficient 
psychological compensation for it. So the criteria by which we judge a 
person’s life to be fortunate are not intrinsically related to the temporal 
location of its successes and failures.  
 Slote seems to reject the first possibility, i.e., that we ourselves are 
exhibiting a pure-time-preferential bias in preferring being a late bloomer to 
being an early achiever, when he says that he has “been concentrating on the 
sorts of judgments concerning individual good that are sometimes made 
when we consider the lives of others or stand back from our own lives and 
attempt to view them in a detached way” (28; italics added). Slote does not give a 
fuller characterization of this detached perspective. But we can infer, 
minimally, that he does not mean to maintain that we prefer a later period of 
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life merely from the temporal perspective of that period itself, or from a time 
immediately adjacent to it. Slote’s argument must then be either that we 
prefer it from a temporally remote perspective, which is improbable given the 
age of his audience, or that we prefer it from no temporal perspective at all, 
i.e., irrespective of our temporal location. I shall assume he means the latter. 
The claim would then be that, from the detached, atemporal perspective, from 
which we make judgments of rationality, we do not necessarily have equal 
regard for all parts of our life. 
 Now Slote may think we prefer a later period of life from the detached 
perspective for any number of reasons. Perhaps it is because we typically 
(and, as we have seen incorrectly) associate maturity with later life. This 
explanation would fail to address the rationality of pure time preference, for 
contingency reasons. Or because we have a sentimental fondness for the 
twilight years of a person’s life, including our own, whenever and at 
whatever age those occur. This, too, would fail to identify the phenomenon as 
one of pure time preference, for temporal-indeterminacy reasons. Or perhaps 
because we each just in fact prefer absolutely, from the detached, atemporal 
perspective, a certain identifiable temporal location as such, situated toward 
the end of each of our own lifelines, at whatever particular age it is situated, 
regardless or what occurs at it and what we typically expect to occur at it.  
Surely we have no such preference. But, even if we did, this could not 
possibly prove the rationality of pure time preference. For the detached 
perspective from which we might, as Slote seems to think, prefer any such 
temporal location precludes the identification of that location as earlier or 
later than the location from which we prefer it. Hence it is not a pure time 
preference. And we have already seen that, if it were a pure time preference, 
we could not show it to be rational from that temporal location. Slote’s 
dilemma can now be stated more generally. The perspective of a particular 
pure time preference conceptually precludes the detached perspective from 
which any arguments for the rationality of pure time preference could be 
advanced. Hence no Anti-Rationalist appeal to intuitions and examples of 
pure time preference can succeed in showing its rationality. On the other 
hand, any more abstract, systematic argument to this effect from the detached 
perspective implicitly repudiates the pure-time-preferential perspective it 
purports to defend.  
Thus Slote’s and Williams’ Anti-Rationalist methodology, of appealing 
primarily to undefended basic intuitions, examples, and common-sense 
empirical generalizations at the expense of a more abstract and systematic 
(dare I say “rationalistic?”) analysis, is ultimately self-defeating. For where 
they adhere consistently to this methodology, their claims are unlikely to 
persuade the skeptical, whereas, when they abandon it, they often ends up 
presupposing the view they purport to reject. In Chapter XIII I show that this 
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dilemma holds for Annette Baier as well. It would seem that Slote’s dilemma 
is of a sort any consistent Humean Anti-Rationalist will find difficult to avoid. 
 
3.2.3. The Impersonal Point of View 
 Next consider the possibility that an agent adheres to an impersonal 
point of view without adhering to universalistic moral principles. Recall that, 
on Williams' thesis, we can be detached from our ground projects in two 
ways: We may be detached from our own feelings and central aspirations, 
and we may be detached from others, in that moral theory obscures the reality 
of our circumstances, other people, and our attachments to them, by 
providing us with "one thought too many." In both cases, we lack personal 
reference or connection to our projects, by regarding them from a perspective 
from which they are not essentially ours. Now Williams would say that this 
just is the perspective of moral theory. But this is not necessarily so. To see 
this, consider the question of whether or not I should save my good friend Jeff 
first from some natural disaster; and suppose my moral theory sufficiently 
fine-tuned to yield the answer that I should, say, by the inclusion of a special-
obligations-to-loved-ones clause. Williams' objection then would be that I am 
morally alienated from Jeff nevertheless, if I am motivated to save Jeff first 
because my moral theory prescribes it, rather than out of love for Jeff. 
Williams would say that my investment in this theory detaches me from my 
love for Jeff, since it is only in virtue of my theory that I am overridingly and 
unambivalently motivated to save him first. My impersonality is evinced by 
my primary attachment to my moral theory. 
 To see how very odd this objection is, consider the alternative it seems 
instead to recommend: I save Jeff first, but not because he is my good friend, 
nor because I love him, nor because I value and respect him especially as a 
person – since these are all descriptions that can enter into impartial moral 
prescriptions. Indeed, let us suppose that none of these descriptions are true 
of Jeff. Instead I save him first simply because he is who he is, namely Jeff, and 
for no other reason. Clearly this is absurd. I have salvaged Jeff's uniqueness 
and specificity, and the uniqueness and specificity of my relationship to him, 
at the expense of its intelligibility.  
 But the same objection could be made even if no such theory intervened 
between me and Jeff. For my desire to save Jeff first may also intervene 
between me and Jeff. In this case, the complaint would be that my investment 
in the satisfaction of my desires – especially, let us suppose, the altruistic and 
other-directed ones – takes precedence over my love for Jeff, since it is only in 
virtue of my unsatisfied desire to save him first that I am overridingly and 
unambivalently motivated to do so. This would be another example of the 
benevolent and other-directed but self-interested desires analyzed in Chapter 
VI.1.2. Here my impersonality, my lack of personal connectedness to Jeff, is 
evidenced not by my attachment to my moral theory, but rather by my 
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attachment to my own desires. My lack of personal connectedness to Jeff is 
maintained by my overabundant personal connectedness to my own desires 
and emotions. 
 In both cases, there may be some validity to these complaints. I may be, 
indeed, so enamoured of my moral theory and the fact that I subscribe to it 
that I really do regard other moral agents as nothing more than occasions for 
instantiating its precepts. But alternately, I may be so committed to the 
satisfaction of my other-directed desires that I regard other moral agents in a 
similarly superficial way, as mere occasions for exercising my beneficence. 
This is the stereotype of the "do-gooder," whose moral behavior somehow 
seems entirely self-aggrandizing, and neither elicits nor presupposes any 
attachment to the individuals her actions serve. In this case, too, the agent 
foregoes the depth and insight that accompanies attention to the specifics of 
who they are, for the sake of an essentially egocentric conception of reality. In 
the first case, the self is personally invested in a theoretical moral stance that 
degenerates into impersonality because it is used to deflect and disguise 
unmediated interpersonal contact. But in the second case, the self is invested 
in a nontheoretical moral stance that also generates into impersonality because 
it deploys others as a means to the achievement of its personal moral ideal.  
 Thus I may subvert my personal connection with myself and others, not 
only by interposing a universalistic moral theory between us. I may 
accomplish this by interposing self-aggrandizing emotions and desires as 
well. To suppose that impersonality necessarily implies unemotionality 
would be mistaken. For in both of these cases, the very real problem to which 
Williams' thesis calls attention is not just personal detachment, but a deeper, 
more generalized pathological narcissism, of which the condition Williams 
characterizes as "moral alienation" is merely a contingent and localized 
symptom. 
 
3.2.4. Narcissism 
 By narcissism, I mean that persisting state of the self characterized by an 
excessive preoccupation with one's self-image and image in the eyes of others, 
with one's personal flaws and assets and an unrealistic ideal of perfection 
against which they are measured, and with a self-oriented conception of one's 
relationship to others. Moreover, a self is narcissistic if it cannot tolerate 
others' independence of its expectations and requirements, nor appreciate 
their independence as intrinsically valuable. Finally, a self is narcissistic if 
these preoccupations effectively shield it against unmediated interpersonal 
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vulnerability or contact, and against the trauma of personal growth that 
frequently results.
29  
Among the manifestations of narcissism some psychologists have 
observed are envy and an inflated sense of one's own importance; the 
consequent devaluation of others and of their attentions to oneself; and the 
inability to empathize with others, to experience a sense of connectedness 
with them, and to form deep attachments to them. At the same time, 
narcissists are often highly dependent on others to buttress an extremely 
fragile and volatile self-esteem. They are beset by occasional eruptions of self-
righteously sadistic anger and nightmares of self-contempt, both of which are 
recycled to fuel the grandiose belief that their ideals and aspirations are 
higher and purer than anyone else's. Consequently, narcissists are frequently 
smug, condescending, and seemingly remote as well.
30  
 It is not difficult to understand how a narcissistic self might have a 
greater allegiance to its favored moral theory than to other people, or 
alternately, a greater allegiance to its altruistic self-image than to the 
individuals thereby served. Nor is it difficult to understand in what sense a 
narcissistic self might view others from a detached or impersonal perspective, 
and how its concern with the opinions of others might be accompanied by an 
inability to establish genuine and unmediated contact with them. That is, it is 
not difficult to see how what Williams describes as moral alienation might be 
a significant problem for a narcissistic self. 
 Let us speculate on the rationalized form such an attitude might take 
when the narcissistic self is confronted with evidence of its own narcissism, 
say, in the form of a complaint that one's aspiration to sainthood seems 
largely unaccompanied by any personal warmth. If narcissism functions as a 
defense against the intrusion of an undisguised other into the domain of the 
                                                
29
 This characterization is based on the criteria described in DSM III: Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition (Washington, D.C.: The American 
Psychiatric Association, 1980), 315-17. 
30
 Dr. Otto Kernberg discussed these symptoms in a lecture at the University of 
California at San Francisco on May 2, 1984. Also see Kernberg's books, Borderline 
Conditions and Pathological Narcissism (New York: J. Aronson, 1975), Part II; and Severe 
Personality Disorders (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), Part III. For a related 
and insightful discussion that does not, however, use the concept of narcissism 
explicitly, see David Shapiro, Autonomy and Rigid Character (New York: Basic Books, 
1979). 
 It is important to emphasize that the following discussion is intended to chart 
some of the connections between narcissism as I have defined it and the so-called 
impersonal point of view. It should not be taken to imply that actual proponents of 
Williams' thesis are narcissists, since of course it is the philosophical force of the thesis 
that has garnered it so many adherents. I am grateful to Jeffrey Evans for alerting me to 
this possible misreading of the argument. 
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self, a natural response to such a complaint would be to denigrate personal 
warmth as an invasion of privacy. Thus, for example, it might be argued that 
attempting to be familiar or cozy with everyone one meets is the worst form 
of moral inauthenticity of all; that it is irrational and self-indulgent to allow 
others to make importunate emotional demands on one; or self-defeating to 
allow them to take advantage of one's generosity and moral concern; that it is 
delusory or even self-destructive to "spread oneself too thin,"  "try to save the 
world," or be a martyr; and that the preservation of a private realm within 
which the universalistic demands of morality cease to apply is a necessary 
condition for having any sustained moral impact whatsoever. 
 These claims derive their persuasiveness from the recognition that few of 
us indeed can be morally effective when hanging from a crucifix. But 
deployed as narcissistic defenses, they rationalize the detachment of the self 
from the moral requirements of others, and the withdrawal of the self into a 
private domain in which those demands can be safely disregarded. By 
contrast with views that justify the need for privacy and personal fulfillment 
as a condition of greater moral compassion and commitment, the narcissist 
would claim that there is a certain realm in which the requirements of moral 
compassion and commitment simply fail to apply. That is, a sanctuary for the 
individual self is not justified as a necessary condition of sustaining and 
strengthening its moral ties to others, but instead as a sufficient condition of 
sustaining and strengthening the self to withstand them. Others, in this view, 
are regarded as intrusive or disruptive of the equilibrium of the self, or as 
exacting too great a demand on its resources rather than enriching them. The 
narcissistic self is distinguished, then, by the subordination of its moral 
commitments to its need for eminent domain. 
 A narcissistic self also might be expected to regard any universalistic 
moral theory of which it is an object as unsympathetic or distasteful. For by 
definition, a universalistic theory is impartial; that is, it refuses to accord 
privileged or exceptional status to the requirements of any self, including 
narcissistic ones. But we have already seen that one of the defining features of 
the narcissistic self is the arrogation to itself of value and importance that 
others are perceived to lack. From the viewpoint of the narcissistic self, the 
privileged status of its particular requirements, and its right to special 
treatment are justified by their special and superior value in its own eyes. 
 Moreover, from the perspective of a narcissistic self committed to the 
preservation of its internal boundaries against unmediated contact with 
others that threaten or disrupt it, the obligations to, for example, treat all 
human beings fairly, or not to be biased by one's personal preferences would 
naturally present themselves as particularly odious competitors to that 
commitment. For recall that another one of the defining features of such a self 
is the specifically self-orientation of its central desires, regardless of the 
content of those desires. I argued in Chapter II.2.3 and further in Chapter VI 
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that such an egocentric preoccupation with the condition of the self was a 
defining feature of the Humean self. We now can see the sense in which 
narcissism is built into the desire-based motivation of such a self.  
The actual requirements of impartial morality disturb the integrity of the 
narcissistic self by threatening this orientation. For they demand, not merely a 
personal desire to conform to them, but rather an unmediated comprehension 
of and sympathy for the needs and requirements of others that, for a 
narcissistic self, are in direct competition with its own. We might expect, then, 
that the integration of personal needs and desires with the requirements of 
moral principle would be regarded by the narcissistic self as an abdication or 
sacrifice of selfhood, and rejected accordingly. 
 Not just moral alienation, but a more generalized social alienation is a 
predictable outcome for a narcissistic self. For if its primary concern with 
others is the nature of their relation to oneself, and if their behavior is 
invariably interpreted as evidence of this relation, then obviously, one's view 
of others will be mediated by this interpretation, and correspondingly 
detached from their independent reality. In this case, whether the terms of 
this interpretation are theoretical or affective is largely irrelevant. An agent 
who saves his good friend first in order to fulfill his moral obligations or 
satisfy his benevolent desires is psychologically and morally crippled, but not 
because of his moral theory. He is crippled because his preoccupation with his 
own rectitude overrides the dispositions and behavior that his moral theory 
prescribes. 
 Thus the real problem to which Williams' thesis importantly draws our 
attention does not lie with moral theory, or with transpersonal rationality 
more generally. For we have seen that one may adopt such a theory without 
assuming an impersonal point of view, and that one may assume this point of 
view without adopting a moral theory. Moral alienation is instead 
symptomatic of a more generally corruptive and debilitating pathology, 
namely narcissism, that bears no necessary relation to moral theory at all. 
 
3.2.5. Self-Evaluation and Moral Paralysis Reconsidered 
 If the desiring half of the bipartite self thus has no more claim to 
psychological primacy than the reasoning half, then the problems of 
self-evaluation and moral paralysis do arise for Williams' version of the 
bipartite self, after all. The problem of self-evaluation is generated by the 
central role Williams accords to first-order desires, and takes a form similar to 
that described in Section 2.1, above. I argued in Chapter II.2.3 that from the 
perspective of one's first-order desires, all the apparent manifestations of the 
self are instrumental to their satisfaction; and that these desires are 
themselves, by definition, obfuscated even by our attempts to identify them. 
Such attempts then give rise to an infinite regress of instrumentally nested 
desires, the satisfaction of each n+l-level of which our n-level beliefs and 
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perceptions of the self are hypothesized to promote. Again a decisive 
commitment to the veracity and finality of any one such desire as providing 
the interpretive matrix for understanding the rest must be an irrational and 
unjustifiable act of faith. The problem of self-evaluation, then, is not 
ameliorated but exacerbated by the ascription of primacy to first-order desires 
in a bipartite conception of the self. For anything may be instrumental to the 
satisfaction of a desire, and any desire may be instrumental to the satisfaction 
of a further one. 
 The problem of moral paralysis also attacks Williams' version of the 
bipartite self, from two directions. First, it is inherent in the instrumental 
structure of first-order desires that no such desire can provide terminating 
criteria of evaluation of the motives of the self, no matter what their source. 
For any such motive, including desires, are subject to further scrutiny from 
the perspective of further desires to which they are presumed to be 
instrumental. Second, the bifurcation of the self into two parts implies that the 
problem of moral paralysis also arises in the same form for Williams as it did 
for Watson. For here, too, it is an open question with which part the self is 
identified on any particular occasion, and so an open question which part 
evaluates the other's motivational content. And this leaves open the 
possibility that, in situations of conflict, neither part may prevail. Again, the 
reality that we often do make rational and well-informed terminating 
judgments about our first-order motives, and are not ordinarily stricken with 
moral paralysis in situations requiring quick responses suggests that neither 
Watson's nor Williams' version of the bipartite self is adequate to the 
psychological facts. 
 Clearly, the problems of self-evaluation and moral paralysis can be 
generated by any multipartite conception of the self. Just as clearly, those 
problems are also generated by a unipartite conception of the self as 
structured and motivated by desire alone. The challenge is then to articulate 
an alternative unipartite conception of the self that both circumvents these 
problems and also respects the psychological data; and to consider whether 
the remaining in-house candidate, namely reason, might be adequate to 
furnish the basis for a unipartite conception of the self that successfully meets 
this challenge. In Volume II I argue that it is.  
 So Williams' sustained Anti-Rationalism does not succeed in supplanting 
reason with desire as the final arbiter of what ends we ought to adopt. While 
his analysis yields a more subtle conception of what a desire is, it answers the 
question of whether its object is rational or worthwhile by simply asserting its 
psychological centrality as a "ground project," to which the evaluations of 
moral or rational principle are irrelevant. But to this claim the appropriate 
response is the obverse of that made to Watson, and the same as that made to 
Frankfurt: Simply asserting that rationality is irrelevant to the assessment of 
final ends does not make it irrelevant. At this point in the discussion the Anti-
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception   351 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
Rationalist may either table the discussion and back up her assertion with 
force; or she may provide a sound, rational justification for the irrelevance of 
rational justification to the evaluation of final ends. Neither alternative is 
likely to be rationally persuasive to the innocent bystander. 
 Frankfurt's and Williams' distinctive variants on the Humean conception 
of the self have in common a palpable impatience with the restrictions 
rationality and morality threaten to impose on objects of individual desire; 
and also a vehement insistence on the overriding worth of centrally definitive 
objects of individual desire, simply in virtue of their status as one's own. 
These two views, each in their way, exemplify and discursively defend the 
attitude Nagel analyzes as the subjective perspective, from the standpoint of 
which one sees and evaluates objects and states of affairs through the lens of 
subjective values that have the status of values solely in virtue of the agent's 
personal attachment to them. They also exemplify nicely the attitude I 
described in Chapter II.2.3 as “funnel vision.” This attitude can be found, 
perhaps in its purest form, in very young children who have been indulged 
but not yet socialized to acknowledge others' rights and demands as fully 
legitimate. I offer a fuller analysis of this attitude in Volume II, Chapter V.6.1. 
This combination of devaluing rational justifiability and valorizing personal 
gratification is paradoxical in practitioners of a craft that valorizes rational 
justifiability and purports to ignore personal gratification as a criterion of 
professional evaluation. Neither Frankfurt nor Williams seem to appreciate 
the self-undermining implications of their responses to the problem of 
rational final ends. 
 This is unfortunate, since it is their allegiance to the Humean conception 
of the self that generates it. The problem of rational final ends is a problem 
only from the perspective of a conception of the self that ignores the fact that 
rational final ends can be distinguished from irrational ones, when confronted 
by the psychological fact that they do. An explanatory paradigm that requires 
us to deny or dismiss such basic facts about human nature is bound to 
generate problems that appear insoluble from within the perspective of that 
paradigm.   
 
 
 
 
Chapter IX. The Problem of Moral Justification 
 
 
 In Chapter I.7.2.2, I argued that the problem of moral motivation that so 
preoccupied Nagel was one of three interconnected ones a viable conception 
of the self must solve. The second two were the problem of rational final ends 
and the problem of moral justification respectively, the latter being a special 
case of the former. With regard to rational final ends, I argued in Chapter VIII 
that the Humean assumption that no authoritative terminating criteria for 
rational final ends are possible generates further difficulties: of the infinite 
regress, of self-evaluation, and of moral paralysis.   
 Moral motivation and rational final ends are connected in the question of 
what kinds of mental events motivate action. If only desires do, and desires 
substantively understood are what Nagel calls "unmotivated desires" that 
simply assail us, then final ends – i.e. the objects we ultimately and 
noninstrumentally desire – simply assail us, too. No attempts at rational 
persuasion can alter them, any more than rational persuasion might alter a 
sudden craving for a jelly doughnut; and no celebration of their 
imperviousness to reason – under the rationales of decisiveness, 
wholeheartedness, or moral character – can validate those final ends that flout 
it. If, on the other hand, by "desires" we understand what Nagel calls 
"motivated desires," then these drop out of the equation; and rational 
deliberation-events alone may be able both to formulate final ends and to 
inspire us to achieve them. In this case our final ends would be corrigible by 
reason, and the transpersonally rational attempt to articulate and justify 
alternative ones would be a meaningful enterprise. If reason can identify final 
ends, then their moral justification is possible. 
 Assuming we can establish the power of reason to identify and set 
legitimate final ends, are there any beyond those we already have – for 
example, friendship or happiness – for it to set? Philosophers who engage in 
substantive theory-building in moral and political philosophy answer this 
question with an affirmative fait accompli. They fashion normative views that 
describe and defend detailed visions of the good life, just society, or right 
conduct that both offer alternatives to the final ends we already happen to 
have, and by implication criticize those we prereflectively strive to realize. 
That normative moral and political philosophers devote so much professional 
energy to advocating and defending the normative ethical visions in which 
they believe, even though these may fail to mirror the actual conditions under 
which they live and act, is prima facie evidence of the conative pull these 
alternatives may have on us.  
 Even avowedly Humean moral and political philosophers – those who 
purport to believe that final ends are not properly subject to rational criticism 
– exploit this position as a means of arguing for alternative sets of social 
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arrangements that will, they claim, enable citizens to maximize the promotion 
of their individual final ends, whatever these may be. It thus in effect defends 
this vision as though it were itself a final end that the reader, independently of 
her actual particular final ends, ought to adopt. Like all moral and political 
philosophers engaged in substantive theory-building, Humeans deploy the 
analytical reasoning skills of their trade in order to demonstrate the rationality 
and intrinsic value of these alternatives, regardless of the particular final ends 
any individual may have. But since the Humean conception implies that 
transpersonal rationality has a merely instrumental role in satisfying the 
agent's desires, Kantians who accept it are disadvantaged in their attempt to 
demonstrate that transpersonally rational final ends provide a viable 
alternative to the pursuit of desire-satisfaction itself. 
 The second question that then follows on the heels of the first is whether 
deliberation-events that identify new or alternative final ends it would be 
rational to try to achieve can also motivate action in the service of such ends, 
independent of desire-satisfaction. Certainly we can and do daydream about 
living differently, doing things differently, responding and interacting with 
one another differently than we have in the past. But can we actually be 
inspired to take concrete steps to realize such visions independent of the 
negative behavioral reinforcement against which we instinctively react? That 
is: can we carry out a resolve to take such steps, independent of the stick of 
painful past experience and the carrot of misplaced optimism? Again moral 
and political philosophers engaged in substantive theory-building presuppose 
that we can, even if this requires a sacrifice of comfort or desire-satisfaction on 
our parts. They assume we can be moved by the force of logic, by 
transpersonally rational considerations of justice, compassion, or perhaps 
even sheer disgust with our present level of moral turpitude, to override or 
subordinate self-interest – which often requires doing nothing and changing 
nothing – to what is best all things considered.  
 Moral philosophers thus try actively to inspire their audience to adopt 
their visions of the good life, and to guide action accordingly. Like the most 
shameless writers of self-help manuals, they use argument, exhortation, and 
example to communicate their visions of the good with the same vividness 
and conviction it has for them.1 Thus by providing moral justifications of 
these visions that try rationally to persuade us of their value and importance 
to us, they aim to motivate our joint attempts to realize them. And sometimes, 
moral philosophers succeed in this endeavor, for good or for ill. Patanjali’s 
                                                
1Actually some of those self-help manuals can be pretty effective, provided that the 
author is both skilled and (very important) enthusiastic. Some recent volumes on time 
management are particularly worthy of the name "motivational literature." There are 
also some good ones on nutrition. Just because we cannot be rational dissuaded from a 
craving for a jelly doughnut does not imply that we cannot be rationally persuaded to 
desire broccoli sprouts. 
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influence on Gandhi and through him Bayard Rustin and Martin Luther King, 
Locke’s influence on the American Revolution, Rousseau’s on the French 
Revolution, Nietzsche’s on World War II, Marx’s on Communism, and Rawls’ 
on “trickle-down” economics are only a few of the more prominent examples 
of the motivational influence of moral philosophy on concrete action. 
Thus doing normative moral and political philosophy in order to develop 
and justify some substantive ethical vision of the final good is a quintessential 
example of invoking transpersonally rational justification in the service of 
moral motivation. In this way the problems of moral motivation, moral 
justification, and rational final ends converge in the practice of substantive 
moral and political philosophy itself. The very fact of normative philosophical 
practice as an enduring human enterprise of self-critique and self-
development presupposes that these three problems can be resolved. This is 
the enterprise that the Humean conception of the self by implication rejects.   
 So baldly stated, this enterprise may seem impossibly ambitious and the 
Humean conception merely a realistic corrective. But the history of 
philosophy's influence on political events suggests otherwise. It is neither 
unrealistic nor dishonorable for a philosopher to hope that the resources he 
devotes to articulating his vision of the good will find their final expression in 
public social action by those who are convinced of its worth. If moral and 
political philosophers did not wish for this final outcome of their efforts, it is 
unclear why any such philosopher would be motivated to expend them. This 
chapter through to Chapter XII treats several late twentieth-century moral 
theorists who attempt to address the problem of moral justification within the 
constraints of the Humean conception. 
 But what does it mean to justify an alternative conception of the good? To 
justify a theory is to give convincing reasons for believing it – or for believing 
in it. Anglo-American Socratic metaethics models its justificatory 
methodology on those of logic, mathematics and the natural sciences. That is, 
it treats a normative moral or political theory as justified if it can be shown to 
be derivable from weak and intuitively acceptable foundational premises 
according to standard rules of inference. I agree with this methodology, and 
try in Volume II to further refine it. What counts as acceptable foundational 
premises differs from theory to theory, however, as does in what a derivation 
consists. In the late twentieth century three types of derivation emerged: 
Noncognitivism, Deductivism, and Instrumentalism; and most metaethicists 
in the Anglo-American analytic tradition continue to subscribe to one of the 
three. This chapter introduces all three and examines particular exemplars of 
the first two in depth. 
Section 1 addresses Noncognitivism, a sophisticated variety of Humean 
Anti-Rationalism that attempts to derive substantive moral principles from 
noncognitive premises about attitudes and emotions rather than beliefs, 
assumptions or actions. However, the rationality that Noncognitivism rejects 
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as a criterion of argument and analysis it then resurrects as a criterion for 
evaluating attitudes and emotions: The idealization involved invokes reason 
as a criterion of the appropriateness of those attitudes and emotions through 
which we express our values, rather than as a criterion of deliberation, 
argument, or proof. It thus accords with the Humean conception in assigning 
a central motivational and valuational role to desire and emotion, and in 
relying on what is in the end the familiar model of means-end reasoning that 
characterizes the Humean model of rationality. 
Working in the Noncognitivist tradition of Raz2 and Gibbard3, Elizabeth 
Anderson’s pluralist, nonconsequentialist, rational attitude theory of value in 
particular offers a justificatory methodology that derives value judgments, 
and so alternative conceptions of the good, from foundational premises that 
accord prima facie significance to expressive attitudes but rely ultimately on a 
hypothetical process of interpersonal rational dialogue and deliberation 
similar to that proposed by Habermas, Dworkin, and particularly Rawls. 
However, Anderson’s process of social rationality functions as a prescriptive 
criterion for directly evaluating expressive attitudes through which we 
communicate and reinforce shared values. This process therefore functions as 
a criterion of value relative to which substantive moral principles can be 
justified. I show how the process itself is biased in favor of conformist and 
socially conservative conceptions of the good; and conclude that it is therefore 
inclined to obstruct rather than promote the openness, flexibility, and social 
change that implementing a genuinely alternative conception of the good 
would presuppose. 
Sections 2 and 3 examine Deductivism, the attempt to derive substantive 
moral principles directly from weak and widely shared metaethical premises 
through conceptual analysis and logical inference. Alan Gewirth’s Reason and 
Morality is the most ambitious and comprehensive Deductivist attempt to 
date, within the Kantian tradition, to develop fundamental moral principles 
that both apply universally and imply specific and detailed solutions to 
normative controversies in applied ethics. Gewirth attempts to turn the 
Humean handicap into an advantage, by showing, essentially, that a 
substantive moral theory, that grounded in his Principle of Generic 
Consistency, is logically implied by the very concept of desire-satisfaction; 
and so that the latter end presupposes another, more fundamental moral one. 
He thereby means to derive this principle from the concept of action, by 
straightforwardly theoretically rational inference.  
However, Gewirth's acceptance of the belief-desire model of motivation, 
according to which we necessarily have a "pro-attitude" toward the objects we 
                                                
2 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) 
3 Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990) 
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desire, generates problems for this project. From this "pro-attitude," Gewirth 
infers that agents necessarily value the purposes of their actions as goods 
(whether or not these purposes are in fact goods for them); and from this that 
they are logically committed to generic principles of freedom and wellbeing 
necessary for pursuing these perceived goods. He argues that such freedom 
and wellbeing are therefore rights not only to the agents themselves, but also 
to and for all agents. But agents do not need freedom and well-being in order 
to act purposively: A coerced or psychologically unstable action is still an 
action toward the purpose of which, according to the belief-desire model of 
motivation, the agent must have a pro-attitude in order to be motivated to 
perform it. Hence an agent's necessary pro-attitude toward the purpose of her 
action either does not imply that she values that action, or else that she may 
value coerced or self-destructive actions as well. Thus the tautological 
character of the belief-desire model of motivation enables Gewirth to infer too 
much from the resulting concept of action to justify a substantive moral 
theory. A different conception of action, as goal-directed behavior guided by 
an intentional principle, would avoid these objections without undermining 
his Deductivist justification of the Principle of Generic Consistency. 
The problems generated by the Humean conception of the self are not 
confined to Kantians such as Gewirth who take for granted that there is no 
viable alternative to it. The Humean conception of the self subverts 
metaethical and normative moral projects even among those who explicitly 
adopt it. The problem of moral justification looms particularly large when the 
Humean conception of the self is deployed to provide an instrumental 
justification of a particular moral theory. By contrast with Deductivism, 
Instrumentalism is the view that, roughly, a moral theory is objectively justified 
if the actions or social arrangements it prescribes can be shown to be the most 
efficient means to an agent's final ends, whatever these may be. In Section 4 I 
introduce this view, and the wide variety of Humeans – Rawls, Brandt, 
Gauthier, and Harsanyi, as well as Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, Mill, and 
Sidgwick – who are each identifiable as Instrumentalists. Section 4 traces the 
general form of the dilemma for all such Instrumentalists: If the arrangements 
prescribed by the moral theory in question promote all final ends, then they 
are by hypothesis objectively justified, but do not exclude immoral final ends. 
If special motivational assumptions are added so as to exclude immoral final 
ends, they then do not promote all final ends, and so are not objectively 
justified. Hence modifying the Instrumentalist strategy in order to justify a 
moral theory either involves sacrificing objective validity, or else implies that 
the Humean requirement of instrumental rationality is doing no justificatory 
work. In either case, Instrumentalism can at best reaffirm the moral value of 
the ends we already have. But it can neither justify nor motivate the adoption 
of a moral theory that requires us to modify or sacrifice our ends, even for the 
sake of the common good. Chapter X and XI, following, apply this general 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception    357 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
analysis to the particular theories of John Rawls and Richard Brandt 
respectively. 
 
1. Anderson’s Noncognitivism 
 
1.1. Expressive States 
 To say that someone or something is valuable, on Anderson's account, is 
to say that it is rational, i.e. makes sense, for someone to value her or it. To 
value that person or thing intrinsically is to have a "complex of positive [or 
favorable] attitudes" toward her or it (2, 17, 124).4 Favorable attitudes toward 
people or things are diverse: they include being inspired, attracted interested, 
pleased, awed, emotionally involved, attentive, or concerned (2). Anderson 
does not define what she means by an attitude, but she describes it first, as an 
expressive state, and second, as "partly constituted by norms that determine 
[its] proper objects"(3).  
 Let us leave aside this second clause for the moment and concentrate on 
the notion that an attitude is an expressive state of the agent. What kind of 
state is an expressive state? A brain state? A dispositional state? An emotional 
state? Or perhaps all of the above? What does an expressive state express? 
Emotions? Thoughts? Desires? Impulses? Perceptions? Or all of the above?  
 I shall describe a yes answer to these questions as the inclusive conception 
of an attitude. On the inclusive conception, an attitude can express emotions, 
thoughts, desires, impulses, perceptions, or any of the other myriad internal 
states – brain, dispositional, emotional, etc. – that constitute our mental life. 
And to say that an attitude, on this conception, expresses any such state is to 
say that the bare presence of this state necessarily manifests its particular 
contents in overt physical change – as, for example, inner turmoil might 
manifest itself in rapid breathing, dilated pupils, increased heart rate, and 
agitated movement of the limbs. So the inclusive conception of an attitude 
implies that for any internal state constitutive of our mental life, there is 
necessarily some observable, physical manifestation of it. 
 Now on Anderson's view there cannot be a necessary connection between 
any such state of the agent (whether brain state, dispositional state, or 
emotional state) and a particular physical manifestation of it. For that would 
conflict with her later attempt to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate 
expressions of an attitude (83, 129). If the connection between an internal state 
and a particular physical expression of it is a necessary one, there is no point 
in evaluating it as appropriate or inappropriate. That physical expression of it 
is not subject to reform. 
                                                
4
Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). All page references to this volume are parenthecized in the text. 
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 Similarly, Anderson's view cannot realistically imply that any such 
mental state – whether thought, desire, impulse, or perception – has some 
observable physical manifestation. For we learn to conceal and internalize our 
thoughts, desires, impulses and perceptions in the process of socialization; to 
keep our thoughts to ourselves, to suppress our desires, to refrain from acting 
on our impulses, to register our perceptions without reacting to them. This 
skill of controlling and internalizing our reactions is, in essence, what the 
process of socialization teaches; and, as Nietzsche observed, it is the origin of 
the interiority of our mental lives. But any such state that, for reasons of 
socialization, individual constitution, or personal control has no physically 
observable manifestation cannot be meaningfully described as an expressive 
state at all. So it cannot be true that, as the inclusive conception claims, all 
internal states constitutive of our mental lives are expressive states; nor, 
therefore, that all internal states constitutive of our mental lives conform to 
Anderson's conception of an attitude. 
 However, for later purposes Anderson will want to insist that anything 
that is an attitude is necessarily expressive. She will also want to insist that an 
attitude can be expressed appropriately or inappropriately. Since the inclusive 
conception of an attitude implies the rejection of both of these features, 
Anderson should reject the inclusive conception of an attitude. 
 By contrast, an exclusive conception of an attitude toward a person or thing 
might define it as a specifically emotional response, or disposition to so 
respond, to that person or thing, such that the emotion is caused in part by the 
agent's perceptions, thoughts and beliefs about the object of valuation. On the 
exclusive conception, an attitude is an expressive state in that there is a 
necessary connection between the agent's inner emotional state and some overt 
physical manifestation. However, it excludes any necessary connection 
between any such emotional state of the agent and a particular physical 
manifestation, since Anderson needs to be able to distinguish between the 
attitude itself and the appropriateness with which it is expressed.  
 For the same reason, the exclusive conception of an attitude excludes any 
necessary connection between the agent's inner emotional state and any 
intentional action, whether of execution or of omission. Thus the exclusive 
conception of an attitude excludes certain thoughts, desires, impulses, and 
perceptions unless they bear the right kind of causal connection to emotions. 
And it leaves open whether a particular attitude is expressed only in the most 
subtle and minimal overt physical changes, or in gross behavior or action of 
an appropriate or inappropriate kind. This account of an attitude appears to 
mitigate the objection I raised to Humean Anti-Rationalist views in the 
General Introduction, i.e. that they subvert in practice the enterprise of 
Socratic metaethics on which they rely in theory, by appealing to 
interpersonally inaccessible moral states to justify their moral judgments. The 
exclusive definition of an attitude mitigates the inaccessibility of such states 
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while suitably restricting their overt expressions. For these reasons, Anderson 
should accept the exclusive definition of an attitude.  
 Let us assume, provisionally, that she does. Then to value intrinsically a 
person or thing, is, first of all, to respond with positive emotions to one's 
perceptions and beliefs about her or it. However, not just any favorable 
emotional response to a person or thing counts as valuing it. Positive 
valuations must be "governed by distinct standards for perception, emotion, 
deliberation, desire, and conduct" (2,3).  Parents who value – love – their 
children will feel not only proud when their children achieve, but alarmed 
when they are in danger, and disposed to rescue them. Parents who felt pride 
at their children's achievements but only indifference or regret rather than 
concern at their endangerment could not properly be said to value them at all. 
So to Anderson's account we can add that intrinsically valuing a person or 
thing requires not only a complex of favorable emotions and dispositions 
toward her or it, but also that this complex exhibit a certain internal 
consistency determined by our concept of valuation itself. Only a certain specific 
set of favorable responses, elicited under their appropriate conditions, counts 
as, e.g. loving or respecting or admiring a person or thing. That is, our 
valuation concept provides both a criterion for identifying the constellation of 
favorable attitudes constitutive of it, and also a standard of adequacy against 
which these responses can be measured. 
 On Anderson's account, valuing a person or thing in a particular way 
requires that this constellation of favorable attitudes – perception, emotion, 
deliberation, desires, and conduct "express and thereby communicate one's 
regard for the object's importance" (11). Here Anderson goes beyond the 
exclusive conception of an attitude I advocated above. That conception built 
in only the most minimal notion of expression, namely some overt physical 
manifestation of the agent's emotional state. The notion of expression 
Anderson invokes here builds in two further conditions: first, that an 
authentic valuation should "express [those] valuations in the world, ... 
embody them in some social reality ... actually establish the relationship to the 
object of one's concern which is implicit in one's attitudes toward it" (17). This 
seems right. An agent who is not moved to establish some such connection 
with the object she values either does not really or deeply feel what she claims 
to feel, or else her purported values have strictly armchair status. There is a 
natural causal link between emotion and behavior expressive of it in all cases, 
no less so in the case of that complex of emotions partly constitutive of 
valuation. If one really values something, one is disposed to act accordingly.   
 However, we can grant this much without requiring, as Anderson does, 
that the connection between valuing and action be a necessary one. The 
connection may be merely sufficient, such that a failure or inability to express 
one's valuation in action would not imply that it was not an authentic 
valuation after all.  
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1.2. Expressive Norms 
 Anderson's second requirement, however, is that in genuinely expressing 
one's valuations in action, one thereby communicates one's regard for the 
object's importance to some possible observer or listener. To do this requires 
that others can identify our behavior as appropriate, i.e. as meeting shared 
behavioral standards for expressing that valuation. This is the sense in which 
Anderson wants to claim that expressing valuations is governed by shared 
social norms relative to which others can recognize our behavior as 
expressing the valuations we intend to express by it. So in order to count as an 
authentic valuation, on Anderson's view, an agent must not only manifest 
overtly a positive valuational attitude. Indeed she also must not only express 
that attitude in action that establishes a relationship to the object she values. 
In addition, the action must be intelligible to others as an expression of her 
regard for that object. If the action through which the agent expresses her 
connection and regard for the object valued does not (or could not) 
communicate that regard to other agents, she does not qualify as authentically 
valuing that object at all. 
 This is a very strong claim. But there is no ambiguity in Anderson's 
formulation of it. She argues that "I am capable of valuing something in a 
particular way only in a social setting that upholds norms for that mode of 
valuation.  ...  To care about something in a distinctive way, one must 
participate in a social practice of valuation governed by norms for its sensible 
expression" (12). Earlier I suggested that intrinsically valuing a person or 
thing requires not only a complex of favorable emotions and dispositions 
toward her or it, but also that this complex exhibit a certain internal 
consistency determined by our concept of valuation itself. So, as we saw, 
loving one's children requires pride on some occasions, alarm and a 
disposition to rescue them on others. This suggestion was consistent with the 
exclusive definition of an attitude, since it did not require a necessary 
connection between these emotional and dispositional responses on the one 
hand, and action on the other. By contrast, we can now see that Anderson's 
account does require this, and more. Her idea is that one must conform one's 
action to the shared behavioral norms prescribing appropriate expression of a 
particular mode of valuation in order to be said to value something in that 
way at all.  
 The example she gives is that of honoring someone. Her claim is that if 
we do not physically do what counts socially as honoring her, e.g. treating her 
deferentially, applauding her or paying her obeisance under the appropriate 
circumstances, etc., we cannot be said truly to honor her. This seems right. But 
these are all actions whose connections to valuational mental states of the 
agent are contingent at best. Honoring may usually include valuational 
attitudes such as respect, admiration, perhaps affection, or esteem. But the 
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concept of honoring someone is not exhausted by the constellation of attitudes 
we take toward her, nor are any of those just named necessary conditions of 
it. It is much more closely linked to public performative rituals, and much 
more detached from any particular set of emotional states, in ways that other 
valuational attitudes are not. Honoring is in this way much more like 
promising or proclaiming than like appreciating or admiring.   
 To claim that one does not really value something unless one conforms to 
social norms for expressing that valuation seems much too strong, for it 
makes impossible inarticulate or concealed valuation, being at a loss to 
express the depth or intensity or particular quality of one's valuation of a 
person or thing, or of doing so awkwardly, or of trying to express one's 
emotional response and failing. To say that there is a natural link between 
authentic valuation and action is not thereby to say that there is a necessary 
link between them; nor to say that the action expresses that valuation 
successfully; nor that it does so in accordance with shared social norms for 
expressing that valuation.   
 A recent television commercial illustrates this point. A man takes a 
woman to a candlelight dinner at an expensive restaurant. The occasion is 
clearly a special one, through which he intends to express his feelings for her. 
Over drinks he gives her a small, wrapped gift, a jewel box seemingly 
intended for a ring. Her manner is expectant and loving. She opens the box to 
find a ceramic pin with the cartoon face of a clown on it. She looks up at him 
in shock and astonishment. He smiles uncomfortably. "Next time, better call 1-
800-FLOWERS," the voiceover intones. The implication is clear that he has 
expressed his affection for her inappropriately. Perhaps he has. But perhaps 
he intended to express something else. Perhaps he meant to portray himself as 
a clown and symbolically give himself to her. Or to communicate that they 
should lighten up in this relationship and not lose their sense of humor just 
because they were getting involved. Or to suggest that he loves her for the 
madcap clown she really is rather than for the self-important façade she 
presents to the world; and to give her a means by which to advertise a more 
lighthearted self-image. The setting makes clear that he meant to show how 
much he values her, and also that he lacks the social resources for expressing 
in what exactly that valuation consists. Perhaps the culture contains no such 
resources, or perhaps he is just unschooled in the ways of love. 
 Thus as it stands, Anderson's analysis disses dorks, geeks, nerds, and 
dweebs. But even for the most highly socialized and sophisticated among us, 
sometimes there really are no words adequate to express our gratitude for 
another's support, nothing we can do to demonstrate the depth of our 
affection, no way to express our heartfelt appreciation – and simply saying 
this, or doing nothing, doesn't do the trick, either. This doesn't mean that we 
do not have those attitudes.  
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 If conforming to shared norms for expressing our valuations were a 
necessary condition of valuing something, it is hard to see how new and 
original forms of social expression of these attitudes could arise, or what 
would motivate their creation, or how they could be recognized as original 
ways of expressing those attitudes. What of attitudes people in fact have that 
may not (yet) make sense to a society, such as the desire to rebel, detach, 
explore or innovate? What of societies that do have norms needed to 
adequately express its members' reflectively endorsed valuations, but none 
for valuations that are recognizably among the panoply of human valuations 
but not reflectively endorsed? And what of societies whose norms for 
expressing its members' valuations are themselves not reflectively 
endorsable?   
 Anderson agrees that "a social order can be criticized for failing to 
provide adequate normative vehicles for the expression of attitudes that have 
come to make sense to its members. ...  If a society lacks the social norms 
needed to adequately express its members' reflectively endorsed valuations, 
the rational thing to do is to invent and institute such norms" (18). But if 
people can make reflectively endorsed valuations in the absence of adequate 
social norms for expressing them, then expressing those valuations in 
conformity with the norms cannot be a necessary condition for the existence 
of the reflectively endorsed valuations themselves.  
 
1.3. Making Sense of Value 
 This brings us to Anderson's conception of a valuation's making sense; of 
its being reflectively endorsable. Just as Anderson equates having the 
constellation of favorable attitudes constitutive of a particular mode of 
valuation with expressing it in norm-governed action, she also equates 
rational valuation with expressing one's valuations through reflectively 
endorsable norm-governed action. Thus Anderson wants to distinguish 
between valuing something and that thing's being valuable. She improves on 
Mill's formulation by stipulating that something is valuable if it makes sense 
for someone to value it (91-2, 102, 124); and if it meets standards it makes 
sense for someone to value (114-5).  
 The concept of a thing's making sense is a central one for Anderson. Here 
she deploys two locutions. In some passages she speaks interpretively, of 
making sense of our attitudes. For example, she characterizes the quest for 
self-understanding as "an attempt to make sense of our own valuational 
responses to the world" (3); and the coziness of a bedroom as making sense of 
"[one's] feeling snug when [one] retire[s] there" (4). Later she suggests that "if 
either [of two very different and incommensurable ways of adequately 
expressing one's valuations of one's ends] makes adequate, but very different 
sense, of one's valuations, then reason permits the pursuit of either one" (63); 
and that "[o]ne can make sense of one's own attitudes only by taking up a 
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point of view from which others can also make sense of them" (95); and that 
"[t]o justify an evaluative claim is to appeal to reasons that make sense of 
particular attitudes toward the evaluated object" (97); and finally that 
"[j]ustification is concerned with making sense of our concerns and attitudes" 
(111).   
 In these passages Anderson treats some attitudes as a given. Making 
sense of them is then equivalent to finding the interpretation or explanation of 
given mental phenomena that makes them most comprehensible to oneself 
and others. On this reading, to justify one's valuations just is to explain them 
with reasons why. The interpretive locution has the advantage that it does not 
beg any questions about what valuations or attitudes any particular 
interlocutor might think one should have. It is a comparatively weak 
requirement on justification, in that it requires only that I understand your 
values, whether or not I share them. To complain that a valuation does not 
make sense is, on this reading, to complain not that it is personally 
unacceptable, but that it is unintelligible, i.e. that it violates certain basic 
conditions of conceptual coherence and consistency. 
 In other passages, however, she speaks prescriptively, of what it makes 
sense for someone to do. Were two friends to become enemies, she argues, "it 
would make sense for [one] to stop cherishing" an ugly bracelet given her by 
the other (19).  Similarly, she says, it "makes sense for a person to value most 
[states of affairs] only because it makes sense for a person to care about the 
people, animals, communities, and things concerned with them" (20); and 
"what it makes sense to do now essentially depends on what one has done in 
the past" (34). Later she argues that "[i]f goods are not commensurable, then it 
does not make sense to maximize their values" (46). She defines a standard as 
"authentic if and only if ... it could make sense for a person to guide her 
responses by it. ..." and as important to a person "if it makes sense for her to 
care about it" (48). Similarly, she says that "[w]hich higher-order good it 
makes sense to use in justifying a person's choices depends on the context of 
decision ..." (54); that "it makes sense to value different good in different ways 
...." (72), and that "the conditions that make states of affairs valuable are not 
other states of affairs, but the people animals, and things it makes sense to 
care directly about" (85).  
 In these passages, what it makes sense for someone to do is what there is 
reason for doing.  To justify one's valuations is to demonstrate that the balance 
of reasons prescribes it. And to state that it makes sense for someone to do 
something is to state that the balance of reasons prescribes it. It is to advocate 
the doing of that thing. Thus it presupposes and expresses a set of values with 
which one's listener is assumed to agree. The prescriptive locution in this 
sense imposes a much stronger condition on justification than the interpretive 
one. 
Chapter IX. The Problem of Moral Justification        364 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
 Anderson's explicit definition of making sense supports the prescriptive 
locution but not the interpretive one. To judge that one's valuations make 
sense, for Anderson, is "to judge that they would be endorsed" from a 
hypothetical, common point of view in which people can both achieve one 
another's valuations and also reflectively endorse them. The process of 
reaching this point of view as a desired endpoint is one in which "people 
interpret and justify their valuations by exchanging reasons for them" (3). Part 
of exchanging reasons for one's valuations is being "able to tell a story that 
makes sense of [an] ideal, that gives it some compelling point, that shows how 
the evaluative perspective it defines reveals defects, limitations, or 
insensitivities in the perspectives that reject these valuings" (92). Moreover, 
this process of justification is objective, on Anderson's account, if the 
participants in this dialogue can reach agreement or make progress when they 
adhere to the following norms of rational discourse: 
 
 (A) they acknowledge the possibility of a permanent gap between 
their actual attitudes and rational ones;  
 (B) they acknowledge the equal authority of others to offer criticisms 
and proposals;  
 (C) no one competent to participate is excluded from the dialogue;  
(D) all apply reasons consistently to their own proposals and to 
others;  
 (E) they aim for agreement or a common point of view;  
 (F) they agree to work from mutually accepted reasons toward 
resolution of their differences;  
 (G) the process contains methods for introducing new considerations 
as reasons and for criticizing what are currently taken to be reasons (93). 
 
So one's valuations are valuable, i.e. make sense, if they would be endorsed by 
others who, through adhering to norms (A)-(G) constitutive of the process of 
rational justification, comparison and critique of one another's valuations, 
were to reach mutual agreement on their valuations. Thus this idealized 
process of justification is familiarly instrumental in form, with mutual 
agreement on valuations as the desired outcome. It is called for when people 
who have different values have some interest or need to reach agreement. It is 
possible, Anderson writes, when there is some overlap in the considerations 
each party accepts as counting for or against attitudes and judgments (93). 
And it is required as a necessary condition of making sense of oneself and 
one's own values (94-95). 
 This account of rational value does require that others share some values 
in common at the outset. It presupposes "a background of socially contingent 
and historically evolving social practices and conditions" (102), as well as 
common ground, minimally, in "shared intuitions or in curiosity, trust, and a 
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willingness to try alien practices" (105). It also presupposes that all 
participants agree either on what counts as a reason for or against something 
(norms (D) and (F)) or on how to introduce new considerations as reasons for 
or against things (norm (G)). Together these presuppositions constitute a quite 
substantial area of shared values. Anderson's claim is that unless one's 
valuations conform to the hypothetical point of view delineated by these 
norms, one cannot make sense of oneself or them at all. 
 
1.4. Making Sense of Oneself 
 In this discussion so far I have been concerned to make room in 
Anderson's metaethics for valuational attitudes people can have but not 
express, or express but not in socially familiar or acceptable ways. I have 
wanted to insist on the existence of such anomalous attitudes, as I shall call 
them, even in the face of social ignorance or incomprehension of them. I will 
now want to insist on the rational value of some anomalous attitudes even 
though they do not meet some of the rationality conditions Anderson 
requires. I will want to show that such anomalous attitudes can be valuable, 
i.e. rational, even though they are not reflectively endorsable by other 
members of a social community governed by norms for their expression.   
 Consider someone whose valuational attitudes are marginal with respect 
to all the social communities in which he moves. Suppose, for example, that 
the background of social practices and conditions in which he was raised is at 
odds with the two in which he now lives and commutes; that these two are at 
odds with each other; and that the two in which he now lives and commutes 
have alienated him from the one in which he was raised. Also suppose that 
because of his outsider status with respect to all three cultures, his intuitions, 
perceptions and beliefs about the inhabitants of each are greatly at odds with 
the intuitions, perceptions and beliefs the inhabitants of each culture have 
about themselves, and similarly at odds with the intuitions etc. each culture 
has about the others. Suppose further that this outsider status has virtually 
sated his curiosity and willingness to try alien practices by requiring him, as a 
condition of his own adaptation and survival, to study and gain extensive 
familiarity with the mores of each culture – to become more knowledgeable 
about each culture, in fact, than any single inhabitant of any of the three 
cultures is about her own. Moreover, suppose his outsider status has brought 
upon him repeated and consistent social ostracism, rejection, and punishment, 
so that his ability to trust any member of any of the three cultures is virtually 
nonexistent.  
 It is not implausible that, as the result of his experience as an interloper in 
all three social communities, his conception of what counts as a reason in 
favor of certain basic matters might be equally at odds with others' 
conceptions, so that it would not be possible to apply certain reasons 
consistently both to his and to others' proposals (norm (D)). That certain 
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lifestyles were socially isolating, for example, might count as a reason against 
them for members of any of the three communities, but as a consideration in 
their favor for him; that certain activities would bring one face-to-face with 
one's own mortality might count as a reason against them for others but as a 
reason for them for him; that certain kinds of relationships would fill his life 
with connection to others might count as a reason against them for him but a 
reason for them for others; and so forth. 
 Similarly, it is not implausible that, given his experiences, he might not 
agree with members of any of the three social communities on how to 
introduce into the dialogue new considerations for or against things as 
reasons (norms (E) and (G)). By hypothesis he would be fully conversant with 
the practices members of all three cultures agreed on for doing this – 
something analogous, let us suppose, to following Robert's Rules of Order. 
But he might justifiably think these practices inadequate for introducing 
considerations that were radically unlike those members of these cultures 
were conditioned to recognize as reasons. He might think that precisely 
because of their social cohesion and conformity, there were certain sorts of 
quite important reasons that members of all three communities simply were 
not psychologically or socially equipped to consider; that they just wouldn't 
"get it." And he might think that only quite radical presentations of these 
considerations – in theatrical or otherwise dramatic symbolic form, perhaps, 
or in acts of self-immolation or antisocial destruction, might lead the light to 
dawn. Being unwilling or unable to perform such acts himself, he might 
conclude that there was no way for him to tell the story that made sense of his 
ideals, that would give it a compelling point or reveal the defects, limitations, 
or insensitivities in the perspectives of an audience of interlocutors whose 
experiences were so radically different from and limited relative to his own. 
Although he might fully understand their valuations, he might realistically 
conclude that there was no way for him to make his valuations intelligible to 
them. 
 For all of these reasons, his valuations would not be rationally endorsable 
by other participants in the rational dialogue Anderson describes, nor might 
he think it worth his while even to participate in it (norm (F)). But this would 
not imply that he was unable to make sense of his own values. First, it would 
not imply this for the interpretive locution. He would be able to explain his 
attitudes and values in the same terms I have just described, offering reasons 
why he values and disvalues as he does that enable us to understand his 
valuations even if we did not share them. Second, that his values were not 
rationally endorsable from Anderson's hypothetical common point of view 
would not imply that it would not make sense prescriptively for him to 
respond and act as he does. He could, by hypothesis, give realistic and well-
grounded reasons for valuing solitude, silence, and confrontation with 
mortality, such that we would be compelled to recognize the rational integrity 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception    367 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
of his perspective even if we did not share it. That these values would not 
make sense from the shared perspective of a community of participants 
engaged in rational dialogue of the kind Anderson describes does not imply 
that they do not make sense at all. 
 Third and most importantly, that these anomalous values were not thus 
rationally endorsable would not imply that our marginalized agent could not 
make sense of himself. Anderson argues that "one can make sense of one's 
own attitudes only by taking up a point of view from which others can also 
make sense of them.  ...  we can make sense of ourselves only by participating 
in practices of justification" (95). By contrast, this agent would make sense of 
his own attitudes from a perspective to which no one else had access, namely 
the perspective of having experienced the three disparate social communities 
in the unique and particular ways that he had. And he would be able to do 
this even though he had, by hypothesis, declined to participate in a social 
practice of justification of the kind Anderson advocates. 
 Now Anderson argues that "[m]aking sense of ourselves is not a matter of 
theorizing about an object whose properties we cannot affect. We make 
ourselves intelligible to ourselves by cultivating attitudes that make sense to 
us, by determining to act in accord with ideals we accept that have survived 
critical scrutiny" (91). She claims that part of the quest for self-understanding  
requires that when we recognize in ourselves attitudes that we cannot 
endorse from the hypothetical common point of view governed by shared 
social norms of discourse, we reform these attitudes "so that they make sense 
in the context of an enlarged self-understanding" (96). Thus self-
understanding, on Anderson's view, requires active self-determination 
through the cultivation of attitudes that are reflectively endorsable from the 
hypothetical common point of view.  
 Again this is way too strong. It implies that we cannot make sense of 
what we cannot either endorse or improve; and so that those intractable and 
incorrigible parts of the self that are so necessary for bringing us face to face 
with our imperfections, our guilt, and our personal limitations must remain 
opaque or impenetrable to rational analysis. It also implies that we can easily 
improve what we cannot initially endorse, and I have yet to see an account of 
how this is supposed to work that does not degenerate into exhortations to 
bootstrap the triumph of the will over the flesh. Most people cannot even 
manage to stay on a low-cholesterol diet.   
 But my main concern is what it implies for the possibility of social and 
cultural change. Earlier I asked how new and original expressions of 
valuational attitudes could arise, if conforming those expressions to shared 
social norms were a necessary condition of their existence. The same question 
can be asked about new and original valuational attitudes themselves. 
Demographically mobile societies such as this one are constantly creating 
marginalized agents of the sort just described. Through upward mobility we 
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may move from our original class backgrounds to higher ones, and to 
different ethnic or cultural groups, through education and professional 
training; through downward mobility and economic contraction we may 
move in the reverse direction, and thereby into other new ethnic or lifestyle 
communities – perhaps even into homelessness or penal incarceration; 
through travel, new technologies, or contact with other cultures that create 
new possibilities for experience or lifestyle, we may find our most basic 
values or lifestyle preferences undergoing radical revision. Anderson 
conceives the relevant contrast along Marxist economic lines, as between 
individualistic and social conceptions of rational attitudes. But a society as 
marked by heterogeneous social values as this increasingly global one owes 
its plethora of anomalous attitudes at least as much to its ethnic and class 
diversity and mobility as it does to its capitalist economic structure. 
 Agents who undergo these social, economic and cultural shifts are 
regularly confronted with disparities between their own anomalous attitudes 
and those that are socially endorsed by the community at hand. Under these 
circumstances, one always faces the choice of to which source authoritative 
weight should be ascribed. Either one may conclude that one's own values are 
inappropriate, and take steps to reform them in accordance with the norms of 
the community; or one may conclude that the norms of the community are 
inappropriate, and take steps to reform them in accordance with one's own 
values. Those who are strongly identified with the norms of a particular 
community will incline to choose the former alternative; marginalized agents 
by definition have a greater capacity to choose the latter. Without this 
capacity, it is hard to see how social and cultural value change could occur.  
 When value change does occur, it does not require that one construct or 
even envision an alternative community that adopts and enacts the norms of 
rational dialogue Anderson describes, nor that one rely on such a hypothetical 
community to endorse and legitimate the anomalous attitudes one may know 
independently to be rational. A marginalized agent can recognize his 
anomalous values as rational if, to summarize briefly, (1) he can causally 
explain them by his experiences, (2) he can in turn cite these values as reasons 
for his behavior and attitudes, and (3) these values, and the experiences that 
form them, are internally coherent. Of course this does not imply that they are 
therefore morally acceptable to any actual or hypothetical community. 
Whether they are or not, what any actual or hypothetical community thinks 
about them is irrelevant to their rationality. In Volume II, Chapter VI.8 I show 
that this characteristic of rationality – its independence (or, if you like, its 
“individualism”) – is crucial to understanding what motivates the whistle-
blower to withstand the pressures and threats of his moral community for the 
sake of a higher good. 
 Therefore, social and cultural value change does not require that "if our 
lives are to be meaningful, then we must adopt a perspective informed by the 
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expressive theory as our global mode of deliberating about and justifying our 
actions, emotions, and attitudes" (83). Since rationality is itself a value, it is 
unclear why Anderson, after successfully developing a fully pluralistic theory 
of value, thinks she needs to ground it with monistic and global criteria of 
rationality. Social and cultural value change requires only marginalized 
agents whose anomalous values are sufficiently secure, independent of the 
community's, and well-grounded in their experience to furnish the distanced 
critical perspective from which the community's can be found to be lacking. 
That is the kind of agent for which I believe a genuinely pluralistic, rational 
attitude theory of value such as Anderson's can and must make room. The 
alternative is a set of values embedded in and reinforced by social conformity, 
convention and conservatism; values of a sort that only mire an actual moral 
community further in the habits of unreflective corruption with which it 
already is likely to be far too familiar. 
 
2. Deductivism 
 Deductivism attempts to derive substantive moral principle via a 
conceptual analysis of the foundational premises that purport to generate it. 
In Chapter VII we encountered in the work of Kant and Nagel two examples 
of Deductivist metaethical strategies. We saw that just as Kant attempted to 
derive the moral law from the foundational concept of a free and rational 
being, similarly Nagel attempted to derive a principle of altruism from a self-
conception of oneself as just one person among many – i.e. from 
impersonality and objectivity conjoined. In both cases, the argument 
proceeded by elaborating and explicating what was presumed to be contained 
in the concepts of, respectively, freedom and rationality in Kant's case; and 
being one person among many others in Nagel's. Deductivism, then, is a 
central technique of Anglo-American analytic philosophy applied specifically 
to the analysis of moral, political, or otherwise value-laden concepts. 
 However, Deductivism aspires to more than merely unpacking what is 
analytically implied by certain foundational moral concepts. It chooses which 
concepts to unpack with an eye to drawing forth from the analysis 
prescriptive moral principles whose rationale is to be found in the 
foundational concepts from which they are said to follow. This is not easy. On 
the one hand, the derivation must not have the tautologous form, 
 
If P then P, 
 
for fear of eliciting bored yawns. So, for example, it would not do for Kant to 
derive from the concept of freedom merely the principle that a free agent is 
not unfree, although that certainly would seem to follow by conceptual 
analysis of "freedom." On the other hand, however, the more interesting but 
suspect form, 
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If P then Q, 
 
often elicits pained protests. So, for example, it is indeed very hard to see how 
Kant purports to get from the concept of freedom to the principle that a free 
agent always tells the literal truth in every situation, no matter what. Many do 
not think he does get there. To navigate successfully between these two 
extremes is, on the one hand, to derive moral principles that – like 
mathematical or logical proofs – really do follow by conceptual analysis from 
their premises; and, on the other, to derive from neutral or weak and widely 
accepted premises new and substantive principles that really do guide action 
in some identifiable direction. 
 On the face of it, it is very difficult to see how any metaethical 
justification can have it both ways. The problem is not that it is impossible to 
say anything interesting without going beyond the concepts with which one 
began. That is not true. We learn a lot by reading about what Aristotle thinks 
the concept of friendship entails, or what Kant thinks the concept of reason 
entails. The problem is rather that it is very difficult to draw forth principled 
prescriptions from conceptual descriptions – i.e. "oughts" from "ises." Yet this 
is essentially what Deductivism tries to do. Without lapsing into tautology, 
Deductivism attempts a proof that begins with premises that approach 
prescriptive neutrality as nearly as possible – so much the better to win your 
assent to them, whoever you may be; and from them attempts logically to 
derive conclusions that have rich prescriptive content which you are 
rationally – logically – required to accept; i.e. which are "necessitated by 
reason" (Kant), or "rationally inescapable" (Nagel).  
 Most metaethical Deductivists do not try to begin with premises that 
have no prescriptive content whatsoever. The concepts of freedom, reason, 
being one person among many others, objectivity, etc. are all value-laden to a 
certain degree, even if this amounts to no more than everyone agreeing that 
the states of affairs these concepts denote are worthwhile in some unspecified 
way. But a Strict Deductivist will rightly beware even of these relatively weak 
premises. For if we take it as a given that one cannot get out of a premise any 
more than one has put into it, injecting even this much prescriptive content 
into one's foundational premises threatens to tilt the derivation toward 
tautology, if its conclusions resemble them too closely in conceptual and 
prescriptive content (so, for example, from the premise of free agency, it 
would not be interesting to conclude that free agents should always chose 
freely). A Strict Deductivist will not be satisfied with tinkering with the 
content of the premises to the extent that the principles to be "derived" follow, 
by definition, as a foregone conclusion. Rather, a Strict Deductivist will set 
herself the more ambitious project of drawing forth a new and prescriptively 
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interesting result from weak, morally neutral and widely shared premises that 
were not previously thought to contain it.   
 However, avoiding tautology may tilt the derivation in the opposite 
direction, of fallacious inference: if one did not inject anything about freedom 
into one's foundational premises, it is very unlikely that one is going to get 
anything about freedom out of them, at least according to the standard rules 
of inference. So if the prescriptive moral principles one derives as conclusions 
have a great deal of highly satisfying content, whereas one's foundational 
premises are as nondescript and value-neutral as any premises can be, one has 
cause either for great exultation or – what is more likely – for serious concern. 
Either one has managed to achieve what no other philosopher in the Western 
tradition has; or else it is likely that something, somewhere in one's derivation 
has gone awry. The Strict Deductivist must take care, not only that she has not 
pumped into her premises the prescriptive content she wishes to derive, but 
also that she has not surreptitiously pumped into the steps of her derivation 
itself the prescriptive content she so scrupulously barred from her premises. 
 
3. Gewirth's Deductivism 
 Alan Gewirth is a Strict Deductivist. In Reason and Morality,5 he answers 
both of the questions with which this chapter opened,  
 
(1) Are there any final ends aside from desire-satisfaction it is 
rational to aspire to? 
(2) Can we be motivated independently of desire-satisfaction to 
accept and aspire to achieve such rational final ends? 
 
in the affirmative. He both articulates a substantive vision of the good society 
as a final end, and, in order to motivate its acceptance, enlists a thorough and 
exhaustive analysis of possible objections and alternatives.  
 By attempting to derive a substantive moral theory from weak, value-
neutral premises through straightforward conceptual analysis, Gewirth 
follows Nagel as a second and more recent contemporary philosopher 
committed to the Kantian tradition of Deductivism. What distinguishes 
Gewirth's approach from Kant's and Nagel's is the explicit nature of his 
commitment to the procedure of rational derivation through conceptual 
analysis. In the explicitness and rigor of this commitment, Gewirth takes his 
cue from John Rawls's similarly explicit and rigorous attempt, which I 
examine in Chapter X, to justify his moral theory as a derivation from the 
theory of rational choice. Gewirth matches Rawls's essentially Humean 
strategy with a Kantian one that is just as ambitious in scope and just as 
                                                
5(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Henceforth all page references to this 
work will be parenthecized in the main text. 
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demanding in execution. The explicit nature of this commitment entitles us to 
inquire not only whether his justificatory strategy is successful, but also, more 
specifically, whether the rigorous standards of an explicit derivation have 
been met. 
 Gewirth's version of the Kantian strategy is the derivation of a normative 
foundational moral principle from a conceptual analysis, not of reason or of 
the self, but rather of action. This concept, at least on the face of it, genuinely 
is normatively neutral to a degree that those of reason or objectivity are not. 
The normative principle Gewirth derives is what he calls the "supreme 
principle of morality", the Principle of Generic Consistency (henceforth the 
PGC). The PGC commands us to act in accord with the generic rights to 
freedom and wellbeing of our recipients as well as of ourselves (135). The 
detailed elaboration of this principle, and its application to a variety of moral 
cases, describe his vision of the just society. This is the normative moral 
theory that occupies the second part of Reason and Morality, and that thereby 
answers the first question, above, affirmatively. The first part of his book 
comprises what purports to be a definitive justification for accepting the PGC 
as a guide both to social policy and to individual conduct, and so answers the 
second affirmatively. 
 
3.1. Justification 
 By a "definitive justification," Gewirth means one that answers the "three 
central questions of moral philosophy" (3): First, there is the authoritative 
question: Why should I be moral? Second, there is the distributive question: 
Whose interests other than my own should be helped by my action? And 
third, there is the substantive question: Which interests are good?  
Notice that the authoritative question calls for metaethical justification, 
not of any particular normative moral theory, but rather of one's commitment 
to some such moral theory or other. It assumes that we should be moral, and 
demands reasons why. The distributive and substantive questions, by 
contrast, call for substantive answers from some particular normative moral 
theory. In essence, they demand articulation of the basic prescriptions and 
values of the theory. Thus Gewirth's conception of a definitive justification 
requires a justification of moral commitment in general and an exposition of a 
particular set of normative moral premises. It leaves a gap between 
persuading us of the value of moral conduct in general on the one hand, and 
persuading us of the value of his particular account of moral conduct on the 
other. It does not explicitly require the justification of some such set of 
normative moral premises as themselves "rationally inescapable." However, 
Gewirth aims to close this gap by arguing that the overriding reasons for 
being moral in general necessarily commit us to the PGC in particular. 
 Gewirth also requires that the answers a definitive justification provides 
to the three central questions of morality be, first, determinate. That is, the 
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criteria of moral rightness these answers establish must have sufficient 
particular content so that the opposite content cannot also be derived from the 
justified principle (21, 164-5). This requirement concerns the content of the 
answers to the distributive and substantive questions, rather than to the 
authoritative one. It states that the justified principle cannot be so general in 
content that one could derive from it both an internally consistent set of moral 
prescriptions on action and also the negation of that set. An example of a 
principle that violates determinacy would be "Act to further your own self-
interest," because it might generate prescriptions both to keep one's promises 
and also to break them, for the same situation. Another example would be the 
principle, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," because this 
might generate prescriptions both to render aid to the needy and also to 
withhold it under the same circumstances. The scope of application of these 
principles for particular kinds of situations would need to be specified in 
much greater detail in order to meet the determinacy requirement.6 
 By setting the determinacy requirement as a standard his own PGC must 
meet, Gewirth, like Rawls before him, sets himself the challenge of justifying a 
moral principle that specifically proscribes conduct a different principle might 
endorse, and so of making his theory palatable to those who might disagree 
with its particular prescriptions. By holding his own theory to the 
determinacy requirement, Gewirth signals his intentions both to take strong 
stands and to change minds. He rejects a traditional escape hatch for moral 
philosophers who justifiably want to claim as many converts as possible: of 
generalizing and thus weakening the particular prescriptions of their moral 
theory, or merely endorsing the familiar ones, in order to increase the breadth 
of its appeal. The harder task – Gewirth's task – is to specify the practical 
prescriptions of his moral theory as fully as possible, and also convince the 
unconverted of their worth. 
 Gewirth also requires, second, that a definitive justification be conclusive, 
i.e. that the criteria of morally right conduct implied by the PGC be both 
beyond rational challenge by competing moral theories and also categorically 
obligatory for all moral agents irrespective of particular circumstance (21, 23, 
149-150). This extremely ambitious requirement concerns the answers to the 
distributive and substantive questions explicitly, and to the authoritative 
question indirectly. Gewirth thinks that particular standards of morally right 
conduct are beyond rational challenge by competing moral theories if they are 
implied by rational analysis itself; and that they are categorically obligatory 
for all moral agents if they are necessitated by some feature of moral agency 
that no moral agent can avoid. This is where Gewirth aims to close the gap 
                                                
6See Henry S. Richardson, "Specifying Norms as a Way to Resolve Concrete Ethical 
Problems," Philosophy and Public Affairs 19, 4 (Fall 1990), 279-310 for a detailed analysis 
of what this would involve. 
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between the authoritative question on the one hand and the distributive and 
substantive questions on the other. He aims to demonstrate that the PGC is 
uniquely implied by a universal and necessary feature of moral agency, hence 
that the reasons why we should be moral are the same reasons we should 
follow the prescriptions derived from the PGC.  
 Thus Gewirth makes explicit the ambitions inherent in Nagel's project as 
well as Kant's. We have seen that in Kantian metaethics as traditionally 
conceived, moral justification is to be understood along the same lines as 
mathematical proof: the normative moral theory is a content-rich result to be 
generated from comparatively weak premises according to universally 
accepted rules of logic. Gewirth's metaethical thesis is that the rational 
analysis of action provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for 
answering the three central questions of moral philosophy. By "reason," he 
means the generally accepted canons of deductive and inductive logic and 
conceptual analysis (22-23). Gewirth's claim is that if we consider carefully 
what is essentially involved in action, we will see that the PGC follows from it 
as a matter of logical necessity. So he means to answer the three central 
questions of morality by arguing that we ought to be moral because morality 
is implied by action itself; and, more specifically, that this morality, as 
encapsulated in the PGC, is implied by action itself. 
 
3.2. Derivation 
 Before turning to detailed scrutiny of Gewirth's reasoning, let us first 
examine the underlying traditional Kantian strategy itself, of deriving a 
content-rich normative theory from relatively weak premises through 
conceptual analysis. The strategy assumes, first, that normative moral truths – 
that is, the uniquely valid moral theory that applies universally and 
necessarily to all rational, human, and/or sentient agents – are as deeply 
embedded in our cognitive faculties as are logical truths. If P, and if P then Q, 
then Q, then if agents act, and if agents act then they are committed to the 
PGC, then they are committed to the PGC. Second, this strategy assumes that 
normative moral truths can be uncovered in much the same way as can logical 
truths, i.e. through a rational deductive procedure. Finally, it assumes that to 
do so is to insure for the moral truths thus uncovered the same cognitive and 
conative inevitability that logical truths seem to possess. Kant himself had 
good reasons for these assumptions. Does Gewirth? Suppose Gewirth's PGC 
can be shown to follow from the rational analysis of action. What are the 
implications for moral motivation, rational final ends, and moral justification?   
 Would we be rationally persuaded to adopt the vision of society implied 
by the PGC as a final end and obey its prescriptions, simply in virtue of 
learning that it was logically implied by the concept of action? Is this 
justification sufficient to inspire action on its behalf? How can a derivation of 
a moral principle from the concept of action give us any obligation to do 
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anything other than what we already do in virtue of acting? If the PGC is 
logically implied by the concept of action, then it follows tautologically from 
that concept. Then I necessarily follow it, just in virtue of acting. If the PGC 
requires me to do more than what I already do just by acting, then it contains 
more than the concept of action from which it is derived. In this case it seems 
that some extra assumptions must be appended as the argument progresses. 
Now Nagel appended to his account of our impersonal self-conception as one 
among many equally real individuals an analysis of reasons as timelessly, 
tenselessly, and objectively valid, in order to generate the requirement of 
altruism. This was unobjectionable because he did not claim to give a strictly 
logical derivation in the first place. By having chosen boldly to meet the 
Kantian challenge head-on, Gewirth does not have that luxury. If he really 
means to derive the PGC from the concept of action, then whatever is strictly 
implied by the concept of action itself should suffice to enjoin our obedience 
to it. 
 To see this, consider the consequences of my realizing that my being a 
teacher follows tautologically from my being a professor. There would be no 
such consequences. I would not behave any differently upon realizing that, in 
virtue of being a professor, I am also thereby a teacher. Then analogously, 
why should my learning that, in virtue of acting, I am committed to the PGC 
move me to do anything more than what I already do in virtue of acting?  If 
my concept of action itself does not elicit from me obedience to the PGC, why 
should my discovery that that it implies the PGC do so?  
 Gewirth might respond by likening his conceptual analysis to a complex 
mathematical proof, in which the tautological relationship between axioms 
and results are not obvious, but rather must be exhibited through elaborate 
reasoning in an extended sequence of steps. Relative to this sequence, the 
conclusion is a surprise that affords us genuinely new information, even 
though it was implicit in the old. The question then would be how close the 
similarities between Gewirth's derivation and a mathematical one actually 
are. In a mathematical proof, a later step in the sequence is derived from an 
earlier one through the application of canonical rules of logic and theorems 
already proven. The challenge for Gewirth will be to not import into his 
analysis any additional unargued or controversial assumptions in order to 
derive the conclusion he wants. If he meets this challenge, then those of us 
with a deeply rooted commitment to accurate theoretical reasoning might be 
convinced to accept his derivation of the PCG from the concept of action. If he 
does not, then our acceptance or rejection of the PGC will turn on other, 
nonrational factors, such as its intuitive viability, familiarity, convenience, or 
appeal.  
 Thus it is important to emphasize that the failure of the metaethical project of 
providing a foundational rational justification of a normative moral theory does not 
entail the failure, falsehood, or unacceptability of the theory itself, for Gewirth any 
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more than it does for Nagel, Kant, Rawls, or indeed any of the other theorists 
considered in this project. We still might find the theory persuasive or inspiring, 
even we cannot justify rationally our doing so. If we cannot, this may mean 
either that no rational justification of the theory is possible, or merely that we 
have not yet found one. But in neither case would it follow that the theory 
was not true, or not the best we could do. The connection between truth and 
justification is not that close in any theoretical inquiry.7 
 Gewirth's solution to the motivational problem is to reason that if the 
PGC can be shown to be logically necessary, then its denial is self-
contradictory. Then any agent with a minimal commitment to logical 
consistency has a conclusive reason for believing its prescriptions. But, 
Gewirth continues, to have a conclusive reason for believing that certain 
actions ought to be performed is thereby to have a conclusive reason for 
performing them oneself, "so that the principle's normative necessity, 
whereby its requirements for action cannot rightly be evaded, follows from its 
being logically necessary" (23). Gewirth's reasoning here echoes Nagel's 
argument that altruism is rationally inescapable because if one has objective 
reason to believe an end should be promoted then one has objective reason to 
promote the end oneself. 
 The first question, however, is whether believing that the PGC is entailed 
by the concept of action necessitates believing that an action that is in turn 
entailed by the PGC ought to be performed. If I believe that the concept of 
action entails the PGC, and that the PGC entails action A, then perhaps I 
ought to believe that the concept of action entails action A (we might most 
plausibly assume A to be some inescapably basic action such as minimally 
bestirring oneself). But merely deriving A from the concept of action does not 
in turn necessitate a belief that A ought to be performed. Ought I then do 
whatever is said to follow from the concept of action?  If it follows from the 
concept of action, then presumably I already do. Do I have a choice about 
what implications of the concept of action to act on, i.e. what actions to 
perform? If these implications follow necessarily, as Gewirth claims, then 
presumably I do not; I perform them in virtue simply of acting. But if I did 
have such a choice, then it would be hard to see how any such logically 
entailed implications of actions could be obligatory rather than 
supererogatory. So either I have no choice but to perform such actions, or else 
I have no obligation to do so. Ought I do at least what minimally follows from 
the concept of action? For example, if the concept of action entails setting 
goals, ought I then set goals because I act? Of course not. If anything, it is the 
other way around: I ought to act because I set goals, and it is these goals that 
give me reason to act, not the concept of action that gives me reason to set 
                                                
7See Paul Benacerraf, "Mathematical Truth," The Journal of Philosophy LXX, l9, November 
8, l973. 
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goals. That A follows from the concept of action, then, is not sufficient to 
conclude that A ought to be performed. That A also follows from the PGC 
gives it a prima facie prescriptive legitimacy that its following from the concept 
of action alone does not.   
 But this legitimacy is only prima facie.  For it is similarly difficult to see 
how my believing that the PGC entails A can necessitate my believing that A 
ought to be performed. In order for me to believe this, I must believe, not 
merely – or necessarily – that the PGC is entailed by the concept of action, but 
instead that there is reason to do what the PGC prescribes. That the PGC is 
entailed by the concept of action is no more reason to do what the PGC 
prescribes than that A is entailed by the concept of action is reason to do A. 
Gewirth should not try to argue that this entailment relation (assuming it is 
one) confers any particular obligation on agents. A less risky strategy would 
have been to argue that the PGC describes clearly what agents confusedly 
attempt to achieve whenever they act; and that the rational acknowledgement 
of the PGC as a clarified and elaborated concept of action entails certain 
obligations on the part of those who rationally acknowledge it as such.  
 The second question raised by Gewirth's solution to the motivational 
problem is whether believing that an action ought to be performed entails 
believing that one ought to perform it. Here are some of the actions I believe 
ought to be performed: Afghanistan ought to be rebuilt; batterers and child 
abusers ought to be sentenced to life in prison without parole; Lani Guinier 
ought to be appointed to the Supreme Court. But my believing that these 
actions ought to be performed does not necessitate any belief on my part that I 
ought to be the one to perform them.  
Does the claim work for more generalized action-descriptions? Nagel's 
answer was that unless a tensed, subjective judgment from the personal point 
of view implied a tenseless, objective judgment with motivational content 
made from the impersonal one, practical solipsism would result. But does the 
arrow point in the other direction as well? Does an objective, tenseless 
judgment with motivational content made from the impersonal point of view 
imply a subjective, tensed judgment made from the personal one? No: I 
believe aid should be rendered to the needy, but (feeling pretty needy myself) 
not necessarily that I should be the one to render it. 
 The third question raised by Gewirth's solution is whether, even 
supposing I do have conclusive reason for believing I ought to perform some 
act A, such that I thereby have conclusive reason for performing it, I also have 
sufficient motivation for performing A. Is Gewirth an internalist or an 
externalist on this matter? This recurs to Nagel's attempt to rescue internalism 
from the Humeans, and the question is the same: Granted that I have reason 
to do A and accept these reasons as mine, is this acceptance sufficient to get 
me to actually do A? The range of answers also have not changed: If 
accepting, on good grounds, that I ought to do A, is an occurrent event, then 
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there is no reason on the face of it why this mental event cannot have the same 
conative power as any other occurrent mental event such as desiring or 
craving. If it is not, however, we await some explanation of how an abstract 
object such as a reason can function as though it were a material cause even 
though it in fact is not one. 
 
3.3. Voluntariness 
 Gewirth's strategy is to attempt to derive the PGC from two of what he 
calls the generic features of action, namely its voluntariness and its 
purposiveness. His claim is that these features are morally neutral in that they 
"fi[t] all moralities rather than reflecting or deriving from any one normative 
moral position as against any other" (25). They are also invariant in that they 
"pertain generically to all actions" (25). Moreover, they demonstrate that 
action has a normative structure, i.e. that certain normative judgments are 
"logically implicit in all action" (26). Finally, Gewirth claims, these normative 
judgments themselves rationally imply the PGC. So actions themselves, on this 
account – not the concept of action, imply certain judgments; and these 
judgments, in turn, imply the PGC. Therefore actions themselves imply the 
PGC. I will want to call attention to each of these claims for the two generic 
features of action: their moral neutrality, their invariance across all actions, 
and, in Section 5 below, their capacity to generate normative judgments.  
 First consider voluntariness. Gewirth equates voluntariness with freedom 
by defining it as the control of behavior through unforced choice. So he wants 
to say that all actions have the property of being behavior controlled through 
unforced choice. But in the section following the above quotes, he says not 
that action is in fact behavior controlled through unforced choice, but rather 
that action as envisaged by moral precepts is behavior controlled by unforced 
choice: 
[T]he sense [of the word 'action'] relevant here is that which is the 
common object of all moral precepts as well as of many other practical 
precepts that set requirements for action. ... they have in common that the 
intention of the persons who set them forth is to guide, advise, or urge 
the persons to whom they are directed .... [I]t is assumed that the hearers 
can control their behavior through their unforced choice so as to try to 
achieve the prescribed ends or contents ... (26-27; also see 28, 30, 35). 
Since there are many actions that fall outside the scope of moral and other 
practical precepts, this provision represents a significant restriction on the 
range of actions from which the PGC can be said to follow. 
Assume for the sake of argument that individuals who issue moral and 
other precepts envisage the actions they prescribe to others as behavior 
controlled by unforced choice; and that this is what it means to act freely. 
Then individuals who issue moral and other precepts assume that those to 
whom these precepts are addressed can freely carry them out. But whether 
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this assumption is true or not is a separate question, and its answer may be 
independent of what any individual, including the agent addressed, thinks 
about it. The explanation of my carrying out a prescription you issue to me 
may be entirely unconnected to your belief, and indeed my belief, that I freely 
choose to do so. For example, I may have been socially conditioned by my 
upbringing to carry out reflexively just the sort of prescription you issued in 
just the tone of voice in which you issued it.  
If the assumption that agents can freely carry out moral precepts is not 
true, this does not necessarily mean that an agent whose behavior conforms to 
such prescriptions does not perform bona fide actions. It may be simply that 
individuals who issue moral and other precepts are mistaken in their 
conception of what an action is. It may be that a person whose behavior is not 
controlled by unforced choice has nevertheless performed an action; and so 
that the individual who prescribed it has envisaged action incorrectly. Basing 
the derivation of the PGC on a conception of action as envisaged by those 
who issue moral precepts is risky if that conception turns out to be too 
optimistic and too demanding for the action-capacities human beings actually 
have. 
 So even if action as envisaged by moral and other precepts really is 
behavior controlled by unforced choice, this does not mean that is what action 
is in fact. If a behavior can be an action without being an action as envisaged 
by moral and other precepts, then voluntariness as Gewirth defines it is not 
invariant across all action, but instead only across those actions envisaged by 
moral and other precepts. Then the normative judgments such actions entail 
are not logically implicit in all actions, but only – perhaps – in those as they 
are envisaged by moral and other precepts. That is, they are logically implicit 
in a limited subclass of conceptual representations of actions, and not in actions 
per se at all. This narrows considerably the scope of actions that are supposed 
to entail the PGC; and to the extent that action as envisaged by moral and 
other precepts are envisaged incorrectly, undermines its justification. 
 Narrowing the scope of actions to those as they are envisaged by such 
precepts also calls into question Gewirth's claim that voluntariness – again, as 
Gewirth defines it – is morally neutral. It may be neutral among competing 
moral theories, but it is biased toward those which issue some moral precepts 
or other. As we saw in Chapter V.1.1, not all moral theories do this. Someone 
who does not already care what various moral precepts prescribe will not be 
swayed by what they assume in common about action. Someone who does 
already care, and wonders whether he rationally should, will regard what 
these precepts assume in common about action with an equally skeptical eye.  
To this extent, whatever Gewirth can then derive from this conception of 
action will not answer the authoritative question of morality, of why in 
general we should be moral (2.1.(1), above). It will not try to supply reasons 
for being moral, but instead – like the authoritative question itself – 
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presuppose that we already are, at least to the extent of being positively 
disposed toward the acceptance of some moral precepts or other, without 
answering the question of whether it is rational to be so disposed. It will then 
try to convince us of why we should accept those particular precepts which 
are implied by the PGC. To say that Gewirth's conception of action as 
envisaged by moral precepts is not morally neutral is thus to say – at the very 
least – that it implicitly presupposes that the authoritative question already 
has been answered positively. 
 This necessitates some revision in our conception of Gewirth's 
justificatory strategy. Initially we understood Gewirth to intend to begin with 
the concept of action as a premise; from this concept to derive two generic 
features of it, from which in turn would follow certain logically implicit 
normative judgments – specifically, certain generic rights and right-claims; 
and from these to derive the PGC. This would follow the traditional Kantian 
Deductivist strategy, of deriving from weak and generally accepted premises 
substantive normative results through conceptual analysis. But upon closer 
examination, we see that Gewirth begins not with the concept of action, but 
instead with the concept of a moral precept. From this premise he derives a 
conception of action that he claims all such moral precepts imply; from this 
the two generic features, from these the normative judgments, and from these, 
finally, the PGC. That is, he begins with the formal concept of a moral precept 
in general, and finally derives a particular moral precept for which he claims 
universal application. The PGC, then, in fact is justified as following 
deductively from the concept of a moral precept. The concept of a moral 
precept is neutral among competing moral theories. But it is not morally 
neutral in its content, the way the concept of action is. Gewirth's particular 
conception of a moral precept contains particularly strong moral assumptions 
– choice, freedom, value, and power.   
 So far we have assumed that Gewirth's concept of action as behavior 
controlled by unforced choice is that envisaged by all moral precepts. We 
must now examine that assumption more closely. By the voluntariness of 
action, Gewirth means that the behavior does not occur from direct or indirect 
external physical or psychological compulsion, such as gusts of wind or 
terrorist threats; or from uncontrollable causes internal to the person, such as 
reflexes, ignorance or disease (31). When these mitigating causes are absent, 
Gewirth argues, the agent's unforced and informed choice  
is the necessary and sufficient condition of the behavior.... When there is 
such control, the person chooses on the basis of informed reasons he has 
for acting as he does.... The self, person, or agent to whom the choices 
belong may be viewed as an organized system of dispositions in which 
such informed reasons are coherently interrelated with other desires and 
choices. Insofar as a person's behavior derives from this system, it is the 
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person who controls his behavior by his unforced choice, so that it is 
voluntary (31). 
Voluntary action, then, is free action, i.e. action that expresses a disposition to 
act on the basis of informed reasons for choosing that action, such that the 
agent's unforced and informed choice of that action is the precipitating (not, 
as Gewirth would have it, necessary and sufficient) cause of the action.  
 By contrast, actions caused by forced choices such those performed under 
threat of bodily harm – from the gunman who demands either my money or 
my life, or the terrorist who demands either state secrets or the torture of my 
family, for example – "are not fully voluntary, hence not actions in the strict 
sense" (32). He admits that some behavior resulting from forced choice may be 
actions, if there is a moral precept prescribing or prohibiting it. For example, a 
moral theory might contain the precept that if the gunman will kill your 
friend unless you hand over your money, then you ought to hand over your 
money. But the fact that the act is done under duress leaves it with an 
"irreducibly involuntary" component. Although one chooses one alternative 
and controls one's behavior so as to carry it out, one's alternatives are set by 
another in such a way that failure to choose the lesser evil threatens the 
greater one. Since this component is not under the agent's control, Gewirth 
argues, it cannot be morally prescribed or prohibited. Because such behavior 
is to some extent compulsory and a response to threat, 
[t]his component, ... is not subject to [the agent's] control and hence is not 
itself an object of moral or other practical precepts. For this reason, voluntary or 
free action in the full or strict sense excludes forced choice, so that such choice 
is not included among the generic features of action that provide the 
justificatory basis of the supreme principle of morality (33; italics added). 
The italicized passages make three points. First, if a behavior is not an object 
of moral "or other practical precepts," it is not, strictly speaking, an action “in 
the full or strict sense” on Gewirth's view. But how can this be? Can no 
behavior quality as a bona fide action unless someone does or could 
meaningfully prescribe it? What about whistling as I play in addition to as I 
work? Or doing the silly thing immediately after doing the right thing? 
Would Gewirth want to argue that whistling as I play or doing the silly thing 
are not bona fide actions because no one does or could meaningfully prescribe 
them? So that being silly never counts as a bona fide action? This will not do.  
The italicized passages make two more points: second, if a behavior is not 
fully voluntary, it also is not an action; and third, it therefore is not among the 
generic features of action that justify the PGC. We will take these latter two 
claims in turn. Recall that Gewirth aimed to give a conclusive justification of 
the PGC, and that this required that it be beyond challenge by competing 
moral views. If Gewirth were successfully to derive the PGC from a broad 
conception of action shared at least by all such views (if not by all agents), it is 
not impossible that competing moral views would find this justification 
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difficult to challenge. But by defining action in such a way that forced choice 
actions are excluded, Gewirth immediately opens himself to such challenges 
from any moral view with a broader and weaker concept of action. Aristotle, 
for example, does not require that voluntary actions be free in Gewirth's 
sense. On the basis of a distinction between choosing an action and desiring it, 
Aristotle suggests that although such actions are performed under duress, 
they still may be voluntary because it is always within the agent's power to 
choose the less desirable alternative.8 So Aristotle could challenge Gewirth's 
premises on the grounds that the latter defines voluntary action too narrowly.  
 Similarly, although moral precepts in Kant's moral philosophy enjoin us 
to perform certain actions as though we had voluntary control over our 
behavior, we are not excused from moral responsibility for behavior that 
indicates weakness of will, such as my bankrupting myself in the service of 
my empirical inclination to play slot machines. Actions whose maxims violate 
the categorical imperative are not for that reason excluded from the realm of 
action altogether. So Kant could challenge Gewirth's premises on the grounds 
that the latter defines action itself too narrowly. Gewirth's justification of the 
PGC cannot be conclusive if its underlying conception of action is so quickly 
susceptible to challenge by competing moral views that enjoy such broad 
support. 
 Certainly there is no unanimous agreement among action theorists about 
what an action is. But there are at least some generally acknowledged 
minimal conditions all actions must satisfy. The weakest of these is that an 
action must be intentional, i.e. goal-directed. This excludes such behavior as 
the kicking reflex, but might include such controversial cases as the blinking 
and coughing reflexes. It also might include other behavior that is goal-
directed but not necessarily conscious. For this reason it seems too weak, and 
is at best a necessary but insufficient condition of action.   
 A stronger condition would be that an action must be not only goal-
directed but also conscious. This seems insufficient because it fails to exclude 
the above cases of reflex behavior in which we are both conscious and 
behaving goal-directedly but are not conscious of the goal at which our 
behavior is directed. For this, formulating the condition as one of consciously 
goal-directed behavior, such that one is conscious of the goal, is only 
minimally better, since it does not decide borderline cases such as 
absentmindedly scratching an itch (you're conscious of wanting to relieve the 
itch, but only minimally aware, or unaware, of scratching it) or lighting up 
after having foresworn smoking (you're conscious – always – of wanting a 
cigarette, but light up out of reflex or habit, without attending to what you are 
doing at all).  
                                                
8Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. E. Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985) Book III, 
1110a16-17. 
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 An even stronger and more controversial condition would be that an 
action must be at least partially caused by an intention, such that the goal is 
consciously held by the agent and the behavior is consciously aimed at that 
goal. But this can exclude such habitual but largely unconscious behavior as 
brushing one's teeth upon awakening, answering the telephone, or 
downshifting when making a turn. Attempts to redress this exclusion may 
add a dispositional condition requiring that the agent could and would 
identify consciously the relevant goals if asked, other things equal. But the 
dispositional condition obscures the location of the intention relative to the 
action: Is it a cause of the actual action that was performed, or merely a 
disposition that would be actualized counterfactually, i.e. only through 
questioning? I may sincerely explain that I meant to brush my teeth when you 
ask me why I stumbled to the bathroom upon awakening, without sincerely 
meaning anything when I actually do it. 
 The condition that an action must be not only intentional and the result of 
an intention, but must, in addition, be deliberate, i.e. such that the agent 
consciously performs a particular action in part because she perceives that 
action as the best available means to realize her goal, is much stronger than 
any of these. In fact it is much too strong, since it rules out waving rather than 
saying goodbye, ordering the trout rather than the swordfish for dinner, and 
so on. Gewirth's requirement that an action must be voluntary, and, even more 
strongly, controlled by unforced choice, is stronger yet, and so even more 
controversial. By now we are describing a conception of action so restricted in 
its application that only a few moral precepts may imply it. 
 So why does Gewirth insist on it, particularly since it restricts so 
narrowly the scope of actions from which the PGC can be derived and so the 
range of agents to whom the PGC is claimed to apply? Why – and this brings 
us to the third claim – can he not include forced choice under the rubric of 
action "in the strict sense" and argue instead that choice simpliciter, rather than 
unforced choice, is the defining mark of voluntariness? Even this would be an 
exceedingly strong condition to impose on what is supposed to be a general 
conception of action. But at least it would have intuitive plausibility, and it 
would buttress rather than undermine Gewirth's claims of universality and 
conclusiveness. In order to understand why Gewirth insists on unforced 
choice as a generic feature of action, we must turn to his analysis of its other 
generic feature. 
 
3.4. Purposiveness 
 Purposiveness for Gewirth encompasses some of the criteria discussed 
above as characterizing a commonsense conception of action. By goal-
directedness, Gewirth essentially means something between what I described 
above as the action's being the result of an intention and its being deliberate, i.e. 
that the agent consciously envisages some state of affairs to be achieved by the 
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action. The state of affairs envisaged may be the physical behavior itself, such 
as taking a walk; or it may be some causal consequence of the behavior, such 
as improving one's health. The purpose of the action is then the goal for the 
sake of which the agent acts. We saw in Chapter V.5 that since the description 
of the action is borrowed from the description of its purpose, it is this that 
may violate or conform to moral precepts. 
 Gewirth then goes on to characterize the goal or purpose of an action in 
the following terms: 
In this whole range, the agent's aims or intentions are wants or desires, so 
that in every action an agent acts more or less reflectively in accordance 
with his wants. These wants, however, need not be hedonic or 
inclinational; they may consist simply in the intentions with which 
actions are performed (38). 
Here Gewirth identifies intentions with a certain kind of desire. He 
distinguishes between the intentional and the inclinational sense of desire 
(39). Whereas the second requires some hedonic element such as liking or 
taking pleasure in the object of desire, the first need not, and indeed may be 
pursued very reluctantly (38, 40). In the first sense, to want to do A just is to 
intend to do it (39). Nevertheless, to want in this intentional, nonhedonic 
sense to do A, "by the very fact that [an agent] aims to do the action" (40), 
Gewirth says, he has a pro-attitude toward it. 
 In equating intention with a certain kind of desire, Gewirth signals his 
metaethical allegiance to that Humean tradition that attempts to provide a 
reductive analysis of intention in terms of beliefs and desires.9 Although 
Gewirth's distinction between the intentional and the inclinational sense of 
desire is reminiscent of Nagel's between motivated and unmotivated desires, 
for the most part they bisect each other. A desire to perform an unpleasant 
duty can be both intentional and motivated in the event that it is caused by 
deliberation. A desire to speak the truth at great personal cost can be both 
intentional and unmotivated in the event that it simply assails one. A desire to 
join the public library can be both inclinational and motivated in the event 
that it is caused by reflection on the wealth of satisfying books there to be 
borrowed. A desire for a slice of pie can be both inclinational and 
                                                
9See, for example, Donald Davidson, "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?" in Essays 
on Action and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 21-42. Davidson equates desire 
with the "inclination to act" (27) and intention with "value or desire" (31). Similarly, in 
"Intention and Akrasia," in Bruce Vermazen and Merrill B. Hintikka, Eds. Essays on 
Davidson: Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) 51-74, Christopher 
Peacocke asserts in passing that "of course intentional action is always action on the 
strongest desire (in the motivational sense of strength) ..." (53). In both of these writers, 
and others in the Humean tradition, intention is taken to include beliefs and judgments 
about one's ability and/or likelihood of performing the action one intends. But these are 
taken to support the reductive analysis rather than furnish an alternative to it.  
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unmotivated in the event that one's anticipated pleasure in eating the pie 
simply assails one. Thus whereas Nagel's distinction addressed how desires 
are caused, Gewirth's addresses their content.  
 However, Nagel's concept of a motivated desire intersects with Gewirth's 
concept of an intentional desire in their scope of application, and this is where 
the lingering Humean sympathies of both surface. We saw that for Nagel, the 
explanation of a motivated desire to perform an action is identical to the 
explanation of the action itself, and that motivated desires seem to be logically 
but not materially necessary preconditions of action. For this reason, 
motivated desires could be both postulated to "explain" any action, and 
therefore eliminated as an explanatory variable. That is, that S had a 
motivated desire to perform act A was trivially true for any A, and hence 
contributed nothing to our understanding of A. – This was Nagel's strategy 
for honoring yet modifying the Humean, belief-desire model of motivation:  
to effectively eliminate it by acknowledging its ubiquity. 
 Gewirth has a more substantive plan for ubiquitous Humean desires. By 
identifying noninclinational wants with intentions, he goes further than most 
writers in the Humean tradition. Whereas they mean to explain intentions in 
terms of beliefs and desires, Gewirth, by contrast, explains intentions in terms 
of a certain kind of desire alone. By so doing, he effectively conflates the two 
rather different traditions in action theory discussed in Chapter V.6. As we 
saw there, the Kantian tradition defines actions as behavior motivated and 
guided by intentions.10 An intention, in this tradition, must be conscious but 
need not be deliberate. The object of an intention is the goal or purpose of the 
action. But we have seen in Chapter VI.2 that one may seek this goal 
independently of any positive responses or favorable attitudes one may have 
toward it. So, for example, I may intend, and carry out my intention, to 
socialize with powerful colleagues toward whom I feel nothing but revulsion, 
and come to hate myself for my careerism as a result. Or I may intend, and 
carry out my intention, to fulfill an unpleasant moral obligation, even though 
it will net me no satisfaction whatsoever. On Gewirth's account, this is 
psychologically impossible, since "by the very fact that [the agent] aims to do 
the action he has a pro-attitude toward doing it and hence a positive or 
favorable interest in doing it" (40). 
 In the Kantian tradition, the intention that explains the action functions, 
first, as a precipitating cause of the action, i.e. as an occurrent mental event of 
setting oneself to aim at a goal;11 and second, as a logically necessary 
condition of the action: I cannot do A without having intended to do A. As we 
                                                
10Michael Bratman's "Two Faces of Intention," Philosophical Review XLIII (1984) and 
"Davidson's Theory of Intention," ibid. Vermazen and Hintikka, 13-26 provide careful 
defenses of a contemporary Kantian view.  
11Peacocke (ibid. Vermazen and Hinktikka) denies that intention implies belief (69-70), 
but suggests that it does imply trying (68). Both of these theses seem to me mistaken. 
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have seen in Chapter V.6, the action itself depends on its antecedent intention 
for its very identity, and to perform a different action is by definition to have 
revised one's intention. Thus Kantians tend to identify intention with the will, 
and the close causal and conceptual connection between intention and action 
underwrites the claim that actions are essential expressions of will. But 
Kantians admit two different sources of motivation within a bipartite self, 
namely reason and inclination, and so two sources by which the will, and the 
formulation of intention, can be influenced.  
 This raises the possibility of a structural conflict between the different 
motivational components of the bipartite self: Reason may conflict with 
inclination. Thus the Kantian tradition explains the problem of weakness of 
will qua weakness of intention, i.e. of an intention the rationality of which is 
in question, and which is therefore susceptible to attack, dissolution or 
revision by contrary inclinations such as personal gratification or moral 
temptation. The Kantian tradition holds an agent responsible for akratic 
behavior because it assumes that the agent who performs it has revised her 
intention – and so the object of her will, and so her action – accordingly.  
 By contrast, the Humean tradition in action theory defines actions as 
motivated by desire and guided by beliefs about how to satisfy it. Alvin 
Goldman’s theory of action was examined at length as a prominent example 
of this tradition in Chapter II.1.2. Achieving the object of the desire is the goal 
or purpose of the action. To seek this goal is by definition to have a favorable, 
"pro-attitude" toward it; and actually to achieve it is by definition to have 
desired to do so. So whereas one need not have a pro-attitude toward the 
object of an intention, one must have a pro-attitude toward the object of a 
desire, by definition of what a desire is. In this, the representational analysis 
of desire offered in Chapter II.2.1 fully accords with the Humean tradition. 
 A desire, in this tradition, must precipitate the action, but need not be an 
occurrent mental event. We have seen that, according to the Freudian variant 
on this tradition, neither the desire nor its concomitant beliefs must be 
conscious, much less deliberate; and that in the behaviorist variant favored by 
economists as well as some experimental psychologists, that an action 
achieves some goal is sufficient evidence for ascribing to the agent a desire for 
that goal, irrespective of the agent's reported mental state. So in this tradition, 
the explanatory connection between action and cause is retrospective rather 
than prospective. I may desire to do A, but my doing B instead implies that 
my desire to do B was stronger. If I did B in fact, the reasoning goes, I must 
have most desired to do B. Gewirth endorses this reasoning (40).  
 Thus the problem of weakness of will becomes a paradox on the 
traditional, monopartite Humean conception. First, since desires, not the will, 
motivate action, the action I actually take resolves any conflict among 
competing desires that may have preceded it. Second, even if I act in violation 
of some desire I flag as particularly central or meaningful, this only shows, 
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retrospectively, that I must have desired something different after all. Any 
internal, structural conflict I may experience over an action I have performed 
is a conflict, not between warring motivational components of the self; but 
rather between what I believe I desire and what I desire in fact. On the 
Humean analysis, beliefs are not motivational components at all, and 
irrespective of them, I always do what I most desire in fact. Since the desire to 
do what I did in fact is a ubiquitous feature of action, so is my pro-attitude 
toward it. How weakness of will can ever occur is then a mystery indeed. 
Stephen Schiffer12 analyzes weakness of will as the case in which an 
agent's first-order desire to φ is stronger than her first-order desire not to φ, 
her second-order desire not to act on her first-order desire to φ is stronger 
than her second-order desire to act on her first-order desire to φ, yet she φs 
anyway. Her first-order desire to φ is therefore stronger than her second-order 
desire not to act on her first-order desire to φ. That she φs in spite of her 
second-order desire not to act on her first-order desire to φ is what qualifies 
her action as weakness of will. I have already addressed some of the 
difficulties of this type of view in discussing Frankfurt in Chapter VIII.2. It can 
be added here that this is recognizable as a case of weakness of will only if the 
agent's first-order desire is irrational and her second-order desire rational; but 
neither Frankfurt nor Schiffer offer any assurance that it must be. For 
example, suppose φ is "to obtain adequate rest."  Then in what sense am I 
suffering from weakness of will if I favor this desire over my second-order, 
reflective desire not to? Even Davidson's compelling example, in which I 
compulsively get up to brush my teeth even though this will make no 
difference to my dental health but will disturb my sleep, 13 preserves the 
rationality of the reflective desire I flout. Davidson may be right that the 
reflective desire or judgment I violate need not be moral. But it nevertheless 
must be rational in order to enter into an occurrence of weakness of will. 
Neither Frankfurt's nor Schiffer's analyses meet this requirement. 
 These two conceptions of action thus radically diverge. Whereas the 
Kantian tradition defines the consequent action with reference to its 
antecedent intention, the Humean tradition defines the antecedent desire with 
reference to its consequent action. So whereas the Kantian tradition implicitly 
assumes that actions depend for their identification on the independent and 
antecedent intentions that precipitate them, the Humean tradition implicitly 
assumes that desires depend for their identification on the independent and 
consequent actions they precipitate.  
 Marrying the two traditions as Gewirth tries to do engenders a very odd 
hybrid. Gewirth means only to equate intentions with a certain species of 
                                                
12 Stephen Schiffer, "A Paradox of Desire," American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976), 
195-203. 
13See Davidson, op. cit. Note 9.  
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desire. But if actions are identified by intentions and desires identified by the 
actions taken to satisfy them, and if all actions are caused by desires, then all 
desires that we act to satisfy, not only the noninclinational ones, are identified 
ultimately by the intentions behind the actions they cause. But if desires were 
identified by the intentions behind the actions they caused, it would mean 
that identifying what I desire depended not, after all, on what I 
retrospectively did, but rather on what I prospectively intended to bring 
about: I could be said to desire O only if I intended to bring O about, and not 
merely if I in fact brought O about. This concept of desire would conflict not 
only with the theory of revealed preference out of which the Humean model 
of motivation has gotten so much mileage; but, even worse, with the 
underlying Freudian variant on which the theory of revealed preference – and 
so much else in social science explanation – depends. Thus I could have no 
desires unrecruited into my agenda for future action; no behaviorally 
manifested desires in which my own behavior first instructed me; no frivolous 
or innocuous or irrelevant desires; no subliminal or fantasy desires whose 
existence surprised me after the fact of their satisfaction. Their hedonic buzz 
would be a mere side-effect of realizing my prior intention to satisfy them.  
 This would be to regard each of my desires with a degree of seriousness 
not all of them deserve; and – more importantly, to abdicate the central tenet 
of the Humean belief-desire model that insures its universality. Gewirth 
might reject the Humean conception of desire on which they are based, 
according to which desires are identified by the actions they purportedly 
cause. But without this conception of desire, it is not open to him to declare 
that every intention – and so every action – implies a pro-attitude toward its 
purpose. The cost of circumscribing Humean desires by Kantian intentions is 
the ubiquity of those desires.Desires cannot depend for their identity on 
intentions because I can identify many of my desires independently of any 
intention to satisfy them, and can satisfy many of my desires without having 
intended to.  
 Consider how Gewirth's equation of certain wants with intentions then 
functions. The inference that we always have a pro-attitude toward the 
purposes of our actions is invoked to support Gewirth's later argument that 
we necessarily value our purposes as goods: 
It is important to have seen the connection presented above between 
purposiveness and wants or desires. For from this connection stems the 
fact that the agent necessarily regards his purposes as good, and hence 
makes an implicit value judgment about them; and from this, in turn, 
there necessarily follow other judgments, both evaluative and deontic, 
that finally entail the supreme principle of morality as a principle that 
every agent is logically committed to accept (41). 
Now suppose we accept Gewirth's analysis of action. What follows from it? 
One of its implications is that if we have a pro-attitude towards all of our 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception    389 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
purposes, whatever they are, then we must have a pro-attitude towards the 
purposes of coerced choice behavior such as handing over our money to the 
gunman, committing treason in order to prevent the torture of our family, and 
so forth.  
 Now we are in a better position to see why Gewirth was so concerned to 
deny that coerced choice behavior is "action in the strict sense." If coerced 
choice behavior is not really an action but instead merely a species of 
intentional behavior, then Gewirth's analysis of action will require only that 
we have a pro-attitude towards unforced choices. This requirement remains 
controversial, since surely we can voluntarily perform actions we find 
distasteful in every respect; but not as much so as the thesis that we have a 
pro-attitude toward actions we have been coerced into performing. Gewirth's 
denial that coerced choice behavior is bona fide action functions to circumvent 
this implication. 
 Unfortunately, eliminating coerced choice behavior from the purview of 
action does not eliminate it from the purview of pro-attitudes. Even if coerced 
choices are not actions, Gewirth's analysis of action still implies that we have a 
pro-attitude toward them, because on his view we necessarily have a pro-
attitude toward all of our purposes, whether coerced or not. Gewirth could 
avoid this implication only by denying that coerced choice behavior is goal-
directed, which is implausible.  
So we are left with two alternatives. Either an agent's pro-attitude toward 
an action does not necessarily imply that she values it – since she has such an 
attitude toward coerced choices as well; or else it implies that she values 
coerced choices just as much as "action[s] in the strict sense." Gewirth's 
attempt to ground his Deductivist project in a Humean model of motivation 
has the unhappy consequence that obeying the PGC is of no more – or less – 
value to an agent than handing over her money to the thief who has a gun at 
her back. 
 
3.5. Dialectical Necessity 
 Finally we turn to Gewirth's third thesis about the two generic features of 
action, namely their capacity to generate normative judgments. Here Gewirth 
introduces what he calls the dialectically necessary method. The basic reasoning 
behind the dialectically necessary method is that since thought is expressed in 
language and actions presuppose (at least to some extent) thought, tacit 
linguistic judgments can be ascribed to agents who act: 
[T]o the extent to which such practical thinking is attributable, and to 
some extent necessarily attributable, to the agent who performs actions as 
analyzed above,14 to the same extent linguistic expressions or judgments 
are also attributable to him. This does not mean that he necessarily 
                                                
14Note the qualification on action here. 
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speaks aloud or mutters to himself vocally, but rather that in acting and 
thinking as he does the agent uses or makes judgments that can be 
expressed in words (42). 
Gewirth's reasoning, then, is that in acting, the agent necessarily thinks; and 
in thinking, the agent necessarily makes implicit judgments we can ascribe to 
him.  
 This reasoning needs to be examined very closely. First, it is not obvious 
that I necessarily think on any level about what I am doing. Sometimes I do, 
sometimes I do not. I can act unselfconsciously just in case I act intentionally 
and achieve a goal I would confirm if someone were to ask me, but of which 
at the time I have no conscious conception. Driving a car or dancing or 
playing a musical instrument, among many other examples, can have this 
unselfconscious quality, and they, too, might be objects of moral precepts 
under given circumstances. Second, do I necessarily make judgments about 
what I am thinking about? Only if I think only and always in categorical 
declaratives, which most human agents do not. An agent can think about S, 
have S on her mind, without ascribing any predicate P to it; I defend this 
claim at length in Volume II, Chapter II.2, and rely here on its intuitive 
plausibility. Therefore an agent can think about S without making a judgment 
about it. So even if it were true, which it is not, that I always thought about 
my actions, it would not be necessarily true that any particular judgments 
would be ascribable to me in virtue of them.  
 Now Gewirth answers this objection by stipulating that the linguistic 
expressions ascribed to agents refer to dispositions to describe retrospectively 
what they did, if asked. But I may have no coherent answer, if asked, if my 
thoughts were not propositional in form; or if, since I really did not think 
about my actions at all, I have no retrospective speculations to offer. When 
asked, for example, what I meant to accomplish by placing the mushrooms on 
the exercise wheel and the hamsters in the salad bowl, I shrug my shoulders 
helplessly and respond forthrightly that I simply was not thinking about what 
I was doing. Thoughtless actions are still actions; and again they may count as 
such even under the restrictions Gewirth imposes. Moreover, retrospective 
interpretations of my own action may suffer the same handicaps as third-
personal interpretations of that action. Having failed to retain in memory the 
details of my past, I may be unable to reconstruct accurately what my 
motives, goals and thoughts were at the moment of action. Certainly I can 
offer more or less plausible interpretations of what I must have had in mind. 
But these may have no more or less prima facie plausibility than their third-
personal counterparts. 
 Gewirth's dispositional provision assumes that an agent can always 
produce a plausible verbal story of his actions on demand. He describes this 
as "practical thinking." The dialetically necessary method consists in 
rendering such thinking in equivalent, explicit linguistic expressions and 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception    391 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
drawing out their logical implications. It is necessary because it examines 
statements the agent implicitly makes from within his standpoint that are 
"necessarily attributable to every agent because they derive from the generic 
features that constitute the necessary structure of action" (43-4). 
For example, the method does not proceed by saying merely that some 
person happens to say or think that X is good; rather, the method 
proceeds by saying that every agent necessarily says or thinks that X is 
good. The basis of this necessity is found in one or another aspect of the 
generic features of action and hence in the rational analysis of the concept 
of action. Thus, although the dialectically necessary method proceeds 
from within the standpoint of the agent, it also undertakes to ascertain 
what is necessarily involved in this standpoint. The statements the 
method attributes to the agent are set forth as necessary ones in that they 
reflect what is conceptually necessary to being an agent who voluntarily 
or freely acts for purposes he wants to attain (44). 
 But first, if the basis for claiming that every agent necessarily thinks X is 
good is the two generic features – voluntariness and purposiveness – of action 
in Gewirth's "strict sense," then these two generic features undermine rather 
than ground the claim. They circumscribe the range of action to those which 
have these two generic features, and so to those agents who perform this 
restricted class of actions. The population of agents excluded from this 
putatively universal claim would seem to be quite large, consisting, as it does, 
in all of those agents who almost always act under duress of one form or 
another: agents who, for example, are coerced by poverty into giving up their 
children for adoption, or into working at dangerous and ill-compensated jobs, 
or are coerced by threats of violence or death into remaining in abusive 
environments, or by fear of job loss or financial ruin into accepting brutality or 
sadism from colleagues. So even if it were true that every agent did in fact 
tacitly or dispositionally think about "what is conceptually necessary to being 
an agent who voluntarily or freely acts for purposes he wants to attain," it 
could not be true that, for any designated X, every agent necessarily thinks that 
X is good. Only those lucky enough to control their behavior through 
unforced choice would; and this would be a matter of contingency rather than 
necessity.  
 Second, is it true that every agent does tacitly think about "what is 
conceptually necessary to being an agent who voluntarily or freely acts for 
purposes he wants to attain"? In the above passage, Gewirth goes 
considerably beyond his account of practical thinking. The necessary 
statements he claims are attributable to the agent encompass not only 
expressions of the thoughts the agent is presumed actually to have in order to 
have performed the action she performed. They also encompass necessary 
conditions of free agency. However, no free agent need ever actually have 
thought about these conditions in order to fulfill them, nor need any such 
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agent demonstrate a disposition to make judgments about them when asked. 
Indeed, some such agents may exhibit a veritable aversion to thinking too 
much about what freedom entails, on the grounds that this tends to 
undermine their belief in it. Even if the two generic features of action were 
conceptually necessary to my agency, this would not imply that I necessarily 
thought about them; nor, therefore, that judgments about them were "within 
the standpoint of the agent," nor part of "what is necessarily involved in this 
standpoint." 
 The problem here is a conflation of what action from the third-personal, 
ascriptional standpoint implies with what action as envisaged – by moral or 
some other practical theory or interpretation, or by some agent who acts – 
implies; i.e. between behavior and action. From the third-personal, 
ascriptional standpoint, action is simply behavior. It is a physical event. 
Independently of its envisaging by its agent or by a third party whose 
interpretation of it presupposes the ascription of judgment which is in question, an 
action is an occurrence in the natural world just like other physical events 
such as earthquakes, rainy weather, or the growth of underbrush. Such 
physical events are not the kind of entity that can imply anything: What does 
an earthquake imply? What does a landslide imply?  What does a potted plant 
imply? Similarly, the act of taking a walk, independently of its envisaged 
intention, consists in nothing more than an agent's behavior of repeatedly 
throwing his weight onto each foot alternately while pitching forward. 
Repeatedly throwing one's weight onto each foot alternately while pitching 
forward is not the kind of metaphysical entity that can imply anything.   
 Implication is an intensional, conceptual relation that can hold between 
propositions, statements, concepts, or terms. So a third-personal, ascriptional 
interpretation of behavior, or a judgment about behavior that ascribes an 
intention to the agent and thereby identifies it as an action, may have certain 
implications. The first-personal intention that identifies behavior as action for 
its agent may also have certain implications. So, for example, it follows from 
your intention to take a walk that you intend repeatedly to throw your weight 
onto each foot alternately while pitching forward. And in interpreting the 
behavior as action, a third-personal observer might infer something from it 
considered as evidence for or against some intention, proposition or theory. But 
an evidential relation is, too, an intensional conceptual relation between a 
theory and a physical state of affairs intensionally regarded as datum relative 
to it.  
 Thus an agent's physical behavior has implications only under some 
intensional interpretation, vision, intention, judgment, or description, and not 
otherwise. Under some such intensional interpretation etc., this physical 
behavior counts as action. Under others it may not. Under those in which it 
does, the interpretation in part comprises the judgments one ascribes to the 
agent. Judgments may have implications. But if one does not accept the 
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interpretation etc., one is not committed to the implications. So, for example, 
my behavior of putting myself through law school does not imply anything 
about "what is conceptually necessary to being an agent who voluntarily or 
freely acts for purposes he wants to attain," unless I explicitly conceive my 
behavior in those terms, or would if questioned about it, or a third person 
correctly interprets it in those terms. In the latter case, that person's 
interpretation of my behavior would determine the judgments ascribed to me, 
and so their implications. But the particular judgments that person ascribes to 
me also might be incorrect. There is nothing in my mere behavior that 
necessitates them.  
 However, Gewirth's argument depends on their necessity. He reasons 
that all agents "implicitly judge" their purposes to be good, and therefore that 
they have rights to freedom and well-being; that all agents who have 
purposes must claim these rights (i.e. must judge similarly); therefore every 
agent is logically committed to the generalization that all agents who have 
purposes have rights to freedom and well being (48). I show in Chapter X that 
this line of argument is, in outline, the reverse of that which Rawls defends. 
Whereas Rawls begins in the original position with free and equal agents who 
are claimed therefore to value their goals and therefore to possess self-respect, 
Gewirth begins with the definition of goals as valued by their agents; and on 
the basis of this premise argues for such agents' right to freedom. So an agent 
is logically committed to the PGC only if she "implicitly judges" her purposes 
to be good. But we have already seen in Chapters VI and VIII.3.2.2.2 that it is 
not a matter of necessity that an agent judge her purposes in this way; and in 
Section 3, above, that even if she did this would not, on Gewirth's view, 
suffice to qualify them as actions.  
 Were Gewirth's dialectically necessary method without these troubling 
complications, it would enable him to ascribe to the agent certain judgments 
about actions that the externalist – and Nagel – seemed to deny were 
motivationally effective. These judgments as particular mental events would 
be, on Gewirth's thesis, necessary logical implications of acting that were 
internal to the agent's personal point of view. As mental events, these 
judgments would be internal, subjective, and personal. As logically necessary 
implications of action, they would be external, objective, and impersonal. 
They thereby would furnish a psychologically integrated alternative to the 
practical solipsism that threatened Nagel's account. The internality of such 
judgments would tackle the problem of moral motivation, while their 
objectivity would tackle that of moral justification, and so that of rational final 
ends. Thus the potential importance of Gewirth's dialectically necessary 
method to satisfying his criterion of conclusiveness is clear. So are the 
problems that stand in its way. 
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3.6. Generic Goods 
 Gewirth believes that certain specific judgments are ascribable to agents 
in virtue of their acting, namely judgments about the goals they set 
themselves to realize: 
purposive action is conative and dynamic in that the agent tries by his 
action to bring about certain results or consummations that he wants ... to 
attain. ... He regards this goal as worth aiming at or pursuing; for if he 
did not so regard it he would not unforcedly choose to move from 
quiescence or nonaction to action with a view to achieving the goal (48-
49). 
Gewirth's argument here is that the very fact that an agent is motivated to 
pursue a goal demonstrates that he regards it as worthwhile, as valuable. But 
we have already seen in Chapter VIII. 3.2.2.2 that this demonstrates no such 
evaluation. An agent may have contempt or distaste for his goals, and for 
himself for pursuing them; or an agent may regard a goal neutrally, and find 
it of interest that he has and pursues this goal without finding the goal itself of 
interest in the least. Gewirth assumes that motivation implies positive 
evaluation because he accepts the Humean dictum that only objects of desire 
can motivate action. I argue in Volume II, Chapters II and V that this is not 
true. But even if the Humean model of motivation were the right one, it 
would not imply an equation of desiring something with evaluating it 
positively, because desiring is a psychophysical event whereas evaluating and 
judging is an intellectual one. Gewirth continues:  
This conception of worth constitutes a valuing on the part of the agent; he 
regards the object of his action as having at least sufficient value to merit 
his action to attain it .... The primary ... basis of judging something to be 
good is precisely its connection with one's pro-attitude or positive 
interest or desire whereby one regards the object as worthy of pursuit. 
And since it is admittedly some desire, at least in the intentional sense of 
wanting, that provides one's purpose in action, it follows that an agent 
acts for a purpose that constitutes his reason for acting and that seems to 
him to be good on some criterion he implicitly accepts insofar as he has 
that purpose (49-50). 
But desire, even in Gewirth's "intentional sense," is not the only source of 
purposes of action. Resolutions, choices, inferences, and external states of 
affairs such as events or other people are, in addition to intentions, further 
sources of goals an agent may adopt, none of which necessarily have even the 
most tenuous relation to desire. 
 Since, as we have seen, an agent need not value her purpose, she need not 
regard it as good. Nor need such a purpose constitute her reason for acting 
(although of course it might still constitute the explanatory reason why she 
acts). Nor, therefore, does such an agent therefore value the generic conditions 
of action necessary for achieving such purposes, namely freedom and well-
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being (52, 53). On Gewirth's view, well-being includes the follow generic goods: 
basic goods, i.e. all necessary preconditions of acting; nonsubtractive goods, i.e. 
those whose use does not diminish an agent's level of purpose-fulfillment; 
and additive goods, i.e. those whose use increases an agent's level of purpose-
fulfillment. But since, on Gewirth's view, we always have a pro-attitude 
towards whatever we do, it is hard to see how any action we might take could 
lower our level of purpose-fulfillment. And so it becomes a trivial truth, on 
Gewirth's view, that every action maintains or increases wellbeing (55), but 
not a truth at all that any agent necessarily values this. Since an agent need 
not value freedom and wellbeing, nothing follows from the concept of action 
about our mutual obligation to protect the freedom and wellbeing of agents. 
The PGC in particular does not follow from it. Thus does Gewirth's allegiance 
to the Humean conception lead his potentially powerful derivation to unravel. 
 
4. Instrumentalism 
 Instrumentalism is a special case of Deductivism. We saw in Section 2 
that Deductivism tries to derive normative moral principles from 
foundational premises via a conceptual analysis of those premises. 
Instrumentalism similarly tries to derive normative moral principles from 
foundational premises. In this case, the premises specifically concern what 
human beings are, what moves them, and at what they aim. The method of 
derivation is, again, conceptual analysis of those premises, i.e. of the 
properties thus ascribed to human beings. These combine to form a 
conception of the self that is the background theory from which empirical 
predictions are then derived about how, given those properties, human beings 
will behave and what they will choose in order to achieve their goals. Thus 
the procedure includes empirical conjecture and inductive as well as 
deductive inference. The outcome is an argument that justifies a set of 
normative moral principles as those which an agent would choose as 
optimally instrumental to his final ends. 
 The Humean conception of the self lends itself to an Instrumentalist 
strategy, because its conception of rationality is Instrumentalist in nature: The 
self is conceived as rationally coherent to the extent that theoretical reason 
calculates and schedules the satisfaction of as many of its desires as possible, 
with the minimum necessary costs. So we make sense of an agent's behavior 
by ascribing to her the desire to achieve the ends that she does in fact achieve, 
and the theoretically rational belief that, given the information and resources 
available to her, behaving as she did was the most efficient way to do so. The 
moral principles she is claimed to choose under certain given circumstances to 
govern her social relations are then argued to be the most efficient means to 
the achievement of her final ends, whatever these may be. 
 Instrumentalism is a strategy of moral justification because of the relation 
it bears to the Humean conception of the self. If you believe this conception to 
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be true of yourself and other human agents, then if you want to motivate 
other agents so conceived to accept your favored normative theory – or, for 
that matter, any suggestion of yours, you must demonstrate to them that what 
your theory enjoins them to do is in fact the most efficient thing for them to 
do, in order to achieve the desired ends they already have. And 
Instrumentalism is a strategy of moral justification because it attempts to 
persuade other agents that your suggested theory is objectively the right 
theory. In this way Instrumentalism is not merely a bit of practical reasoning 
that directs someone to perform certain actions in order to maximize the 
achievement of his given ends. It is more than that, because it attempts to 
demonstrate that reason directs all of us to perform those very same actions in 
order to achieve any of our given ends. This means not only that each of us 
has our own reasons to perform the very same actions that are in fact 
prescribed for others. The persuasive appeal of the theory in question is 
heightened to the extent that the Instrumentalist strategy can show its 
prescriptions to be instrumentally rational, not just to your final ends, but to 
anyone's. This fact about these prescriptions, if it is a fact, is supposed to 
provide you with a reason to conform to them that is independent of their 
instrumentality in promoting your particular ends.15 
 To the extent that Instrumentalism is successful in providing an objective 
justification of a normative moral theory – and we will see that it cannot be 
completely successful – it cannot provide a moral justification. But when we 
try to modify it so as to produce a specifically moral justification, we 
undermine its objectivity. In this case, we are forced to conclude that either an 
objective, Instrumentalist moral justification of a normative theory is 
foreclosed, or else the Humean notion of instrumental rationality is doing no 
justificatory work. 
 
4.1. Instrumentalism and Objectivity 
 The motivation behind Instrumentalism as characterized above is not 
difficult to understand. The Cambridge Platonists failed to justify moral 
statements as referring to objective facts directly deducible from theoretical 
reason,16 and the Moral Sense Theorists and Emotivists tried to demonstrate 
the implausibility of belief in any such facts.17 Nevertheless, many of us 
                                                
15Richard Brandt is particularly explicit about his use of this strategy in his Theory of the 
Good and the Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); see particularly Chapter 
VIII. Brandt's view is discussed in Chapter XI, below. 
16See, for example, the selections by Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, and Wollaston in D. D. 
Raphael, Ed. The British Moralists 1650-1800, Volume I (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1969). 
17For the former, see Francis Hutcheson, "An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil," 
in D. D. Raphael, ibid. For the latter, see, for example, Charles Stevenson, Ethics and 
Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).  
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continue to believe that our deepest moral convictions have the same sort of 
claim to objective validity as our epistemological convictions (whatever sort 
that may turn out to be), to the extent that they are equally fundamental 
psychologically. It is natural to view what I have called the Socratic enterprise 
of analyzing and rationally evaluating theories as a natural extension of the 
prephilosophical impulse to question, criticize, and modify those convictions 
in light of evidence and argument. From this perspective, a convincing case 
has yet to be made for exempting moral beliefs and theories from these 
practices. While we may agree that moral truths cannot be deduced from 
reason or directly confirmed by the "furniture of the earth," many of us are 
less easily persuaded that, as the Emotivists claim, moral beliefs are not 
genuine beliefs at all. However, our awareness of the history of moral 
philosophy confronts us with the dilemma of what connection between our 
moral beliefs and the requirements of objectivity might be left to us to argue 
for.  
 The Humean conception of the self furnishes a substantive solution to 
this dilemma. Just as its motivational constituent supplies a strategy for 
motivating other agents, so conceived, to accept one's favored theory of what 
they should do, similarly its model of instrumental rationality supplies a 
connection between that theory and the requirements of objectivity. The 
Humean model of instrumental rationality accepts the traditional conception 
of fully informed, theoretically rational belief as objectively justified belief, 
and then assigns such belief an instrumental role in achieving the agent's 
desired outcomes. Action is then rational, hence objectively justified, to the 
extent that theoretical reason identifies it as similarly instrumental in 
producing that outcome. 
 The implicit reasoning can be reconstructed as analogical. One necessary 
requirement for viewing a scientific theory as objectively justified is that, 
oversimply, it accurately predict certain consequences of a set of given events. 
Similarly, the Humean might say, we may view an action as objectively 
justified to the extent that it is implied by a theory that accurately predicts 
consequences of so acting which the agent in fact wants to effect. So, for 
example, if a theory accurately predicts that keeping promises will enhance 
social stability, then I may justify my keeping promises on the grounds that I 
want to enhance social stability, and keeping promises enhances social 
stability. Here it is assumed that to the extent that I act in accordance with the 
theory's prescriptions for producing those desired consequences, my action is 
more likely to achieve those desired consequences in fact. Of course this 
assumption may be wrong, even if the theoretical reasoning that engenders 
the theory is correct and its predictions accurate. No further justification of the 
correct theoretical reasoning that generates the theory is needed, because 
correct theoretical reasoning about the facts itself constitutes the terminating 
criterion of theoretical rationality as asymptotic to objectivity. Hence an action 
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taken on the basis of correct theoretical reasoning about its predicted 
consequences receives the imprimatur of objective validity derivatively, in 
virtue of its instrumental connection with theoretical rationality. 
 Instrumentalism then extends this line of thought to the justification of 
normative moral theories, by attempting to demonstrate the objective validity 
of a moral theory as the most theoretically rational means to a wide range of 
unspecified final ends. Here one's favored theory plays the same role relative 
to the Humean model of instrumental rationality as does an instrumentally 
rational action. Just as an action is objectively justified by its expected 
instrumental success in achieving an agent's final ends, similarly, it is claimed, 
with the correct normative moral theory. A theory lays claim to objective 
validity if the actions or set of social arrangements it prescribes are the most 
instrumentally rational means to an agent's final ends, whatever they may be. 
 This last clause represents a more ambitious extension of the concept of 
objective validity just described. That concept connected theoretical reasoning 
with accurate prediction of objective events. But in the case of a scientific 
theory, we require some further, independent check on the accuracy and 
comprehensiveness of the theoretical reasoning by which the theory was 
constructed, in order to insure that the events it predicts are objective ones. In 
particular, the theory's predictions must be independently confirmable by 
other relevantly placed, disinterested observers under similar experimental 
conditions. Successful independent confirmation then elicits the 
intersubjective acceptance of the theory by such observers. 
 Again the application to moral theories is analogical.18 Under comparable 
conditions, the Instrumentalist might claim, we each may be moved 
intersubjectively to accept a moral theory as theoretically rational and so 
objectively valid. That acting on the theory's prescriptions actually promotes 
the range of ends it is predicted to promote confirms the theory's theoretical 
rationality to each agent considering whether or not to accept it. This is 
objective evidence that the theory is in fact theoretically rational and hence 
objectively valid, and not just that it appears to be to some particular agent 
whose information and reasoning powers are limited. And that acting on the 
theory has predicted consequences that are desirable to other, relevantly 
placed agents who take an interest in the particular predicted consequences I 
happen to desire is evidence that the theory's theoretical rationality and 
objective validity do not depend on the particular ends I happen to have. To 
show that the actions or set of social arrangements a normative moral theory 
                                                
18The analogy between inductive method in science and the requirements of 
intersubjective agreement in ethics has been developed extensively in Rawls's pre-
instrumentalist paper, "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics," Philosophical Review 
LXVI (1957), 177-197. The extent to which he has retained in his later writings a 
commitment to the value of objectivity developed there is explored in Chapter X, below. 
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prescribes instrumentally promote an agent's ends whatever they are implies 
that they promote not just someone's final ends, but anyone's. Thus as in the 
case of action, the possibility of supplying objective evidential support for 
one's favored moral theory is retained, by exploiting its instrumental 
connection with theoretical rationality. 
 Instrumentalism as I have described it characterizes in a very general way 
a large variety of justificatory strategies that differ considerably in their details 
from case to case. For example, I have claimed that Instrumentalism attempts 
to justify a moral theory as the best means to a wide range of unspecified 
ends. But different moral philosophers impose different structural constraints 
on that range, and thus decide differently how wide that range can be. For 
Hobbes, an agent's relevant range of final ends to which the Laws of Nature 
are claimed to be instrumental are circumscribed by the existence of other 
agents who are more or less equally strong, intelligent, and self-interested.19 
For Sidgwick, the final ends to which commonsense moral precepts are 
claimed to be in fact instrumental are those definitive of utility, understood as 
an internal, independent state of pleasurable consciousness that all agents are 
presumed ultimately to desire.20 For Brandt, as we see in Chapter XI, the final 
ends that an Ideal Code-Utilitarian society is argued to promote are those that 
would survive cognitive psychotherapy, understood as a process by which 
one's desires are maximally corrected by vividly represented facts and logic.21 
 Similarly, different moral philosophers impose different motivational 
constraints on the agent assumed to choose the moral theory. For Gauthier, 
the choosing agent must be transparent in the sense that others are able to 
detect any insincerity in her commitment to conform to the precepts of 
morality.22 For Harsanyi, the choosing agent must assign an equal probability 
to occupying any social position under the set of social arrangements that 
results from implementing the chosen theory.23 For Rawls, in a later revision 
of his views in A Theory of Justice, the agent is presumed to be overridingly 
motivated by the desire to realize and exercise her capacity for an effective 
sense of justice;24 and so on. 
                                                
19Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier Books, 1977), 
Chapter 13. 
20Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (New York: Dover, 1966), Book IV, Chapter III. 
21Op. cit. Note 15. 
22David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 
Chapter VI. 
23John C. Harsanyi, "Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior," Social Research 44 
(1977), 623-656. 
24John Rawls, The Dewey Lectures 1980, "Rational and Full Autonomy," The Journal of 
Philosophy LXXVII (1980), Section IV. I mention this version of Rawls's view here in 
order to mark that Rawls's commitment to Instrumentalism has survived his 
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 These moral philosophers have in common that they conceive neither the 
circumstances under which moral principles are chosen, nor the ends relative 
to which they are taken to be instrumentally justified to be absolutely 
unlimited. They each suppose that some constraints must be imposed both on 
motives and on ends in order for the right kind of choice to be made. In what 
follows, we will see that there is good reason for this shared supposition. 
However, we will also see that, at least relative to Instrumentalism as I have 
characterized it generally, no such constraints can succeed in providing an 
objective moral justification for any viable normative theory. If this argument 
is sound, it has significant implications for any normative view that deploys 
the Instrumentalist strategy. I consider two such views in the two chapters 
subsequent to this one. 
 
4.2. Justification 
 The appeal of the Instrumentalist strategy, even in the very general form 
stated above, is clear.  Prereflectively we may suppose that which action is 
instrumentally rational depends entirely on the very specific further, final 
ends a particular agent wants to achieve. This supposition implicitly equates 
rational justification with correct practical reasoning. From this vantage point, 
we may find initially mystifying the suggestion that some actions are 
objectively justified instrumentally regardless of the particular character of 
one's final ends. But on further reflection, we can appreciate the plausibility of 
this suggestion. 
 Take for example, behaving courteously. Sometimes behaving 
courteously has clear disadvantages. Among many others, it frustrates 
opportunities to vent one's irritation or to demonstrate one's lively wit at 
someone else's expense. Nevertheless, it might be claimed that it pays to 
behave courteously to others no matter what. First, one can vent one's 
irritation just as well by kicking a pillow; and demonstrate one's lively wit at 
someone else's expense with whoopee cushions, water-squirting lapel flowers, 
and the like. Besides, just how much of a buzz is it possible to obtain by 
gratifying one's impulse to be rude? Moreover, others will be more positively 
disposed toward one, and so more positively disposed to help one further 
one's ends if one is courteous than if one is abusive, as long as one's ends do 
not seem to threaten theirs. Furthermore, one cannot know in advance who 
will be in a position to help or hinder the achievement of one's ends. Since one 
loses so little by restraining one's impulse to verbal abuse, it pays over the 
long term to behave courteously to everyone, whatever other ends one may 
have. Behaving courteously, then, would seem to be an action that is 
                                                                                                     
abandonment of many of the characteristics stipulated of the Original Position in A 
Theory of Justice. I discuss the implications of this in Chapter X, below. 
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instrumentally rational for a very wide range of ends, and so objectively 
justified to that extent. 
 Note that the intuitive appeal of the above reasoning depends on two 
connected features. First, the ends to which having courteously are 
instrumental are assumed to be motivated by the desire to achieve them. This 
is true by definition, relative to the Humean model of motivation. For on this 
model, the only thing that can motivate action in the service of some end is a 
desire for that end. On the Humean model, if I am motivated to achieve an 
end, i.e. if it is really my end, then I have a desire to achieve it. 
 The second, connected feature of the above justification is the substantive 
weakness of the resulting constraints. The sole motivational constraint is that 
one has a desire to promote one's ends. The sole constraint on those ends is 
that they do not appear to threaten the ends of those to whom one is to 
behave courteously. These constraints leave open to an impressive extent the 
substantive nature of the ends that may be promoted by behaving 
courteously, and so the substantive motivation of any agent who may be 
persuaded to do so. They give everyone whose reasoning is accurately 
described by such a justification a reason to behave courteously. 
 So the above argument counts as a candidate for an objective justification 
of behaving courteously and not just as a bit of correct practical reasoning 
contingent on the particular ends an agent happens to have, because the 
argument in question gives each of us, as audience, a reason for adopting this 
as a rule of conduct irrespective of the particular antecedent ends each of us 
happens to have. A reason for your adopting this action as a rule of conduct – 
a reason that is assumed to approximate objective validity as the number of 
agents for whom it is a reason increases – is not just that it promotes your 
ends; this would make it merely your reason. An objective reason for you to 
adopt it is – as Nagel has shown – that it promotes everyone's ends. Hence its 
status as a reason, to that extent, does not depend on the particular antecedent 
ends you happen to have. It is an objective reason precisely to the extent that 
it is everyone's reason. 
 Of course the fact that behaving courteously promotes everyone's ends 
cannot constitute an objective moral justification of behaving courteously. For 
among the ends that behaving courteously promotes may be recognizably 
immoral ones; as when, for example, I behave courteously because this 
enables me to accumulate political favors which I then cash in for the purpose 
of ruining my enemies. If immoral ends of this kind, too, are among those 
which behaving courteously promotes, and if part of the persuasive appeal of 
behaving courteously is its all-purpose character, then this argument supports 
the pursuit of immoral ends. This means that the Instrumentalist strategy 
cannot yield a moral justification of a moral theory, if it shows the actions or 
set of social arrangements that the theory prescribes to be instrumental to the 
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promotion of just any ends, including recognizably immoral ends. In this case 
it may justify the theory, without morally justifying it. 
 It seems, then, that we cannot generate a specifically moral 
Instrumentalist justification of an action or set of social arrangements without 
imposing or presupposing at least some prior moral constraints on the range 
of ends the choosing agent is assumed to desire to promote – as the moral 
philosophers mentioned above all seem implicitly to recognize. Next I suggest 
that to the extent that such constraints are imposed, either the action or set of 
social arrangements in question cannot be justified, or else the Humean model 
of instrumental rationality is doing no work in justifying them. 
 
4.3. The Incredible Shrinking Means 
 Now consider a second example of an action that is instrumental to 
certain final ends, namely giving one's money away. Consider what an 
instrumentally rational justification of this action might look like, keeping in 
mind that such a justification must attempt to persuade, not just some few 
agents, but everyone, you included, that it is rational to give one's money 
away. Giving one's money away seems to have certain obvious 
disadvantages. It may frustrate one's opportunities to indulge expensive 
tastes, or to satisfy certain desires for which money is a prerequisite, such as 
buying one's parents a house or securing a high-quality education for one's 
children. It also leaves one in a position of relative insecurity, for one cannot 
know in advance what emergencies the future may bring. Unfortunately there 
seem to be no obvious compensations for these disadvantages. 
 However, this depends on the kinds of desires one has. If one takes one's 
expensive tastes very seriously, or are particularly committed to securing the 
wellbeing of one's family, or to being prepared for future emergencies, then 
the disadvantages of giving one's money away may seem practically 
insurmountable. But if one does not happen to care as much about these 
things as one does about supporting anti-racist initiatives, ending worldwide 
famine, and fighting cultural imperialism – let us call these beneficent ends – 
then the disadvantages may be more than adequately outweighed by the 
range of ends one cares about that giving one's money away enables one to 
promote. So if one has beneficent final ends, and one agrees that giving one's 
money away is the best way to promote them, then one has a reason for 
giving one's money away. If you have such a reason, giving your money away 
would seem to be instrumentally rational for you. 
 Of course if you do not happen to have beneficent final ends, then you 
will not be as impressed by the argument that giving one's money away 
enables one to realize them. Not only will you fail to be persuaded by this 
argument. You may not even recognize it as an argument.  Rather than an 
argument or attempt at justification, this claim may strike you as little more 
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than an observation, i.e. a bit of correct practically reasoning contingent on the 
particular ends some other agent may happen to have. 
 Certainly this reasoning may be supplemented by further argument to 
the effect that you ought to be the kind of person for whom such beneficent 
final ends outweigh other kinds. You may or may not find such arguments 
persuasive. If you do not, you will need to be persuaded that you ought to 
want to be this kind of person; and if not by this argument, by an argument 
that you ought to want to want to be this kind of person; and so on. You will 
need to be persuaded, at some point in the regress, that you have some 
terminating, rationally authoritative obligation, however tenuous, that links 
you in your present state to the promotion of beneficent final ends, in order 
for you to recognize the promotion of beneficent final ends as a justification 
for giving one's money away. But even if you do so recognize them, it is hard 
to see how any of these latter arguments will succeed in justifying to you your 
giving your money away, if you do not in fact have beneficent final ends. For 
they will not demonstrate the instrumental rationality of that action to any 
end you actually have.   
 So the success of the Instrumentalist strategy depends on the 
inclusiveness of the range of ends to which the prescribed action or set of 
social arrangements is in fact instrumental. In order to insure the unanimity of 
the choice among actions or sets of social arrangements, all agents must be 
presumed to share final ends toward which the prescribed action or set of 
social arrangements is instrumental. If the prescribed action or set of social 
arrangements requires a significant degree of beneficence or altruism, the 
agents' final ends must be characterized accordingly; and if not, then not. In 
either case, only if your ends are among them will it justify that action or set 
of social arrangements to you. And only to the extent that most people's ends 
are similarly among them will that justification seem to approximate objective 
validity.   
 Thus Instrumentalist moral philosophers have two choices. They may 
water down their normative prescriptions for action to the point of providing 
little more than a rationale for the status quo, in order to secure for those 
prescriptions the largest number of final ends to which they are instrumental; 
Sidgwick would be a classic example of a philosopher who approaches 
objectivity at the expense of normative substance. Or they may issue 
normative prescriptions that may require rather a great deal of personal self-
improvement in order for most people to follow, and simply stipulate that 
they speak of and to only that much smaller range of agents who share such 
ultimate aspirations to begin with. Rawls' more recent views would exemplify 
this alternative.  
 But the smaller the range of ends promoted by the action, the fewer the 
individuals likely to hold them, and the less the instrumentalist justification 
will approximate objectivity. Call such an action or set of social arrangements 
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a shrinking means. A shrinking means presents an obstacle to supplying an 
objective moral justification of an action or set of social arrangements, to the 
extent that the sympathetic audience it selects is correspondingly esoteric. To 
this extent, it thwarts the Instrumentalist attempt to demonstrate that reason 
directs all of us to perform certain actions in order to achieve any of our given 
ends, and replaces this with what we might describe as an exclusivist 
demonstration that reason directs some of us – those of us with, say, beneficent 
ends – to perform certain actions in order to achieve some of our given ends. 
Thus it diminishes the Instrumentalist strategy of objectively justifying certain 
prescriptions to a mere piece of correct practical reasoning that is contingent 
on certain ends some of us may happen to have.  
 Now consider a natural Instrumentalist response to the problem of the 
shrinking means. The response is, essentially, to retort that we cannot concern 
ourselves with those who do not share our ends, for they lie outside our moral 
community. If a person does not care about being beneficent (say), then there 
is nothing more we can say to persuade him of our favored moral theory. We 
must, it is claimed, suppose ourselves to be talking to those whose basic 
values are at least roughly similar to our own.25 The difficulty is that to the 
extent that this is true, either the action or set of social arrangements in 
question has not been justified, or else the Humean model of instrumental 
rationality is doing no work in justifying them.  
 The action or set of social arrangements in question has not been justified 
because our acceptance of it is now contingent on having certain particular 
antecedent ends. If we do not happen to have, say, beneficent ends, or if our 
ends gradually become less beneficent, perhaps as we get older and familial 
responsibilities encroach on us more and more, then the prescribed action will 
become correspondingly contingent and dispensable. This is an acceptable 
feature of an agent's practical reasoning about particular ends and how to 
achieve them: if one stops wanting the end, one no longer has reason to 
perform the action instrumental to achieving it. But this is less acceptable in 
reasoning that purports to furnish an objective justification of an action or set 
of social arrangements. For as we have already seen, what makes a piece of 
reasoning a candidate for an objective justification is its ability to give us a 
reason for adopting an action or set of social arrangements independently of the 
particular antecedent ends we happen to have. But restricting the appeal of 
this reasoning to those who must be presupposed to share our particular 
antecedent ends violates this criterion. An action or set of social arrangements 
cannot be both objectively justified and a shrinking means. Restricting the 
                                                
25See, for example, Phillippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetic Imperatives," 
The Philosophical Review LXXXI (1972), 306-16; Gilbert Harman, "Moral Relativism 
Defended," The Philosophical Review LXXXIV (1975), 3-22. Rawls also seemed to move in 
this direction. See his Dewey Lectures (ibid., 537). 
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range of final ends to those to which a preferred action or set of social 
arrangements is instrumental means abdicating the aspiration to the objective 
validity of the theory that prescribes it. 
 
4.4. The Problem of Moral Justification 
 The contingence and dispensability of a shrinking means is a liability for 
an objective justification of it. But for a purportedly objective moral 
justification of it, its contingence and dispensability is a quite fatal liability. 
For an objective moral justification of an action or set of social arrangements is 
supposed to persuade us that we ought to observe its implied prescriptions 
whatever else we do. That is, an objectively valid moral theory is supposed to 
demonstrate its prescriptions to be absolute constraints on action, and not mere 
rules of thumb contingent on the particular antecedent ends some of us 
happen to have. Indeed, if the theory is to provide absolute constraints, even a 
shrinking means sufficiently comprehensive to promote everyone's de facto 
antecedent ends will not do the trick. For even here, its promoting everyone's 
ends supplies me with a reason to act on it that is independent of any of my 
antecedent end thus promoted only because of the particular antecedent ends 
it does promote, namely everyone else's. This means that, at best, the 
Instrumentalist strategy can justify an action or set of social arrangements 
independently of any particular antecedent end it promotes. Instrumentalism 
cannot justify an action or set of social arrangements as objectively valid 
independently of all antecedent ends, i.e. absolutely. So Instrumentalism can 
approximate but cannot achieve objective moral justification, because any 
action or set of social arrangements it attempts to justify must function as a 
relatively shrinking means, however inflated it may seem. 
 But an absolute moral justification is needed, so that we can make the 
kinds of moral judgments a moral theory should enable us to make. A 
normative moral theory does not direct us to respect others, to behave 
responsibly, to help the needy, and to be honest in our dealings only when it 
is convenient and not otherwise. The whole point of a normative theory is to 
guide behavior correctly in those cases where self-interest obscures the 
morally right thing to do. Similarly, a normative moral theory is supposed to 
enable us to make negative moral judgments about actions or sets of social 
arrangements that violate the prescriptions implied by our theory. But in 
order to be moral judgments, these judgments cannot find the action or set of 
social arrangements defective simply because it does not best promote, say, 
the beneficent ends we are presumed to share. Such a judgment would not be 
a moral judgment but rather a judgment of practical irrationality. In order to 
be a moral judgment, it must evaluate the action or set of social arrangements 
as right or wrong independently of our particular antecedent ends. It must be 
able to make judgments about the actions of agents who do not share our 
beneficent ends and values – for example, that an agent does right to 
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contribute to charity even though she wants only thereby to enhance her 
social standing; or that an agent does wrong to keep promises in order to 
accumulate political favors which he may later cash in for the purpose of 
ruining his enemies. We cannot simply throw up our hands in such cases and 
decline to judge the behavior of such agents on the grounds that they do not 
share our ends and therefore are not members of our moral community – as 
though a moral community were nothing but a private club or chat room 
(who might comprise a moral community is discussed at greater length in 
Volume II, Chapter X). A moral theory must be able to judge when such a 
person's actions are wrong because the ends that define and identify those 
actions are wrong – objectively, morally wrong. If a moral theory is not 
objectively valid in this sense, it is unclear why anyone would have reason to 
hold it.  
 Now put this problem aside for the time being.  Assume we can go on 
thinking of a shrinking means as objectively justified, despite its esoteric 
appeal, to those who have, say, beneficent ends. I shall signal this assumption 
henceforth by putting "justify" in scare-quotes when using it to refer to a 
shrinking means. Here I am assuming what is false, namely, that our moral 
community consists only in those who share our central ends and values. In 
this case the Humean model of instrumental rationality is in any case doing 
no justificatory work. For what "justifies" my giving my money away is not 
the fact that it is the most efficient means to my beneficent ends; as we have 
already seen, this consideration does not differentiate a piece of correct 
practical reasoning from an objective moral justification. Nor is what 
"justifies" my giving my money away the fact that everyone in my moral 
community shares the beneficent end to which this action is instrumental; as 
we have also seen, this contingent intersubjective unanimity is not what 
guarantees the objective validity of giving my money away.  
 Rather, what "justifies" my giving my money away is the fact that, as we 
have already seen in Chapter V.3, this action itself can be regarded as 
constitutive of beneficence. The point has more general application, but let us 
confine it to the case of morality. It holds of any action claimed to be a means 
to a set of ends characterized in morally specific terms. A set of ends is 
characterized in moral specific terms if normative terms (such as "good," "fair," 
"beneficent," "evil," "selfish," "unjust") are among the predicates we ascribe to 
each member of the set. If we ascribe moral predicates to the ends we aim to 
achieve by acting, then since actions are defined and identified by their ends, 
those selfsame predicates can be applied equally to the actions we take to 
achieve them. Let us describe such predicates as having a retrospective 
application. So, for example, if my ends are good, then the actions I take to 
achieve them may be characterized similarly. Of course they may be other 
things as well, such as stupid, ill-considered, naive, and so forth. If my ends 
are beneficent, then giving my money away can be described as a beneficent 
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act. If my end of acquiring as much personal power as possible in order to 
ruin my enemies is vengeful, then I can be regarded as acting vengefully in 
accumulating political favors in order to achieve it. These three examples 
show that moral predicates ascribed to an end can be applied equally to the 
action taken to achieve it, regardless of how vaguely or specifically either is 
characterized. It is the value of our ends, not their popularity or the efficiency 
with which they are pursued, that confer value on the actions we take to 
achieve them. 
 This may not seem obvious. It may be objected that, for example, if I have 
the virtuous end of improving social relations among my colleagues at work, 
and a necessary means to that end is that I dress warmly before going to work 
in the morning, it does not follow that my action of pulling a second pair of 
woolly socks over my feet is virtuous. But my claim is neither that any such 
action must be so characterized, nor that it cannot be characterized 
alternatively. My claim is simply that it can be so characterized, in so far as it 
is understood as promoting the good end in question. However, this 
conclusion does not extend to just any terms in which an agent's ends are 
characterized. For example, it does not follow from the fact that my ends are 
varied that the actions I perform in their service are varied as well. Nor 
should it be thought that the morally specific terms that characterize an action 
necessarily have prospective application to its end. From the fact that behaving 
courteously is morally virtuous it does not follow that all the final ends it 
promotes can be characterized as morally virtuous as well. But this 
asymmetry is to be expected. For part of what we want to say is that some 
actions are susceptible of moral evaluation independently of the further ends 
they promote. The problem with an Instrumentalist strategy that uses a 
shrinking means is that it does not allow us to say this. 
 If a shrinking means can always be regarded as constitutive of the moral 
end it promotes, then as we have just seen, its status as an efficient means to 
that end cannot be what "justifies" it. It is rather the value conferred on it by 
that moral end itself that does the justificatory work. Indeed, the whole point 
of imposing moral constraints on the range of ends an agent is assumed to 
desire to promote via the action or set of social arrangements in question is to 
subordinate efficiency considerations to moral ones. This implies that moral 
considerations are overriding in evaluating the suitability of means to our 
moral ends.  
 So we who share that moral end are not persuaded to adopt a shrinking 
means because it efficiently achieves that end. Any action that could be 
characterized similarly in terms of it would have the same persuasive force. 
For example, even if distributing fliers promoted our beneficent ends less 
efficiently than giving our money away, that they did so would "justify" 
distributing fliers just as well. Certainly we might want to invoke 
considerations of efficiency in choosing between the alternatives of giving our 
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money away and distributing fliers, if we could not do both. But in this case 
the primary efficiency considerations would ordinarily concern which 
alternative was less costly to us, given our other ends. They would not, unless 
we were martyrs or efficiency fanatics, concern which was less costly tout 
court. It is not even clear what this would mean.   
 But if the primary efficiency consideration concerns which action is least 
costly to us rather than which is least costly tout court, then according to the 
Humean model of motivation, my choice of giving my money away rather 
than distributing fliers (or vice versa) makes that choice the most efficient 
action for me to take, for any action I choose. So it would be the fact that the 
action achieved our moral ends, rather than that it did so efficiently, that 
"justified" that action to us. But in this case, the notion of efficiency that is 
centrally definitive of the Humean model of rationality is doing no 
justificatory work. It is rather the values we hold in common that persuade us 
to adopt the means for realizing them. 
 I have discussed two examples of such means: behaving courteously and 
giving one's money away. We have seen that these two differ in systematic 
ways. Behaving courteously is instrumental to a wide range of ends. For that 
very reason, I have suggested, behaving courteously can be objectively 
justified to a degree, but to that degree cannot be morally justified. By 
contrast, giving one's money away is instrumental to a more limited range of 
ends. For that very reason, I have claimed, it cannot be objectively justified to 
any degree, but to that degree can be morally "justified." There is one further 
notable difference between behaving courteously and giving one's money 
away. Behaving courteously is easy. Giving one's money away is hard. It is 
not surprising that we can be more easily persuaded to do things that are easy 
than things that are hard, nor that the Instrumentalist strategy is particularly 
well suited to thus persuade us. This is a consequence of the background 
Humean conception of the self, according to which we are motivated to do 
things that efficiently promote ends and values we are already assumed to 
have. We are not so easily motivated to do things that require us to adopt new 
ends, and even less so if they require us to modify our values or priorities. 
Actions we recognize as morally virtuous but hard to motivate ourselves to 
do are actions for ends we have not seriously adopted, ends that express 
values to which we may give lip service at best – ends and values that may 
well lie beyond the actual moral community of which we are in reality 
members. 
 It would be very regrettable if we could find no moral theory persuasive 
that enjoined us to do things that are hard, things that required us to modify 
or sacrifice our ends, because in that case we could find no reason to sacrifice 
where we are able for the sake of the common good. But if it is in any case, as 
I have suggested, the values we hold in common that persuade us to adopt 
the means for realizing them, rather than considerations of instrumental 
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rationality, then our willingness to sacrifice where we are able for the sake of 
the common good will depend on the values we hold, and on the conditions 
under which we can be rationally persuaded to modify them. And then it 
becomes crucial to ascertain whether those values themselves are rationally 
justified. As we will see in the following two chapters, to answer this question 
we will need to press beyond the limitations of Instrumentalism. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter X. Rawls’s Instrumentalism 
 
 
 I have just argued in Chapter IX.4 that the Instrumentalist strategy of 
moral justification is self-defeating. John Rawls and Richard Brandt have each 
utilized the Instrumentalist strategy in defense of their respective moral 
theories, by arguing that their theories would be chosen by a fully 
instrumentally rational agent concerned to further her own ends, whatever 
these might be, given the available information, whether limited (Rawls) or 
full (Brandt). However, the success of this strategy requires each to make 
further, controversial assumptions about the chooser's ends and motivations 
in the choice situation, in order to derive the favored moral theory. I address 
Rawls’s theory in this chapter and Brandt’s in the next.  
Common lines of early criticisms of Rawls’s Theory of Justice1 made by, 
among others, Schwartz, Nagel, Gauthier, and Miller were alike in 
presupposing the continuity thesis, i.e. that the parties in the original position 
are psychologically continuous with members of the well-ordered society. To 
my knowledge, no later commentators on Rawls’s writings have disputed this 
assumption. There is evidence in A Theory of Justice, The Dewey Lectures2, and 
other writings by Rawls both to confirm and to disconfirm this thesis. His late 
Political Liberalism3 appears to dispense with it – without, however, addressing 
the issue directly. If this thesis is true, then either the original position cannot 
generate any principles of justice at all; or else Rawls’s special motivational 
assumptions about the parties in the original position, i.e. that they are 
overridingly concerned to develop and express their moral personalities, and 
secondarily, to advance their conceptions of the good, tautologically imply 
that they will choose the principles of justice, in order to distribute primary 
goods. In this case, it is vacuously true that an agent will choose what he has 
special motivation to choose, other things equal. But in order to justify this 
choice for us, we, too, must have that special motivation.  But if we do, then 
the argument does not succeed in justifying this choice as instrumentally 
efficient whatever our ends, i.e. objectively.  If we do not, then it does not 
succeed in justifying this choice for us at all. In either case, the Instrumentalist 
strategy fails. However, if the continuity thesis is false, then Rawls’s early 
ambition to conceive moral justification on analogy with scientific justification 
must be reevaluated. Greater attention then must be focused on Rawls’s 
conception of wide reflective equilibrium as a justificatory device, and Rawls 
is correct in maintaining the irrelevance of the question of personal identity to 
the construction of his moral theory. 
                                                
1John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1971). 
Henceforth references to this work are parenthecized in the text and denoted by "TJ". 
2 John Rawls, The Dewey Lectures 1980, The Journal of Philosophy LXXVII (1980) 
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)  
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Section 1 grounds the type of justification I want to discuss in Rawls’s 
early and very ambitious “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics,”4 in 
which he explicitly sets his sights on a conception of moral justification 
analogous to scientific explanation. Section 2 offers a general description of 
the basic features that identify traditional Social Contract Theory. Section 3 
situates Rawls’s central metaethical and normative views within that context, 
and Section 4 examines and refutes some of Habermas’ criticisms of Rawls’s 
normative and metaethical theories. Section 5 reevaluates what Rawls’s 
metaethical approach to moral justification can achieve relative to the analogy 
of scientific justification on which it is based, with particular reference to 
Rawls’s threefold distinction among perfect, imperfect and pure procedural 
justice. Section 6 traces the evidence in Rawls’s work for the continuity thesis, 
and its use by some early critics of A Theory of Justice. Section 7 analyzes the 
Humean and Instrumentalist underpinnings of Rawls’s views, and the quite 
serious contradiction in Rawls’s conception of the original position that these 
assumptions generate. Section 8 considers the resources within Rawls’s view 
for resolving this contradiction and thereby answering his early critics. 
Section 9 extends the metaphysical implications of this alternative 
interpretation of the original position to a resolution of the question of 
personal identity, and also reconsiders the potential of wide reflective 
equilibrium to provide an alternative to the Instrumentalist strategy of 
justification. Section 10 spells out the alternative conception of justification as 
analogous to scientific procedure that the concept of wide reflective 
equilibrium entails, and concludes with some observations about how Rawls 
might finally deploy this concept to satisfy the stringent requirements of 
moral justification which he set for himself in 1951. 
 
1. The Analogy with Science 
 In 1951 John Rawls expressed these convictions about the fundamental 
issues in metaethics: 
[T]he objectivity or the subjectivity of moral knowledge turns, not on the 
question whether ideal value entities exist or whether moral judgments 
are caused by emotions or whether there is a variety of moral codes the 
world over, but simply on the question: does there exist a reasonable 
method for validating and invalidating given or proposed moral rules 
and those decisions made on the basis of them? For to say of scientific 
knowledge that it is objective is to say that the propositions expressed 
therein may be evidenced to be true by a reasonable and reliable method, 
that is, by the rules and procedures of what we may call "inductive logic"; 
                                                
4 John Rawls, "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics," Philosophical Review 66 (1951), 
177-197; reprinted in Ethics, Ed. Judith J. Thomson and Gerald Dworkin (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1968), 48-70. 
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and, similarly, to establish the objectivity of moral rules, and the 
decisions based upon them, we must exhibit the decision procedure, 
which can be shown to be both reasonable and reliable, at least in some 
cases, for deciding between moral rules and lines of conduct consequent 
to them.5 
In this passage Rawls expresses impatience with the traditional treatment of 
metaethical issues as a branch of speculative metaphysics. He reconfigures the 
issue of moral objectivity and reorients the practice of metaethics from 
linguistic analysis to decision theory. By turning attention to the correct 
procedure for making substantive moral decisions – about what action is right 
as well as about what kind of society would be good for human beings, Rawls 
thereby revitalized the practice of normative moral philosophy, and of 
casuistry more concretely, after a century of relative neglect. 
 At the time Rawls wrote "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics," 
moral philosophers did not often address normative moral questions. They 
were more centrally concerned with the metaethical status of such questions 
themselves, and were accustomed to couching their concerns about the 
objectivity of moral judgments in the following terms: Do terms such as 
"good" and "right" refer to anything? And if so, to what do they refer? 
Abstract entities? Emotional states of the speaker? Can a moral judgment be 
objectively true independently of the local moral code in which it figures? If 
so, in what does this truth consist? If moral terms do not refer, on what basis 
do we accept the judgments in which they figure as objectively valid? Or are 
all moral terms and judgments valid only relative to a particular speaker, 
community, or culture? This last conclusion would entail a correspondingly 
relativized and reduced role for the normative moral philosopher, and so a 
contraction in the scope of philosophical ambition of the kind already 
discussed: If some such form of relativism were true, we would have no moral 
justification for intervening in any of the practices or behavior of other 
individuals or groups whose actions we found objectionable. Fighting for civil 
rights, protesting international human rights violations, and helping the 
needy would find no more solid legitimation than imperialism, hegemony, or 
meddling. 
 In response to this possibility, Rawls replaced Moore's question, Do 
moral terms refer? with a different one: Can moral judgments be the outcome 
of a rational and reliable procedure? He argues in the above passage that the 
conception of moral objectivity on the basis of which these issues traditionally 
have been framed is itself wrongheaded. The project, he argues, should not 
consist in a search for abstract metaphysical entities, corresponding to moral 
terms and judgments, which we can metaphorically pinch, kick and pummel 
to reassure ourselves of their objective reality as we physically do bodies, 
                                                
5ibid. 
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tables and pillows. Nor should it consist in a cross-cultural statistical study of 
the variety of moral codes that govern various human societies. Instead we 
need to learn from the procedures of decision-making and verification used in 
the natural sciences, and from the conception of objectivity defined by those 
procedures.  
 We have seen in Chapter IX.4 that in the natural sciences, a judgment is 
taken provisionally to be objectively valid if it is the outcome of the 
procedures of inductive logic: observation, adequate gathering of data, 
inductive hypothesis formulation, deduction of predicted outcomes, testing of 
those predictions under controlled conditions, and intersubjective replication 
of predicted experimental results. Objective scientific truth ideally is 
conceived as a function of rational investigative procedure carried through 
without error. Similarly, Rawls suggests, objective moral truth, ideally, is a 
function of a rational decision procedure carried through without error. 
 In the remainder of this early paper, Rawls proposes such a procedure, 
and refines it further in the series of publications that succeeded it.6 But it is 
not until A Theory of Justice that he is prepared unapologetically to defend the 
thesis that moral philosophy is to be considered "part of the theory of rational 
choice (TJ 16, 47, 172);" and to assert that "[t]he argument aims eventually to 
be strictly deductive (TJ 121)." In yet later writings, Rawls had occasion to 
revise and qualify this stance.7 In Political Liberalism, he decisively disowns it 
(PL 53, fn. 7). His considered qualification of his earlier enthusiasm about the 
extent to which moral philosophy could aspire to objective universality is a 
tribute both to the seriousness with which he took his critics' objections, and 
to his commitment to the value of Socratic metaethics more generally. 
 I believe Rawls took his critics' objections a bit too seriously, and did not 
need to retrench quite as much as he did. Nevertheless, there are serious 
problems with the Instrumentalist strategy of metaethical justification to 
which Rawls, like all devotees of the Humean conception of the self, is 
committed; and in this chapter I examine the particular ways in which this 
strategy leads his metaethical project astray. My analysis has no implications 
for the truth or falsity of Rawls’s substantive, normative theory of justice. Nor 
does it imply that this normative theory cannot be metaethically justified. 
Indeed, I argue, finally, that Rawls’s concept of wide reflective equilibrium 
                                                
6See his "Justice as Fairness," The Philosophical Review 57 (1958); "The Sense of Justice," 
The Philosophical Review 62 (1963); Constitutional Liberty and the Concept of Justice," 
Nomos VI: Justice, Ed. C. J. Friedrich and John Chapman (New York: Atherton Press, 
1963); "Distributive Justice," in Philosophy, Politics and Society, Third Series, Ed. Peter 
Laslett and W.G. Runciman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967); "Distributive Justice: Some 
Addenda," Natural Law Forum 13 (1968); and "The Justification of Civil Disobedience," in 
Civil Disobedience, Ed. H. A. Bedau (New York: Pegasus, 1969). 
7See, for example, his "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 14, 3 (1985), 223-251. 
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constitutes an alternative rational procedure that is not dependent on the 
Instrumentalist strategy he in A Theory of Justice deploys; and that this 
procedure can provide the metaethical defense of the theory as objective 
moral truth that the Instrumentalist strategy does not.8   
 
2. Traditional Social Contract Theory 
 
2.1. The Normative Theory 
 In A Theory of Justice, Rawls positions himself as a Social Contract Theorist 
in the tradition of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Hume, and Kant (some would 
add Hegel). This is a lengthy list comprised of widely divergent philosophical 
sensibilities. But almost all share certain fundamental normative beliefs in 
common constitutive of the doctrine of liberal democracy. Most generally, 
almost all believe we should have a society that maximizes individual 
freedom to pursue personal goals and interests, given the existence of other 
people. Almost all assume, additionally, that the existence of other people, all 
equally engaged in pursuing personal goals, requires constraints imposed by 
a governing body that regulate and coordinate orderly interactions among 
them (here Hegel would be the clearest exception). From these two 
assumptions almost all conclude that society ideally should be structured so 
as to protect individual rights, freedom and autonomy as fully as possible, i.e. 
so as to maximize political equality, consistently with these constraints 
(Hobbes' view would necessitate qualification of this claim). Political equality, 
then, for the Social Contract Theorist, means equal protection under laws 
designed to safeguard these freedoms. It means that no interference by the 
governing body in the rights of individual citizens to conduct their affairs as 
they choose that is not justified by the ideal of political equality itself is 
defensible in a court of law; and that any individual citizen can call upon the 
legal system to protect her against any such infringement.   
 The ideal of liberal democracy is therefore characterized by an in-
principle refusal to specify the content of personal goals or values deemed 
acceptable or worthy of pursuit by individual citizens. Individuals are 
assumed to be able to decide these matters for themselves, and to have the 
right to do so. Attempts by the state to define, impose, or circumscribe the 
range of such goals, beyond the bare minimum required for social cooperation 
and stability, are taken to be unwarranted interference in the exercise of 
                                                
8 Rawls accords greater significance to wide reflective equilibrium along these lines in 
explicit response to Habermas’ critique of his views. See Jürgen Habermas, 
“Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism,” and Rawls’s “Reply to Habermas,” both in The Journal of Philosophy XCII, 3 
(March 1995). Rawls’s reply is reprinted in Political Liberalism and I use that pagination. 
See particularly PL 384-385.  
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individual liberty. Whereas the state can compel citizens to observe 
restrictions on liberty required in order to maximize liberty overall, it cannot 
compel them to have, profess, or act upon any other such values.  
 In this sense the normative value content of traditional Social Contract 
Theory is deliberately minimal, for the value of liberty itself does not enter 
into the hierarchical prioritizing of multiple values among which an 
individual may make rational trade-offs (for example, assigning a higher 
priority to satisfying work than to a relaxing vacation). Instead it functions as 
a side-constraint on the set of values any such individual may have: Whatever 
their content, all must be consistent with respect for individual liberty. No 
other constraints on the content of individual goals or values are permitted. 
So, to invoke Rawls’s famous example, someone who solves complex 
mathematical equations for a fee so that he can maximize the time he spends 
counting blades of grass (TJ 432) cannot be prevented from pursuing this goal 
on grounds of futility, sloth, or lack of productivity. If counting blades of 
grass is the activity he values most and he does not waste any scarce social 
resources in its pursuit, he is free to do so.  
 Also implicit in this in-principle refusal to evaluate the content of 
individual goals and values is a subjectivism about what constitutes 
acceptable or worthwhile ones. Answers to this question are left to the 
individuals in question – not only because individuals alone have the right 
and the liberty to answer them for themselves; but also because no individual 
is granted the authority to prescribe value for any other. There is no 
equivalent in social contract theory to the explicitly authoritarian roles of 
Pope, Ayatollah, or dictator, whose actions and/or pronouncements function 
as symbolic embodiments of personal ethical, political, or spiritual values held 
in common by all. Instead the rulings of the governing body are conceived as 
at most enacting a "General Will" to protect liberty itself. 
 Traditionally, the Social Contract-Theoretic ideal of political equality is a 
juridical ideal. It does centrally affirm the right to private property. But it is 
famously silent on the question of how economic resources are to be 
distributed among individual citizens. This follows from its hands-off attitude 
toward the content and worth of individual goals and interests. Since it makes 
no assumptions, within the constraints imposed by the requirements of social 
cooperation and stability, about what goals and interests are worth pursuing, 
it similarly makes no assumptions about the quantity or quality of resources 
instrumentally necessary to pursue them. Therefore there can be no 
justification inherent in the traditional conception of the social contract itself 
for stipulating any basic social minimum to which all citizens are entitled, 
since any such minimum would arbitrarily presuppose a particular range of 
ends whose pursuit would require it. Since no such presupposition can be 
justified in traditional Social Contract-Theoretic terms, no such social 
minimum can be, either. The traditional contract-theoretic view implies that 
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those who find shelter under a bridge or in a subway tunnel, and sustenance 
in a soup kitchen or garbage bin implicitly choose to do so; and reject the 
concept of a social minimum as an unwelcome burden, imposing unwelcome 
obligations, in a lifestyle choice that maximizes freedom of mobility at the 
expense of security and safety. 
 
2.2. The Metaethical Justification 
 The Social Contract-Theoretic ideal of liberal democracy is a normative 
moral theory of the good society. Traditionally its metaethical justification has 
taken a certain form most evident in the views of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and 
Rousseau. In Kant and Hegel this strategy is virtually absent. It consists in 
arguing, basically, that this ideal of liberal democracy can be conceived as the 
outcome of an agreement among individuals in a pre-societal "state of nature" 
to abide by its laws, rules, and norms. Each individual is motivated to obey 
these norms by her desire to maximize the achievement of her individual 
goals and interests as efficiently as possible, given the desire of other 
individuals to do the same. Obedience to the rule of law is defended as the 
necessary price of protection by the state against the potential for confusion, 
conflict, disequilibrium, and the consequent thwarting of individual interests 
and desires that would obtain if no such rule of law existed. The reasoning is 
that, given our individual desires to achieve our goals, whatever they are, the 
system of laws and norms that constitute the ideal of liberal democracy is one 
we each would have consented to, or that was consented to, under pre-
societal conditions of disequilibrium. 
 The strategy of metaethical justification of the social contract is, then, 
backward-looking rather than forward-looking. It conceives the social contract, 
and the ideals of liberal democracy it expresses, as the result of prior 
conditions imposed on equal and rationally self-interested choosers who 
begin on a level playing field. That the social contract is the result of these 
prior conditions is what legitimates it. Traditional Social Contract Theory does 
not argue that our obeying these rules will in fact have the best consequences 
for our attempts to satisfy our desires. It merely claims that rationally self-
interested individuals would – or did – justifiably think it would, under the 
condition that they themselves had no rules at all. All traditional Social 
Contract Theory claims is that if there were no rules governing legitimate 
social exchange, these are the ones equal, instrumentally rational, self-
interested individuals would agree to. That such individuals in a pre-societal 
state might justifiably reason that obeying these rules will maximize their 
chances of satisfying their desires does not, of course, imply that our actually 
obeying them will in fact have this effect.  
 A fortiori, traditional Social Contract Theory does not argue that the actual 
individual or collective consequences of implementing the social contract are 
necessarily superior to those of any other social scheme. Indeed, it could not 
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argue this. Actual individual consequences must vary according to the 
individual goals and interests one happens to have and the economic 
circumstances in which one finds oneself. So, for example, a homeless person 
living under a bridge who aspires to the U. S. Presidency will probably fare 
less well relative to his aspirations than the well-trained daughter of a 
wealthy financier who aspires to continue the family business will relative to 
hers. And since traditional Social Contract Theory stipulates that there are in 
principle no collective goals it aims to maximize over and above the freedom 
to pursue individual ones, there are no actual collective consequences that 
might demonstrate any such superiority. To reproaches for permitting radical 
inequalities in wealth and social well-being among citizens, divisive and 
destabilizing social conflict among groups of citizens, political corruption, 
neglect of the neediest, or exploitation of the powerless, the traditional Social 
Contract Theorist responds with the "Yes, but at least ..." argument intended 
to remind us of the side-constraining value of individual liberty itself. The 
claim is that any such social ills are more palatable under conditions of 
political liberty – indeed, more palatable than their amelioration under 
conditions of political repression would be. 
 Similarly, the traditional strategy of metaethical justification of the social 
contract is Instrumentalist rather than deontological (again Kant and Hegel are 
the exceptions here). It does not argue that the implementation of the social 
contract is a good in itself, or that the rules and norms observance of which 
constitute the ideal of liberal democracy have intrinsic value as, for example, 
an expression of human community, or as the culmination of human 
rationality. It claims, rather, that the social contract is justified by the 
conditions that generated it, as an instrumental means to the realization of 
certain further conditions. Suppose it does not, in fact, succeed in maximizing 
the ability of individual citizens to satisfy their desires. Then either the 
circumstances under which it was chosen were so different from the ones that 
obtain now that the instrumental considerations that justified it to the rational 
individuals who chose it then are similarly different from what justifies it to 
the agents who abide by it now; or else the individuals who originally agreed 
to it may have been mistaken in their reasoning. Perhaps they may have 
lacked relevant information, or made false inferences. In either case, its 
Instrumentalist justification is accordingly called into question. If the social 
contract is not justified instrumentally, it is not justified at all. 
 However, this Instrumentalist justification can be called into question 
without being refuted, since, as we have just seen, the metaethical justification 
of social contract theory is Instrumentalist without being "consequentialist" 
("consequentialism" is just one variety of Instrumentalism). Unwanted and 
unanticipated actual consequences of implementing the social contract in 
practice can call its instrumental rationality into question without thereby 
requiring the conclusion that it would be rational to abandon it. For it may be 
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true, on the one hand, that it does not, in practice, maximize the satisfaction of 
individual desire for all or even most citizens; and, on the other, that it was, 
after all, the most rational choice under the circumstances in which it was 
chosen. If those circumstances themselves have special significance to the 
agents who abide by it now, then the instrumental reasoning that generated it 
then may survive retrospective scrutiny. The social contract would still be 
instrumentally justified even though it did not have the best consequences in 
practice, because the particular circumstances and instrumental reasoning that 
generated it then would themselves have intrinsic value for us now. 
 The metaethics of Social Contract Theory as traditionally conceived, then, 
has certain identifying characteristics. First, it includes a characteristically 
Humean conception of the self. It conceives of human agents as motivated by 
the desire to pursue and achieve self-interested goals and values, in whatever 
these may consist. These goals are conceived as prior to and independent of 
established political and legal institutions, and as instrumentally justifying 
those institutions. Human agents are thus conceived as expressing themselves 
through their capacity for instrumental, means-end reasoning, i.e. their ability 
to seek out and exploit the most efficient means available for satisfying their 
desires. In these ways, human agents are also conceived as more or less equal 
in physical and mental abilities, such that each has a certain minimum degree 
of strength and calculating ability, such that deficiencies of one are usually 
compensated by excesses of the other. 
 Second, the metaethics of Social Contract Theory traditionally includes a 
preconditioning set of circumstances – the "state of nature" – that, by 
generating the social contract, thereby justifies it. By definition, these 
preconditioning circumstances are such that the agreed-upon social 
arrangements that constitute implementation of the contract are not yet in 
place. Since individuals are nevertheless motivated to pursue the satisfaction 
of their desires, these preconditioning circumstances are characterized by 
confusion, conflict, and mistrust, and this thwarts or obstructs each 
individual's ability to satisfy his desires. 
 Third, there is, of course, the social contract itself. Using instrumental 
reasoning, each individual in the preconditioning circumstances concludes 
that mutual cooperation with other similarly self-interested agents is the best 
means for her to pursue her own self-interested goals. Each therefore agrees 
on terms of mutual cooperation – laws, social norms, and moral rules 
coordinating expectations and behavior, and providing for sanctions and 
means of enforcing them – which each also thereby agrees to obey. In order to 
implement this agreement, individuals voluntarily abdicate a certain amount 
of personal freedom and power available in the preconditioning 
circumstances to a mutually agreed-upon governing authority. The function 
of this governing authority is to regulate and insure obedience to these norms 
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by all individual parties to the agreement, and so to protect a certain degree of 
social stability, order, and individual freedom for all.  
 Thus each individual trades unlimited – but insecure and unstable – 
freedom and power in the state of nature for a more limited but secure and 
stable freedom and power under the social contract. Limited but secure and 
stable freedom and power under the social contract are instrumental goods 
deemed more efficient means for pursuing one's ends than the alternatives 
available in the state of nature. Social Contract Theory ranks unlimited power 
for everyone in the state of nature lower in priority than the benefits of 
instrumental rationality, and so gives a higher priority to the limitations, 
constraints and regulations of power that instrumental rationality requires. It 
answers Nietzsche's devaluation of the character dispositions of rationality 
with the argument that power is exercised most effectively only with their 
help. 
 
3. A Theory of Justice 
 
3.1. Rawls’s Metaethics 
 
3.1.1. The Original Position 
 Rawls’s metaethical justification of the social contract bears comparison 
with the traditional one only in certain respects. It is roughly similar in its 
conception of human nature and agency in the preconditioning 
circumstances. Here, too, human beings are more or less equal, motivated by 
desire, instrumentally rational, and primarily concerned to advance their self-
interest, that is, they instantiate the Humean conception of the self. However, 
Rawls introduces a broader conception of self-interest as a conception of the 
good.  By "good," Rawls means basically "what it is rational for someone with a 
rational life plan to desire" (TJ 399, 405). A rational life plan is one that is 
consistent with the principles of rational choice (TJ 410-416) and chosen with 
full deliberative rationality (TJ 408). He distinguishes between interests in the 
self – i.e. egoistic desires as traditionally understood, and interests of the self, 
of which egoistic desires are only a subset (TJ 127). Other interests of the self 
might include other-directed interests such as particular moral commitments, 
religious convictions, or altruistic social concerns that define an individual self 
without being directed at the individual self. Thus individual conceptions of 
the good might still conflict even though they are not primarily egoistic.  
 By stipulating that the parties in the preconditioning circumstances are 
also mutually disinterested, i.e. that they take no interest in one another's 
interests (TJ 13, 127-130, passim), Rawls insures that even though each may 
hold a conception of the good guided by other-directed concerns, the others to 
whom these concerns are directed do not include the other parties in the 
original position. This enables Rawls to conceive the parties as having 
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conflicting conceptions of the good without requiring them to be self-
interested in the narrow, egoistic sense. It also means that the parties will have 
no motivation to form special interest groups or power blocs among 
themselves that might advocate jointly held, other-directed conceptions of the 
good outweighing other parties' individually held conceptions. 
 Rawls’s version of the preconditioning circumstances in which such 
individuals find themselves is equally distinctive. The original position, as 
Rawls calls it, is entirely hypothetical. It legitimates a set of social 
arrangements as just if it is governed by principles of justice we would have 
chosen if we ourselves had occupied in the original position. There is no 
suggestion that the original position might have existed historically, or even 
that it metaphorically describes our actual social relations. So, in particular, 
Rawls does not claim that actual human agents, embedded in social and 
political relationships, adhere to moral and social conventions for reasons of 
self-interest even in Rawls’s broader sense of that term. The implication, on 
the face of it, is that actual human agents may be motivated by conscience, 
habit, peer pressure, or individual biochemistry, or any of the other myriad 
motivations that move us. The original position is rather an ideal choice 
situation counterfactually conceived such that, if it were to obtain, would 
generate principles of justice. Thus it provides an Instrumentalist justification 
of those principles even in the event that adhering to them now, under actual 
circumstances, does not in fact promote our actual self-interest more 
efficiently than any other. 
 Rawls’s argument in outline is that if the parties choosing in the original 
position were free, equal, perfectly rational, morally impartial, and motivated 
to settle conflicts among their respective conceptions of the good, they would 
choose a well-ordered society, i.e. one structured by Rawls’s two principles of 
justice. That they would so choose then provides a criterion against which to 
evaluate the justice of our actual situation (TJ 13, 16, 17). This is what he 
means by declaring moral philosophy to be part of the theory of rational 
choice. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls’s conception of the original position and 
the parties in it is a decision-theoretic conception that, like decision-theoretic 
proofs, imposes certain formal and value-neutral conditions on an ideally 
rational chooser, such that the outcome chosen can be formally derived from 
the set of those conditions taken as premises. With this reconceptualization of 
the traditional Social Contract Theorist's state of nature, Rawls brings the 
arguments for particular conceptions of social justice to a degree of formal 
rigor that had never before been attempted within the Social Contract-
Theoretic tradition, and that has enabled it to compete with the welfare 
economics of Utilitarianism. This is only one reason why I vehemently oppose 
Rawls’s later disavowal of this key tenet of his theory. 
 What motivates the parties to choose principles of justice is what Rawls 
calls the circumstances of justice (TJ 126-130). These are of two kinds. The 
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subjective circumstances of justice consist in the mutually conflicting goals and 
values of the parties. This, as we have seen, is built into the original position 
by their mutual disinterest and differing conceptions of the good. The objective 
circumstances of justice consist in a moderate scarcity of resources, such that 
there are not enough for each individual to have as much as he wants. Only 
under conditions of moderate scarcity can questions of justice arise: An 
overabundance of resources presents no need for raising questions of fair 
distribution (as, for example, fresh air and clean water did not before the 
industrial revolution); whereas an extreme scarcity of resources – i.e. one in 
which proportional amounts to everyone is insufficient for each and 
withholding distribution to anyone is unjustifiable – makes questions of fair 
distribution impossible to answer. Together, the subjective and objective 
circumstances of justice – the necessity of fairly distributing moderately scarce 
resources among individuals with divergent and conflicting plans for their 
use – constitute the conditions under which such individuals are moved to 
find principles of such distribution on which they all can agree. 
 
3.1.2. The Parties' Psychology 
 The parties in Rawls’s original position are defined by certain further 
special psychological characteristics in addition to being mutually 
disinterested. Rawls’s detailed treatment of these and other motivational 
assumptions in A Theory of Justice rekindled attention to a philosophical 
tradition of moral psychology that had begun with Aristotle but had lain 
virtually dormant in the analytic tradition after Kant. Rawls stipulates that the 
parties are not moved by envy, i.e. by rancor and spite (TJ 538) such that they 
so strongly desire that another have fewer resources that they are willing to 
accept fewer resources themselves in order to achieve this (TJ 143). This 
means that individuals do not compete with one another or measure their 
own degree of well-being comparatively. An envious person, on Rawls’s 
view, is one who engages in the practice of cutting off her nose to spite her 
face. As we saw in Chapter II.2.4, she regards another's gain as by definition 
her own loss, which she will take steps to prevent – by choosing to incur a 
more serious yet more bearable loss for herself. For such a person, no loss is 
worse than the loss of self-regard she experiences as caused by another's 
success; and any other alternative loss that will prevent this is preferable. For 
example, an envious colleague might attempt to thwart one's professional 
success in order to avoid feelings of personal and professional inferiority, by 
placing administrative or procedural obstacles in the path of one's research – 
even though the completion of one's research would yield needed practical 
and social benefits and precedents for the status and reputation of one's 
department overall and so for that colleague himself.  
 Thus an envious person is one who is willing to accept quite substantial 
social or material losses in order to avoid the feeling – to which she is 
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especially susceptible – that she is in some respect inferior to another. To say 
that the parties in the original position are not moved by envy is thus to say 
that each individual chooses principles of justice in such a way as simply to 
maximize her distribution of resources relative to the total amount available. 
Each is guided by a sense of the sufficiency and intrinsic value of their own 
plan of life. They "have no desire to abandon any of their aims provided 
others have less means to further theirs" (TJ 144). I argued in Chapter II.2.4 
that this stipulation of the original position is inconsistent with Rawls’s 
adoption of the belief-desire model of motivation, because envy is an 
unavoidable consequence of being motivated by desire alone. 
 The parties in the original position are also, thirdly, capable of a sense of 
justice. This means that they will be able to respect and carry out whatever 
principles of justice are chosen, such that their strict compliance with such 
principles can be assured at the outset (TJ 145). The intuition behind this 
stipulation has two parts. First, the parties are here assumed be autonomous 
and responsible; that is, they are assumed to be capable of adhering to their 
agreements without bribes, coercion, or external promptings. But second, they 
are assumed to have the ability to identify the principles they have chosen to 
distribute available resources as just, even though they did not come together with 
the conscious aim of achieving justice.   
It is important to the value-neutrality of the metaethics of A Theory of 
Justice – the attempt to derive a substantive normative theory from 
"commonly shared ... widely accepted but weak ... natural and plausible ... 
seem[ingly] innocuous or even trivial ... [metaethical] premises" (TJ 18) – that 
they did not. That is, it is important that they choose principles of distribution 
on purely self-interested grounds that, on Rawls’s view, contain no normative 
ethical bias. If, on the contrary, they had gathered with a view to choosing 
principles of justice explicitly, they would have had to agree upon in what 
justice consists. Since this question would have required a collective and 
transpersonal answer, the stipulation of mutual disinterest would have been 
violated. Hence Rawls would have had to make the metaethically 
controversial – because normatively biased – motivational assumption that 
the parties were at least in part altruistic. This, in turn, would have 
undermined the strength of his eventually deductive argument, since it would 
have been less impressive to derive normative conclusions from explicitly 
normative premises than from arguably nonnormative ones. So to stipulate 
that the parties have a sense of justice is to ensure that they recognize it when 
they find it, even though they were not motivated to look for it. This 
stipulation enables Rawls to preserve at least the semblance of value-
neutrality in his premises, while at the same time establish in his conclusion a 
normative motivational basis for citizens' adherence in the well-ordered 
society to the principles of justice that structure it. 
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 Finally, the parties are limited in the information available to them for 
making the choice by what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance (TJ 136-142). They 
do not know their personal identities, the society to which they previously 
belonged, their socioeconomic status in it, their conceptions of the good, or 
any other particular facts that might bias their choice of principles. For 
example, if one knew one's particular society, one might tend to choose 
principles of justice that would improve it specifically; if one knew one's 
socioeconomic status in it, one might tend to choose principles that would 
enhance or protect it; if one knew one's conception of the good, one might 
tend to choose principles that would favor the particular distribution of 
resources it required (TJ 137). By excluding all such information, no 
individual can use these actual resources, status or circumstances as leverage, 
threat, bribe or coercion to fashion principles to his own advantage. However, 
the parties do know the general facts about human nature, the laws of the 
natural and social sciences, and any other general facts that enable them to 
choose principles of justice.  
 Together these constraints express the following assumptions. First, the 
choice of principles should not be biased by the personal advantage or 
disadvantage of the choosers. Second, it should not be possible to tailor 
principles of justice to one's own interests. And third, all choosers are equal in 
having a conception of the good and a sense of justice. Under these 
circumstances, the requirements of rational deliberation can be observed and 
unanimity can be insured:  
[S]ince the differences among the parties are unknown to them, and 
everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by 
the same arguments. Therefore, we can view the choice in the original 
position from the standpoint of one person selected at random. If anyone 
after due reflection prefers a conception of justice to another, then they all 
do, and a unanimous agreement can be reached (TJ 139). 
Together with the circumstances of justice, the original position constitutes 
Rawls’s version of the preconditioning circumstances that is traditionally 
invoked to metaethically justify the social contract.   
 
3.2. Rawls’s Normative Theory 
 
3.2.1. The Two Principles of Justice 
 Rawls then argues that, under these preconditioning circumstances, the 
parties would choose his two principles of justice to structure and regulate 
their society. The first of these is what Rawls calls the Millian Principle. This 
says that each citizen of a well-ordered society has a right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others. All have 
equal liberties because all have equal rights under law designed to protect 
that liberty. The Millian Principle thus echoes and elaborates upon the 
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juridical ideal of equality characteristic of traditional Social Contract Theory. 
Rawls’s second principle has two parts. Part one Rawls describes as the Fair 
Opportunity Principle. This requires that social and economic inequalities be 
attach to roles and offices available to all. Rawls calls the second part of the 
second principle the Difference Principle. This one requires that social and 
economic inequalities benefit the least advantaged (TJ 60).   
 Rawls is the first Social Contract Theorist to try to meet the Marxist 
objection that merely juridical equality is no equality at all. He does not do 
this by arguing in favor of perfect social and economic equality for all citizens. 
This would have certain undesirable consequences, such as undermining 
incentives to do any of those things that might be driven by the desire for 
individual social or economic advancement – difficult or challenging or 
committed work, for example; or innovation or invention, or activities or roles 
that require a high level of visibility and so a high level of risk. Instead the 
second principle, in both of its parts, requires that the rewards of any such 
advancement benefit even those who are least likely to obtain them. So, for 
example, the more economically advantaged may be taxed at a higher rate so 
as to subsidize education, housing or health care for the least advantaged; the 
more socially powerful may be required to exercise that power – through 
judicious governance, role modeling, charity, or advocacy of social causes – in 
ways that benefit the less powerful.9 
 Rawls argues, but does not claim that the parties would argue, in favor of 
a serial ordering of these principles, such that the Millian Principle has lexical 
priority over the second, the Fair Opportunity Principle has lexical priority 
over the Difference Principle, and so the Millian Principle has lexical priority 
over the Difference Principle (TJ 62-3). This means that it is impermissible to 
abdicate or restrict basic liberties in order to obtain greater social or economic 
benefits, and similarly impermissible to abdicate either basic liberties or one's 
right to consideration for any public role or office in order to obtain any such 
benefits (TJ 61). So, for example, it would be impermissible to pass laws 
permitting press censorship for the sake of greater social harmony or 
economic well-being among citizens. Of course this does not mean that there 
are no restrictions at all on basic freedoms. We must not be at liberty to shout 
                                                
9In the Reagan and Bush eras, discussion of Rawls’s Difference Principle found its way 
into rationalizations of "trickle-down economics," in which the deregulation of 
corporate investment practices was supposed to be justified by creating more jobs for 
the economically disadvantaged. This was a perversion of Rawls’s conception of justice 
to begin with, and has proven to be false in its predictions as well. Nietzche would have 
been similarly horrified by the use made of his concept of the Übermensch by the Nazis, 
as Marx would have been by the atrocities committed by Lenin and Stalin in the name 
of the "truly human society." Whether a philosophical conception of the good society 
can ever have tangible social influence except through misunderstanding or 
misapplication of it is an issue I neglect with relief. 
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"Fire!" in a crowded theater just for fun, nor to allow children to act or be 
treated in any manner whatsoever. But in all such cases, basic liberties can be 
restricted only for the sake of greater liberty for everyone (TJ 244).  
 Similarly, an example of violating the lexical priority of the Fair 
Opportunity Principle over the Difference Principle would be any tradeoff 
that benefited the least advantaged economically by restricting or canceling 
their right to apply for public roles or offices. An hereditary but benevolent 
aristocracy, primogeniture, or laws benefiting needy groups or individuals 
with tax credits or bonuses or welfare payments in return for prohibiting 
them from running for election to public office would all violate the lexical 
priority of the Fair Opportunity Principle over the Difference Principle, by 
reducing the life prospects of those disadvantaged individuals (TJ 299-301). 
Finally, an example of violating the lexical priority of the Millian Principle 
over the Difference Principle would be laws or customs permitting the sale of 
oneself into slavery, or abdication of the right to vote, if it improved one's 
economic well-being to do either. Rawls thus contrasts what he calls his special 
conception of justice with a general conception that would permit the unequal 
distribution of any and all social and economic resources if so doing were to 
improve the situation of the least advantaged. 
 
3.2.2. Primary Goods 
 Rawls’s conception of the social and economic resources distributed by 
the principles of justice the parties in the original position decide upon is 
equally distinctive. Rawls defines primary social goods as those instrumental 
resources which are directly under the control of principles of distribution, 
such that one necessarily wants to maximize them in order to achieve 
whatever else one's goals may be (TJ 62, 92-93). They comprise, first, the rights 
and liberties distributed by the Millian Principle: the freedom to vote, 
freedom of speech and assembly, of conscience and thought, of one's person, 
to hold private property, and finally freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
seizure. Rawls argues that these are each necessary and jointly sufficient for a 
further primary good, that of self-respect. This he defines as a person's sense 
of her own value, the conviction that her goals are worth pursuing, and a 
realistic confidence in her ability to carry out her intentions (TJ Pars. 29 and 
67). 
 The basic idea of self-respect as a primary social good is that a society 
that gives explicit priority to the freedom of its citizens from undue 
constraints, that explicitly values the pursuit of individual goals and interests 
as such, conveys to its citizens a sense that their goals and interests are worth 
pursuing. Such a society endorses and undergirds its citizens' aspirations to 
autonomous self-realization. The explicit juridical valuation of an individual's 
goals and interests as such will then confer on that individual a sense of value, 
or self-respect. Self-respect is thus a backward-looking consequence of a 
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socially endorsed respect for individual liberty: Implementation of the Millian 
Principle confers worth on individual goals, and these juridically valued goals 
in turn confer worth on the individual whose goals they are. Individuals then 
have self-respect because the fundamental principles that structure their 
society acknowledge and support their right and ability to pursue their ends 
as they please. 
 To see the force of this, consider two individuals who do not regard their 
goals as worth pursuing. For one, a realistic assessment of the limited social 
and economic resources available to him might require him to assign a much 
lower priority to his aspirations than to the exigencies of immediate survival. 
It might not be that he views the desire to become a lawyer as intrinsically 
worthless. Having had considerable contact with lawyers, he might think that 
lawyers are valuable, and that his skill in analytical reasoning would make 
him a good one. But if his first priority were to find a soup kitchen, his second 
to find a place to sleep for the night, his third to avoid being sent to jail on 
vagrancy charges, and his fourth to learn how to read, his dream of becoming 
a lawyer would not count as a goal at all, for it would remain for all intents 
and purposes merely an unrealistic fantasy. Since he could not be said even to 
have this as a goal in the absence of sufficient social and economic resources, 
he could not even be described as viewing his goal as worthless.  
 A second individual might regard her aspiration to become a lawyer as 
not worth pursuing because she regarded herself as lacking in worth. 
Although she might nurse the secret desire to be a lawyer, she would not be 
able to imagine herself doing the job well, and would lack the self-confidence 
necessary to do what was instrumentally necessary to become one. The 
thoughts of applying to law school, taking the LSATs, clerking for a judge all 
would make her feel afraid, and sure she would fail. The basic idea behind 
Rawls’s conception of the basic liberties as necessary and conjointly sufficient 
for the primary good of self-respect is that the citizen of a well-ordered society 
structured by Rawls’s two principles of justice will not experience such 
failures of nerve. A citizen whose society publicly endorses freedom of 
thought, speech and mobility thereby publicly endorses the free pursuit of her 
individual goals as valuable simply because they are her goals. This public 
valuation of her goals as hers will lead her to regard herself as similarly 
valuable. This, in turn, will give her the self-confidence to pursue them.  
 Other primary goods distributed by the two principles of justice include 
the powers and opportunities distributed by the Fair Opportunity Principle, 
and income and wealth distributed by the Difference Principle. Both 
principles require that any disparities in the distribution of these goods be to 
the benefit of the least advantaged, i.e. such that any advantages accruing to 
those who are better off also work to the benefit of those who are less well off, 
and any decrease in those advantages would thereby decrease the benefits to 
the less well off. So, for example, a thriving business with a strong profit 
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margin arguably creates more jobs for those who need them through 
reinvestment and expansion; the lower the profit margin, the less revenue is 
available to salary positions, and so the fewer jobs available and the worse off 
the job seekers become. Both parts of the second principle of justice thus 
satisfy the requirement of Pareto optimality, i.e. that the preferred distribution 
is one that cannot be improved so as to increase anyone's benefits without cost 
to someone else (TJ 79). Taken together, rights, liberties, powers, 
opportunities, income, wealth and self-respect constitute resources which, on 
Rawls’s view, the parties in the original position would want to maximize for 
themselves as necessary means to the achievement of whatever conception of 
the good they might hold. 
 Rawls’s conception of primary social goods as necessary social and 
economic resources distributable by principles of justice circumvents a 
problem that besets Utilitarian theories of justice (TJ 91-92). On all such views, 
justice consists in maximizing the total or average utility, summed over all 
citizens, where "utility" is a dominant final end defined in various ways 
depending on the specifics of the theory: as happiness, welfare, desire-
satisfaction, or pleasure (I consider the classical version of Utilitarianism in 
Chapter XII). All of these subjective states of the agent raise the problem of 
how to measure the wellbeing of one citizen relative to another, i.e. of how to 
make interpersonal comparisons of utility. This problem was addressed in 
depth in Chapter IV.1. Suffice it here to say that without being able to make 
these interpersonal comparisons of utility, no variety of Utilitarianism has a 
basis on which to apply its distributive principle of justice, for there is no way 
of ascertaining whether I am in objective fact happier than, just as happy as, 
or less happy than you; nor, therefore, whether, if I am less happy than you, I 
am nevertheless as happy as I can be. Without ascertaining these things, there 
is no way of knowing whether or when total or average happiness, welfare, 
desire-satisfaction, or pleasure has been collectively maximized. I examine 
Brandt's solution to this question in Chapter XI. 
 Rawls’s concept of primary social goods bypasses it entirely. First, 
primary goods are publicly quantifiable.  Even self-respect, the most elusive 
of the set, is tied systematically to rights and liberties that are less elusive and 
so more susceptible to comparative measurement: One individual has less 
self-respect than another if the well-ordered society defends less ardently the 
rights and liberties of the former than it does those of the latter. Second, they 
are stipulated to be consensually valuable regardless of one's conception of 
the good. In this they diverge from Utilitarianism, which requires all citizens 
to adopt the same ultimate, dominant-end conception of the good. Third, the 
lexical ordering of Rawls’s principles of justice assigns to the seven kinds of 
primary goods a ranking that is both objective and ordinal, and requires only 
that each be maximized within its ordinal position for all citizens so far as 
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possible. Since each is publicly quantifiable at least in general terms, there is 
far less difficulty in saying in what maximization of a primary good consists.  
 In outline, then, Rawls’s theory of justice has the following structure: 
 
The Original Position  chooses  Two Principles of Justice  distribute  Primary Goods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        structure          within 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. The Structure of Rawls’s Theory of Justice 
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4. Habermas’s Critique 
 
4.1. Primary Goods 
 Jürgen Habermas objects to Rawls’s normative characterization of rights 
and liberties as primary goods on the grounds that, first, rights and liberties 
are not things that can be possessed in the ways that income, wealth, or 
property can. Rather, they regulate interactions among agents. Second, they 
must be exercised, not merely owned, in order to be enjoyed (RT 54).10  
Only between rights, on the one side, and actual chances to exercise 
rights, on the other, can there exist a chasm that is problematic from the 
                                                
10 “Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy XCII, 3 (March 1995), 109-131; reprinted in The 
Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1998). Page references to the latter edition are paginated in the text in 
brackets and preceded by “RT”. 
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perspective of justice; such a rupture cannot exist between the possession 
and enjoyment of goods (56). 
Habermas thus offers a counterpart to Marx’s critique of traditional Social 
Contract Theory, that rights are empty, merely juridical concepts without the 
fair distribution of economic resources that gives them meaning. Similarly, 
Habermas faults Rawls for reifying juridical concepts that are just as empty 
and meaningless without practical and concrete opportunities for their 
exercise. As is true for Marx, such opportunities presuppose the material and 
social means to do so. In this respect there is an asymmetry between rights 
and goods that, Habermas argues, Rawls fails to acknowledge. 
Furthermore, Habermas reproaches Rawls at the metaethical level, for 
having effectively conflated the distinction between teleological values and 
deontological norms by conceiving of rights and liberties as goods. Norms, 
Habermas argues, guide action decisions, impose obligations, express 
behavioral expectations, make binary claims of validity or invalidity, are 
impartial in their application to agents, and must be mutually coherent. 
Values, by contrast, guide outcome choices, offer arrays of particular objects 
of preference, express purposive ends, require ordinal rankings, are culturally 
or subjectively conditioned, and compete for priority. 
To sum up, norms differ from values, first, in their relation to rule-
governed as opposed to purposive action; second, in a binary as opposed 
to a gradual coding of the respective validity claims; third, in their 
absolute as opposed to relative bindingness; and last, in the criteria that 
systems of norms as opposed to systems of values must satisfy (55). 
Rawls, Habermas thinks, ignores these distinctions by assimilating rights and 
liberties into the decision theorist’s pairwise comparisons among preference 
alternatives. 
 However, from Rawls’s stipulation of rights and liberties as objects of 
preference along with other goods, it does not follow that he disregards these 
deep structural differences between them, any more than it would follow 
from my having to choose between darning a sock and reading a book that I 
disregarded the structural differences between them. We have already seen in 
Chapter IV that it is both a blessing and a curse that canonical decision theory 
can reify any state of affairs that can be an object of desire into a preference 
alternative. And surely rights and liberties can be objects of desire. Habermas 
is right to call attention to the important difference between those primary 
goods which can be enjoyed merely by being owned and those which can be 
enjoyed only by being exercised. This distinction assumes increasing 
significance as the primary goods are gradually distributed by the two 
principles of justice under the four-stage sequence. But we can see in Figure 
12 above that Rawls does, in fact, make provision for this distinction in the 
primary goods that each principle of justice distributes: rights and liberties are 
distributed specifically by the first, Millian principle that stipulates that the 
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distribution of these goods must be equal. This stipulation in effect ensures 
that the particular, norm-governed character of rights and liberties that 
Habermas enumerates – rule-governedness, binariness, unconditionality, and 
mutual coherence – are respected. 
 
4.2. The Four-Stage Sequence 
 Once the principles for just distribution of the primary goods are chosen, 
Rawls stipulates a process, which he calls the four-stage sequence, during which 
progressively more information is made accessible to the parties in order that 
they may make increasingly specific choices about constitutional and 
legislative matters (TJ 195-201). As the veil of ignorance is gradually lifted, the 
parties learn increasingly more about their actual places in society and the 
particular distribution of primary goods their choice of the two principles has 
allotted them. 
Here Habermas observes that first, in order to ensure the consonance of 
the two principles of justice with the more specific information that comes in 
as the veil of ignorance is lifted, the designer of this normative moral theory 
must anticipate and foresee the contents and effects of all the specific 
information he denied to the parties in the Original Position in the first place 
(RT 58). This authorial omniscience, assuming it is plausible, undermines the 
function and purpose of the veil of ignorance itself, and leaves the parties in 
the original position with virtually nothing to do. Second, similarly, 
the higher the veil of ignorance is raised and the more Rawls’s citizens 
themselves take on real flesh and blood, the more deeply they find 
themselves subject to principles and norms that have been anticipated in 
theory and have already become institutionalized beyond their control. In 
this way, the theory deprives the citizens of too many of the insights that 
they would have to assimilate anew in each generation (RT 69). 
Because all of the substantive questions of just distribution have been decided 
before the citizens find out who they are, either by the parties in the original 
position under the veil of ignorance, or by the author who works out the 
detailed social arrangements that the veil of ignorance temporarily conceals, 
there is virtually nothing for the citizens to do either, beyond passively 
accepting and affirming (Rawls’s term) the principles and arrangements that 
have been fashioned for them. This ensures social stability, but only at the cost 
of citizens’ political autonomy and their active exercise of public reason (RT 
70). The four-stage sequence, Habermas objects, takes the important work of 
theory-building and political decision-making out of the hands of the citizens 
whose society is their subject, leaving them with little to do but enjoy the 
fruits of intellectual and political work performed at earlier stages of 
conception; and, therefore, no resources for training future generations to do 
this important work. Rather, the citizens are better understood as custodians 
of the well-ordered society whose main responsibility is to ensure its stability 
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and continuity over time. But because they are deprived of the opportunity to 
engage actively in the project of determining the general content and 
particular form of the principles of justice that fix the basic structure of their 
society, the validity of those principles must remain in question. 
 
4.3. The Moral Point of View 
Habermas’s most serious criticism is that this lack, in turn, deprives the 
citizens of the well-ordered society of a genuinely moral point of view, in 
which  
everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else and thus to 
project herself into the understandings of self and world of all others; 
from this interlocking of perspectives there emerges an ideally extended 
‘we-perspective’ from which all can test in common whether they wish to 
make a controversial norm the basis of their shared practice (RT 58; cf. 
also 68, 81-82) [.] 
Habermas’s conception of the moral point of view thus requires a version of 
Mead’s ideal role-taking,11 in which we enlarge our perspectives beyond the 
personal, by successively assuming the personal perspectives of all other 
participants and incorporating them into our own. The ideal end-point of this 
process is a “universally valid view of the world,” in which “what from my 
point of view is equally good for all [would] actually be in the equal interest 
of each individual” (RT 57). But the process as Habermas and Mead conceive 
it require a degree of imagination and insight into the inner lives of others 
that can come only from extensive experience of and intensive information-
gathering about different kinds of people and cultures. Thus it is strongly 
conditioned by the empirical experience of walking in another’s shoes: living 
in another culture, for example, or visiting a different political milieu, or 
taking a job outside one’s class and education status, or inhabiting for an 
extended period of time a different social environment, or fraternizing with 
friends from other subcultures.  
There is no question that concerted use of the imagination, combined 
with sensitivity to others’ attitudes, curiosity about their origins, and a 
consequent openness to their contributions to serious discussion can have the 
similarly salutary effect of opening one’s eyes, deepening one’s insight into 
otherness, and raising one’s awareness of the subjectivity of the personal 
values and attitudes with which one began. However, Habermas’s optimistic 
assumption that this process will engender a perspective from which the 
successive perspectives one has assumed can be unified in a universally valid 
“we-perspective” holds only in cases in which the perspectives in question are 
not in fact structurally irreconcilable.  
                                                
11 See George Herbert Mead, “Fragments on Ethics,” in Mind, Self and Society (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1934), 379 ff. 
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But Rawls is concerned precisely with such cases, and builds them into 
his conception of the original position; for these are the subjective and 
objective circumstances of justice under which truly urgent questions of 
political justice arise.12 In such cases of incorrigible conflict among personal 
perspectives, the process of ideal role-taking must engender not a point of 
view from which the interests of all can be equally served; but rather the 
recognition that the interests of some must be sacrificed. This point of view is 
the perspective of transpersonal rationality that prepares one to accept the 
possible sacrifice of one’s personal interests in the service of a larger vision of 
moral and social justice. These are among the possibilities that the parties in 
the original position must consider. By operating under the veil of ignorance, 
the parties accept that “any principle chosen in the original position may 
require a large sacrifice for some” (TJ 176). No participant in rational dialogue 
who is unprepared to countenance such a possibility, and to accept it as a 
possible outcome, can be said to have a genuinely moral point of view toward 
the resolution of questions of just distribution.  
Habermas’s objection that Rawls’s citizens of the well-ordered society 
lack such a point of view is therefore misplaced on two counts. First, these 
sacrifices have already been made in the original position, through imposition 
of the veil of ignorance; and resolution of questions of just distribution 
already achieved. The citizens of the well-ordered society are the result of 
such a resolution, not the agents of it, by definition. Hence the transpersonally 
rational perspective that is a precondition for making such sacrifices is no 
longer required in the well-ordered society. But second, this perspective in 
fact is, contra Habermas, available to its citizens, through reflection on the 
concept of the original position and the principles of justice it engenders. Here 
it is worth quoting Rawls’s concluding description of this standpoint at 
length: 
Each aspect of the original position can be given a supporting 
explanation. Thus what we are doing is to combine into one conception 
the totality of conditions that we are ready upon due reflection to 
recognize as reasonable in our conduct with regard to one another. Once 
we grasp this conception, we can at any time look at the social world from the 
required point of view. … it is a certain form of thought and feeling that 
rational persons can adopt within the world. And having done so, they 
                                                
12 At least in the United States. I suspect that this difference in what Rawls and 
Habermas respectively require for the moral point of view is at least in part a function 
of their differing background political environments: the United States is a four 
hundred year-old attempt to contain murderously antagonistic and widely diverse 
social and cultural forces under the rubric of capitalism, whereas Germany is a sixty-
year-old attempt to contain relatively homogeneous social and cultural forces under the 
rubric of democracy. 
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can, whatever their generation, bring together into one scheme all individual 
perspectives and arrive together at regulative principles that can be affirmed by 
everyone as he lives by them, each from his own standpoint. Purity of heart, if 
one could attain it, would be to see clearly and to act with grace and self-
command from this point of view (TJ 587; italics added). 
Thus both Rawls and Habermas agree that the moral point of view integrates 
all individual perspectives into a single transpersonal one. But Rawls’s 
conception of the moral point of view is one that results from agreement 
reached in the original position. It is accessible both to us as readers and to the 
citizens of Rawls’s well-ordered society, whenever we need to be reminded of 
the magnitude of the efforts that had to have been made so that justice could 
be achieved. Embedded in the conditions and outcome of the original 
position, it provides us and the citizens of the well-ordered society with a 
mnemonic device for recalling and affirming the validity of the principles of 
justice that have been formulated to structure it. Because it presupposes prior 
resolution of conflicting claims to scarce resources, it is a much more 
demanding point of view than Habermas’, for its vision requires a wider 
sweep and greater distance from the pull of any particular agent’s self-
interest.  
By contrast, Habermas conceives the “we-perspective” not as a 
consequence but rather as a precondition for reaching agreement on 
principles of justice. This requires that conflicting claims among individuals 
be reconcilable in advance of such agreement – i.e. that differences among 
individual perspectives not be so deep that they cannot be coherently 
integrated independently of and prior to any accord on principles of justice that are 
supposed to resolve them. However, to meet this requirement is, in effect, to 
leave such individuals with nothing substantial to resolve.  
So it is Habermas’s conception of the moral point of view, not Rawls’s, 
which leaves participants in rational dialogue with nothing to do. For 
Habermas’s conception deprives citizens of the painful and instructive 
opportunity to engage the difficult issues of whose interests are to be 
advanced and whose sacrificed, whose claims to scarce resources are valid 
and whose invalid, and what principles of justice are most suitable for all 
regardless of personal advantage to anyone. A moral point of view that 
successfully integrates all individual perspectives into a single transpersonal 
one presupposes that these issues have been addressed and resolved. It can 
therefore be a consequence of such resolution but not a precondition of it.  
  
5. The Analogy with Science Reconsidered 
 
5.1. Pure Procedural Justice 
 We have seen that the parties in the original position are stipulated to 
have the capacity to recognize the two principles of justice as, indeed, just. But 
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in what sense are these principles just? Rawls distinguishes three ways of 
conceiving justice. The first is what he calls perfect procedural justice (TJ 85). 
Here we begin with a prior conception of what justice under the 
circumstances requires, and then devise a procedure for yielding that 
outcome. The example he gives is of dividing a tasty cake fairly among 
healthy adults. Intuitively, it seems obvious that each should have a slice 
equal to that of everyone else's. To insure this we ask the person who will get 
the last slice to cut the cake for everyone. Most problems of fair distribution 
are not solved so easily.   
 In imperfect procedural justice, by contrast, we again have an independent 
conception of what justice requires, but no sure procedure for reaching that 
outcome. Here Rawls’s example is of a criminal trial. Our prior conception of 
what justice requires is simply that the defendant should be found guilty if 
and only if he committed the crime. We do our best to secure that outcome by 
devising and following laws of evidence, testimony and deliberation, but it 
does not always work; there are miscarriages of justice. Classical 
Utilitarianism would provide another example of imperfect procedural justice 
(TJ 89): It begins with a prior conception of what justice requires – i.e. the 
greatest net sum of happiness, welfare, or desire-satisfaction for everyone, 
and may experiment with different procedures – for example, regulated or 
unregulated free markets, centrally planned economies, private ownership 
versus nationalization of industries, employee stock ownership or profit-
sharing plans, etc. – for maximizing it. But it can provide no procedure 
guaranteed to yield this outcome. 
 Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness is an example of what he calls 
pure procedural justice. Here there is no prior conception of what justice 
requires, independent of a certain kind of procedure, which, when actually 
carried out, ensures its outcome as just by definition. Therefore, pure 
procedural justice generates a just outcome from a value-neutral starting 
point, in that the procedure that generates this outcome can be specified as a 
series of steps to be followed and conditions to be met that include no 
reference to any independent preconceptions about in what justice should 
consist. The example he gives is of gambling: If all players voluntarily engage 
in a series of unrigged bets and no one cheats, such that "unrigged" and 
"cheats" are shorthand for subprocedures that can be specified value-
neutrally, the resulting distribution of cash is by definition fair (TJ 86), and 
recognizable as such by all players. Similarly, Rawls argues, if the parties in 
the original position go through the process of deliberation and agreement he 
describes under the conditions he describes, the outcome is similarly fair by 
definition and recognizable as such by them.  
 In both cases, the procedure actually must be carried out in order to judge 
the resulting outcome as just, and in order to know what justice requires 
under those circumstances. Unless it is the actual result of that very 
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procedure, the particular distribution has no claim to justice. So, for example, 
there is nothing inherently just about your having 86% of the pot compared to 
my 2%, unless this is the outcome of a gamble in which we both voluntarily 
participated. Only its status as the outcome of that procedure makes it just. 
The way in which the two principles of justice distribute primary goods in the 
well-ordered society is just, on this view, because and only because of the 
procedure of deliberation and agreement in the original position through 
which they have been selected. However, Rawls’s integration of widely 
accepted principles of rationality into the conception of the original position 
insures that the resulting distribution will not seem arbitrary. 
 Rawls’s account of pure procedural justice develops further the 
conception of moral objectivity he limned in "Outline of a Decision Procedure 
for Ethics," discussed in Section 1. Like that account of moral objectivity, pure 
procedural justice might be compared to an analogous conception in the 
natural sciences, which we might call pure procedural truth. Like pure 
procedural justice, pure procedural truth would presuppose no criterion of 
validity independent of the actual outcome of a correctly carried-out 
procedure for ascertaining it. Therefore, like pure procedural justice, pure 
procedural truth would be value-neutral in the important sense that it would 
be unbiased by any preconceptions about what a legitimate outcome ought to 
look like. More specifically, pure procedural scientific truth, on this 
hypothesis, would be defined as the outcome – whatever that outcome might 
be – of correctly carried out procedures of observation, data gathering, 
inductive reasoning, hypothesis construction, deductive reasoning and 
prediction, experimentation under controlled conditions, and intersubjective 
replication of predicted experimental results. Whatever outcomes resulted 
from this procedure would qualify as by definition objectively valid.  
 Now natural scientists do not actually adhere to this conception of pure 
procedural truth in all of its particulars, nor would they necessarily accept the 
outcomes of these procedures as such without qualification. On the contrary: 
we know that scientists very often proceed unsystematically and intuitively, 
follow hunches rather than rational deliberation and deviate from canonical 
scientific procedure at many points along the way. Moreover, even the more 
scrupulously procedural may shrink from anointing the outcome of their 
labors with the appellation of objective validity. For suppose that outcome is 
too anomalous relative to their initial premises, or deviates too far from 
accepted scientific dogma of the day, or violates too radically the personal 
metaphysical views that underlie their acceptance of that dogma. Then rather 
than legitimate it as objectively valid, no matter how many times that 
outcome has been replicated under controlled conditions by different 
laboratories, they may blink at the requisite inference rather than stare it 
down. They may infer instead that mistakes in procedure must have been 
made somewhere in order to generate this outcome; or suspect that evidence 
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has been doctored; or turn their attention to all the additional errors that can 
accumulate in the process of intersubjective replication of results by different 
laboratories. That is, they may, in effect, conceive objective validity as 
imperfect procedural truth, in which one begins with a prior conception of 
scientific truth, for the discovery of which one has devised rather vulnerable 
procedures of reasoning and experimentation that do not always work. If the 
outcome of these procedures in a particular case deviates too wildly from 
one's preconceptions about what an objectively valid outcome should be, the 
inference is available that it is the procedures, rather than one's 
preconceptions, that are at fault. 
 
5.2. Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
 Rawls’s early analogy with scientific procedure, carried through here, 
illuminates the question of which account of justice – pure procedural, perfect 
procedural, or imperfect procedural – in fact best fits Rawls’s account in A 
Theory of Justice of the eventually deductive relationship between the original 
position and the well-ordered society as structured by the two principles of 
justice. Like experimental procedure among scientists, deliberative procedure 
among the parties is stipulated to generate an outcome that is objectively 
valid in virtue of its history. Like an experimental result, the deliberative 
result may cast doubt on the care or precision with which the procedure was 
executed. Or, in case these standards have been verifiably met, it may reveal 
that our commitment to the procedure as an index of objective validity is in 
fact outweighed by our commitment to an independent preconception about 
what an objectively valid outcome can be – to which this result has perhaps 
failed to measure up. Is the relationship between the original position 
procedure and the two principles of justice more like the procedure and 
results of gambling? Or is it more like the procedure and results of a criminal 
trial?  
 So far we have examined Rawls’s metaethics from the perspective of the 
original position. We have traced just a few of the basic relationships between 
the conditions that define it and the principles it is claimed deductively to 
generate. What we have not yet done is the analogue of what scientists do in 
assessing the status of their experimental results relative to the hypotheses 
that predicted them, namely decide whether they are in accordance with their 
trained judgment, intuitions, and practice as scientists; or whether those 
results, the procedures that generated them, the hypotheses those procedures 
were intended to test, or indeed the training and practice on which all depend 
require rethinking or revision.  
 Analogously, we have not yet assessed whether the metaethical and 
normative scheme Rawls offers conforms to our commonsense moral 
intuitions about what a free, equal and impartial consensus in deliberation 
entails, or in what a just distribution of moderately scarce social goods in a 
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well-ordered society consists. Nor, if either the metaethical or the normative 
scheme does not, whether it is our commonsense moral intuitions, the 
description of the original position, or the statement of the two principles of 
justice that should be rethought. In later sections, I show that we need to be 
able to make these assessments of Rawls’s scheme, independently of the 
Instrumentalist strategy by which he first attempts to justify it; and that his 
later revisions of this strategy retain its deductive character while jettisoning 
its Instrumentalism (recall that Instrumentalism is just one kind of 
Deductivism). 
 Rawls’s concept of wide reflective equilibrium allows us to make these 
assessments. He distinguishes three elements in the justification of his theory 
of justice. The first would consist in showing that the original position 
expresses shared, weak assumptions that we accept about the conditions of 
rationality and impartiality under which principles of justice should be 
chosen (TJ 19). The second would show that the two principles of justice 
derived from these conditions express or extend our basic moral intuitions 
about a just society, or enable us to resolve cases in which our intuitions are 
unsure (TJ 21). The third combines the first two:  We try to achieve narrow 
reflective equilibrium between the first two elements – the original position and 
the two principles of justice – by checking each against the other in relation to 
the third: our basic moral intuitions. We examine or modify the statement of 
the two principles in relation to the construction of the original position that 
generated them, with an eye to maximizing their coherence with one another, 
as well as with our commonsense moral intuitions.  By aiming to maximize 
the coherence of all three elements – the description of the original position, 
the statement of the two principles of justice, and our commonsense moral 
intuitions, we enter into a process of self-scrutiny in which we gradually and 
reflectively articulate considered moral judgments (TJ 47-48), leaving open the 
possibility that any of the three may undergo radical revision in the process.  
 We then try to achieve wide reflective equilibrium by testing and revising 
these considered judgments in light of hard cases that may challenge them 
and other theories of justice – Classical Utilitarianism most importantly, for 
Rawls, but others such as Marxism and Perfectionism as well – that offer 
competing principles of distribution (TJ 49-50).  Rawls’s overall scheme in 
wide reflective equilibrium would then look this way (note the bi-
directionality of some arrows of influence): 
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Figure 14. Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
 
 The analogy with scientific procedure enables us to clarify what is at 
stake. In the process of constructing a scientific theory, scientists are 
influenced by competing hypotheses and explanations to make adjustments 
and revisions both to the statement of their own and to the predictions they 
expect it to yield. But both hypothesis and predictions are also conditioned by 
a scientist's epistemic intuitions about what is physically possible and likely 
under the circumstances. If a hypothesis entails predictions that are, in that 
scientist's judgment, highly unlikely to occur, this undermines the plausibility 
of the hypothesis in favor of competing ones, before the experiments have 
even been performed.  
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 On the other hand, such judgments of plausibility may have to be 
sacrificed if the hypothesis has been carefully formulated on the basis of 
sufficient inductive evidence and rules of inference scrupulously observed. In 
this case, the strangeness or improbability of the predicted results may not 
warrant further revision or rejection of the hypothesis before experiments 
have been performed. Should the results of such experiments then be equally 
strange or improbable, a commitment to the rational integrity of the 
procedure necessitates sacrifice of those epistemic intuitions, not an insistence 
that its integrity must have been violated somewhere along the line.  
 Thus in the scientific case, an overriding commitment to the rationality of 
scientific procedure requires conceiving of it as an instance of pure procedural 
truth; whereas an overriding commitment to one's prior conception of what 
might plausibly constitute scientific truth – a commitment that might, in a 
particular case, require rethinking or revising the procedure in order to 
conform to it – requires conceiving of this procedure as an instance of perfect 
procedural truth. The question is, to paraphrase Humpty Dumpty, which – 
scientific procedure or conception of scientific truth – is to prevail. 
 Analogously in Rawls’s theory of justice. Which – deliberative procedure 
or commonsense moral intuitions – is to prevail? If our commonsense moral 
intuitions about what justice requires are the final arbiter in evaluating the 
plausibility of the two principles, or of their derivation from the original 
position, or of the original position itself, such that we are unwilling to 
sacrifice these intuitions to any counterintuitive results Rawls’s stipulated 
decision procedure (correctly carried out) might have, then Rawls’s 
deliberative procedure is in fact one of perfect procedural justice. For by 
insisting that the outcome of this procedure finally conform to our 
commonsense moral intuitions about what justice requires, we will have 
subordinated that outcome, and indeed the procedure itself, to prior 
preconceptions about what justice requires that the procedure is designed to 
approximate. Only if our moral intuitions are equally vulnerable to sacrifice in 
the service of the rational procedure of deliberation Rawls describes can he 
make the claim about justice analogously to that one might wish to make 
about science. Only if rationality may outweigh moral intuition in metaethics 
just as it may outweigh epistemic intuition in science is Rawls’s view truly an 
instance of pure procedural justice; and so only then can he claim to have met 
the standard of moral objectivity he set for himself in 1951. We will be in a 
better position to settle this question after we examine more closely what 
Rawls’s deliberative procedure entails. 
 
6. The Continuity Thesis 
 With at least some of the basics of Rawls’s theory in place, let us now 
look at the implications of a certain metaphysical thesis the truth of which is 
presupposed in various early objections that were raised against A Theory of 
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Justice by a number of philosophers. Although their criticisms differ in many 
respects, all of these objections concur in assuming what I refer to as the 
continuity thesis. This consists of the following claims conjointly: 
 
(1) The parties in the original position are, and know themselves to 
be, fully mature persons who will be among the members of the well-
ordered society which is generated by their choice of principles of justice. 
(2) The original position is a conscious event among others, 
integrated (compatibly with the constraints on knowledge and 
motivation imposed on the parties) into the regular continuity of 
experience that comprises each of their ongoing conscious lives. 
(3) The parties in the original position thus are, and regard 
themselves as, psychologically continuing persons, partially determined in 
personality and interests by prior experiences, capable of recollection and 
regret concerning the past, anticipation and apprehensiveness regarding 
the future, etc. 
 
Thus, for example, some early criticisms of Rawls’s Theory of Justice centered 
on what they took to be the individualistic assumptions embodied in the 
original position: Adina Schwartz argued that Rawls’s assumption that the 
parties prefer a greater rather than a lesser amount of primary goods would 
contribute to a well-ordered society based on a preference for more rather 
than less wealth, and that this condition would be unacceptable to one who 
discovered herself to be a socialist.13 Similarly, Thomas Nagel argued that the 
very concept of primary goods biases the choice of principles 
individualistically, against conceptions of the good that depend on the social 
interrelationships among individuals, and so may require the parties in the 
original position to commit themselves to a set of social arrangements that 
contravene their deepest convictions once the veil of ignorance is lifted.14 
David Gauthier attacked Rawls’s assumption of economic rationality, 
showing that parties guided by instrumental reasoning in the OP would 
choose, not principles to structure a society based on justice as fairness, but 
instead those that would structure a "private society" instrumental to the 
pursuit of their individual utility-maximization.15 Finally, Richard Miller 
argued that an individual in the original position who turned out to have 
been a member of the ruling class with an acute need for wealth and power in 
                                                
13Adina Schwartz, "Moral Neutrality and Primary Goods," Ethics 83 (1973), 294-307. See 
especially pp. 304-6. 
14In "Rawls on Justice," The Philosophical Review 87, 2 (April 1973), 220-34; reprinted in 
Reading Rawls, Ed. Norman Daniels (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974). 
15David Gauthier, "Justice and Natural Endowment: Toward a Critique of Rawls’s 
Ideological Framework," Social Theory and Practice 3 (1975), 3-26. 
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the society preceding the original position would find her interests frustrated 
by the egalitarian requirements of the difference principle.16 Each of these 
criticisms called attention to the possibility of a disparity between the interests 
or beliefs of the parties in the original position and the conditions they may 
confront in the well-ordered society that is supposed to result from their 
choice. Hence each presupposes the continuity thesis. Subsequent criticisms of 
Rawls’s theory presupposed it as well.17 
 Although the continuity thesis as stated above is not at odds with any of 
the conditions that define the original position, its exegetical validity is a 
matter for discussion. I argue here that if it is indeed contained in or a 
consequence of Rawls’s theory, then it reinforces Rawls’s reliance on an 
Instrumentalist metaethical strategy. This then casts into doubt the capacity of 
the original position to generate or justify any principles of justice at all. On 
the other hand, if the continuity thesis is viewed as dispensable and 
unnecessary to Rawls’s theory, then Rawls is correct in maintaining the 
irrelevance of the question of personal identity to the construction of his 
moral theory18. In this case, the Instrumentalist justification for the two 
principles of justice should be supplanted by a modified conception of wide 
reflective equilibrium. The considerations that form the bulk of this discussion 
thus provide a philosophical rationale for Rawls’s recent revisions in the 
model of justification on which his theory of justice rests, and for his 
increasing emphasis on us as moral mediators between the original position 
and the well-ordered society.19 
                                                
16Richard Miller, "Rawls and Marxism," in Daniels (op. cit. Note 14.). 
17See, for example, Anthony Kronman's and Samuel Scheffler's comments on Rawls’s 
Tanner Lecture, "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority," The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, Vol. III (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 1982). 
18John Rawls, "The Independence of Moral Theory," Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Association 1975 (Presidential Address). 
19See in particular Lectures I and III of his Dewey Lectures, "Kantian Constructivism in 
Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980," The Journal of Philosophy LXXVII, 9 
(September 1980); "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 14, 3 (Summer 1985), 223-251; and his emphasis on the original position as a 
"device of representation .. set up by you and me in working out justice as fairness ...." 
in Political Liberalism (op. cit. Note 3), 22-28. In my September 1976 paper, “Continuing 
Persons and the Original Position,” for Rawls’s moral and political philosophy seminar, 
I suggested that Rawls reconceive the original position as a device applied to the 
“circumstances of moral conflict that regularly confront us .. [that] both insures the 
impartiality of our moral judgments and also yields substantive moral principles in 
accordance with which we can judge these issues;” and also that he accord greater 
emphasis to “ourselves as moral mediators between the original position and the well-
ordered society” – i.e. you and me – as practitioners of wide reflective equilibrium. I 
repeated these suggestions in revising this paper for publication as "Personal 
Continuity and Instrumental Rationality in Rawls’s Theory of Justice," Social Theory and 
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 Now let us consider whether or not, given the textual evidence, anything 
like the continuity thesis is stated or implied by Rawls; and what problems for 
his theory, if any, turn on a positive or negative answer to this question. To 
begin with, there is much in A Theory of Justice to lend support to the 
continuity thesis. Certain passages on what Rawls calls the strains of 
commitment suggest that the parties in the original position are 
psychologically continuous with identifiable members of the well-ordered 
society ((1) and (2) of the continuity thesis). For example, when Rawls 
stipulates that the parties have a sense of justice in that they "can rely on each 
other to understand and act in accordance with whatever principles are finally 
agreed to. Once principles are acknowledged the parties can depend on one 
another to conform to them" (TJ 145), the importance of insuring that these 
individuals are, in the well-ordered society, capable of adhering to the 
commitment they made in the original position is evident. This is 
reemphasized later when Rawls asserts that 
In view of the serious nature of the possible consequences [of the original 
agreement], the question of the burden of commitment is especially acute. 
A person is choosing once and for all the standards which are to govern 
his life prospects ... the parties must weight with care whether they will 
be able to stick by their commitment in all circumstances (TJ 176). 
These claims clearly presuppose that the parties in the original position are, 
and know themselves to be, psychologically continuous with particular 
members of the society the basic structure upon which they now decide. Also, 
in discussing sound procedures of moral education in the well-ordered 
society, Rawls proposes that "in agreeing to principles of right the parties in 
the original position at the same time consent to the arrangements necessary 
to make these principles effective in their conduct" (TJ 515). This condition is 
clearly meant to insure the conformity to principle in the well-ordered society 
of the parties in the original position. Finally, Rawls made clear in subsequent 
discussion20 that the parties in the original position are to be conceived as 
future members of a well-ordered society. 
 Also relevant to the continuity thesis are those passages in A Theory of 
Justice which suggest that the parties in the OP are continuing persons in that 
they are partially determined in their tastes and values by events prior to the 
original position ((2) and (3) of the continuity thesis), and that this must be 
considered in the subsequent well-ordered society. Rawls claims, for example, 
that the parties in the original position are to decide in advance the principles 
                                                                                                     
Practice 13, 1 (Spring 1987), 49-76, from which this chapter originates. Also see Section 8, 
below. 
20"Reply to Alexander and Musgrave," Quarterly Journal of Economics 88 (November 
1974), 633-39. 
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which are to regulate their interaction (TJ 11, 31), and further that they do this 
without a knowledge of their more particular ends: 
They implicitly agree, therefore, to conform their conceptions of their 
good to what the principles of justice require, or at least not to press 
claims which directly violate them. An individual who find that he enjoys 
seeing others in positions of lesser liberty understands that he has no 
claim whatever to this enjoyment (TJ 31). 
The evidence here is strong that Rawls is canvassing the possibility that one 
such individual might discover, when the veil of ignorance is lifted, that his 
prior personal interests conflict with the principle he has chosen in the 
original position. Rawls’s response is that such interests are simply to be 
disregarded. Further, his controversial claim that "it may turn out, once the 
veil of ignorance is removed, that some of [the parties in the original position] 
for religious or other reasons may not, in fact, want more of these [primary] 
goods" (TJ 142) provides additional support for the thesis that the parties in 
the original position are continuing persons, partially determined by their 
psychological histories, for whom the original position is an event among 
others in their conscious lives. This is because the implication here, as in the 
passage quoted above, is that the parties in the original position might 
subsequently discover in themselves psychological tendencies or desires that 
are in no sense determined by the decision made in the original position, 
hence must be determined by forces prior to that event. Nevertheless, those 
forces must continue to operate after it in order for the requisite discovery to 
be made. Again, the same point is made even more strongly later: 
How can the parties possibly know, or be sufficiently sure, that they can 
keep such an agreement? ... any principle chosen in the original position 
may require a large sacrifice for some. The beneficiaries of clearly unjust 
institutions (those founded on principles which have no claim to 
acceptance) may find it hard to reconcile themselves to the changes that 
will have to be made. But in this case they will know that they could not 
have maintained their position anyway (TJ 176). 
 Finally, there are auxiliary passages which, when taken together, clearly 
buttress the conception of the continuity of the parties as identifiable 
individuals both prior and subsequent to their participation in the original 
position. On page 166 of A Theory of Justice, Rawls observes that "The persons 
in the original position know that they already hold a place in some particular 
society;" and later, in discussing the strategic advantages of the four-stage 
sequence, he says, "So far I have supposed that once the principles of justice 
are chosen the parties return to their place in society and henceforth judge 
their claims on the social system by these principles" (TJ 196). These two 
passages establish that the original position as an event is integrated into the 
continuing personal histories of the parties ((2) of the continuity thesis). 
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 Further evidence of the continuity thesis is to be gleaned from the 
concluding paragraphs of the Dewey Lectures21, where Rawls claims of the 
parties in the original position that 
persons so conceived and moved by their highest-order interests are 
themselves, in their rationally autonomous deliberations, the agents who 
select the principles that are to govern the basic structure of their social life (DL 
572; emphasis added). 
Moreover, in this later discussion, Rawls frequently characterizes the parties 
in the original position in terms similar or identical to those which 
characterize the members of the well-ordered society (see, for example, the 
description of each as self-originating sources of valid claims at DL 548, 564, 
and 543 respectively). 
 From all these claims jointly, we are quickly led to the conception of 
particular individuals, mature and partially formed by their own pasts and 
the previous conditions of their society, who voluntarily come together and, 
temporarily assuming the constraints and veil of ignorance of the original 
position, choose principles that are henceforth to govern their claims upon 
one another. The veil of ignorance is then lifted gradually, in accordance with 
the four-stage sequence. These individuals recover knowledge of themselves, 
their pasts, their habits, interests, and conceptions of the good, and 
immediately proceed to realize their chosen well-ordered society in 
conformity with the two principles of justice. This is the conception the 
continuity thesis expresses.  
 The truth of the continuity thesis gives credence to an implication 
common to each of the early criticisms of Rawls mentioned earlier. Schwartz 
and Nagel both claimed that someone of a strongly socialist or communitarian 
persuasion might be frustrated in her efforts to realize her conception of the 
good in Rawls’s well-ordered society. Gauthier argued that individuals with 
the economic rationality Rawls ascribes to the parties in the original position 
would repudiate the two principles of justice for others that better enabled 
them to pursue their individual interests. And similarly, Miller's criticism can 
be understood as suggesting that someone with a highly individualistic, 
ruling class-determined conception of the good might be frustrated in 
realizing it by choosing the difference principle. Now if the continuity thesis is 
true, the parties in the original position must at least consider the possibility 
that in fact they may be any of these types of people, in addition to numerous 
other possibilities (for example, that their conception of the good includes 
seeing other persons in positions of the lesser liberty). They must consider the 
possibility that by choosing as they do – however they choose – they risk at the 
very least the extreme frustration of their deep-seated desires and conceptions 
of the good; or at most their gradual extinction as continuing personalities 
                                                
21 Rawls, Dewey Lectures, ibid. Page references will be in the text, preceded by DL. 
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with identifiable tastes, interests, and values. Thus they must be prepared, as 
we have seen a transpersonally rational moral point of view requires, to give 
up all that is central to their prior sense of self for the sake of those principles 
which they agree are to regulate their behavior. But since they are also 
assumed by Rawls to be primarily concerned in the original position to 
advance their own interests and conceptions of the good in the subsequent 
society, it is difficult to see how both conditions can be satisfied; and how they 
can therefore choose principles of justice under the constraints of the original 
position at all. Rawls’s Humean commitment to principles of egocentric 
rationality comes into direct conflict with the transpersonally rational moral 
point of view he so eloquently describes at TJ 537. 
 
7. Rawls’s Instrumentalism 
 But now suppose this dilemma solved, as do Rawls’s critics. Suppose, 
that is, that the truth of the continuity thesis is consistent with the parties' 
choice of some principles of justice that govern their society once the veil of 
ignorance is lifted. In this case, there are implications both for Rawls’s 
essentially Instrumentalist justification of the two principles of justice, and for 
the method of wide reflective equilibrium in which they are embedded. In A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls seems clearly committed to justifying these principles 
as necessary, instrumentally rational means for furthering the interests of free 
and instrumentally rationally persons (TJ 11, 16, 47, 94, 172), regardless of 
what these interests are (TJ 129; also see 432).  In determining the basic 
structure of the well-ordered society, these principles indirectly constrain the 
interests, aspirations and conceptions of the good of its citizens, and so the 
actions they take to realize them: 
In justice as fairness, persons accept in advance a principle of equal liberty 
... They implicitly agree, therefore, to conform their conceptions of their 
good to what the principles of justice require, or at least not to press 
claims which directly violate them (TJ 31; emphasis added). 
Rawls’s concept of the original position is thus designed to produce the choice 
of the two principles of justice as an outcome of the parties' recognition in the 
original position that under conditions of moderate scarcity of resources to 
which all have a prima facie equal claim, this is the most instrumentally 
rational way for each of them to secure their own interests in the resultant well-
ordered society (TJ 119; also see Section 22).  
 Now the continuity thesis also implies that from the point of view of any 
single individual in the original position, the two principles of justice are 
necessary means to the realization of his system of ends under the 
circumstances of justice only if, when the veil of ignorance is lifted, and he 
discovers his own conception of the good, he has no cause to regret his choice 
of the two principles, no matter what that conception of the good turns out to 
be (TJ 421-22). But as we have already seen, Rawls himself acknowledges that 
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this may not be the case (TJ 176). Moreover, the beneficiaries of unjust 
institutions also know that their inability to maintain their favored positions is 
a direct consequence of having chosen principles of justice which, when 
implemented, so alter the circumstances of their life that their original plans of 
life, i.e. continuing to benefit from these institutions, become untenable. But 
we have also seen that if the parties know, in the original position, that 
implementation of the principles of justice may thus require them to sacrifice 
rather than advance their conceptions of the good in this way, they cannot fail 
to see the instrumental irrationality of choosing the two principles of justice in 
the first place. 
 It may seem that the parties do not have reason to regret their choice if 
they recognize that the two principles of justice were the best available 
alternative open to them.22 And perhaps it is true that no alternative principles 
of justice would have the effect of securing their future happiness and 
security. But it was open to them not to choose principles of justice at all, i.e. 
to opt for some version of the "No Agreement Point" (TJ 147). Unless we 
assume that the parties were forced into the original position – surely an 
unpalatable assumption in view of the parties' freedom and autonomy (TJ 11, 
13), and Rawls’s allegiance to traditional Social Contract Theory, it is open to 
the parties to regret choosing to live by principles of justice in the first place, 
rather than to maintain the status quo in their previous society.  
 Rawls does not consider the latter as a viable alternative for the parties in 
the original position, but there is no clear reason why he should not. For 
unlike traditional Social Contract Theory, the parties do not, on the continuity 
thesis, enter into the original position from a state of nature mutually 
acknowledged as unacceptable. So it is consistent with the constraints on 
information expressed by the veil of ignorance (TJ 12, 136-7), i.e. that the 
parties know nothing of the circumstances of their own society, that the 
parties nevertheless elect to take their chances in their society as it has been up 
to now, rather than risk having to abdicate everything that gives meaning and 
satisfaction to their lives – even if this requires the deliberate perpetuation of 
social injustice. 
 For there is, in addition, nothing in the description of the parties' 
motivation, circumstances, or interests in A Theory of Justice that commits them 
to choosing just principles for society.  Recall that their stipulated sense of 
justice required only that they be able to recognize and honor principles of 
justice once chosen, not that they deliberately set out to choose justice in the 
first place. By hypothesis, the parties are moved by the desire to further their 
conceptions of their own interests, or good, whatever this may turn out to be 
(TJ 129). And the fact that it is the circumstances of justice that move them to 
deliberate (TJ 128) does not imply that they must opt for just principles to 
                                                
22 I was helped by discussion of this point with John Rawls. 
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adjudicate their claims. Rawls often talks as though the specification of the 
circumstances in which questions of justice arise naturally generate a 
motivation to seek a just resolution of the conflict of interests that characterize 
this situation (TJ esp. 126-7). But there is no reason to assume this. An 
instrumentally rational individual whose interests are already immoral or 
unjust has no prima facie reason even to view those circumstances as 
circumstances of justice, for there may be more efficient ways of removing any 
obstacles to the achievement of her ends. In the face of such considerations, 
one's sense of justice might well remain dormant. 
 Thus for a continuing, instrumentally rational individual whose plans 
and projects already violate the moral constraints embodied in the two 
principles of justice, these principles are not necessary means but rather 
obstacles to the achievement of those plans. Since all parties in the original 
position must canvass in advance the possibility of being precisely such 
individuals when the veil of ignorance is lifted, they must view these 
principles as expendable, just as are any other inefficient means to the 
instrumentally rational achievement of one's ends; and so reject them 
accordingly. 
 The general problem begins to emerge. In order to motivate uniquely the 
choice of principles of justice, Rawls must presuppose that the parties in the 
original position have not only a conception of the good they want to advance 
and a sense of justice, but in addition a motivationally effective desire for or 
interest in justice. Otherwise the two principles of justice are not 
instrumentally rational for them to choose.  
 Now in the Dewey Lectures, Rawls reformulates the parties' motivation in 
the original position in order to meet this requirement. There the parties are 
described as being moved by their highest-order interest in developing and 
exercising their sense of justice (DL 525-6). First, this means that whatever else 
they want, they know at least that they want to be moral persons. This 
reformulation thus purchases motivation to choose principles of justice at the 
cost of attenuating the opacity of the veil of ignorance. More seriously, it 
attenuates the ability of the original position to provide an independent, 
choice-theoretic justification23 for the powerful moral conception the well-
ordered society expresses. As we have seen in Chapter IX.4.2-4, it purchases 
moral unanimity at the cost of objective validity. 
 To see this, reconsider the justificatory role of the circumstances of justice 
in determining the choice of the two principles of justice in A Theory of Justice. 
Here the idea is that the original position represents the salient features of the 
                                                
23Rawls states his commitment to this kind of justification in many places. See TJ 16, 47, 
94, 119-121, 125,172, 583. He retracts it at DL 572, and again more forcefully in "Justice 
as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," 237, fn. 20 (op. cit. Note 19), and yet again in 
Political Liberalism (op. cit. Note 3), 53 fn. 7. 
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situation in which equally positioned agents compete for scarce resources to 
further their unstated, mutually conflicting ends. These circumstances are 
compelling to us because most of us understand what it means to have to 
compete for scarce resources in our daily lives. To show that these 
circumstances plus the other special conditions that define the original 
position generate certain principles of justice would provide a powerful 
incentive for us to accept them, for it would depict those principles as a 
rational outcome of conditions essentially reflected in our experience. It 
would thereby appeal to our actual life situations, independent of the 
particular values and moral convictions any of us may happen to have; and in 
so doing, gain objective authority for each of us. This is what an objective 
moral justification should do. 
 By contrast, the reformulations in the Dewey Lectures require that each of 
the parties' conceptions of the good be constrained by their shared highest-
order interests in developing and exercising their senses of justice. To 
stipulate at the outset that the parties are overridingly motivated to act on 
principles of justice is to ascribe to them a motivation that a fortiori overrides 
the motivational incentive of the circumstances of justice. This means that 
each of the parties is more concerned to develop and exercise her sense of 
justice than she is to acquire sufficient resources to further the other ends that 
are peculiarly hers. That is, each party wants to become just more than 
anything else, and everything else she wants is subordinate to this one. 
Second, the parties must therefore share the interest of developing and 
exercising their senses of justice as a nonconflicting highest-order interest. 
Third, this interest must be partially determinate, since they must therefore 
have some prior conception of what justice is, in order to be moved to develop 
and exercise their sense of it (to see this, try substituting "sight" for "justice").  
 But the relative determinateness of the parties' conception of justice in 
turn further undermines the sense in which they can be said to choose just 
principles through rational negotiation, consistently with the assumption of 
pure procedural justice (TJ 120, 136).  It is hard to see how a shared antecedent 
desire to develop and exercise one's sense of justice, of which each party has 
an antecedent conception, could fail to influence the outcome of the procedure 
of rational deliberation that the parties undergo in the original position; and 
how that antecedent conception of justice could fail to bias the process of 
deliberation as well. These revisions thus move Rawls’s account closer to a 
conception of perfect procedural justice, in which we begin with an 
antecedent conception of what justice requires and rig the procedure so as to 
produce that outcome. 
 These revisions also undermine Rawls’s claim, first made in A Theory of 
Justice (128) and developed more fully in the Dewey Lectures (557-60, 561, 564, 
571), that the parties are not bound by antecedent moral ties. How can they 
have an antecedent conception of justice and a shared, overriding interest in 
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developing and exercising their sense of it without being bound by antecedent 
moral ties? This overriding, nonconflicting interest in justice is an antecedent 
moral tie. To each party, it stipulates not that that individual should try to 
obtain as large a quantity of primary goods as he can, but rather that that 
same individual should see to it that each and every one of the parties, 
including himself, should obtain a fair allocation of primary goods. That is, it 
requires each party in the original position to be cognizant of the well-being of 
all of them, thereby violating the stipulation of mutual disinterest. 
Furthermore, the more fully the sense of justice is conceived as a 
motivationally effective intentional object for the parties in the original 
position, the more motivationally otiose the subjective and objective 
circumstances of justice become – and the less the rational appeal of Rawls’s 
argument to the unconverted, the cynical, the opportunistic, or the 
unabashedly self-seeking, all of whom may hold, rather like the Hobbesian 
Free Rider, the belief that giving primacy to justice for all over the exigencies 
of personal self-aggrandizement is a naiveté of those with the noblesse oblige to 
indulge it. 
 Indeed, that the parties are overridingly motivated to realize and exercise 
the "capacity ... to understand, to apply and to act from (and not merely in 
accordance with) the principles of justice" (DL 525) tautologically requires them 
to choose the two principles of justice in order to realize this aim. Rawls has 
ensured that it is instrumentally rational for the parties in the original position 
to choose the two principles of justice by stipulating in advance that this is 
what they are most highly motivated to choose, regardless of the further ends 
they serve. He has built the choice of the two principles of justice into the 
original position in such a way as to effectively nullify the force of their 
instrumental rationality altogether.  
 Thus Rawls has in effect dropped the Instrumentalist strategy of 
justification and substituted a more purely deductive one, just as he originally 
intended (TJ 119-120). The two principles of justice are, in the Dewey Lectures, 
no longer justified as instrumentally rational means to the promotion of even 
a circumscribed range of conceptions of the good. They are stipulated to be 
final ends, i.e. part of each of the parties' conceptions of the good itself, in the 
premises from which they are then deduced as outcomes of deliberation.  
 This stricter form of Deductivism creates its own problems. Whereas 
Gewirth began with very weak premises and had to add stronger, more 
value-laden assumptions to the argument as it proceeded in order to derive 
his principle of generic consistency as a conclusion, Rawls adds stronger, 
more value-laden assumptions to his premises – the conception of the original 
position – in order to preserve the value-neutrality of the derivation itself. But 
this makes it harder to conceive the original position itself as generating, 
rather than presupposing, the moral ties it was its original function to justify.  
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 So either the parties must be viewed as motivationally uncommitted to 
making a specifically moral choice,24 in which case a return to the unjust 
status quo is a viable alternative; or else we must assume a priori that they are 
morally motivated to choose the two principles of justice, in which case it 
remains an open question how those principles are to be independently and 
objectively justified. As we have seen in Chapter IX.4, this choice of 
alternatives is inevitable, and fatal, for the committed Instrumentalist. 
 But how committed an Instrumentalist has Rawls ever been? Is there any 
remaining justificatory force in the original position for the two principles of 
justice, now that Rawls has made this recent modification? The answer is yes. 
However, this force does not derive from the demonstrated instrumental 
rationality of the two principles of justice; for as we have seen in Chapter IX.4, 
it is vacuously true that an agent will choose what she has special motivation 
to choose, other things equal. This fact cannot justify that choice to us unless 
we, too, have that special motivation, or would have it under appropriate 
circumstances.  
 Now we have just seen that the relevant circumstances on which the 
significance and justificatory force of the original position originally relied 
were supposed to be the more practically compelling circumstances of justice, 
in which the parties were realistically portrayed as competing on an equal 
basis for scarce resources for achieving their ends, not a highest-order interest 
in their sense of justice. And it is controversial whether this moral motivation 
is as essentially reflected in our actual lives; i.e. whether it is in fact more 
important to us to obtain for ourselves an equitable allocation of the scarce 
resources we need to survive comfortably, or to develop and exercise our 
sense of justice. This moral motivation may be more an expression of our 
idealized self-conceptions than well-grounded in a conception of the self that 
is adequate to the psychological facts about us.  
 If the two principles of justice are to be generated by a highest-order 
interest that we do not actually have, or have only to a relatively minor 
degree, then as we have seen in Chapter IX.4.3, the extent of their persuasive 
force for us will be inversely proportional to the extent of the remoteness of 
the ideal self-conception that includes that interest from our actual emotions 
and dispositions. In this case, the justification of the two principles will 
require that we be convinced, first, that the parties in the original position 
represent characteristics and dispositions that we have, or do or should aspire 
                                                
24This possibility is supported by the stipulations that (i) the parties are mutually 
disinterested (TJ 13, 127); and (ii) they are not bound by prior moral ties (TJ 128). If these 
things are true of them, then why should they commit themselves to choosing 
principles of justice when each could stand to benefit from injustice? Clearly the 
additional stipulation of risk aversion is inadequate to answer this question, since each 
might value the benefits of injustice highly enough to risk being victimized by it. 
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to have; and second, that the well-ordered society, structured by the two 
principles, depicts the kind of society we envision as a felt social ideal.  
 That is, both the original position and the well-ordered society now 
represent deductively connected but value-laden hypotheses that must be 
evaluated for their rational persuasiveness from a third perspective, namely 
that of the engaged but as yet uncommitted reader for whom the question in 
what a just society consists is a pressing one. Thus the effect of Rawls’s recent 
revisions in his conception of the original position is to shift the fulcrum of his 
justificatory strategy from the choice of the parties in the original position to 
the receptiveness of the reader to the values the original position and well-
ordered society embody. Let us call this the rational reader conception of 
justification.   
 Rawls has developed the rational reader conception of justification in 
recent writings, by explicitly addressing as his audience those who affirm the 
liberal-democratic tradition his theory of justice also affirms. Clearly, he 
means to be addressing us as readers about issues of central importance to us, 
and articulating the basic conditions under which public agreement among us 
can be achieved: 
[T]his conception [of justice] provides a publicly recognized point of view 
from which all citizens can examine before one another whether or not 
their political and social institutions are just. It enables them to do this by 
citing what are recognized among them as valid and sufficient reasons 
singled out by that conception itself.... [J]ustification is not regarded simply 
as valid argument from listed premises, even should these premises be true. 
Rather, justification is addressed to others who disagree with us, and therefore it 
must always proceed from some consensus, that is, from premises that we and 
others publicly recognize as true; or better, publicly recognize as acceptable 
to us for the purposes of establishing a working agreement on the 
fundamental questions of political justice (italics added).25... [Kantian 
                                                
25“Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," 229. I do not agree with Rawls that 
public recognition of such premises "as acceptable to us for the purposes of establishing 
a working agreement on the fundamental questions of political justice" is better than 
premises "that we and others publicly recognize as true." Everyone recognizes some 
premises as true. The question is whether these premises – the ones to which we are 
most deeply committed psychologically as well as epistemically, and which Rawls 
describes as “comprehensive doctrines” in Political Liberalism (op. cit. Note 3) – are to be 
examined, criticized and revised in light of public discussion of them, or excluded – 
perhaps shielded would be a better word – from such discussion altogether. By leaving 
unmentioned, unscrutinized, unanalyzed, unevaluated, and unrevised what one in fact 
actually does recognize as true, the former, merely pragmatic public recognition 
precludes authentic Socratic dialogue and the genuine meeting of minds that can result 
from it. These values are discussed in Chapter I, Section 2, above. In Political Liberalism 
Rawls initially advocates a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to our deepest moral and 
epistemic convictions (PL 15-16, 152, 153); but later distinguishes between exclusive 
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constructivism] recasts ideas from the tradition of the social contract to 
achieve a practicable conception of objectivity and justification founded 
on public agreement in judgment on due reflection. The aim is free 
agreement, reconciliation through public reason.26 
Since the two principles of justice are no longer justified as instrumentally 
rational for the realization of the parties' individual conceptions of the good in 
the well-ordered society, this more recent conception of justification does not 
require the truth of the continuity thesis. So we must now turn to the question 
of whether there are sufficient resources in Rawls’s theory of justice to replace 
it. 
 
8. The Discontinuity Thesis 
 There is some textual evidence in A Theory of Justice that undermines the 
continuity thesis. The falsity of the continuity thesis is, for example, suggested 
by Rawls’s emphatically drawn distinction between the parties in the original 
position as "theoretically-defined individuals" and the actual propensities of 
people in everyday life (TJ 147); he asserts that the mutual disinterest in one 
another of the parties is not necessarily continuous with the motives of 
"persons in everyday life who accept the principles that would be chosen and 
who have the corresponding sense of justice" (TJ 148). One might speculate 
that by "everyday life" Rawls may mean here not only the everyday life of the 
reader, but perhaps also the everyday life of a person in the well-ordered 
society. In any case, the latter point is made more strongly in a later 
discussion of this issue: 
[T]he motivation of persons in a well-ordered society is not determined 
directly by the motives of the parties in the original position. These 
motives affect those of persons in a well-ordered society only indirectly:  
that is, via their effects on the choice of principles. It is these principles, 
together with the laws of psychology (as these work under the conditions 
of just institutions), that determine the resulting motivation.27 
These passages taken conjointly do not, of course, explicitly conflict with all 
the clauses of the continuity thesis. They are primarily aimed at confuting the 
purported continuity of the original position's individualistic motivational 
assumptions with the underlying psychology of members of the well-ordered 
society. But in so doing the point is also made that the parties in the original 
                                                                                                     
public reason as appropriate to the ideal case (PL 248), and inclusive public reason 
which introduces discussion of comprehensive doctrines in non-ideal cases of serious 
political dispute or destabilizing conflicts about constitutional essentials; and later still, 
in the Introduction to the Paperback Edition, admits the introduction of comprehensive 
doctrines into public discussion at any time (li-lii). 
26Ibid., 230. 
27"Fairness to Goodness," The Philosophical Review 84 (October 1975), 543. 
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position are psychologically discontinuous with members of the well-ordered 
society. So whatever prior conceptions of the good, tastes, and interests the 
parties may have held, their subsequent psychological proclivities 
nevertheless conform to the constraints of the two principles of justice. Thus 
we can read these passages as conflicting with clauses (2) and (3) of the 
continuity thesis. 
 Clause (1) is called into question by Rawls’s claim that "We use the 
characterization of the persons in the original position to single out the kinds 
of beings to whom the principles chosen apply" (TJ 505; emphasis added). If 
we understand this to mean that the parties in the original position are not 
among those particular individuals to whom the principles of justice might 
apply, but rather schematic adumbrations of the type of individual for whom 
they are intended, i.e. moral persons, there is no reason to suppose that the 
parties bear anything like the concrete relation to particular members of the 
well-ordered society suggested by the passages adduced in Section 6. On the 
present construal, the parties in the original position are as much hypothetical 
constructs to the members of the well-ordered society as they are to the 
reader; and indeed there is some further evidence to support this possibility. 
 Near the beginning of A Theory of Justice, Rawls relates his conception of 
the original position to the hypothetical state of nature characteristic of 
traditional Social Contract Theory. After briefly limning what will later 
become the four-stage sequence in which a conception of justice, then a 
constitution, and a legislature to enact laws is chosen, Rawls then argues that 
Our social situation is just if it is such that by this sequence of hypothetical 
agreements we would have contracted into the general system of rules 
which defines it. Moreover, ... it will then be true that whenever social 
institutions satisfy these principles, those engaged in them can say to one 
another that they are cooperating on terms to which they would agree if 
they were free and equal persons whose relations with respect to one 
acceptance of the corresponding principles of justice. No society can, of 
course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a 
literal sense; .... Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness 
comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the 
principles which free and equal persons would assent to under 
circumstances that are fair (TJ 13; emphasis added). 
The hypothetical nature of the original position with respect to the vantage 
point of the reader is reaffirmed in a number of places in A Theory of Justice 
(16, 21, 48, 115, 120, 167, 587). The importance of the above passage lies 
instead in the facts that first, the continuity thesis is vigorously rejected in its 
entirety; and second, the implied relation between the parties in the original 
position and the members of the well-ordered society is very different here 
from what it is elsewhere. Here the implication is not that the parties 
afterwards "return to their place in society and henceforth judge their claims 
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on the social system by these principles" (TJ 196) with the newly requisite 
attitudes. Rather, it is suggested that the original position is equally 
hypothetical relative to any society, including the well-ordered one; and that 
the former functions as an idealized standard in comparison with which the 
underlying principles, constitution, legislature, and laws of such a society can 
be appraised, criticized, and, in theory, revised.  
 On this construal, we regard the well-ordered society not as an 
immediate and concrete temporal consequence of the series of decisions made 
throughout the four-stage sequence of the original position and then 
miraculously implemented by the subsequent efforts of the parties. On the 
contrary, we view the well-ordered society as the theoretically projected 
outcome (remote though it may be) of our concerted application of a device, 
i.e. the hypothetical original position and the principles chosen there, to the 
circumstances of moral and political conflict that regularly confront us. This 
device both insures the impartiality of our moral judgments and also yields 
substantive moral principles in accordance with which we can judge these 
issues.28 
 Similarly, in the Dewey Lectures, Rawls frequently refers to the original 
position as a construction (DL fn. 41, 532), a point of view (DL 554, 560, 567), 
and a framework of deliberation (DL 533, 560, 561); and the parties themselves 
as "agents of construction" (DL 547, 552, 560). These characterizations 
reinforce the interpretation of the original position as a theoretical construct 
that enables us as well as citizens in the well-ordered society to perform 
systematic moral deliberation. And on page 234 of "Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical," Rawls characterizes his conception of the parties 
in the original position as "a basic intuitive idea assumed to be implicit in the 
public culture of a democratic society;" this is part of the "publicly recognized 
point of view" that enables us to evaluate the justice of our own institutions. 
He also, at last, describes it emphatically as a "device of representation" (236-
8) within which  
the conception of justice the parties would adopt identifies the conception 
we regard – here and now – as fair and supported by the best reasons.... As 
a device of representation the idea of the original position serves as a 
means of public reflection and self-clarification.... The original position 
serves as a unifying idea by which our considered convictions at all levels 
of generality are brought to bear on one another so as to achieve greater 
mutual agreement and self-understanding (238; emphasis in text). 
In these passages the detachment of the parties in the original position as a 
device we use from the citizens of the ideal well-ordered society generated by 
                                                
28Something like this strategy seems to lie behind Rawls’s treatment of substantive 
questions in the second part of A Theory of Justice, e.g. civil disobedience (Secs. 55-59), 
but this is too large a topic to discuss here.   
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it is almost complete: Each bears a continuity relationship, not to the other, 
but to us.29 
 Thus these passages suggest an alternative to the continuity thesis in the 
form of the following conditions: 
 
(1') The parties in the original position do not regard themselves as 
future members of the well-ordered society (clauses (1) and (3) of the 
continuity thesis). Rather, they recognize themselves to be 
psychologically discontinuous with those members, and recognize also 
that their choice of principles determine the general motivational features 
of the members of the well-ordered society. 
(2') The original position itself is not an actual event (clause (2) of the 
continuity thesis), but rather a hypothetical one relative to the well-
ordered society. Hence the parties are not in fact physically continuous 
with any member of the well-ordered society. 
 
Let us call this the discontinuity thesis. 
 A number of exegetical consequences follow from adopting the 
discontinuity thesis as the favored interpretation of the original position. If we 
assume the falsity or irrelevance of the continuity thesis to the Rawlsian 
enterprise, those criticisms that presuppose it must be disregarded. One 
cannot then argue against the conception of the original position or the two 
principles of justice chosen there on the grounds of what the parties so 
situated would do or think after they got out of it or before they went into it,30 
or how their society might be colored by their prior psychological proclivities. 
Without the continuity thesis, there is no prima facie reason for the parties in 
the original position to suppose that anyone's needs or conception of the good 
might conflict with, undermine, or be frustrated by the constraints imposed 
by the two principles of justice on the basic structure of society.  
 This is not to propose that everyone's psychology in the well-ordered 
society must be consonant with these principles. It is just to argue that 
without the notion of continuing persons, this possibility does not suffice to 
deter the parties in the original position from choosing as they are presumed 
to do. It does not suffice because the parties then have no reason in 
deliberating to provide for the possibility that the persons they turn out to be 
might be persons to whom their choice in the original position is 
unacceptable. If the continuity thesis fails, the parties in the original position 
                                                
29 Cf. Footnote 19.  
30Certain of Ronald Dworkin's arguments in "The Original Position" (University of 
Chicago Law Review 40, 3 (Spring 1973), 500-33; reprinted in Daniels, 16-52) against the 
justificatory function of the original position that depend on his distinction between 
"antecedent" and "actual" interest (20-21) would necessitate revision on this 
interpretation. 
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must be regarded as self-determining in the very strong and liberal sense that 
in the original position, they determine the kinds of persons they are to be, the 
kind of psychology they will have, and the kinds of moral constraints they 
will be prepared to accept, by deciding what principles of justice are to 
regulate their interactions. The circumstances of the original position must 
then be viewed as a radical discontinuity in their adult lives, after which they 
become the kinds of persons who are constrained and partially determined, 
not by the continuity of their previous psychological histories, but by their 
choice of moral principles in the original position.  
 At the same time, those passages we have cited from A Theory of Justice 
and The Dewey Lectures that lend support to the continuity thesis must be 
similarly bracketed. We must, for example, interpret Rawls’s discussions of 
the expectations of the parties in the original position in the same hypothetical 
light as we do the concept of the original position itself. The parties must be 
conceived, and must conceive themselves, as deciding on principles as though 
such principles were to govern their life prospects. For they recognize that 
they are in fact choosing principles not for themselves, properly speaking, but 
for the persons they thereby choose to become. Thus they must regard 
themselves as advancing in the subsequent society not only their conceptions 
of the good, but indeed their idealized self-conceptions which the choice of 
principles determine. 
 Rawls’s arguments regarding the strains of commitment must be 
qualified in much the same way: The issue then becomes not whether the 
parties can adhere to the chosen principles, but instead whether the preferred 
self-conception includes this capacity. This implies, first, that the capacity for 
a sense of justice cannot be stipulated as a motivational assumption of the 
original position, independently of this preferred self-conception. Secondly, it 
implies that the capacity for a sense of justice cannot be used as a criterion for 
differentiating between acceptable and unacceptable principles of justice. For 
we can expect a great variety of such principles to be successful in tailoring a 
self-conception that will stably adhere to them. 
 Finally, the abandonment of the continuity thesis entails the 
abandonment of the Instrumentalist strategy of justification that is, for many, 
centrally definitive of the social Contract-Theoretic tradition. That tradition is 
founded on the reasoning that a justified society is one by the rules of which 
individuals who are instrumentally rational and self-interestedly motivated to 
improve their lot in the state of nature would agree to be bound in it, in order 
to regulate their interactions. In this picture, the state of nature, the self-
interested and instrumentally rational individuals, and the social contract are 
jointly continuous but hypothetical relative to our actual society. But by 
abandoning the continuity thesis, the modifications we have traced in Rawls’s 
later writings eliminate the state of nature, the self-interest, and the 
instrumental rationality of the individuals; and stipulate the hypothetical 
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nature of the contractual agreement in the original position relative to the 
ideal well-ordered society itself. There are many elements in Rawls’s 
normative theory of the well-ordered society that continue to affiliate him 
with the tradition of Social Contract Theory. But his developed conception of 
its metaethical justification represents a radical departure from that tradition. 
 
9. Personal Identity and Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
Next I consider the implications of the discontinuity thesis, first, for 
Rawls’s views on personal identity; and second, for his concept of wide 
reflective equilibrium. Samuel Scheffler’s criticism of Rawls’s theory has 
focused on the seeming disparity between claims made in A Theory of Justice 
supporting the choice of the two principles of justice over Utilitarianism, and 
Rawls’s more recent treatment of the issue of the relevance of the problem of 
personal identity to moral theory.31 In A Theory of Justice, it was suggested that 
the fact that Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between 
persons might be a reason why the parties in the original position would be 
disinclined to choose it. For they would then have good reason to doubt 
whether a society erected on Utilitarian first principles would protect and 
promote those long-term plans and interests which the parties each know 
themselves to have (TJ 27-29). In “The Independence of Moral Theory," on the 
other hand, Rawls is concerned to show that conclusions in the philosophy of 
mind concerning personal identity, i.e. that it involves bodily continuity and 
also mental continuity subject to varying degrees of fluctuation, do not 
conclusively favor one moral theory over any other. Thus Rawls claims that  
what sorts of persons we are is shaped by how we think of ourselves and 
this in turn is influenced by the social forms we live under.... There is no 
degree of connectedness that is natural or fixed; the actual continuities 
and sense of purpose in people's lives is relative to the socially achieved 
moral conception.32 
As we have seen, this argument provides important support for his view that 
the parties in the original position are psychologically discontinuous with the 
members of the well-ordered society.  
 But Scheffler has tried to show that this has one of two equally 
problematic implications. One possibility is that the parties then cannot 
assume themselves to have long-term plans and purposes – since this feature 
would characterize a particular kind of personal identity which is no more 
natural or fixed than a weaker one in which plans, projects, memories, and 
experiences undergo continual alteration and replacement. Hence they cannot 
choose principles of justice with an eye to protecting such long-term plans 
                                                
31Samuel Scheffler, "Moral Independence and the Orginal Position," Philosophical Studies 
35, 4 (May 1979), 397-403. 
320p. cit. Note 18, p. 20. 
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and purposes. The second possibility is that the parties' choice of the two 
principles of justice, on the supposition of having long-term interests, 
demonstrates only that individuals having a certain kind of personal identity 
would choose a society that would protect it, without providing any 
independent argument against the choice of Utilitarianism.33 If the parties are 
then not assumed to have long-term plans and purposes but nevertheless are 
assumed to choose principles of justice for the basic structure of the society in 
which they will then live, it is then an open question whether they would 
choose a society which protected long-term interests over one that did not. 
 But if the continuity thesis is supplanted by the discontinuity thesis, and 
in particular clause (1'), these difficulties do not arise. For it is only if the 
parties are conceived as continuing persons who had adopted certain projects 
and purposes prior to the original position, which they then advance in the 
well-ordered society subsequent to it, that there is any independent 
requirement for how long a person in the original position must endure, and 
how long a long-term interest must be in order to count as long-term. A 
person, and hence her goals and interests, must endure long enough to have 
originated and engendered in the person a deep commitment to the 
fulfillment of these goals and interests before the circumstances of the original 
position occurred; they must survive the protracted period of conflict, 
dialogue and deliberation which the original position, with the support of 
clause (2), surely entails; and it must survive the actual lengthy period of 
implementation of the two principles of justice in the well-ordered society 
which the continuity thesis plus the four-stage sequence entails. Such 
longstanding commitment to a goal or interest is impressive indeed. It might 
even survive what we normally think of as a natural human lifespan. 
 Rejecting the continuity thesis, on the other hand, permits us to leave 
open the question of how long, in actual time, the parties' long-term interests 
must be in order to count as long-term. It is then sufficient that a long-term 
interest survive for the duration of a person's adult life, as we would normally 
expect. But there is now no reason to place any prior constraints on how long 
such a life must be. Hence whether a person has a weak identity or a strong 
one is irrelevant to whether that person can be said to have long-term 
interests or not. The person's interests are identified as long-term relative to 
the duration of her personal identity. Now since there are no longer any 
independent constraints on how long the parties themselves endure, nothing 
about the conception of the original position forces the characterization of the 
parties as having either particularly weak or particularly strong personal 
identities. And the ascription to them of long-term interests fails to decide this 
question one way or the other. 
                                                
33Scheffler, op. cit. 399-401. 
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 Furthermore, that a person has a weak personal identity in any case does 
not imply a lack of concern with personal survival. Even if I know that my 
character is so volatile and unstable that I can realistically expect to be a 
completely different person in five years, I need not be happy about this. Or I 
may wish my interests to endure for as long as I do, however long that is. It is 
both conceivable and likely that an individual with a weak personal identity 
would be either concerned with her own personal survival, or hold personal 
survival as a value in general, or both. And so long as the continuity thesis is 
rejected, the question of how long, in real time, such an individual would 
consider it in general valuable for a person to survive, is once again left open. 
So the fact that the parties in the OP may have weak personal identities does 
not imply that they would have no reason to choose principles of justice that 
would respect and protect long-term interests. Indeed we might expect the 
concern with person survival to increase with the threat to personal survival. 
Thus that Utilitarianism fails to take seriously the distinction between persons 
and hence would fail to protect their interests remains a good reason for any 
party in the original position not to choose it. 
 Now clause (1') of the discontinuity thesis implies that the parties know 
they will not psychologically survive past the circumstances of the original 
position. They regard themselves as determining future selves for the well-
ordered society in light of the chosen principles of justice, and hence as 
determining the long-term goals and interests these selves will have. Hence 
they choose principles, not with an eye to promoting instrumentally their own 
long-term interests, but rather with an eye to protecting the long-term 
interests of the kind of person they simultaneously choose to become. And to 
suppose that the parties could be unconcerned about the survival of those 
long-term interests – however long in real time they might be – would be to 
suppose that they were indifferent to the particular nature of the self they had 
chosen. But since they regard themselves as self-determining, there is no 
reason to believe they would be. 
 Thus Rawls’s claim, that conclusions about the nature of personal 
identity are irrelevant for the construction of a moral theory, can be made to 
hold in spite of the apparent conflict with the earlier argument against 
Utilitarianism. These conclusions are irrelevant as long as the characterization 
of the original position is not complicated by the assumption of the continuity 
thesis. For only then is Rawls committed to a type of personal identity which 
the parties might desire self-interestedly to prolong into the well-ordered 
society, rather than one they desire disinterestedly to create.34 
                                                
34However, my conclusions here should not be taken to endorse Rawls’s later disavowal 
of the relevance of metaphysical questions to his theory of justice tout à fait ("Justice as 
Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," 230, 238 40, fn. 22). If my arguments are well 
taken, Rawls’s disavowal was too sweeping. 
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 But perhaps the most important consequence of supplanting the 
continuity thesis is that greater attention needs to be directed towards Rawls’s 
concept of wide reflective equilibrium. In A Theory of Justice, the concept of 
wide reflective equilibrium referred to a stable state in which the description 
of the original position and the principles chosen in it to govern the well-
ordered society had been mutually adjusted and compared with other 
alternatives so as to finally match our considered moral judgments (TJ 20, 48-
9). As we have seen, many of the features originally ascribed to the original 
position have required modification in order to circumvent the unacceptable 
implications of the continuity thesis. In particular, the motivational features of 
the original position that, at least on the interpretation initially offered in this 
chapter, lead the parties to choose principles of justice in order to advance 
their conceptions of the good in the subsequent well-ordered society must be 
abandoned, and replaced by some other connection between the original 
position and the well-ordered society.  The strictly deductive connection 
Rawls offers in the Dewey Lectures between the parties' motivation and the 
outcome of their deliberation does not require the continuity thesis for its 
plausibility. 
 Thus clause (2') of the discontinuity thesis denies that the major 
connection between the original position and the well-ordered society is 
mediated by continuing persons who are assumed to participate in both. And 
we have already seen that Rawls himself later gave increasing prominence to 
us, the readers, conceived as members of a liberal democratic society who are 
reflective, self-critical, and morally concerned thinkers who attempt to give 
coherence, substance, and reality to their considered moral judgments. As 
moral mediators between the original position and the well-ordered society, 
we advert to the original position in order to attain the requisite impartiality 
of judgment, and to the well-ordered society in order to substantiate and 
specify the scope of application of those judgments themselves. Hence the 
attainment of wide reflective equilibrium must be measured by the internal 
coherence of our own moral judgment on the one hand, and the points of 
view from which we make them on the other. The importance of this line of 
thought to Rawls’s thinking from the very beginning is strongly suggested by 
his closing remarks in A Theory of Justice.35 
 
                                                
35For this reason I now think I was too hasty in claiming (in "A Distinction Without a 
Difference," Midwest Studies in Philosophy VII: Social and Political Philosophy (Minneapolis, 
Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 406) that Rawls’s theory of justice 
contains no action-guiding part at all. Although this was true of A Theory of Justice, there 
has always been a practical and applied strain in his thought that became increasingly 
salient in his later writings. 
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10. Moral Objectivity and Pure Procedural Justice 
 We are now in a better position to answer the questions raised in Section 
5.2. There we asked whether Rawls’s conception of rational deliberation in the 
original position in fact qualifies as an instance of pure procedural justice, 
such that the chosen principles are defined and recognized as just because and 
only because of the rational procedure by which they were generated, 
irrespective of prior, prereflective moral intuitions that might conflict with 
them. We also asked what, in the event of such conflict, would need to be 
revised: the conception of the original position? The Instrumentalist 
deliberation procedure? The two principles of justice and the well-ordered 
society they structure? Or the foundational moral intuitions that anchor the 
entire metaethical scheme that Rawls offers? Finally, we noted that if these 
anchoring intuitions remain the final arbiter against which all other elements 
of Rawls’s theory must be measured, then Rawls’s deliberative procedure is 
not one of pure procedural justice after all. For these intuitions, however 
inchoate, in effect constitute a prior conception of justice that, when 
elaborated through the process of wide reflective equilibrium, constrain and 
determine the procedure we construct so as to arrive at it.  
 We saw in Section 5.1 that Rawls originally introduced the notion of pure 
procedural justice in order to capture an insight about the nature and status of 
the Instrumentalist deliberations by which the parties in the original position 
arrived at the two principles of justice in order to advance their individual 
conceptions of the good. The rational procedure constitutive and definitive of 
just principles for the distribution of primary goods was the procedure of 
instrumentally rational choice the parties undertook. We have seen in Sections 
6 and 7 that this procedure, under the conditions Rawls originally specified, 
generates a contradiction in the motivational conception of the original 
position, and so must be abandoned. 
 However, we have also seen in Sections 8 and 9 that Rawls in later 
writings reorients his focus on the metaethical justification of the two 
principles. He replaces the centrality of the procedure of instrumentally 
rational choice with a new emphasis on the more purely deductive procedure 
of theoretically rational theory-construction expressed in the process of wide 
reflective equilibrium. In this latter process, we as rational readers take a more 
active role in a more collaborative process of arriving at principles of justice to 
govern our society: We make adjustments and revisions in all three elements – 
the initial premises expressed in the original position, the statement of the two 
principles express in the conception of a well-ordered society, and the 
commonsense moral intuitions by which we guide our reflections – so as to 
maximize coherence and consistency among all three. This is exactly what 
commentators on Rawls’s Theory of Justice have done, and we have seen that 
he has taken their criticisms very much to heart. We saw in Section 5.2 that 
Chapter X. Rawls’s Instrumentalism          462 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
this process is in fact much closer to the rational scientific procedure analogy 
with which supplied Rawls his original inspiration in 1951. 
 How should we then evaluate each of these two procedures relative to 
Rawls’s identification of his view as an instance of pure procedural justice? 
Since the instrumentally rational procedure of deliberation undertaken by the 
parties in the original position leads to a contradiction, it fails to meet Rawls’s 
characterization of pure procedural justice, by definition. Rawls’s de-
emphasis and indeed rejection of this procedure in later writings, and 
subsequent elaboration of our participation in delineating the conception of a 
well-ordered society which forms one of his last projects in Political 
Liberalism36, constitutes a sacrifice of this procedure to the more purely 
deductive procedure of formulating the premises of his arguments in such a 
way as to derive analytically what is contained within them, such that both 
premises and conclusion cohere with and preserve our most central 
commonsense moral intuitions. This is part of the process of achieving wide 
reflective equilibrium. Hence just as the analogous procedure in scientific 
theorizing – in which we, on the basis of our intuitions, formulate the 
hypothesis and its experimental predictions in such a way as to maximize the 
likelihood of the latter confirming the former – would count as a case of 
perfect procedural truth, similarly Rawls’s procedure of wide reflective 
equilibrium would seem to count as one of perfect procedural justice. 
 However, there is more to the process of achieving wide reflective 
equilibrium than this. Rawls clearly acknowledges that "a person's sense of 
justice may or may not undergo a radical shift" as the result of undergoing the 
process of achieving wide reflective equilibrium (TJ 49). He thereby leaves 
open the possibility that the commonsense moral intuitions that anchor the 
process of achieving wide reflective equilibrium may be sacrificed not only to 
the theory-constructive requirements of coherence and deductive consistency, 
but also to the influence of competing moral views with which those intuitions are 
compared. So the scientific analogy is rather with the attempt to square one's 
hypothesis, its experimental predictions, and the underlying intuitions that 
anchor both with recognizedly anomalous data – perhaps unexpected 
experimental results, or competing hypotheses that are more powerful or 
comprehensive – that call all three into question. This process would be one of 
pure procedural truth. Similarly, the process of achieving wide reflective 
equilibrium makes our commonsense moral intuitions vulnerable to revision 
in light of demonstrations that a competing moral theory is, for example, 
more adept in the casuistry of particularly problematic cases, or more 
comprehensive in its application, or better grounded in the psychological facts 
about human beings.  
                                                
36Op. cit. Note 3. 
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 Hence Rawls’s more recent, more purely deductive procedure of 
justification is an instance of pure procedural justice; but not for the reasons 
he claims in A Theory of Justice. What makes it a case of pure procedural justice 
is not that the outcome of the parties' deliberation in the original position is by 
definition just; for we have seen that the conditions under which they 
deliberate have been revised so as to produce precisely this outcome. What 
makes Rawls’s revised procedure of justification one of pure procedural 
justice is that the outcome of the process of achieving wide reflective equilibrium is, 
according to Rawls, by definition just. By exposing the process of theory-
construction inherent in the process of wide reflective equilibrium to the 
participation of rational readers who are citizens of a liberal democratic 
society, we thereby expose it to the very wide range of competing moral 
views that such a society permits. And by de-throning any individual's 
commonsense moral intuitions as final arbiters of what such a theory should 
contain, we signal our willingness to sacrifice those intuitions to the 
requirements of consistent, reflective, and self-critical rational reflection. This 
is precisely what the enterprise of Socratic metaethics demands. 
 We can now see that Rawls’s revision of traditional Social Contract 
Theory is even more radical than it first appeared. We have seen that Rawls 
supplied Social Contract Theory with a formalizable metaethical 
underpinning (although not the one with which he began), addressed the 
question of economic justice that no social Contract Theorist before him had 
tackled, reinvigorated normative moral theory as a legitimate philosophical 
endeavor, reincorporated moral psychology as a central part of the Social 
Contract-Theoretic enterprise, and revitalized discussion of casuistical issues 
such as civil disobedience, passive resistance, and racism. In addition to this, 
Rawls ultimately reverses the relation between rationality and power 
established by Hobbes and rejected by Kant. Whereas traditional Social 
Contract Theory subordinates unlimited power for everyone in the state of 
nature to the benefits of instrumental rationality under the social contract, 
Rawls subordinates the benefits of instrumental rationality under the social 
contract to the requirements of transpersonally rational procedures of 
deliberation for establishing its objective validity. He thus answers 
Nietzsche's devaluation of the character dispositions of rationality with a 
demonstration that the exercise of power, even under the guidance of 
instrumental rationality, does not suffice to meet our demand for its objective 
validity. Only social arrangements justified as the outcome of a collaborative 
and transpersonally rational procedure of deliberation can do that. 
 
 
  
Chapter XI. Brandt's Instrumentalism 
 
 
 Like Rawls, and following in the footsteps of his metaethical strategy, 
Richard Brandt, too, is an Instrumentalist. His reliance on Instrumentalism 
undermines his attempt to morally justify his normative theory in a similar 
manner, even though his normative moral theory is a species of Utilitarianism 
rather than Social Contract Theory. In this chapter I argue that close 
examination of Brandt's argument in his A Theory of the Good and the Right 
suggests that the primary determinant of an agent's choice of the Ideal Code 
Utilitarian Society is not her having undergone cognitive psychotherapy as 
Brandt claims, but rather her being independently benevolently motivated. 
But in this case, the concept of instrumentally rational choice is doing no 
justificatory work. For it is – again – vacuously true that an agent will choose 
what she has special motivation to choose, other things equal. This fact does 
not succeed in justifying her choice for us unless we, too, have that special 
motivation. But if we do, then the argument does not succeed in justifying this 
choice as instrumentally efficient whatever ends we have, i.e. objectively. 
Brandt's characterization of rational desires as those which survive cognitive 
psychotherapy suggests a different and more powerful method of moral 
justification that renders dispensable his Instrumentalist strategy.   
Section 1 contrasts Brandt’s Instrumentalism with Rawls’s. Although they 
are united in their de facto commitment to the Humean conception of the self, 
Rawls proves to be the more consistent Humean, whereas Brandt incorporates 
central Kantian tenets, explored further in subsequent sections. Section 2 
describes the dilemma generated by his Instrumentalist mode of justification, 
and also the problems raised by his appeal to the reader’s self-interest. Section 
3 examines Brandt’s analysis of desire, and the Kantian implications of his 
stipulation that a belief is the precipitating cause of action. Section 4 traces the 
conditions Brandt imposes on specifically rational desire, with particular 
attention to his conception of cognitive psychotherapy. Although these retain 
the universality of his criterion of rational desire, they imply that there are no 
universally rational desires themselves. Section 5 contrasts Brandt’s account of 
prudence with Nagel’s. But we see that Brandt’s analysis of prudential 
motivation in fact accords with Nagel’s Kantian one rather than opposing it. 
Section 6 looks at the irrational desires which Brandt claims cognitive 
psychotherapy extinguishes, and argues that this criterion does not succeed in 
distinguishing rational from irrational desires. Section 7 argues that on 
Brandt’s account of benevolence, it is rational neither for a benevolent agent 
nor for a self-interested one to choose the Ideal Code Utilitarian society. 
Section 8 concludes that his conception of cognitive psychotherapy has not 
been exploited to maximum effect. 
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1. Brandt and Rawls 
 Ideal Code Utilitarianism describes an ideally rational moral code – a set of 
moral rules that are "presumably some not very distant variant of some 
present rules" (290) 
1
 – conformity to which would maximize welfare for all 
members of a society. It thus has a long Anglo-American pedigree that 
extends back to Bentham and Mill. Like Rawls, Brandt tries to justify his 
normative moral theory to us by arguing that the actions, life-plan, or social 
arrangements it prescribes can be shown to be the best means to the 
achievement of an agent's final ends, whatever these may be.   
However, whereas Rawls tried to defend the two principles of justice to 
us by arguing the value and plausibility of the hypothetical situation that 
engendered them, Brandt tries to defend Ideal Code Utilitarianism on the 
basis of its actual consequences. He argues that implementing its principles is 
the best means to the achievement of our own final ends as well. Whereas for 
Rawls, the final ends in question were any consistent with the two principles 
of justice in a well-ordered society, for Brandt, they are the objects of rational 
desire. As Brandt characterizes them, objects of rational desire are essentially 
the same as the objects of rational choice described by Rawls’s "thick" theory 
of goodness as rationality (TJ Ch. VII). Like Rawls, Brandt assumes we want 
the satisfaction of our rational desires, whatever in particular these may be; 
and he means to argue that the laws and norms of an Ideal Code Utilitarian 
society are best suited to satisfy them.  
 But whereas we have just seen that Rawls was, despite his explicit 
avowals, a Humean disguised as a Kantian, we will now see that Brandt is, 
despite his explicit avowals, a Kantian disguised as a Humean. On Rawls’s 
view in A Theory of Justice, the parties in the original position choose principles 
of justice on the basis of self-interested desires protected from external 
influence by certain restrictions on information. On Brandt's view, by contrast, 
we are to choose principles to govern society on the basis of unrestricted 
information that causes us to have desires that are by definition rational, 
whether they are self-interested or not. We have seen in Chapters III and IV 
that both the restricted- and the full-information models of rational choice 
yield the trivial result that any such choice qualifies as rational. What most 
significantly differentiates Brandt's view from Rawls’s and calls into question 
Brandt’s self-identification with the Utilitarian tradition is that on Brandt's 
view, it is what we rationally believe and know, rather than what we simply 
and self-interestedly want, that is the most important determinant of our 
choice of social principles: 
                                                
1
Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). 
All references to this work are parenthecized in the text.  
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[R]ational desire ... can confront, or will even be produced by, awareness 
of the truth; irrational desire cannot (113). 
 With this modification, Brandt attempts to escape what we saw to be one 
of the most central and frequently repeated criticisms of Rawls’s metaethics, 
namely that the conditions defining the original position – self-interest, 
freedom, equality, the veil of ignorance, the desire to maximize primary 
goods – were not independently rational but rather already biased towards a 
certain liberal democratic conception of justice for which no independent 
justification had been provided. That is, it was objected that Rawls’s 
metaethical methodology was too loaded with value assumptions of its own 
to provide an objective justification of the well-ordered society it was 
supposed to support. We saw that this resulted from a more general tension 
inherent within the Instrumentalist strategy itself, that it can succeed in 
providing an objective justification only to the extent that it sacrifices the aim 
of providing a moral justification; and can succeed in providing a moral 
"justification" only to the extent that it sacrifices the aim of providing an 
objective justification. 
But Brandt's admirable allegiance to the value-neutrality of his 
conception of rational choice undermines the justificatory force of his 
Instrumentalist argument for his particular moral theory, just as it did for 
Rawls. We will see that by stipulating restrictive conditions on motivation and 
on final ends as part of the rational chooser's psychology at the outset, he robs 
the derivation of his theory of its rationally persuasive force for us. As did 
Rawls’s derivation, Brandt's also ends up being strictly deductive – but 
without any pure procedural method comparable to that of wide reflective 
equilibrium to ensure its soundness. 
 
2. Brandt's Theory of Justification 
 Brandt means to escape the Instrumentalist dilemma by deploying a 
weaker, more value-neutral conception of rationality as fully informed choice 
to provide the metaethical underpinning for his justification of the Ideal Code 
Utilitarian society (185, 189-193). He means to argue, not that this social 
arrangement will provide the best resources for satisfying just anyone's 
desires, but that it will provide the best resources for satisfying anyone's 
rational desires. But he then further qualifies this strategy in a second way, by 
arguing that this social arrangement will provide the best means for satisfying 
anyone's benevolent rational desires. By restricting the agent's scope of ends 
and of motivation in these two ways, he makes the agent's resulting choice of 
something like an Ideal Code-Utilitarian society a foregone conclusion. Of 
course an agent whose highest priority is the satisfaction of rational desire 
will choose to live in a society whose moral code is ideally crafted to achieve 
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this end, other things equal. But this does not answer the question of what 
society would be best for us, as imperfectly rational agents, to choose. 
Similarly, a benevolent agent who rationally desires to maximize others' 
happiness will certainly choose to live in a society whose moral code 
maximizes everyone's happiness, other things equal. But this does not settle 
the issue of what society would be best for us as imperfectly moral agents 
whose motives are not always benevolent.  
 Given Brandt's commitment to Instrumentalism, there are a couple of 
strategies open to him: one is to build value-laden normative assumptions 
into his premises and then "derive" them as conclusions. Another is to build 
no such assumptions into his criterion of rational desire and so derive none – 
in which case any desire can be rational depending on the individual and how 
she responds to facts and logic. We will see that Brandt utilizes both strategies 
and both fail. But is he doomed to fail? Is it in theory impossible to fashion a 
procedure or set of formal constraints on rational choice of an Instrumentalist 
sort, comparable to scientific procedure in science, that is both substantively 
neutral with respect to content and also yields the right substantive results, at 
least in easy moral cases? As we have seen in Chapter X.5, hard moral cases 
are comparable to hard cases in science, in that inferences from a theory for 
particular cases may be counterintuitive. However, Rawls’s conception of 
wide reflective equilibrium has demonstrated that we can continue to have 
faith in counterintuitive conclusions if the procedure has proved itself 
powerful enough to explain and predict commonsense cases (for example, 
that everyone should contribute to the common good). In order to meet this 
challenge, Brandt must explicate at a more abstract and formal level what 
makes the "right substantive results" right in decisions we as readers 
recognize as such.  
 For in the end, it is the disinterested and uncommitted reading audience, 
i.e. we, who need to be convinced. To the extent that Brandt's preferred type 
of moral "justification" abandons the desideratum of value-neutrality, it 
thereby seems to abandon the uncommitted audience it was Brandt's original 
purpose to convince. If we are not already benevolent, i.e. already committed 
to the project of maximizing welfare, how is Brandt's moral "justification" 
supposed to justify our choosing a moral system that does? What good does it 
do us to know that if we were rational and benevolent, we would choose such 
a system, if in fact we are neither rational nor benevolent?  
 Brandt does not claim that anyone actually has rational desires. But he 
does try to convince us that it is in our self-interest to cultivate them. He says,   
I shall ... point to some facts which will recommend rational action and 
rational desire to everyone or virtually everyone. In other words, I shall 
cite some facts, awareness of which will make the reader more favorably 
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disposed towards rational action and desire; motivate him to some degree to 
try to do the rational thing; make him tend to lose interest in goals which 
are known to be irrational for him, and to want to conform his desires and 
aversions to what they would be if he were rational (151; italics added). 
In this passage Brandt describes the justificatory strategy he is going to use 
with us. In this strategy, awareness of certain facts can motivate us to do the 
rational thing, and can cause us to want our desires to be rational. We will see 
that this turns out to be the very same method by which, according to his 
view, rational desires are fashioned and can be identified. It thereby 
encapsulates the paradox of Brandt's Kantian type of Humeanism, for it 
describes a process in which not desire but rather transpersonal rationality, 
i.e. disinterested, theoretically rational reflection on given facts, is the final 
determinant of action. So, for example, Brandt's account of rational desires 
implies that the Harvard professor who merely comes to recognize the 
irrationality of his inclination to decline an offer from UCLA will be 
sufficiently motivated by this recognition to override his inclination and 
accept UCLA's offer (125-6). 
 The strategy Brandt merely outlines in this passage attempts to construct 
a link between what a fully rational agent would choose and what we 
ourselves should choose, and to convince us to choose the Ideal Code 
Utilitarian society because a fully rational chooser would. If Brandt can 
maintain a genuinely value-neutral conception of rational choice on the one 
hand and generate from it a specifically moral conception of the just society 
on the other, he will demonstrate that Instrumentalism as a "pure procedural" 
methodology can have, after all, the power to generate substantive moral 
theories, analogously to the way in which untainted scientific methodology 
claims the power to generate substantive physical theories.  
 This strategy thus attempts to answer the question of what difference it 
should make to me to find out that a desire or action is rational, and why I 
should want to do what is rational. Brandt tries to avoid the time-tested tack 
on which Gewirth relied, of arguing that to ask why I should do what is 
rational to do is to ask for reasons; that to ask for reasons is a rational activity; 
and hence that to ask why I should do what is rational presupposes that I 
should. Brandt's approach is more ambitious. He means to supply an 
independent justification of the value of rational desire and action that will 
demonstrate its intellectual usefulness on the one hand, and move us to be 
rational on the other. Thus Brandt observes that irrational or uninformed 
action is not based on knowledge of possible consequences, and we do not 
like it when our actions have distressing consequences (this is true by 
definition of "distressing"). It would be nice to be able to foresee and avoid 
them. Furthermore, he points out, we will be more able to satisfy all our 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception   469 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
desires if we act on the basis of full information about them. Moreover, 
irrational desires interfere with desire-satisfaction generally, as when one has 
an irrational aversion to going outside but desires a vacation in the Bahamas. 
 Notice that all three of these reasons appeal to self-interest and the 
personal comfort of the agent. He says, 
by acting rationally (= avoiding cognitive defects at the moment of 
decision) we assure that our desires, present and future, are satisfied as 
fully as possible in the circumstances, irrespective of what they are. By 
showing that a given action is rational, then, by implication we show that 
it is chosen by a procedure fitted to maximize satisfaction of desires for 
the agent. Thus the showing that an action is rational must recommend 
the act – to any agent, since every agent is an agent with desires. The 
showing does not accidentally recommend to some people; when we 
consider that all agents are creatures with desires, it recommends of 
necessity (154). 
This is a classic encapsulation of Instrumentalism and of the Humean 
conception of the self more generally, within which reason is merely a means 
to the satisfaction of personal desire; and of the Instrumentalist strategy most 
Humeans adopt. Thus Brandt regards as unproblematic the assumption that 
self-interested action is always rational. This assumption depends on the prior 
assumption that self-interested desires are always rational. That is, Brandt 
assumes that an action's being in our self-interest always provides us with a 
motivationally effective reason to perform it. We have already found reason 
to dispute this assumption in Chapter VI, and find more in Volume II, 
Chapter VIII.  
 Further considerations that Brandt invokes which recommend rational 
desire include the fact that we do not like it when our desires and actions are 
inconsistent with our beliefs. We desire rationally coherent desires: 
The proposal here is that awareness of the fact that one has irrational 
desires works in a way similar to awareness that one has incoherent 
beliefs or unjustified fears. One is made uncomfortable by the awareness, 
and is motivated to remove its source (157). 
In line with Brandt's assumption that it is rational to seek personal comfort 
(159), the desire for rationally coherent desires is itself putatively justified by 
our desire to avoid the discomforting effect of an awareness that our desires 
are incoherent. This assumption is in general not sound as a criterion of 
rationality. But even if it were, it would not furnish a satisfying answer to the 
question as to the rational status of the desire for coherent desires, and why 
we should prefer coherent to incoherent desires. That answer, too, will have 
to await more extensive treatment in Volume II, Chapter VIII.1-2. 
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 Ultimately Brandt's "independent justification" of rationality reduces to a 
variant on the time-tested tack described earlier. Having adopted an 
instrumental model of rationality, he then offers an instrumentally rational 
justification of it. However, this variant is less robust than the traditional one, 
because one can counter Brandt's defense by simply rejecting Instrumentalism 
itself as a metaethical strategy. Given the defects already noted, there is 
independent reason to do this. 
 
3. Desire 
 Brandt identifies his view as falling within the Humean tradition with 
respect to the model of motivation he adopts. Revising somewhat his analysis 
in the seminal article (co-authored with Jaegwon Kim), "Wants as 
Explanations of Action,"
2
 that we scrutinized in Chapter II.1, Brandt defines a 
desire for something O as follows:   
[A] person 'wants' something O, ... if his central motive state is such that 
if it were then to occur to him that a certain act of his then would tend to 
bring O about, his tendency to perform that act would be increased" (26; 
cf. 30).  
Desire, then, is defined by stipulating what an agent would do, were certain 
conditions to obtain: I want or desire a soufflé if, were it to occur to me that 
cooking one would get me one, my tendency to cook one would increase.  
On Brandt's view, if I desire an end, it is not possible for me think about 
acting to achieve it without tending more strongly to perform that action. If I 
can think about acting to achieve it without becoming more strongly inclined 
to so act, then I cannot be said to desire the object I am envisioning as the 
outcome of that action. Desire, for Brandt, equals thought plus increased 
tendency to act. 
 Thus a desire is a thought-activated physical disposition to act in the 
service of an end (27, 56). This disposition is activated by the occurrent 
thought that the act will effect that end. The disposition may be activated 
without being realized if the thought disposes me more strongly to act 
without actually causing me to act. In that case, in which the disposition gets 
stronger but not strong enough to exert sufficient motive influence on my 
action, the action will not occur (26). The disposition, that is, is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition, and a contributing cause, of action. Similarly, the 
action will not occur if the thought does not occur, because the tendency or 
                                                
2
Richard Brandt and Jaegwon Kim, "Wants as Explanations of Actions," The Journal of 
Philosophy LX (1963), 425-35; reprinted in N. S. Care and C. Landesman, Eds. Readings in 
the Theory of Action (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1969), 199-213.  
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disposition to act has not been activated. So thought is a necessary condition, 
and the precipitating cause, of action. 
 Brandt believes that one performs that action which there is the "strongest 
net tendency to perform" (47).  So he thinks that no intentional action directed 
toward a certain outcome will occur without a net tendency to act so as to 
bring about (or avert) that outcome; i.e. that intentional action directed 
toward a certain outcome requires a net tendency to act so as to bring about 
that outcome. This means that in order to perform an act at a certain time, the 
sum total of the agent's dispositions and traits of character must incline her to 
perform the act at that time.  
 On the tautologous interpretation of this claim, Brandt is noting merely 
that an agent does what she is most strongly inclined to do. This is a variant 
on the Humean thesis discussed in Chapters II.1 and III, that an agent always 
does what she most wants to do, and that observation of what she does 
answers the question of what she most wanted to do. On a nontautologous 
interpretation, the claim denies that an agent can act against character, or can 
override her settled habits of mind or behavior in action through the force of 
some other motive, for example sheer impulse, or reason. On the 
nontautologous interpretation, observation of what an agent does reveals not 
only her overriding desire, but thereby her settled traits of character.
3
  
 Having characterized desire in terms of a tendency (or disposition) to act, 
and action in terms of the strongest net tendency to act, Brandt then asserts 
that "no intentional action will occur without desire or aversion directed at it 
or its outcome..." (66). It may seem that Brandt is here making the same 
mistake as did Gewirth, by conflating desire and intention. But since Brandt 
has already defined a desire as a thought-activated tendency to act, this says 
merely – again – that no action will occur without a prior disposition to 
perform that action, i.e. that this disposition is a necessary condition – and a 
contributing cause – of action. On both the tautologous and the 
nontautologous interpretation of Brandt's thesis, however, the precipitating 
cause of action is not the desire for the end the action effects. It is a component 
of that desire, namely the occurrent thought that the action will effect this end. 
Thought, not desire, is what precipitates the performance of action, if 
anything does. 
 Brandt's conception of occurrent thought as the precipitating cause of 
action makes his view a peculiar sort of Humeanism indeed. As we have seen 
with Nagel, Frankfurt, Williams, Gewirth, and Rawls, Humeans usually 
stipulate desire as the precipitating conative force in action, and assign 
                                                
3
See Brandt's "Traits of Character: A Conceptual Analysis," American Philosophical 
Quarterly 7, 1 (January 1970). 
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thought and reasoning a subsidiary and instrumental role in achieving its 
ends. On these views, however, desire itself (not just one of its components) is 
an occurrent mental event that causes subsequent events, such as thought 
about how to satisfy it and instrumental action intended to do so. Even on 
these views, desire is not a sufficient cause of action, since other necessary 
background conditions also must be satisfied. But once they are, desire 
precipitates rational calculation and determines whether the act is finally 
performed or not.  
 On Brandt's view, by contrast, desire no longer has this centrally 
determining role. Brandt's modification of the traditional view treats desire as 
a thought-activated disposition to act rather than as an occurrent event. Of 
course a disposition can be a contributing cause. But it cannot be a 
precipitating cause because it cannot itself be the thing that activates the 
disposition.  On Brandt's view, thought – i.e. an occurrent belief about the 
consequence of performing the contemplated action – has this centrally 
determining role. Without such a belief, on Brandt's view, there would be no 
increase in an agent's tendency to perform the designated action, and hence 
no desire to perform it.  
 When Brandt then maintains that "what an agent does is always a 
function of his desires at the time; there is no such thing as motivation by 
beliefs alone" (83), he is maintaining that such a thought is not sufficient in 
itself, in the absence of a prior disposition, to cause action. He says,  
If some philosophers have thought, as some seem to have done, that a 
person can do his duty even if so doing is not positively valenced for him 
[i.e. if he is not disposed to do so], ... perhaps 'out of respect' for duty in 
some sense, they were wrong; and their psychology of morality needs 
basic revision (66-67).  
On the tautologous reading of Brandt's thesis about desire, there would be no 
conflict between that thesis and the Kantian claim, which Brandt obviously 
means to oppose, that one might act out of respect for or knowledge of one's 
moral duty. That is, it might be true both that one has a net tendency to do 
what one does, and also that that tendency or disposition itself was caused by 
respect for or knowledge of the moral law. On the nontautologous reading of 
Brandt's thesis, acting out of respect for or knowledge of one's moral duty 
against one's settled character dispositions would be psychologically 
impossible. Knowledge of one’s moral duty could precipitate action only if 
one had a prior disposition to do it. The extent to which even this 
nontautologous reading of Brandt’s thesis conflicts with the Kantian claim is a 
matter for debate, since Kant agrees with Aristotle that cultivating the 
appropriate character dispositions facilitates and is indeed a precondition for 
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doing one’s duty.
4
 Nevertheless, this second reading would be the one that 
seems to underlie Brandt's claim here, as he clearly means to contrast belief 
and desire as possible causes of action.  
 But in this case Brandt cannot be supposed to be committed to a concept 
of desire defined solely as a disposition to action – not even an activated one, 
because even an activated disposition is merely one of many contributing 
causes of the actual action. If Brandt means to insist that desire rather than 
belief or duty is what causes action, then since a disposition to act is merely a 
contributing rather than a precipitating cause of action, desire itself cannot be 
merely a tendency or disposition to act. In that case desire itself must be an 
occurrent event, as the orthodox Humean model of motivation – and the 
representational analysis of desire I offered in Chapter II.2.1 – assume. Either 
Brandt must adhere to the orthodox version of the Humean model, which 
stipulates desire as an occurrent event that precipitates intentional action; or 
else he is a closet Kantian, for whom occurrent beliefs rather than desire play 
that role. The following section will adduce further evidence that the latter 
possibility most accurately describes Brandt's view. 
 
4. Rational Desire 
 An act, desire, or moral system for Brandt is rational if it survives criticism 
by relevant and available facts and logic (10, 113). It is objectively rational if it 
utilizes all available and relevant information; whereas it is subjectively rational 
if it utilizes all the beliefs rationally supported by evidence the agent has 
available at the time (72). An ideally rational agent is one whose desires and 
actions are what they would be if the agent had access to and was maximally 
influenced by all available relevant facts and logic (10, 11). This requires, first, 
that the agent is vividly and presently aware of every item of relevant 
information; and second, that the agent's desires have undergone cognitive 
psychotherapy. This Brandt defines as "value-free reflection" on available 
                                                
4
 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten, Zweiter Teil: Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der 
Tugendlehre, Herausg. Karl Vorländer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1966), Ak. 399. It 
is regrettable that Gregor decided to change the translation of Beschaffenheit from 
“disposition” in her original translation of this work to “endowment” in the revised 
version. Neither is quite accurate, but the original rendering is closer to the literal 
meaning in this context, which would be something like “habit of character.” Kant’s 
subsequent elaboration of this concept as praedispositio makes clear that he means to be 
referring to character dispositions. Compare Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue: Part 
II of The Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1971), with Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. 
Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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relevant information. If a desire is not altered by this process, then it is 
rational for Brandt (113).  
 Information is available if it comprises "the propositions accepted by the 
science of the agent's day, plus factual propositions justified by publicly 
accessible evidence (including testimony of others about themselves) and the 
principles of logic" (13), i.e. if it constitutes the best system of beliefs, justified 
by publicly accessible evidence, we have at the time of decision (12-13, 112). It 
is relevant if "its presence to awareness would make a difference to the 
person's tendency to perform a certain act, or to the attractiveness of some 
prospective outcome to him. Hence it is essentially a causal notion"(12), i.e. if 
it would influence causally one's tendency to perform the act or one's desire 
for the state of affairs (12, 112). Relevant information thus includes that which 
changes one's desires, extinguishes some desires, produces different desires, 
or simply changes one's behavior. (Brandt further qualifies this definition of 
relevance so as to exclude the possibility that, for example, performing the 
multiplication tables before satisfying any desire might discourage all of 
them, by requiring that the effect of relevant facts or information be local to a 
particular desire, and a function of its content.) 
 Brandt's aim is to  
show that some intrinsic desires and aversions would be present in some 
persons if relevant available information registered fully, that is, if the 
persons repeatedly represented to themselves, in an ideally vivid way, 
and at an appropriate time, the available information which is relevant in 
the sense that it would make a different to desires and aversions (111).  
By representing available information in an ideally vivid way, Brandt means 
that the person focuses attention on the information with maximal vividness 
and detail, and with no hesitation or doubt or stirrings of skepticism about its 
truth (111-112). Cognitive psychotherapy is thus the process of confronting 
one's desires with relevant, available and vivid facts and logic.  
 Brandt believes that desires found to be irrational will extinguish under 
cognitive psychotherapy, i.e. that once one understands that a desire is based 
on false or idiosyncratic beliefs and associations, the desire will disappear. If 
the desire does not extinguish under cognitive psychotherapy, then it is not 
irrational, regardless of its content (113). The set of desires remaining after 
cognitive psychotherapy has been undergone will be rational on this account, 
and so acting to satisfy them will be as well. Thus confronting one's desires 
with the relevant facts and logic may causally influence motivation, by 
eliminating as motivational variables those desires that fail to survive the 
confrontation.   
 Suppose, for example, that I have a burning desire for a fast-food 
hamburger. Then I read Consumer Reports, from which I learn that fast-food 
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hamburgers are injected with a poisonous red dye to improve their 
appearance; infused with hormones to increase their weight, which impede 
normal functioning of the brain and thereby lower intelligence; that fast-food 
hamburgers are cooked all at once at 6:00 AM every day, and sprayed with a 
carcinogenic glaze to retain their freshness; and that while waiting on order, 
fast-food hamburgers are stored in an insufficiently cooled refrigerator 
accessible to rodents; and so on. If my desire for a fast-food hamburger wanes 
the more of this information I receive, then it was not rational to begin with.  
 But the above passage from page 111 also confirms that the process of 
cognitive psychotherapy, of fully registering relevant available information in 
an ideally vivid way, may produce rational desires (also see 113). So, for 
example, one might fully register in an ideally vivid way information about 
the effect of toxic automobile emissions and develop a desire for better public 
transportation; or, as actually happened to Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy, fully register in an ideally vivid way facts about the effects of 
slavery and inner city poverty on the African-American underclass and 
develop a desire to fight for civil rights. Conversely, one might deliberately 
avoid developing such desires by choosing to avoid the relevant facts. 
Cognitive psychotherapy, then, is ultimately a method by which we can cull, 
shape, and cultivate our settled character dispositions by exposing ourselves 
and our inclinations to the bracing effects of reality. Relevant and available 
facts and logic are claimed to have a formative and motivationally influential 
effect on desires. Brandt’s conception of cognitive psychotherapy is thus very 
close to the concept of a motivated desire which we saw Nagel defend in 
Chapter VII, and is even closer to the projected effects of the ideal role-taking 
that we saw in Chapter X.4.3 to be an essential precondition for Habermas’ 
conception of the moral point of view. It reveals Brandt's closet Kantianism 
most clearly.
5
 
 Nevertheless, our first question must be whether any of our desires or 
aversions can qualify as rational on Brandt's intended account; and, if so, how 
this fact might influence our choice of a moral code. Brandt's conception of 
cognitive psychotherapy as a corrective for irrational desires also may be 
understood as a remote heir of Mill's conception of education and experience 
in cultivating the "higher pleasures" among a society’s "informed majority." 
However, there are two interpretations of Mill's informed majority criterion of 
                                                
5
This is not to suggest that Brandt is a consistent closet Kantian. He also believes that if 
the cost of information-gathering can be outweighed by the benefit of acting quickly 
then it is rational to do so (13, 73). This means that relevant and available facts and logic 
are dispensable when they conflict with maximizing utility – the standard, neoclassical 
economic model of rationality that is part of the traditional foundation of the Humean 
conception of the self.  
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higher pleasures. On the democratic interpretation, any pleasure the informed 
majority chooses is in virtue of that choice identifiable as a higher pleasure; 
i.e. the informed majority confers that status on a pleasure in virtue of its 
choice. On the elite interpretation, the informed majority chooses a particular 
pleasure because their education and experience enable them to recognize it 
as higher independently of their choice of it. Correspondingly, there are two 
possible ways of understanding Brandt's cognitive psychotherapy criterion of 
rational desire. On the democratic interpretation, any desire that survives it, for 
whatever reason, thereby qualifies as rational.  On the elite interpretation, a 
particular desire survives cognitive psychotherapy because one recognizes its 
rationality independently of its psychological survival. That is, confrontation 
with relevant and available facts and logic enable one to see which desires are 
in fact rational and which are the result of idiosyncratic associations or 
warped reasoning. Whereas Mill chooses the elite interpretation of his 
informed majority criterion of higher pleasures, Brandt chooses the 
democratic interpretation of his cognitive psychotherapy criterion of rational 
desires. He thereby avoids linking the rationality of a desire to its particular 
content, or to the agent's recognition of the rationality of its content. Instead, a 
desire's rationality is entirely a function of its contingent psychological 
survival for a particular agent, irrespective of its content. This is a fateful 
choice that has several unfortunate implications. 
 First notice that Brandt builds a circularity into his definition of what 
counts as relevant information in the criticism of intrinsic desire. He suggests 
that if information causally affects desires and aversions then it is relevant; 
and that if it is relevant, then it will causally affect desires and aversions. So 
relevance is a function of causal efficacy exclusively. In an attempt to ensure 
the value-neutrality of his conception of rational desire, Brandt offers no 
substantive intellectual criterion by which the content of the information 
might be assessed for its relevance. But this criterion is then so weak that it 
cannot generate an identifiably rational choice at all. On this view, it makes no 
sense to criticize an agent's desires on the grounds that he is not taking 
seriously information that is relevant to his choices; for if it does not affect 
those choices it is by definition not relevant, however pertinent it may seem to 
a third-person observer. And if no information causally affects that desire, 
then no information is relevant to its rationality. Therefore it is in itself 
rational for Brandt, regardless of its content or object. So, for example, if my 
desire for alcoholic oblivion is unaffected by what I have read in The New 
England Journal of Medicine about what alcohol does to the liver or how it 
shortens one's life, then this information is irrelevant to the rationality of my 
desire for alcoholic oblivion. If my desire for alcoholic oblivion does not 
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extinguish when confronted by this information, then it is rational, according 
to Brandt, no matter how unhealthy or noxious this desire may be. 
 A second implication of this view would seem to be that either every 
agent must be supposed to "fully register" available information in the same 
"ideally vivid" way, which is improbable; or else the rationality of desire is 
relative to an agent's susceptibility to the effects of cognitive psychotherapy, 
other things equal. Assuming that agents with full information may 
nevertheless process that information differently in accordance with their 
different though fully functioning individual cognitive capacities, it may 
happen that an arbitrarily selected desire is rational for some of them and not 
others. The rationality of a desire for a particular agent depends on the 
contingent and empirical question of how that agent's cognitive capacities 
happen to respond to cognitive psychotherapy. If an agent is so constituted 
that the desire extinguishes when confronted with it, then it is irrational for 
that agent, although it may not be for others. So which desires are rational for 
which agents will depend on contingencies of their cognitive constitution that 
are independent of the content of those desires themselves: How strongly 
facts and logic affect them, and how susceptible to change their desires are in 
light of them.  Brandt accepts this implication (113). 
 This means that while Brandt's criterion of rational desire may be a 
universal one, the particular desires that satisfy this criterion cannot be 
identified as universally rational – nor, therefore, as objectively valid. For any 
particular desire I may have, whether or not it qualifies as rational for me 
carries no implication as to whether or not it qualifies as rational tout court. To 
use Nagel's terminology, Brandt's universal criterion of rational desire does 
not yield an identification of desires that have objective value such that anyone 
would have reason to cultivate them. We saw in Section 2 that it was Brandt's 
ambition to provide an account of rational desires that recommended them 
necessarily to every agent (154). But this is precisely what his account makes it 
impossible to do. Rational desires recommend themselves necessarily only to 
those particular agents for whom they happen to be rational; and there is no 
necessity about which ones do. Therefore it is equally impossible for him to 
demonstrate the objective validity of Ideal Code Utilitarianism as an object of 
rational desire. 
 Brandt claims that this account of rational desires is nevertheless value-
neutral, in that it does not import into the definition any moral values. 
Although he cannot demonstrate the objective validity of Ideal Code 
Utilitarianism as an object of rational desire, according to his account of 
rational desire, what he can do is try to ground his conception of rational 
choice in established facts of empirical psychology – about conditioning, 
information processing, reasoning, and the like – which, he assumes, 
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themselves contain no hidden, value-laden assumptions. They do, of course. 
They contain assumptions about the value of the cognitive over the intuitive 
or emotional; and of self-scrutiny, analysis, and reflection over spontaneous 
self-expression. Brandt valorizes these skills by assigning them roles as 
constituents in an ideal of rational deliberation that in turn functions 
normatively and prescriptively. Still, we have seen in the General 
Introduction to this project that this degree of value-ladenness is a necessary 
condition of rational dialogue.  
 Thus Brandt's reductive translation of morally value-laden terms such as 
"best" and "good" into terms describing the character dispositions of 
rationality are unobjectionable. He proposes that we understand "the best 
thing to do" as "the rational thing to do," where "rational" is to be understood 
in the terms already explained (12, 126-7). Similarly, Brandt maintains, when 
we say an action is "rational" or "justified," we both describe and recommend 
it. Brandt's strategy for protecting the value-neutrality of his metaethical 
program is to defend a type of equivalence relation between normative moral 
terms and normative psychological terms. This protects the universality of his 
criterion of rational desires, but it does not increase the objective validity of 
those desires themselves. 
 
5. Prudence 
 Should Brandt in fact rule out the possibility that an agent might be 
motivated to act by beliefs or knowledge alone? Consider, as he does, the case 
of prudence. Brandt means to locate his view of prudence in direct opposition 
to that which he takes Thomas Nagel to hold (83-4). On Brandt's official view, 
I must have a present desire to ensure the satisfaction of what I know my 
future desires will be in order to ensure it; merely the belief that I will have 
those future desires is insufficient to motivate me to act.  
 However, in discussing the rationality of pure time preference, Brandt 
often slips into the language of belief-motivation. He considers the case in 
which I now have a desire for a particular satisfaction at a future time t, and 
also the knowledge that at t I will also have another, equally strong desire for 
a second satisfaction at t. For example, suppose I now desire to get to bed at 
9:00 PM this evening, and also know that at 9:00 PM I will desire equally to 
watch "Star Trek." About this kind of case Brandt remarks that 
[s]o far my desire now for O [i.e. to get to bed at 9:00 PM], and my future 
desire for O' [i.e. to watch "Star Trek" at 9:00 PM], appear to come out 
equally; at least, let us suppose this. But it is also true that the idea of O now 
motivates me in a way in which the idea of O' does not. That it does is implied by 
the fact that I do desire it now. In view of this fact, does it not seem plausible 
to say that the total motivation or action-tendency to do what is expected 
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to bring about O will be greater than the total motivation or action-
tendency to do what is expected to bring about O', at the time? The 
answer must be affirmative (86; italics added). 
Brandt is arguing here, first, that the very fact that I now desire something 
implies that the idea of that thing motivates me "in a way in which" the idea 
of something I now know I will desire later does not; and second, that that 
special motivational oomph I obtain from desiring something now implies 
that I now desire what I desire more than I will desire the thing I know I will 
desire later.  
 Both arguments are false. The only way in which my desiring now to go 
to bed at 9:00 PM need motivate me differently from my desiring at 9:00 PM 
to watch "Star Trek" is in motivating me now. And the special motivational 
oomph I receive from desiring now to go to bed at 9:00 PM carries no 
implication whatsoever that I desire this more than I will desire at 9:00 PM to 
watch "Star Trek." Brandt's arguments here are based on two unstated 
assumptions: first, that now desiring O is the same as desiring [that] O [occur] 
now, an assumption that is violated by any case in which my desire occurs 
now but the state of affairs I now desire is something I desire to occur later; 
for example, my present desire to wake up tomorrow morning feeling rested. 
Thus Brandt presupposes the pure time-preferential assumption he is trying 
to prove. Second, he assumes that the state of affairs I desire now is somehow 
sexier or more tempting than the state of affairs I now know I will desire later. 
But this assumption, too, is false – as shown by the example, in which the 
more tempting satisfaction is the one I now know I shall desire later. Making 
plans now to sate or frustrate this future desire, based on and motivated by 
the knowledge I have now, is what prudence is all about. No present desire is 
required to motivate me to do so. 
 But Brandt's analysis of rational desire raises problems even for his 
official account of prudence as requiring a present desire. The problematic 
feature of this account is that it is inherently retrospective. That is, it focuses 
primarily on desires we are already presumed to have, and seeks to modify 
them in light of facts and reasoning about their origins. As such, it provides a 
criterion for the evaluation of the desires on which we have acted. In the case 
in which we subject our known present desires to cognitive psychotherapy, it 
also provides impetus for reforming those desires in the future. What it does 
not purport to do is supply an agent now with any information that might 
causally influence the desires she now first manifests precisely in acting as she does 
to ensure the satisfaction of her future desires.  
 Recall that on the tautologous interpretation of the action-tendency 
account of desire, we perform that action there is the "strongest net tendency" 
to perform. The end of the action to which there is the strongest net tendency 
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is the end we most overridingly desire. Now many alternatives of prudential 
action are presented to us as possible ends of action only once in our lives. We 
get to choose only once whether to go right off to graduate school or take a 
year off after college; only once whether to speak up or remain silent at the 
moment we first discover a particular injustice; and only once whether to 
begin saving now at a fixed interest rate of 12% or defer that plan until later 
when the proffered rates may be lower or higher. In each of these cases, 
Brandt would say, rationality requires that we examine the cognitive origins 
of each of our thought-activated action-tendencies in the situation, in order to 
know which choice we should make. Of course it is particularly important to 
examine the cognitive origins of that action we have the strongest net 
tendency to perform, since that is the one that expresses our motivationally 
overriding desire. However, on Brandt's view, the only way we can know 
which action we have the strongest net tendency to perform is by performing 
it; that is how the strongest net tendency to act is identified. This, then, is also 
the way we identify our motivationally effective desires. The implication of 
Brandt's action-tendency account of desire – at least on the tautologous 
interpretation – is that we cannot know that any such newly manifest desire is 
motivationally overriding in advance of having acted on it. Therefore we 
cannot correct any such newly manifest desire in light of cognitive 
psychotherapy in advance of making a decision upon its basis. On the action-
tendency account of desire, we may evaluate the rational prudence of many of 
our decisions only in retrospect. 
 In Section 2 I argued that a non-tautologous reading of Brandt's act-
tendency account of desire commits him to the orthodox Humean account of 
desire as an occurrent mental event, if he is to retain his allegiance to the 
Humean conception at all. On this model, he encounters no such problem. If I 
can know which desire of mine is strongest before I act on it, I can – at least in 
theory – subject that desire (in addition to all the others) to the scrutiny of 
cognitive psychotherapy, and make my decision on the basis of its results. In 
this case the precipitating cause of action will be, not the thought that 
performing the act will satisfy my desire, but rather the thought that the 
desire itself is rational and therefore worth satisfying. Reason, to use Kant's 
terminology, would be an efficient cause of action in such cases. It turns out to 
be not so easy for Brandt to maintain his allegiance to the Humean conception 
as it might first seem. 
 Through exposure to facts and logic I may also produce new desires in 
the manner described briefly in Section 3. But these newly produced desires 
will not be thought-activated dispositions to act. Such exposure to reality is not 
the same as the lengthy process of habituation by which character dispositions 
are gradually fashioned. It is to character habituation as invasive surgery is to 
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physical therapy. It is literally a moving and often a traumatic experience, an 
occurrent event that precipitates further events – mental, emotional, conative. 
It is the kind of experience that does enable one to act in opposition to settled 
traits of character under the right circumstances – even to act out of respect 
for the moral law, or to spark a motivationally effective desire to do so. If 
desires were nothing but thought-activated, settled character dispositions, the 
experience of exposure to relevant and available facts and logic would be 
unable to generate them. They would require habituation – in which case they 
could be activated by thoughts and instrumental reasoning about how a 
particular action might realize their objects. Exposure to facts and logic would 
be superfluous.  
 On the other hand, in those cases in which cognitive psychotherapy is 
sufficient to engender a rational desire, that desire cannot be merely a 
thought-activated disposition to act, because no process of habituation has 
formed the relevant disposition (remember that we are considering the non-
tautologous interpretation, so it won't do to claim that if we performed the act 
we must have been so disposed to perform it). Here the desire must be an 
occurrent event, itself caused by prior deliberation. So Brandt's account of 
how cognitive psychotherapy produces desires essentially follows Nagel's 
Kantian model. 
 So if desires are thought-activated dispositions in the tautologous sense, 
cognitive psychotherapy can neither evaluate nor improve their rationality. 
Where cognitive psychotherapy can generate a rational desire, on the other 
hand, that desire cannot be a thought-activated disposition. If desires are, 
rather, nontautologous, occurrent mental events of the orthodox Humean 
sort, then rational actions are precipitated, not by the thought of their 
instrumentality, but by a Kantian recognition of their rationality.  
 However, if the orthodox Humean model of desire is, indeed, the one 
that underlies Brandt's assertion that we must always have a desire to ensure 
the satisfaction of our future desires in order to do so, it is then unclear from 
whence the necessity – and hence the universality – of this claim derives. As 
we have already seen in examining Nagel's view, desires understood in this 
sense are obviously not the only sorts of occurrent internal events that go on 
in us. Emotional states such as joy, outrage, or respect, as well as cognitive 
states such as conviction, doubt, or certainty may be among the others. Nor 
does Brandt rule out the possibility that these other internal states may have 
some causal role to play in fueling action as well (89). So it is unclear why 
desires should be ascribed a necessary part to play in motivating action, and 
why, other things equal, other internal, occurrent states such as certainty or 
respect should not at least on some occasions be sufficient. 
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 Indeed, Brandt's account of the motivational efficacy of cognitive 
psychotherapy would seem to require that desire drop out of the motivational 
chain in some cases. For first, if facts and logic can eliminate some desires 
from the set of motivationally efficacious variables, then facts and logic can 
cause me to refrain from performing some actions, namely those caused by 
the eliminated desires, such that this absence itself may contribute to the 
satisfaction of my future desires. For example, suppose, at age 20, I know that 
when I am 60 I will be in great fear of dying from lung cancer, but that 60 is 
too far away for me to worry too much about that now. If facts and logic can 
now extinguish my overwhelming present desire to start smoking cigarettes, 
they thereby can now causally contribute to the satisfaction of my future 
desire not to die of cancer. In this case the causal variables that explain my 
refraining from smoking now are facts and logic alone, not desire. 
 Second, if facts and logic can extinguish all but one present desire, 
leaving only that one to be motivationally effective, then they play a causal 
role in generating that one surviving rational desire as motivationally 
overriding. If facts and logic cause that desire to be motivationally overriding, 
and that motivationally overriding desire causes me to ensure the satisfaction 
of my future desires, then again, by transitivity, facts and logic cause me to 
ensure the satisfaction of my future desires. For example, suppose I know, at 
age 16, that when I am 45 I will, unless I act now, deeply regret not having 
finished my high school education now. Also suppose that facts and logic 
eliminate my desires to do all the things that would interfere with that goal, 
leaving only a knowledge of my future desire to have finished my high school 
education now, the future satisfaction of which I therefore now ensure. I then 
reach the age of 45 and look back with satisfaction and gratitude on my clear 
thinking and prudential course of action at 16. I thereby satisfy at age 16 my 
future desire at age 45 to have finished my high school education at age 16. 
Surely it would be odd to deny that facts and logic had, not only a motivating 
role, but indeed an overwhelming and necessary motivating role in ensuring 
the present satisfaction of my future desire to have finished my high school 
education at age 16, relative to which my present desire to do so played an 
insignificant role. Indeed, it would not be inaccurate to maintain that facts and 
logic, rather than my desires, were ultimately causally responsible for 
ensuring the satisfaction of this future desire. It would seem that Brandt's 
Kantian conception of cognitive psychotherapy interferes with his allegiance 
to the Humean model of motivation more often than not. 
 
6. Irrational Desire 
 Brandt argues that certain actions – hence net action-tendencies, hence 
occurrent thoughts of the instrumentality of those actions – can be identified 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception   483 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
as irrational with reference to the criterion he provides. Which ones, he asks, 
would not have been performed had the agent had and been maximally 
influenced by all available and relevant information? Brandt lists several 
types of such actions; I shall focus on three. First, there are those actions 
which overlook available options that would have enabled the agent to realize 
her ends more efficiently, such as walking back and forth three times between 
the house and, respectively, the supermarket, the hardware store, and the 
cleaners in order to carry home three separate bundles of goods that could 
have been transported in one trip by using the car. Second are actions that 
overlook probable undesirable consequences, such as being too exhausted 
after the first two hikes between the house and, respectively, the supermarket 
and the hardware store to then make a third trip to the cleaners. 
 Some of the problems with Brandt's account of rational desires surface in 
trying to identify unambiguous examples of either of these first two types. 
Take the first. If, knowing I had a fully functioning and readily available car, I 
instead set out to do my errands in three separate walks instead, in what 
sense can I be said to have overlooked the option of driving? Obviously the 
knowledge that I had a fully functioning and readily available car did not 
causally affect my net action-tendency. But on Brandt's view, all this shows is 
that this information was not relevant, and hence that my actions – and so the 
desires they were intended to satisfy – were rational. In this case taking the 
car and making one trip instead of three would not have been a more efficient 
way for me to realize my ends more efficiently because my ends, it seems in 
retrospect, involved getting some physical exercise rather than discharging 
my errands as quickly as possible.  
 Or take the second kind of case, in which the agent overlooks probable 
undesirable consequences of the action. The same question can be raised here 
as well.  Of course it would have been better if I had managed to complete all 
three errands rather than becoming too exhausted after the second to embark 
on the third. But since I chose to walk rather than take the car, we must infer 
that becoming exhausted after completing my second hike – to the hardware 
store – is itself preferable to having gotten no exercise at all by taking the car. 
Once again the inference must be that I did not overlook the undesirable 
consequences of three hikes over one car ride. Rather, I chose two hikes plus 
physical exhaustion over one car ride plus three errands done plus no 
physical exercise. Physical exhaustion was not an undesirable consequence I 
overlooked but rather a fact that was demonstrably – according to Brandt's 
criterion – irrelevant to my desires.  
 The third kind of mistake involves an inability to compute 
simultaneously all of the rank-ordered subjective probabilities that attach to 
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each of multiple outcomes of each action alternative. "Evidently," Brandt 
remarks,  
there is a problem about simultaneous adequate representation of the 
various features or elements of the alternatives, an inability to get 
everything adequately, or even equally, before the mind at the same time 
(76). 
Essentially Brandt reasons that we should try to do our best – "try to get the 
outcomes and their probabilities, as vividly (and equally) before the mind as 
possible," but that we "necessarily depart from ideal 'rationality' because of 
this finite capacity of our minds" (78). He quotes R. N. Shepard's observation 
that "[a]fter a choice of this kind has been made, the decision maker 
sometimes comes to the realization that this particular choice was not the best 
even by his own subjective standards."
6
 The difficulty is the same as before. 
Lacking any further criterion of "adequate representation" of the alternatives, 
we are free to conclude that those elements that failed to inform our decision 
were therefore demonstrably irrelevant to it. Of course in retrospect, with the 
benefit of hindsight and the experience of consequences, we may evaluate the 
alternatives differently. But what was relevant at the time was what causally 
affected our decision. If information available at that time did not affect it at 
that time, then it was not relevant at that time. 
 This general conclusion also applies to the desires and pleasures Brandt 
claims we would not have if we had all the relevant and available 
information. Brandt claims that certain beliefs and thoughts that contribute to 
the formation of desires are incompatible with relevant and available 
information, and therefore that those desires and pleasures themselves are 
irrational (89). According to Brandt, we learn to desire things in three ways. 
First there is classical conditioning. Beginning with an innately pleasant (or 
unpleasant) stimulus to which we respond, that experience is then associated 
with a neutral experience; we then learn to respond to the originally neutral 
experience as we did to the innately pleasant stimulus. Then there is direct 
conditioning, in which the thought of an originally pleasant experience is 
repeatedly paired with an unpleasant stimulus, and so generates withdrawal. 
Both kinds of conditioning are examples of contiguity conditioning, in which 
we learn to desire something because of its contiguity to something we 
already desire. Finally, there is what Brandt calls the principle of stimulus 
generalization, i.e. that if we have learned to like a certain thing, we will also 
like things similar to it, and will like them more the more similar they are. 
                                                
6
Shepard, R. N., "On Subjectively Optimum Selections Among Multi-Attribute 
Alternatives," in M. W. Shelley and G. L. Bryan, Eds. Human Judgments and Optimality 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), 257-81. 
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 We learn to stop desiring something through deconditioning of three 
types. First there is counterconditioning, a foil to classical conditioning, in 
which we replace the originally pleasant stimulus with an unpleasant one, 
and thereby engender the opposite response to the neutral stimulus. Then 
there is inhibition, in which we stop pairing the pleasant stimulus with the 
neutral experience, until the neutral experience alone eventually stops 
eliciting the attraction-response. Finally – and most importantly for Brandt's 
argument, there is discrimination, the foil to direct conditioning and stimulus 
generalization. Here we remind ourselves of the differences between the 
particular thing we like and other things that are similar but not identical to it 
(108). So Brandt's basic idea is that a desire is rational if reflecting on its 
origins, and carefully discriminating it from other similar desires does not 
destroy it.  
 There are many particular facts we may reflect on that may change our 
desires. For one thing, they may be based on false beliefs: for example, 
suppose I desire to become a stockbroker because I think it will satisfy my 
parents' wish for my lifelong financial security. I may then discover that they 
care more about whether I am happy than whether I am financially set for life, 
and do not think the former requires the latter. Or desires may be the result of 
misleading or fallacious advertising or cultural bias, i.e. not engendered by 
actually experiencing the desired or non-desired situation (117). An example 
would be disliking a low-prestige occupation that may be actually quite 
satisfying in practice. Or, third, desires may be the result of generalizing from 
untypical examples, such as assuming, because one was once bitten by a dog, 
that all dogs are apt to bite. Or they may have been produced by severe early 
deprivation, as for example the drive to accumulate power may have been 
caused by childhood experiences of powerlessness; to accumulate wealth by 
childhood experiences of poverty; or to acquire recognition and visibility by 
childhood experiences of neglect or marginalization.  
 Of course it is questionable whether such desires would, in fact, 
extinguish through reflection on their origins. Does one's desire for a wealthy 
lifestyle necessarily disappear through reflection on one's early poverty? On 
the contrary, it may be reinforced by it, as reason for self-congratulation; or be 
so deeply embedded in one's character that it is for all intents and purposes 
uneliminable. Brandt's interesting conception of reflection – i.e. of "verbal self-
stimulation" – is not sufficiently developed to make this case convincingly. In 
order to do so, he would need to add some provisos concerning the 
integration of verbal information with emotion, desire, and memory – 
perhaps something along the lines of Aristotle's requirement that one have 
knowledge of both the particular and the universal – in order to ensure the 
epistemic depth that enables knowledge to actually affect behavior. But even 
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if he were to do this, Brandt still would seem to be conflating the associative, 
psychological process of cognitive conditioning with the rational, deliberative 
process of cognitive intellection. What he offers is not a substantive, 
philosophical conception that enables us to distinguish rational from 
irrational desire. Rather, Brandt offers a substantive psychological conception 
that enables us to distinguish psychologically healthy from unhealthy desire. 
 Essentially, then, cognitive psychotherapy involves the attempted 
modification of idiosyncratic childhood associations, learned through 
contiguity conditioning and stimulus generalization (103), through training in 
perceptual discrimination and heightening one's awareness of the differences 
between events formerly associated (107-108). It is the process of searching 
out and evaluating the empirical accuracy of the associative links between 
what we instinctively desire, what we are taught to desire, and what we 
believe. If as infants we associated satisfaction of the instinctive desire for 
nurture with satisfaction of the learned appetite for condensed milk, we may 
as adults indulge an overwhelming craving for condensed milk, to the 
exclusion of friendship and other sources of emotional support. This craving 
would count as irrational, on Brandt's view, because it mistakenly assumes an 
exclusive and necessary connection between nurturing and condensed milk, 
ignoring the role of friendship, affection, and sympathy. Similarly, if we as 
children associated the desire to play with the thought of parental 
disapproval or punishment, we may develop into joyless, unhappy and 
inhibited adults who have an aversion to relaxation and humor. Brandt would 
regard this aversion to play as similarly irrational, because it falsely 
presupposes a general rather than a contingent and idiosyncratic connection 
between play and punishment that leads us to abjure play altogether. 
 The difficulty this account creates for Brandt is that according to it, just 
about every conditioned desire may count as irrational.  
[H]ow many responses would turn out to be irrational if one affirmed 
that any response is irrational if conceivably, according to the theory of 
extinction, it could narrow in its scope or partially extinguish if one 
repeatedly reminded oneself of the difference between the conditioned 
and the unconditioned stimulus? A liking for Christmas carols, affection 
for one's mother; desire for things one likes, desire even for one's own 
happiness. So, ruling out likes/desires as irrational on so broad a basis 
would imply the irrationality of virtually all learned likes and desires 
(144). 
Since each particular desire is different in some of its details from others, each 
can be distinguished from the inductively generalized class to which it 
belongs. And since each is the consequence of conditioning that is equally 
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idiosyncratic in some of its details, each is similarly vulnerable to the 
deconditioning techniques described above. "For this reason," Brandt says, 
I explained 'cognitive psychotherapy' in such a way as to keep some 
touch with reality; so that a desire or liking ends up as irrational only to 
the extent that repeated self-stimulations would actually diminish it (144-
5; my italics). 
Brandt's solution to this problem is to distinguish between desires that would 
conceivably extinguish under cognitive psychotherapy, and those that would 
actually extinguish. But this is no distinction at all. By using the subjunctive, 
Brandt is in the realm of the counterfactually conceivable as opposed to the 
actual from the outset. His distinction is therefore the distinction between 
desires D1 and D2, such that,  
 
(1) under certain conditions, I can conceive that {I can conceive D1 as 
extinguishing};  
 
and  
 
(2) under certain conditions, I can conceive D2 as actually 
extinguishing. 
 
But if (2) is true, then surely  
 
(3) under certain conditions, I can conceive that {I can conceive D2 as 
actually extinguishing}.  
 
There is then no relevant distinction between D1 and D2, since under certain 
conditions I can conceive both as extinguishing. Brandt's modal operators 
"conceivably" and "actually" are doing no work here.
7
  
 By contrast, suppose Brandt's solution had been instead to explain 
cognitive psychotherapy so that a desire or liking ends up as irrational only to 
the extent that repeated self-stimulations will actually diminish it. A 
straightforward distinction between the conceivable and the actual would 
have preserved the desired "touch with reality." But it also would have 
required him to take a radical empiricist, wait-and-see attitude toward any 
desire proffered for rational evaluation. This would have made it impossible 
to speculate in advance of empirical observation on which desires were 
rational and which were not. We will shortly see that Brandt needs to be able 
to do this in order to defend his claim that benevolent desires are rational. 
                                                
7
In any case, on page 212 he contradicts the distinction he offers here.  
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Unfortunately, we have already seen in Section 4 that there are independent 
reasons why no such a priori speculation is open to him. According to his 
criterion, benevolent desires will be rational for some agents but not others. A 
radically empiricist, wait-and-see attitude toward the rationality of particular 
desires for particular agents would seem to be required by the Humean 
program. 
 
7. The Rationality of Benevolence 
 We have just seen in Section 6 that Brandt's account of inherently 
irrational desires depended on a behaviorist account of conditioning and 
deconditioning that itself presupposed the mutability of all desire, both 
"native" and learned. This distinction is not adequate to the complexity of the 
relationship between environmental and biological influences on behavior. 
Nevertheless, Brandt's account works best for learned desire if it works at all. 
Native desires, on the other hand, would seem automatically to count as 
rational to the extent that they are sufficiently hard-wired as to be immutable 
for all practical purposes. Brandt, however, believes it is "logically possible" 
for these to be changed or extinguished by counterconditioning as well.  
 We have also already seen that Brandt wants to be able to claim that 
benevolent desires are rational so that he can then argue the rationality of the 
Ideal Code Utilitarian society he claims a benevolent chooser would choose. 
And we have seen in Section 5 that there are obstacles in his account of 
rational desire that make it impossible for him to do this. Nevertheless, Brandt 
believes that if he can answer in the affirmative the question as to whether it is 
rational to be benevolent, he can then reason that since desiring to maximize 
happiness for everyone is an expression of benevolence, and since Ideal Code 
Utilitarianism is designed to maximize happiness for everyone, a benevolent 
chooser would choose the Ideal Code Utilitarian society in which to live. Of 
course if benevolence cannot be identified as rational, then Brandt's task will 
be harder. In that case he will have to show that even a self-interested chooser 
would choose the Ideal Code Utilitarian society. We will see that this is a 
difficult task indeed. 
 According to Brandt, a person is benevolent if she is (1) intrinsically 
motivated to produce happiness in others; (2) pleased when others become 
more happy; and (3) displeased when they become less happy (138).  He 
reasons that if benevolence thus defined does not extinguish under cognitive 
psychotherapy then it is rational; and that it probably will not extinguish if it 
is native rather than learned. In defense of treating benevolence as native, 
Brandt interprets it as a disposition to have empathic and sympathetic 
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responses to others.
8
 He defines an empathic response as one in which I respond 
to another's expression of an emotion by feeling that emotion myself. In a 
sympathetic response, I dislike another's aversive states and like their pleasant 
states. In a fully rational person, these responses will extend to the anticipated 
future of the objects of her benevolence, and as much toward future 
generations as toward the present one. They will also discriminate more finely 
between rational and irrational distress, and tend to feel empathy and 
sympathy for rational rather than irrational discomfort (146).  
 Notice that Brandt's account of empathic and sympathetic responses does 
not square with his initial definition of benevolence, since one might have 
empathic or sympathetic responses to others without desiring to maximize 
their happiness, and might desire to maximize their happiness without 
having empathic or sympathetic feelings toward them. Empathy and 
sympathy are emotions, whereas benevolence is a certain kind of desire. 
There is no necessary connection among them.  
 Brandt reasons – controversially – that these responses are native because 
they appear in the second year of life, supposedly before learning can occur. 
He then argues that benevolence would not extinguish in a fully rational 
person because the early appearance of sympathy makes it resistant to 
extinction (143; also 333). This means that whether or not benevolent desires 
are rational or not is similarly a function of two contingent and empirical 
conditions: first, whether or not benevolent desires are initially present in an 
agent – i.e. whether they are instinctive, or, if not, universally learned in the 
process of upbringing; and second, assuming they exist, whether or not they 
would extinguish under cognitive psychotherapy or not – i.e. whether they 
are based on idiosyncratic associations that can be altered through intense and 
careful exposure to information relevant to them. If there is no exposure to 
information that would alter them, then they are rational; if there is, then they 
are not. In the best-case scenario, benevolent desires turn out to have the 
status of the desire for food or nurturing: they are instinctive and ineliminable 
by cognitive psychotherapy. In the second-best case scenario, they are at least 
ineliminable, even if based on learned, idiosyncratic childhood associations. 
If, on the other hand, cognitive psychotherapy can extinguish benevolent 
desires in some people, then they cannot be rational for those people. And if 
cognitive psychotherapy can extinguish benevolent desires in everyone, then 
they can be rational for no one. 
                                                
8
He also says, "or a disposition easily to learn to have empathic and sympathetic 
responses" (139). But this begs the question, by turning any easily learned desire into a 
native desire. 
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 Moreover, we have just seen that there is a difference between 
benevolence and sympathy. So even if it were true that sympathy were 
resistant to extinction because of its early developmental appearance, this 
would prove nothing about benevolence. But this is in any case not clearly 
true. It is a truism that repeated betrayals and exploitative encounters with 
others may dampen and ultimately extinguish sympathy for others (this is 
known as "looking out for number one").  
 Brandt's is an unusual criterion of rationality. Its intuitive appeal is based 
on the centrality, in more traditional ideal conceptions of theoretical 
rationality, of reasoning correctly in light of full information. But in Brandt's 
conception, this traditional ideal conception is subordinated to the empirical 
question of whether or not such reasoning would have a certain causal 
outcome or not, such that the desire is rational if it would not and irrational if 
it would. The oddness of this criterion is brought into relief by the case of 
benevolent desires, because the question whether or not benevolence is or is 
not rational is equally traditional and longstanding. Brandt's criterion of 
rational desire manages to answer the question of whether or not particular 
benevolent desires are rational without even addressing the question of 
whether or not benevolence itself is. It seems that the consequence of his 
attempt to devise a value-neutral criterion of rationality leads him to devise a 
criterion that is content-neutral as well.  
This means that for Brandt there can be no necessary connection between 
the intuitive rationality of certain final ends as objects of desire and their 
conformity to or violation of his criterion: both prudence and benevolence 
might turn out to be irrational in certain cases, if generated by sufficiently 
idiosyncratic causal chains; whereas howling at the moon might turn out to be 
rational. A list of content-specific final ends the identification of which as 
rational would seem a sine qua non of any plausible criterion of rationality – 
prudence, self-interest, friendship, benevolence, justice, etc. – would not serve 
to test the plausibility of Brandt's. Furthermore, since his criterion of rational 
desire permits different desires to be rational for different agents, there will be 
some agents for whom immoral desires are equally rational. This means that 
there can be no one morally acceptable conception of the good society which 
all agents would choose as a means to satisfying their rational desires. 
 So Brandt has not shown that it is rational to be benevolent, his assertions 
to the contrary. If benevolence is not clearly rational, the desire to maximize 
others' happiness is not clearly rational. In this case, this desire cannot provide 
a metaethical justification for choosing a society structured in order to achieve 
this. As we saw, his strategy was to argue from the rationality of benevolence 
to the desire to maximize happiness as an expression of benevolence; and 
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from there to the conclusion that a benevolent rational chooser would choose 
to live in an Ideal Code Utilitarian society: 
[T]he main inference is quite obvious. For a perfectly benevolent rational 
person will tend to do whatever will maximize expectable happiness. He 
will most support that system which as a whole – taking into account 
probable effects on behavior and the resulting contribution to happiness, 
and also the costs of the system such as restrictions on individual 
freedom, the unpleasant pangs of guilt, and the effort of moral education 
– will maximize the expectable happiness of all sentient creatures. In that 
sense we can say that he will opt for some kind of 'utilitarian' moral 
system (217). 
Brandt's reasoning here is quintessentially Instrumentalist; and the same 
problems that beset Rawls’s Instrumentalism beset Brandt's. First, the 
resulting "derivation" is a tautology. Certainly if we assume at the outset that 
an agent desires to maximize happiness, then, other things equal, she will 
choose a system that maximizes happiness. In this case Brandt has built into 
his major premise the conclusion he wants to derive, and the resulting 
derivation does not, after all, generate a normative moral theory from value-
neutral premises. Instead it generates a normative moral theory laden with 
the same values as were the premises. As we saw in Chapter IX.4.4, Brandt 
thereby trades an objective justification of Ideal Code Utilitarianism for a 
moral "justification" that presupposes what it claimed to prove. Brandt must 
find some other basis on which a fully rational chooser might justifiably 
choose the Ideal Code Utilitarian society in which to live. Is there one? 
 We have already seen in Chapter VI that "looking out for number one" is 
the uncontroversial case of rational action within the Humean conception of 
the self; and Brandt acknowledges that cognitive psychotherapy may be 
unable to produce benevolence in such a self-interested
9
 person (145). What 
he presupposes but does not explicitly state is that cognitive psychotherapy 
may easily produce self-interested desires in a formerly benevolent person: 
Through maximal and vivid exposure to facts and logic, such a person might, 
for example, come to revise her sunny conception of human beings as 
naturally entitled to happiness; and conclude that only those few, herself 
                                                
9
Brandt's term is "selfish;" but he must be conflating this with self-interest. A person can 
be both selfish and also benevolent if she desires both not to share her resources with 
others and also to produce happiness in them. There is no incompatibility here: if she 
could satisfy the latter desire without sacrificing any of the former resources she would 
do it. By contrast, a purely self-interested person would not desire to produce happiness 
in others unless it promoted her own self-interest in the weak sense defined in Chapter 
VI. 
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foremost among them, who have earned happiness deserve it. So whereas 
benevolence is not clearly rational, self-interest is.  
 Brandt maintains that even self-interested rational choosers would have 
reason to chose an Ideal Code Utilitarian society because, first, they would 
natural prefer some moral code – what he calls a Hobbesian morality – to 
none at all: 
[T]hey will like the quality of life of a group with a moral system: one 
with autonomous self-restraint, mutual  trust, mutual respect, openness, 
the absence of need to be on one's guard against malicious or self-serving 
attacks of any sort. ... Life is more comfortable in such a society, and a 
completely selfish man will want a society with a moral code on that 
account (205). 
Second, a principle of reciprocity is required in order merely to maximize 
benefits for oneself: 
If the selfish chooser wants, as he will, protection against crimes against 
the person, such as assault, negligent injury, and libel, he must choose a 
moral system which provides the same protection for others, thereby 
restricting his activities and giving them what they surely want. A selfish 
person who supports a rule which provides a desired circumstance for all 
because it, among feasible options, maximizes expectable welfare for him 
is inadvertently also supporting a rule which will maximize expectable 
welfare for the group (219). 
This reasoning leads Brandt to the following conclusion: 
If we take into account the earlier conclusion that rational selfish persons 
will support a moral system which provides protections all rational 
persons want, we have the conclusion that roughly, and in the long run, 
rational selfish persons will support a happiness-maximizing moral 
system, not intentionally but inadvertently, since of course each rational 
selfish person will support his best – his expectable-welfare-maximizing – 
option among the viable ones open to him (220). 
Brandt's conclusion is false. As he acknowledges, a system based on the 
principle of reciprocity is much less demanding than a happiness-maximizing 
system (221). A self-interested person who wishes to maximize expectable 
welfare for himself need not support “a rule which provides a desired 
circumstance for all.” He need support only a much less expensive rule of 
reciprocity for all that provides the desired circumstance for himself. For 
example, if he desires to maximize his own wealth, he need not support a rule 
that maximizes everybody’s wealth; a rule that reduces taxes for everyone 
may well have the effect of maximizing only the wealth of people like him (or, 
in the best case, only his wealth) because only people like him recoup enough 
wealth from the tax cut to enable them to pay for the education that trains 
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them to accumulate more. Where utility-maximization is a zero-sum game, 
the desirability of a society based on the principle of reciprocity does not 
imply the desirability of a happiness-maximizing society to a self-interested 
chooser.  
 But even if it did, Brandt also acknowledges that the choice would be 
inadvertent rather than intentional. If it is inadvertent then it has not taken the 
test of cognitive psychotherapy Brandt proposes as the criterion for the 
rationality of desire. If the inadvertent choice of an Ideal Code Utilitarian 
society does not qualify as rational, then it does not matter, for Brandt's 
metaethical purposes, whether a rational self-interested person would choose 
it or not. For it does not succeed in justifying that choice to a disinterested and 
uncommitted reader. We saw in Section 2 that Brandt invoked self-interest to 
defend rationality to us. We see now, however, that Brandt's appeal to self-
interest cannot rescue the rationality of his theory. 
 So Brandt's metaethical Instrumentalist justification finally fails on four 
counts. First, we have seen in Section 3 that on Brandt's criterion, rational 
desires are not objectively justified in virtue of their rationality. Hence even if 
a benevolent desire for a welfare- or happiness-maximizing Ideal Code 
Utilitarian society is rational, this does not objectively justify it. But second, 
we have seen in Section 5 that on his account, benevolence is in any case not 
rational. Third, we have just seen that Brandt's "derivation" of the Ideal Code 
Utilitarian society is in any case a tautology that presupposes what it attempts 
to prove. Finally, it now appears that tinkering with the premises so as to 
mitigate their value-ladenness effectively subverts the derivation entirely: If 
the Ideal Code Utilitarian society is not even rational from a self-interested 
perspective, then it is not a serious candidate for rational justification at all. 
 
8. Cognitive Psychotherapy Reconsidered 
We see, then, that the problem lies not with Brandt’s conception of the 
Ideal Code Utilitarian society (at least not in any obvious way), but rather 
with his conceptions of rationality and justification. We have seen that his 
conception of rational desire purchases value-neutrality at the expense of 
viability, for it fails to identify any desire at all as clearly rational. Similarly, 
Brandt’s Instrumentalist strategy of justification encounters the same 
problems as did Rawls’s. The difficulties raised by Brandt’s conceptions of 
rational desire and of justification are, for the most part, mutually 
independent. But both are supervenient on the Humean conception of the self. 
It is this, once again, that is the true culprit.  
Now I said in Section 4 above that there were two possible ways of 
understanding Brandt’s cognitive psychotherapy criterion of rational desire; 
and that in choosing the democratic over the elite interpretation, Brandt made 
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a fateful choice with unfortunate implications. I have just enumerated some of 
them. What might have been the implications of choosing the elite 
interpretation instead? Recall that on the democratic interpretation, any desire 
that survives cognitive therapy, for whatever reason, thereby qualifies as 
rational; whereas on the elite interpretation, a particular desire survives 
cognitive psychotherapy only because one recognizes its rationality 
independently. On this reading, confrontation with relevant and available 
facts and logic enables one to see which desires are in fact rational and which 
are warped by idiosyncratic associations or faulty reasoning. On the elite 
interpretation, it is the rational content of the desire rather than the contingent 
matter of its psychological embeddedness that ensures its survival.  
This interpretation would have required a greater degree of idealization 
in Brandt’s account of cognitive psychotherapy, for it would have required 
him to ignore the non-ideal case in which the rationality of a desire – for 
friendly social relations, for example – is obvious, yet we are blinded by other 
emotions that obstruct our ability to recognize it as such. The elite 
interpretation also would have required Brandt to say a great deal more about 
our cognitive capacity to recognize rational content when we are confronted 
with it, and what it is about us, and about rational content itself, that enables 
us to do this. In particular, it would have required him to elaborate further the 
rational capacities we bring to the apprehension of facts and logic, and the 
rational content of his conception of the Ideal Code Utilitarian society itself. It 
then would have required him to say what facts about us and it specifically 
might enable us to recognize its desirability for self-interested as well as 
benevolent readers. That is, it would have required him to say more about 
exactly what facts and what logic successful cognitive psychotherapy requires 
in this case, and how they operate. Just as Brandt’s qualified definition of 
relevant facts and logic was anchored to the content of a particular desire, 
similarly his elaborated analysis of cognitive psychotherapy as a criterion of 
rational desire would have been anchored to the content of the particular 
desire proposed as a candidate for it.  
If Brandt had spoken directly to the “fit” between our capacity for 
independent recognition of the rational and the conception of the good society 
proposed to be rational, he would have thereby dispensed with the 
Instrumentalist justification on which he in fact relied; and indeed would have 
abandoned the Deductivist strategy of which Instrumentalism is an example 
altogether. Instead he would have lent support to Nagel’s Kantian thesis, of 
attempting to show that our recognition of objectively valid and impersonal 
reasons can directly motivate action in the absence of desire. And he might 
have provided indirect support to Kant’s own agenda, of arguing that the 
kingdom of ends is the form of social organization best suited to rational 
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beings with capacities such as ours. Unless Brandt could have given a 
competing, equally precise account of our rational capacities such that the 
Ideal Code Utilitarian society, rather, could have been shown best adapted to 
them, accepting the elite interpretation of cognitive psychotherapy might 
have required him to abandon his in any case tenuous commitment to the 
Humean conception of the self completely. This would not necessarily have 
been a bad thing. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter XII. Classical Utilitarianism and the Free Rider 
 
 
 In the preceding chapter, I argued that the Instrumentalist reasoning that 
characterizes the Humean conception of the self could not provide sound 
justificatory foundations for Richard Brandt’s Ideal Code Utilitarianism. In 
this one, I press that argument to its source in the Instrumentalist, means-end 
reasoning of Sidgwick’s Classical Utilitarianism. His Methods of Ethics1 is 
perhaps the most rigorous and consistent formulation of that normative moral 
theory directly and deliberately founded on the Humean conception. Its basic 
principle is a special case of the utility-maximizing model of rationality, in 
which the utility to be maximized is social; and its account of agency is 
founded on the belief-desire model of motivation, in which the desires in 
question are self-interested, other-directed desires as that concept was 
explained in Chapter VI.1. Classical Utilitarianism appeals to its stipulated 
final end – the ideal community in which all members are Act-Utilitarians, to 
justify not only the basic principle of Utilitarianism, but in addition any and 
all deviations from it deemed necessary to bring that ideal end-state into 
existence. I argue here that the Instrumentalist reasoning – and more 
generally the Humean conception of the self – on which Classical 
Utilitarianism is based makes it impossible even to articulate coherently a 
viable alternative conception of the good society, much less to justify it 
morally. For Classical Utilitarianism, the enterprise of moral justification 
founders on the theoretical incoherence of the idealized conception of the 
good society to which the social policies it proposes are supposed to be 
instrumentally justified as a means. 
That we found structurally similarities between the views of Rawls and 
Brandt should not be surprising, given their shared allegiance to the Humean 
conception of the self. A similar degree of structural similarity between Social 
Contract-Theoretic and Utilitarian views can be found at an earlier historical 
juncture as well. Section 1 grounds Sidgwick’s conception of the ideal Act-
Utilitarian society in his attempt to solve Hobbes’ free rider problem, and 
contrasts the role in each of the publicity condition, i.e. that the principle on 
which the agent acts be publicly acknowledged. Section 2 interprets the 
secrecy stipulation in Sidgwick’s proposed solution to the free rider problem 
as solving a problem left hanging in Mill’s; but then draws out the 
paradoxical implications of this stipulation for Utilitarianism generally. These 
first two sections call attention to how much Hobbes’ Social Contract Theory 
and Sidgwick’s Classical Utilitarianism have in common. The principles that 
define the Humean conception of the self, together with those that define 
                                                       
1 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (New York: Dover Publications, 1966).  
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Instrumentalism in moral justification determine a noticeable portion of the 
content and strategies of reasoning in both theories.  
Section 3 shows that in a description of the ideal Utilitarian community 
that lacks the publicity condition, it is a requirement of social stability that 
members conceal their adherence to Utilitarianism. Section 4 shows that 
unfortunately, adding in the publicity condition renders the very conception 
of such a society incoherent, hence fails to solve the free rider problem even 
for the ideal case. Section 5 concludes that the failure of the publicity 
condition for both non-ideal and ideal cases leaves the consistent Utilitarian 
unable to form psychologically normal and satisfying human relationships, 
and necessitates a permanent policy of free riding. Hence just as Hobbes’ 
conception of the good society foundered on the problem of the clandestine 
free rider, Sidgwick’s founders on the problem of the public free rider. Both 
problems are symptoms of the Humean conception of the self they 
presuppose. A Kantian solution to the free rider problem is offered in Volume 
II, Chapter IV.8. 
 
1. Hobbes versus Sidgwick on Publicity 
All normative moral and political theories in the Anglo-American 
analytic tradition must confront the challenge of solving the problem of the 
free rider first introduced by Thomas Hobbes. A free rider is one who enjoys 
the benefits of others’ compliance with a rule but violates it for the sake of 
personal advantage. If everyone were to behave as the free rider does, the rule 
would lose its social legitimacy and soon there would be no benefits to enjoy; 
this form of counterfactual reasoning is the basis of what Onora O’Neill calls 
Kant’s contradiction in conception test.2  Since anyone can, in fact, reason as 
does the free rider, the social tolerance of or accommodation to free riding is 
an incentive to free riders that threatens the continued existence of those 
benefits for everyone. So the challenge for a normative theory of the good 
society is to find a solution to the threat of destabilization that the free rider 
represents.  
Hobbes himself characterizes the free rider as a “fool,” who 
hath said in his heart, there is no such things as justice; … seriously 
alleging, that every man’s conservation, and contentment, being 
committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man 
might not do what he thought conduced thereunto: and therefore also to 
make, or not make; keep, or not keep covenants, was not against reason, 
                                                       
2 Onora Nell [née O’Neill], Acting on Principle: An Essay in Kantian Ethics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1975), esp. Chapter Five. 
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when it conduced to one’s benefit. … if it be not against reason, it is not 
against justice; or else justice is not to be approved for good.3  
Hobbes’ characterization of the free rider’s reasoning in Leviathan assumes 
that all individuals are motivated by self-directed self-interest. But the free 
rider problem does not depend on this assumption. It can be generated as 
well by agents all of whom are motivated by self-interested but other-directed 
desires – Rawlsian interests of rather in a self, provided that such other-
directed desires have objects with which their agents identify, and that may 
conflict with one another. So, for example, I may obtain social services for free 
by secretly cheating on my tax returns, and donate the money thereby saved 
to anti-war efforts. Or I may fail to pay my annual public library dues, yet 
make free use of the library as well as the money saved in order to take time 
off from work to teach an illiterate neighbor how to read. The free rider 
problem does not depend on egoistic assumptions, as Hobbes assumes. It 
requires that I take advantage of everyone else’s adherence to the rules in 
order to derive personal benefit by violating them. But it does not require that 
the personal benefit I derive be a self-directed one. 
The basis of the free rider problem is not only the conflict between self-
interest and social rules; but in addition the Instrumentalist form of 
justification that is common to Utilitarianism, Social Contract Theory, and any 
other normative theory that presupposes the Humean conception of the self 
(which itself has its origins in Hobbes): If instrumental reasoning justifies the 
decision to abide by social rules and covenants on the grounds that it 
maximizes self-interest to do so, then instrumental reasoning equally justifies 
violating those rules when this maximizes self-interest, whether self- or other-
directed.  
Knowing this, why does any citizen then ever follow the rules? Why do 
we not all reason as the free rider does, taking advantage of rules enacted for 
the social good by breaking them, when we can get away with it, for personal 
advantage – thereby destroying the purpose and effectiveness of the rules 
altogether? In a society in which everyone is assumed to be self-interestedly 
motivated, it is hard to see how social stability can be maintained at all. 
Hobbes’ own solution to this dilemma is to warn that 
he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in 
reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his 
own single power. He therefore that breaketh his covenant, and 
consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be 
received into any society, that unites themselves for peace and defense, 
but by the error of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be 
                                                       
3 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Michael Oakeshott (Macmillan: New York, 1977), 
Chapter 15, 114. I contrast Hobbes’ and Mill’s formulations of and solutions to the free 
rider problem with Edward McClennen’s in Volume II, Chapter IV.8. 
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retained in it, without seeing the danger of their error; which errors a 
man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security: ...[italics 
added].4 
In this passage Hobbes argues that by breaking the rules designed to protect 
all citizens, the free rider thereby announces his unreliability to his fellow 
citizens, and so absolves them of any obligation to protect him. Since the 
potential free rider knows in advance that he is thereby undermining his own 
claim to social protection by breaking the rules, he would be a “fool” to go 
ahead and do so.  
But the force of Hobbes’ argument depends on the mistaken assumption 
that breaking the rules is tantamount to announcing publicly that one is 
breaking the rules. His argument holds only for the highly unlikely and truly 
foolish case in which one publicizes one’s intent to break the rules for 
personal advantage, or does so before an audience, or does so but takes no 
precautions to conceal one’s dereliction. To publicize one’s intent to free ride 
in a society in which one’s audience does not would, as Hobbes observes, be 
self-defeating since it would immediately elicit punitive social sanctions. This 
much seems obvious. 
But Hobbes’ argument does not address the far more widespread case, in 
which one takes advantage of others’ adherence to the rules by secretly 
breaking them. Only by being a clandestine free rider can one be a successful 
free rider. For only in this case can one derive the benefits, gratis, of others’ 
adherence to rules and laws that prescribe, for example, paying one’s taxes, 
voting, financially supporting public radio, etc. Publicizing one’s intention to 
free ride would be to forego these benefits. Thus Hobbes’ instrumental 
reasoning cannot convince a committed, clandestine free rider that her 
behavior is irrational. If all were to reason as this type of free rider does, there 
soon would be no stable social rules for anyone to free ride on. On Hobbes’ 
version of Social Contract Theory, clandestine free riders’ violations of the law 
therefore threaten social stability, and are strictly incompatible with the 
publicity of the principle that justifies them.  
All of Hobbes’ successors in the Anglo-American analytic tradition 
attempt to come to grips with Hobbes’ free rider dilemma by modifying his 
assumptions about individual motivation. Sidgwick’s solution does so most 
radically, and therefore fails most dramatically. However, if my conclusions 
about Instrumentalism in Chapter IX.4.4 are well-taken, a sound solution to 
the problem requires modification not only in the model of motivation, but 
also in the corresponding model of rationality; for it is the Instrumentalist 
form of justification that legitimates free riding as rational and consistent 
behavior. 
                                                       
4 Ibid., 115. 
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Sidgwick distinguishes between those strategies of action and decision 
appropriate to Utilitarians living in an ideal social community, and those 
appropriate in the actual one.5 In the ideal case, Sidgwick tries to solve the 
free rider problem by postulating a single, universal other-directed personal 
motive that motivates and justifies the behavior, including the free rider 
behavior, of all agents. Instrumental reasoning justifies an individual citizen’s 
decision to break the rules when so doing conduces to social utility, so agents 
may well break the rules with some frequency. In this case, breaking the rules 
is quite rightly equated with publicly announcing that one is breaking the 
rules, for all such violations are publicly accessible. But because all such 
violations are justified on Utilitarian grounds, social stability remains intact. 
However, I argue below that this makes not only genuine free riding, but also 
the consistent and well-ordered social rules on which free riding depends, 
impossible in theory.  
In an ideal community of enlightened Utilitarians, Sidgwick claims, no 
one would be justified in acting secretly in some way not sanctioned by the 
accepted moral rules. For even in seeming free-rider cases in which it 
appeared that one was justified on grounds of utility in exempting oneself 
from such a rule, this would simply mean that certain qualifications should be 
added to the rule to cover the exigencies of that type of situation, and thus 
that these qualifications would apply in all cases relevantly similar to one’s 
own:  
It is evident, that if these reasons are valid for any person, they are valid 
for all persons; in fact, that they establish the expediency of a new 
rule...more complicated than the old one; a rule which the Utilitarian, as 
such, should desire to be universally obeyed.6 ...If therefore we were all 
enlightened Utilitarians, it would be impossible for anyone to justify 
himself in making false statements while admitting it to be inexpedient 
for persons similarly conditioned to make them; as he would have no 
grounds for believing that persons similarly conditioned would act differently 
from himself7 [italics added]. 
This last clause is ambiguous but significant. On one reading, it would say 
that a Utilitarian in some situation would expect other Utilitarians to act 
similarly when “similarly conditioned” because all Utilitarians would react in 
the same way under some particular set of conditions, that is, that all would 
reason similarly and thus act similarly. Here “similarly conditioned” would 
have to mean similar in all respects relevant to the making of one particular 
decision: similar in personal makeup as well as in circumstances. This is not 
an unacceptable interpretation of the passage, but it implicitly ascribes to 
                                                       
5 Sidgwick, op. cit. Note 1, Book 4, chap. 5, sec. 3. 
6 Ibid., p. 485. 
7 Ibid., p. 488. 
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Sidgwick the view that in a thoroughgoing Utilitarian society everyone is 
essentially alike, so that a similarity in situation suffices to determine a 
similarity of response. While this may in fact be a valid implication of the 
Utilitarian doctrine in its ideal form8, it is debatable whether Sidgwick would 
accede to it. 
 A weaker but more sympathetic reading would construe Sidgwick as 
meaning that if everyone held to Utilitarian principles, my reasons for acting 
in a certain way would, in theory, be acknowledged as valid by everyone, 
even though no one else can, strictly speaking, be conditioned just as I am. 
Here my supposition that others would behave similarly if similarly 
conditioned is actually a supposition that, since we all share the same moral 
principles, others would, if necessary, condone and support my action as 
being what they would have done if they were, so to speak, in my shoes. 
 The first reading explains Sidgwick’s claim in terms of an assumed 
uniformity of motives, beliefs, and responses among Utilitarians – not a 
clearly desirable condition to impose on the ideal society. The second explains 
it in terms of an implicit acknowledgment of Utilitarian principles as binding 
on all individuals in the community. The latter would seem more faithful to 
Sidgwick’s intended meaning. He cannot, then, be understood as simply 
asserting the truism that an exception to a rule that ranges over some class of 
cases itself ranges over some class of cases. Rather, he is asserting that if 
everyone justified his actions of grounds of utility, these grounds would be 
acknowledged under the relevant circumstances as valid and accessible to 
anyone in any situation – that any action consistently and adequately justified 
on these grounds could be expected by the agent to receive validation by 
others in the community. It is in this sense, then, that the rule in question 
would acquire a qualifying clause, and it is for this reason, seemingly, that 
Sidgwick sees the principle of Utilitarianism as public in the ideal case. It 
would seem to be public in the sense that we could not know what someone 
had done without thereby knowing why; and moreover knowing that they 
had acted rightly, even in breaking the rule. 
 This is a consequence of Sidgwick’s conception of the ideal community as 
consisting of what are essentially Act-Utilitarians.9 Although moral rules are 
held in common, the decision to follow or not follow them is made on Act-
Utilitarian grounds.10 For even where an apparently Rule-Utilitarian stance is 
adopted (for example where Sidgwick appraises the utility value of 
commonsense moral rules), this is done on the grounds that the overall utility 
of following and promulgating the rule outweighs the personal disutility of 
                                                       
8 In fact, I suspect that it is, though I will not try to argue this here. 
9 Thus I use the terms “Utilitarianism” and “Act-Utilitarianism” indifferently in 
discussing Sidgwick’s Utilitarianism and its implications. 
10 Sidgwick, op. cit., Note 1, pp. 486-90, passim. 
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doing so. But clearly this does not preclude the case – without begging the 
question – in which, in the estimation of the Utilitarian, the overall utility of 
controverting the rule is in fact greater than that of following it.  
Here the Instrumentalist calculations are exactly the same for the Act-
Utilitarian as for Hobbes’ free rider; only the source of utility differs. Hobbes’ 
free rider derives it from the pursuit of self-directed benefit, whereas 
Sidgwick’s Act-Utilitarian derives it from the pursuit of other-directed benefit. 
In this latter case, it would clearly seem to conflict with Utilitarian first 
principles to follow the rule.11 So if everyone follows these rules, this is 
because all perceive it as instrumentally useful to do so. But because the 
justification by utility is itself accessible to all members of this community, the 
very recognition of an agent’s situation as being exceptional will determine 
that an exception should be made, for so would any Utilitarian reason who 
had access to the facts – including the agent herself.  
Thus although the problem of the free rider can arise on the assumption 
of other-directed as well as self-directed ends so long as the rules are 
conceived as mere instrumental means to the achievement of those ends, 
Sidgwick’s conception of the ideal Act-Utilitarian society is one in which 
clandestine free riding is impossible because all agents have the same other-
directed end, namely the maximization of social utility. The Utilitarian motive 
behind any action that violates the rules can be read off from the behavior 
itself – and thus identify grounds for qualifying the rules in order to include 
it. In the ideal Utilitarian community, all citizens would reason similarly and 
conclude, on Act-Utilitarian grounds, that such violations were justified by 
Utilitarian considerations.  
Hence the social instability that widespread clandestine free-riding 
would threaten would seem not to occur in the ideal Act-Utilitarian 
community, because rules would be broken only when all citizens could 
recognize this as maximizing social utility and thus warranting a revision of 
the rules themselves. Whereas Hobbes’ commonwealth is one in which 
publicity uncovers and ostracizes self-directed deviations from the common 
good, Sidgwick’s ideal Utilitarian community is one in which other-directed 
violations of the rules are publicly condoned by the universality of the 
Utilitarian motive itself. Here social instability would seem to be impossible 
under the two conditions that  
 
(1) all citizens are motivated by the same other-directed desire to 
maximize social utility, and 
                                                       
11 For a comprehensive examination of this and related issues, see David Lyons, Forms 
and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), esp. chap. 4C. Also see D.H. 
Hodgson, Consequences of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 3-7; and 
Peter Singer, “Is Act-Utilitarianism Self-defeating?” Philosophical Review 61 (1972): 565. 
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(2) each publicly breaks social rules when maximizing social utility 
warrants it. 
 
2. Sidgwick and Mill on Secrecy 
 Under actual circumstances, however, Sidgwick views the case somewhat 
differently:  
The Utilitarian may have no doubt that in a community consisting 
generally of enlightened Utilitarians, these grounds for exceptional 
ethical treatment would be regarded as valid; still he may ... doubt 
whether the more refined and complicated rule which recognizes such 
exceptions is adapted for the community in which he is actually living; 
and whether the attempt to introduce it is not likely to do more harm by 
weakening current morality than good by improving its quality.12  
While the justification for conforming or failing to conform to accepted moral 
rules is the same for the Utilitarian in the actual as in the ideal community, 
there is an asymmetry with respect to the accessibility of his principles to 
others. In the actual, implicitly non-Utilitarian community, the Utilitarian 
must consider not only the effects of following or not following commonly 
accepted moral precepts, but also the comparative utility of letting others 
know the grounds for his decision. For the Utilitarian does not, presumably, 
do the same things, for the same reasons, as others do in this situation. So 
whenever his considered actions diverge from those enjoined by the moral 
rules of the community, the Utilitarian must weigh the utility of this 
divergence as such, in addition to the utility of the act itself. As Sidgwick 
argues, the destabilizing effects of this divergence on others may well lead the 
Utilitarian to conclude that the greatest utility would be served either by 
performing his action secretly, or by performing it publicly and lying about 
his reasons for doing so. For in the latter case as well, publicizing the 
Utilitarian doctrine might undermine general conformity to useful moral 
precepts even more effectively than his seemingly immoral act, which is at 
least susceptible to moral or legal sanction. In the non-ideal case, then, 
Sidgwick’s Utilitarian would seem on the face of it to become a Hobbesian 
clandestine free rider.  
 So Hobbes’ and Sidgwick’s views share the following structural 
similarities. Both rely on the Humean model of rationality. Both rely on the 
Humean model of motivation. Both deploy the Humean conception of the self 
in the service of morally justifying comparable conceptions of the social good. 
And both depend on the same basic Instrumentalist reasoning that justifies 
clandestine disobedience of social rules: if promoting utility justifies following 
the rules, then promoting utility equally justifies breaking them. 
                                                       
12 Sidgwick, op. cit., Note 1, p. 489. 
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They diverge, however, in the motivational content they ascribe to 
individual agents’ desires and in the particular intentional content of their 
respective conceptions of utility. For Hobbes the self-interested motivation is 
self-directed, whereas for Sidgwick it is other-directed. For Hobbes the social 
good for each agent is the promotion of the satisfaction of that agent’s self-
directed desires, whereas for Sidgwick the social good for each agent is the 
promotion of the satisfaction of everyone’s self-directed desires (for pleasure, 
according to Sidgwick).  
Hobbes and Sidgwick are also similar, up to a point, in their attitudes 
toward social instability. In the actual society, social instability for Hobbes 
would seem to threaten whenever  
 
(1’) all citizens are motivated to satisfy self-directed desires, and  
(2’) all secretly break social rules.  
 
For in this case, the rules lose their currency and the practices based on them 
disintegrate. In Sidgwick’s actual, non-Utilitarian society, social instability 
threatens somewhat less whenever  
 
(1”) all Act-Utilitarian citizens are motivated to satisfy their other- 
directed desires, and  
(2”) each secretly breaks social rules when maximizing social utility  
justifies it.  
 
For in this case, the rules lose their currency only for Act-Utilitarians, and the 
practices based on them are overtly maintained.  
Hobbes and Sidgwick thus diverge in their treatment of the publicity 
condition. Hobbes argues that social instability in the actual society can be 
minimized if any such free rider is publicly caught in the act, for this tends to 
call forth a communal, punitive response that discourages free riding. 
Sidgwick argues that social instability in the actual society is exacerbated if 
any such Act-Utilitarian is publicly caught in the act, for this undermines not 
only the Act-Utilitarians’ but more generally the community’s adherence to 
commonsense moral rules. So whereas publicity restores a disrupted social 
order for Hobbes, it undermines social order for Sidgwick.  
Each philosopher’s argument has equal application to the other’s view. It 
is as true for Sidgwick’s non-ideal society as for Hobbes’ commonwealth that 
sanctioning rule-violators may have a deterrent effect on others; and it is as 
true for Hobbes’ commonwealth as for Sidgwick’s non-ideal society that 
publicizing rule-violations recognizes and disseminates an unsavory 
alternative to adherence that may encourage the very behavior it is intended 
to deter. One of the problems with Instrumentalist reasoning is that it enables 
us to advance as a legitimate justification for action any conjectured causal 
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sequence we like. In the end, both Hobbes’ clandestine free rider and 
Sidgwick’s clandestine Act-Utilitarian in the non-ideal, non-Utilitarian society 
have reason to preserve social stability by concealing their violation of the 
rules. Only under those conditions can they advance their personal agendas. 
Thus on Sidgwick’s view, the principle of Utilitarianism should not be 
propagated at all in its most general form in a non-ideal, non-Utilitarian 
society, for its effects on the general community may well be subversive of 
moral conduct if openly acknowledged:  
the opinion that secrecy may render an action right which would not 
otherwise be so should itself be kept comparatively secret; and similarly 
it seems expedient that the doctrine that esoteric morality is expedient 
should itself be kept esoteric .... And thus a Utilitarian may reasonably 
desire, on Utilitarian principles, that some of his conclusions should be 
rejected by mankind generally.13  
Here Sidgwick claims not only the validity of a covert application of 
Utilitarian principles to support a secret exemption of oneself from some 
moral precept, but also the validity of secretly adopting these principles 
themselves. Both are justified on Utilitarian grounds.  
So when Mill in Utilitarianism14 dismisses the possibility of such 
exemption as an objection to Utilitarianism because no doctrine can be 
formulated which successfully rules it out in all cases, he seems to miss the 
real point of the objection, which is the unrestricted character of the Utilitarian 
doctrine: All moral conceptions must admit the possibility of exceptions in 
practice, but Utilitarianism is unique in rationalizing such exceptions in 
theory. Mill’s own, liberal solution to the free rider problem recommends 
intensive social conditioning: 
[L]aws and social arrangements should place the happiness or … the 
interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the 
interest of the whole; and … education and opinion, which have so vast a 
power over human character, should so use that power to establish in the 
mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own 
happiness and the good of the whole … so that not only he may be unable to 
conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct 
opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general 
good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action ... [italics 
added].15 
                                                       
13 Ibid., p. 490. 
14 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Samuel Gorovitz (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
1979), chap. 2, par. 25, pp. 24-25. I discuss this passage further in Volume II, Chapter 
IV.8. 
15Ibid., 17. 
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Thus Mill’s solution attempts to bridge the chasm between Hobbes’ actual, 
imperfect Social Contract-Theoretic society in which free riding is discouraged 
by the threatened loss of social protection, and Sidgwick’s ideal Act-
Utilitarian society in which free riding is impossible in principle. Mill’s idea is 
that particular laws, conventions, education, and public opinion are 
instrumentally justified as a means to instilling motivationally overriding 
benevolent desires that make self-directed free riding a cognitive and 
motivational impossibility. However, Mill does not address the question of 
who is to enact these policies, or how it would be possible to implement them 
without presupposing the very cognitive and motivational possibilities of free 
riding it is the goal of these policies to erase. Indeed, it is likely that free riding 
on the community’s adherence to norms of liberty and autonomy would be 
required in order to instill the relevant benevolent motives.  
Sidgwick’s formulation can be understood as a response to Mill’s silence 
on this issue. For it spells out and instrumentally justifies the clandestine 
actions and policies that Mill’s solution presupposes. It would seem that these 
are theoretically implicit in both liberal and classical formulations of 
Utilitarianism – with all of the paradoxical and alienating implications that 
follow.  
For if the actual community knows that agent S is a Utilitarian, they 
know she justifies all her actions with reference to their utility. And then it is 
easy for them to infer that S will conform to or exempt herself from publicly 
held moral rules when it maximizes utility to do one or the other. But if the 
community knows when supporting these rules would not, in S’s view, 
maximize utility, they can infer when she will secretly exempt herself from 
them. And if they know this, S has clearly failed to act secretly, hence she has 
failed both to maximize utility and to publicly uphold the moral principles of 
the community. So the Utilitarian must either forego forming the normal 
human relationships in which her actions and the reasons for them would be 
known (in degrees varying, say, with the extent of personal involvement in 
the relationship), which is of questionable utility, or else she must adhere to 
her Utilitarian convictions covertly on every front. The latter seems to be the 
more expedient strategy. The Utilitarian cannot, then, make public her 
convictions without undermining both commonly accepted non-Utilitarian 
moral precepts and her own attempts to maximize utility in a non-ideal 
situation. 
 That the necessity for this thoroughgoing policy of secrecy suggests a 
difficulty in theory about bridging the gap between the non-ideal and the 
ideal societies will surely be noted. Unless the Utilitarian is prepared to deny 
any utility to conforming to non-Utilitarian precepts, it is hard to see what her 
strategy might be for bringing a community from a non-ideal to an ideal state, 
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since she cannot, without overall loss of utility, publicize her convictions in 
the non-ideal one at all.16 
 
3. The Pre-Ideal Act-Utilitarian Society 
 Unfortunately, this problem extends to the so-called ideal society as well. 
We will now see that even if the Utilitarian could suddenly make everyone 
else a Utilitarian, without working through the nearly insurmountable 
obstacles of transition just described, such a community still would not be 
viable – and for the same kinds of reasons. In Sidgwick’s brief adumbration of 
the ideal community, recall that he says only that everyone is a Utilitarian, 
hence that everyone justifies both his own and others’ actions by the same 
principle. But we saw that he does not explicitly say that everyone 
acknowledges this principle publicly. On the sympathetic reading, he seems 
to assume that this follows from the universal applicability of the principle 
itself. Now let us look at two variants of the ideal Utilitarian society, one 
where the publicity condition holds and one where it does not, in order to see 
whether either alternative will yield the ideal model Sidgwick has in mind. 
 First let us try to characterize more fully what we might call the “pre-
ideal” Utilitarian society, in which the publicity condition does not hold; that 
is, in which it is not common knowledge that everyone is an Act-Utilitarian. 
While everyone in fact adopts Act-Utilitarianism as her only rule of conduct 
(where by “utility” let us understand, roughly, the maximization of 
happiness, without filling this in any further for the moment), each person 
does not explicitly recognize others as so doing. Hence although everyone 
attempts to promote the greatest social utility through her actions, no one 
views this rule of conduct as the commonly held one. Each person is 
motivated by benevolence toward the rest of society, but no one is conceived 
as explicitly sharing these benevolent purposes with anyone else. This is not 
to say that each conceives the others as selfish and only herself as benevolent. 
Rather, it is that benevolence is so much an all-pervasive but unarticulated 
motive of conduct that no one self-consciously conceives of herself or of 
others in this way. We should try to imagine a situation in which benevolence 
is so ingrained in behavior that there are no circumstances under which 
conscious articulation of it is required. It is, let us say, too much of a truism to 
be worthy of mention. Thus we can think of benevolence in the pre-ideal Act-
Utilitarian community as analogous to the motive of self-support in our own. 
Though we have many reasons and motives for choosing a particular plan of 
life or vocation, that we should do something with our lives that will insure 
our own survival in unquestioned – so much so that it rarely figures in an 
explanation of why we chose as we did. 
                                                       
16 Sidgwick seems to be sympathetic to this conclusion. See, for example, op. cit. Note 1, 
pp. 474-75, 480-82, 484-86, 489. 
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 The extent of each person’s benevolence is, we will suppose, constrained 
by his own adoption of the Utilitarian doctrine. That is, in estimating the sum 
of social utility to be achieved by any action, each person counts his own 
happiness as equal in weight to that of anyone else.17 
 We must also imagine the pre-ideal society, as a variant of the ideal 
society, to be stable, well ordered, and otherwise successfully operated in the 
absence of the publicity of its basic social principle of utility. We must, above 
all, assume it to be reasonably well coordinated: in performing the act with 
the best consequences, each member takes into account the probable behavior 
of others and the necessity of insuring against conflicting or self-defeating 
acts. Thus we can assume, with Sidgwick, that in general the members of this 
society concur in following certain commonsense moral precepts and rules of 
thumb on Act-Utilitarian grounds. This is to stipulate that Act-Utilitarian 
deliberation will, in the absence of the publicity condition, generate these 
precepts as conventions. Now since everyone is an Act-Utilitarian and hence 
reasons similarly with regard to the consequences of actions, each person will 
have no trouble in predicting or assessing the outcome of the behavior of 
others when deciding what to do. For, although they do not assume that each 
acts from Utilitarian convictions, they do consider one another’s behavior and 
its overt consequences. To each member of this society, the others behave as if 
they were Act-Utilitarians in the minimal sense that their actions have, and 
are recognized by others to have, best consequences under the circumstances. 
 It is important to emphasize that this state of things does not provide 
sufficient evidence to any member for thinking that everyone else is an Act-
Utilitarian. For to act as if one were is often to adopt prima facie non-Utilitarian 
moral conventions when they have the best consequences – which, in view of 
the benefits of coordination, will be a good part of the time. This means that 
one will be unable to distinguish Act-Utilitarians from, for example, highly 
efficient Intuitionists, on the basis of behavior alone. To identify them as Act-
Utilitarians, we must know their intentions and their reasons for acting. But 
since this pre-ideal society runs smoothly and acceptably in the absence of the 
publicity condition, members of it will, by hypothesis, rarely be called upon to 
justify or explain their actions overtly; the practices and conduct of each will 
mesh harmoniously with those of others. So the opportunity to discover the 
moral convictions on which they are based will be rare indeed, if not 
nonexistent. The situation bears comparison with a society in which 
traditional social roles and practices are, like the benevolent motive, so deeply 
embedded in the history of the society that talk of reasons and justification for 
them is otiose. Persons are conceived as inextricably dependent on these roles 
and practices in a way that practically vitiates the very possibility of calling 
                                                       
17 I add this proviso in order to avoid the problems inherent in the notion of perfect 
altruism. 
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them into question. In this sense, we may say that the pre-ideal Utilitarian 
society as a whole lacks self-consciousness – not a stringent condition to 
impose when a society is conceived as functioning smoothly. The roles and 
practices generated by rational Act-Utilitarian calculation are so embedded in 
the social structure that their justification is made unnecessary by the smooth 
and harmonious functioning of the social order itself. 
 Now if each Utilitarian had no reason to suppose that others shared her 
convictions, she would obviously have the same good reasons to assume the 
utility of covert actions in this version of the ideal case as the actual one.18 
Further, she might again correctly assume the greater utility of her esoteric 
morality than of its public counterpart. This hypothesis is grounded in the 
supposition that in this society a person’s conduct would be fully informed by 
Instrumentalist Utilitarian reasoning, but would differ from actual behavior 
only in its degree of efficiency and success in bringing about the best 
consequences. For Sidgwick, the reasons militating against making public the 
Utilitarian credo have nothing to do with people’s actual relative inefficiency 
or irrationality, but rather with the damaging consequences of publicly 
recognizing any rational individual as reasoning in the light of this doctrine; 
and the further difficulties that would ensue if everyone, or most people, were 
publicly acknowledged as reasoning similarly. In this respect and under these 
conditions, the principle of free riding and the principle of Utilitarianism are 
exactly analogous. 
 Thus even if our hypothetically placed Utilitarian somehow found out 
that everyone else were also a Utilitarian, he might well judge even here that 
it would be better to maintain silence on this point for fear of the destabilizing 
effects of publicizing it. For note that to say that everyone is an Act-Utilitarian 
is not obviously to say that they act unanimously, but just to say that each 
tries19 to bring about the best overall consequences through his action. And if 
each has been following commonsense moral precepts in part on the 
supposition that they reflect the convictions of others and satisfy their valid 
expectations, we may well expect chaos to result when everyone’s 
assumptions are thus publicly shown to be false. This would seem to hold 
whether everyone is a Utilitarian or not. So the viability of this variant of the 
ideal Utilitarian society would, like the non-ideal one, seem to require for its 
stability the very covert deception of others that Sidgwick wants the ideal 
society to preclude. An ideal Act-Utilitarian society that excludes the publicity 
                                                       
18 This seems to be J.J.C. Smart’s conclusion as well. See “An Outline of Utilitarian 
Ethics,” in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 50. 
19 See Lyon’s distinction between accepting and following the dictates of Act-
Utilitarianism (op. cit. Note 11, pp. 151-52). My reasons for adopting the former, weaker 
description will shortly become evident. 
Chapter XII. Classical Utilitarianism and the Free Rider       510 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
condition does no better at eradicating the clandestine free rider than a 
Hobbesian, imperfect Social Contract-Theoretic society that assumes it. 
 
4. Hodgson, Gibbard and Lewis on the Ideal Act-Utilitarian Society 
 Does an ideal Act-Utilitarian society that includes the publicity condition 
do any better? Consider the second of the two variants of the ideal Act-
Utilitarian society, in which the publicity condition is assumed to hold. I 
argue here that there is in fact no consistent rendering of such a case. We have 
mentioned in passing the obstacles that must be overcome in getting from the 
actual to an ideal Utilitarian society of either kind; and the conclusions of 
Section 3 suggests that these pains of transition are considerably increased in 
severity when publicizing the Utilitarian doctrine is made part of the process. 
But we will now see that even if we suppose this problem solved, the very 
concept of an ideal Act-Utilitarian society in which the publicity condition 
holds is incoherent.  
This is one way of understanding D. H. Hodgson’s argument, which is 
the basis for his critique of Utilitarianism.20 Essentially, he argues that truth-
telling and promise-keeping would be impossible in a society where all were, 
and recognized each other as being, Act-Utilitarians. His argument is based 
on the assumption that one part of the utility of a great many types of social 
action involves the degree to which they satisfy the justified expectations of 
another. In an Act-Utilitarian society, no one could have valid expectations 
about another’s actions (to generalize from Hodgson’s examples). An agent S 
would only do an act x if x had the greatest utility; and x would have the 
greatest utility only if it satisfied the recipient R’s expectations. But R would 
expect x only if R believed that S would do x. Being equally rational, S would 
know this, hence would do x only if he believed that R expected x. But since 
S’s doing x depends on knowing R’s expectations, and R’s expectations 
depend on knowing whether or not S will do x, R has no prior reason to 
expect S to do x. And since the utility of doing x depends on knowing R’s 
expectations, S cannot determine whether or not doing x has greatest utility. 
So there is no prima facie reason to do x rather than not-x. This dilemma holds 
for any act x that involves fulfillment or violation of someone else’s 
expectations in its utility index. Notice that this formulation of the problem 
can be viewed as a consequence of universal free rider behavior that leaves no 
social convention with any practical normative force. 
 A sophisticated attempt to refute Hodgson’s argument was made by 
Allan Gibbard in his dissertation.21 Gibbard interprets Hodgson’s argument as 
claiming that when good consequences depend on the coordination of actions, 
                                                       
20 Hodgson, op. cit. Note 11, Chapter 2. 
21 Allan Gibbard, “Utilitarianisms and Coordinations” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 
1971). 
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rational methods of promoting them are self-defeating unless kept secret.22 He 
offers an example of two Act-Utilitarians who, having agreed to play tennis, 
deliberate about whether to keep their agreement or not, where each will 
come to the courts if and only if he thinks it sufficiently likely that the other 
will. Gibbard argues that Hodgson mistakenly infers from this type of 
instance that what an Act-Utilitarian should do never depends on what he has 
agreed to do, since he never has sufficient reason for believing that an 
agreement made with another will be kept. Thus the problem, as Gibbard sees 
it, is to show that making an agreement in an Act-Utilitarian society under 
certain circumstances could, after all, alter the expected consequences of the 
acts open to the two parties – and thus that the agreements that would be kept 
in such a society are most of those which an Act-Utilitarian would find it 
desirable to keep.23  
 Gibbard’s argument to this effect is strategically similar to David Lewis’s 
in “Utilitarianism and Truthfulness.”24 Both conceive the issue as a limited-
alternative coordination problem (Lewis’s example is of two rational Act-
Utilitarians placed in different rooms who must choose whether to press a red 
button or a green; only if both push the same button will utility be 
maximized, and this coordination at best requires their exchanging 
information about which button each intends to press). Also, both argue that 
there may be a sufficient condition for solving the problem in an assumption 
independent of but compatible with the case as stated. For Lewis, it is 
consistent with the problem to stipulate that the parties will be truthful 
whenever it is best to instill in the other true beliefs about which one has 
knowledge.25 Gibbard’s independent premise is the parties’ common 
knowledge of whether their society has kept such agreements in the past, that 
is, whether they have a history of conventions.26 Let us look more closely at 
the latter answer, since Lewis’s answer presupposes it as well. 
 Gibbard’s account relies heavily on the analysis of the origin of a 
convention as the solution to a coordination problem supplied by Lewis in his 
book, Convention: A Philosophical Study.27 For Lewis, expectations concerning 
the behavior of other parties in a coordination problem rely largely on 
precedent, that is, reasoning inductively from relevantly salient solutions to a 
similar past coordination problem to a most efficacious solution to the present 
one. The precedent in question may have been established deliberately or by 
                                                       
22 Ibid., p. 156. 
23 Ibid., p. 159. 
24 David Lewis, “Utilitarianism and Truthfulness,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 
50 (1972). 
25 Ibid., P. 18. 
26 Gibbard, op. cit. Note 21, p. 164. 
27 David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1969), esp. chaps. 1 and 2. 
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chance, by agreement or tacitly.28 The more points of similarity between the 
present coordination problem and its precedent, the more each party is 
justified in expecting the other parties to concur in solving it in a similar or 
analogous way. Thus a solution established by precedent gives each party 
reason to assume a certain pattern of predictable behavior in the others and to 
calculate his own conduct accordingly. 
 But I now argue that Hodgson’s dilemma implies that no such precedent 
could be established within the constraints of an ideal Act-Utilitarian society 
that requires the publicity of its first and only principle of conduct. Successful 
public adherence to the principle of utility would have to presuppose prior 
regularities of conduct that could not themselves be justified or determined by 
that principle. So neither such regularities nor the precedent on which they 
might be consequent would be forthcoming under conditions that publicly 
recognized the principle of utility as the only rule of behavior. Thus the choice 
of action for a consistent Utilitarian would in every case have to be made not 
between some two alternatives but among a nearly unlimited number of 
unweighted (or equally weighted) possibilities. I conclude, then, that 
Gibbard’s and Lewis’s reliance on the possibility of constructing a weighted, 
limited-alternative coordination matrix not only fails to address the problem 
Hodgson raises but indeed begs the question at issue. Absent some better 
solution to Hodgson’s problem, this means that the Humean, utility-
maximizing model of rationality is incapable of morally justifying an Act-
Utilitarian conception of the good society. 
 Suppose the alternatives for two rational Act-Utilitarians were in fact, 
say, between going to the tennis courts and staying at home. This would mean 
that each party, being fully rational, might simply construct the same 
coordination matrix, accurately working out the probabilities and the 
desirable risk for each alternative. Knowing the full Utilitarian rationality of 
both parties, each would rightly expect this process of reasoning to be fully 
replicated by the other, so that each would expect the other to arrive at the 
same solution which she herself did. A condition of this would of course be 
that each know and assign the same weights and probabilities to each 
alternative and also have good reason for assuming that the other did so as 
well. Thus the expectations of each party would, in this case, have to be 
known to the other: these expectations would derive from their mutually 
acknowledged rationality and accurate weightings and probability 
assignments to the positive consequences of each alternative. But because 
both Gibbard and Lewis give the parties access to the same precedent-setting 
information, each can justifiably expect the other to assess the alternatives in 
just this way. The consistent but independent assumptions utilized in 
Gibbard’s and in Lewis’s solutions thus amount to stipulating in advance the 
                                                       
28 Ibid., pp. 33-36. 
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weight which each party can be expected to assign, and thereby can expect 
each other to assign, to the alternative of keeping the agreement to play tennis 
(or, alternately, of telling the truth about which button one has pressed). But 
these predetermined expectations themselves presuppose that one can 
successfully keep agreements or tell the truth in this version of the ideal 
Utilitarian society. And whether one can or not is, of course, the very question 
with which Hodgson confronts us.29 
 A refutation of Hodgson’s dilemma would, then, have to demonstrate 
that these practices – and any others that derive part of their utility from 
satisfying expectations – could be established in an ideal Utilitarian society by 
Utilitarian reasoning alone, that is, independently of non-Utilitarian 
expectations. For what Hodgson shows is that if we give no weight to 
expectations based on the prior existence of truth-telling and promise-
keeping, there is no way, consistent with Utilitarian reasoning, of introducing 
them into deliberation about what to do. Any act that derives part of its utility 
from the satisfaction of expectations can never be performed, for it will be 
expected only if it has greatest utility, and it will have greatest utility only if it 
is expected. But since neither its utility nor whether it is expected can be 
independently determined, there is no reason for it to be performed at all. 
 Now one apparent solution to the problem can be found in the plausible 
assumption that moral precepts or rules of thumb (such as telling the truth 
and keeping promises) as general guides to conduct have carried over or are 
remembered from the historically prior non-ideal society. The problem for the 
members of the ideal society is then simply to publicly incorporate them into 
the recognized corpus of acceptable Utilitarian behavior. And since, on the 
Utilitarian account, these rules of thumb have the status they do just because 
conformity to them usually has best consequences, this should not be too 
difficult to achieve.30 Or so it may seem. 
 However, how are the members of the ideal Act-Utilitarian society to 
achieve this? To the extent that this program requires them to expressly agree 
                                                       
29 A similar charge can be leveled against the solution proposed by Singer (op. cit. Note 
11 above), for the basis on which he assumes the positive consequences of truth-telling 
and promise-keeping to hold in an ideal society seems to me to beg the question in 
much the same way. 
30 I owe this solution and its elaboration in the second paragraph following to John 
Rawls, in discussion of the 1975 course paper on which this chapter is based. In his 
Political Liberalism, Rawls states that “any conception of justice that cannot well order a 
constitutional democracy is inadequate as a democratic conception. This might happen 
because of the familiar reason that its content renders it self-defeating when it is 
publicly recognized.” Second Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 35-
36. Conceivably my 1975 paper for his course, and its revised article form (“Utility, 
Publicity and Manipulation,” Ethics 88, 3 (April 1978), 189-206) are possible sources of 
this familiarity. 
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on the usefulness of these rules of thumb, or publicly stipulate conformity to 
them under most circumstances, the success of this enterprise once again 
awaits a solution to the prior question of how they are to agree on anything at 
all. 
 But there is an independent problem, even if we suppose that explicit 
public certification of this kind is unnecessary. It might be, for example, that 
prior to the full realization of the ideal Utilitarian society, people have been 
acting on those rules of thumb which generally have best consequences and 
just naturally continue to act in this manner when all have explicitly become 
Act-Utilitarians. The difficulty is then generated by the task of combining the 
notion of rules of thumb for conduct with consistent and public Utilitarian 
reasoning. For part of what distinguishes the rules of thumb an Act-Utilitarian 
may consistently adopt (under non-ideal conditions) from those which a 
putative Rule-Utilitarian adopts31 is that for an Act-Utilitarian, conformity to 
the former on any particular occasion requires a decision to do so, based on 
consideration of whether doing so will have best consequences under those 
circumstances. But under ideal conditions, the decision to conform to the 
rule(s) of thumb relevant to the occasion has, and must be publicly recognized 
to have, the same status as the decision to perform any action, whether it 
conforms to such a rule or not: an action is to be performed only if it has best 
consequences. But under conditions in which everyone acknowledges 
everyone else as adhering to this principle of action, general conformity to 
rules of thumb can no longer be automatically assumed, for the conditions 
under which such general conformity had best consequences no longer 
obtain.   
That is, it is no longer true that the non-Utilitarian majority conforms to 
these rules of thumb, and that violating them would “do more harm by 
weakening current [non-Utilitarian] morality than good by improving its 
quality.”32 A community composed only of consistent Act-Utilitarians will 
conform to such rules only when doing so has best consequences 
independently of these now irrelevant considerations, and this fact will itself 
be publicly acknowledged. Consequently, expectations based on previous 
conformity to rules of thumb under non-ideal conditions must be suspended 
until it is determined which acts maximize utility under ideal ones. But again, 
since there is no way of determining the identity of these acts in advance of 
the expectations aroused by doing them, there is no probability favoring their 
being performed at all. So it will not do simply to suppose that some act x is 
expected, then calculate its utility, as Gibbard and Lewis seem to want to do. 
This is, as Hodgson would say, to engage in mere bootstrap pulling. 
                                                       
31 “Putative” is used advisedly, in view of Lyon’s (op. cit. Note 11, above) analysis. 
32 Op. cit. Note 1, above. 
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 Thus we can see the significance of Hodgson’s (and, for that matter, 
Kant’s) interest in truth-telling and promise-keeping in general as examples 
for discussion, rather than the instances of these on which Gibbard and Lewis 
focus. For this reminds us that the question of whether such general 
conventions of behavior are possible must be settled before the question of 
whether any particular instances of them are. To the extent that promise-
keeping and truth-telling presuppose regularities of speech behavior and 
shared expectations about how language is used, it is far from clear that 
communication of any sort would be possible under such “ideal” conditions. 
To assume in advance that they would begs the question of whether, in an 
Act-Utilitarian society, such conventions could ever arise, and this is just what 
Hodgson implicitly denies. 
 If my account of Hodgson’s argument is right, then any attempt to 
formulate the problem as a choice between two alternatives and to assign 
weights and probabilities accordingly is bound to fail. For in any 
confrontation between two Act-Utilitarians, neither can have any valid 
expectations about what the other will do or say, nor any basis for predicting 
this on probabilistic grounds. This means that the possible alternatives of 
action open to two Act-Utilitarians in any situation are fairly unlimited. To the 
extent that doing x depends on its utility, x’s utility on whether x is expected, 
and whether x is expected on x’s utility, there can be no sufficient reason for 
expecting x, for any x, to be done. So the choice is not between, say, going to 
the tennis courts and staying home, for which a coordination could indeed be 
established. The choice is rather between going to the courts, staying home, 
walking the dog, breaking a window, doing a headstand, and the myriad 
other possibilities that exist between two Act-Utilitarians who have “agreed” 
to play tennis. 
 Now sometimes Gibbard seems to talk as though a coordination solution 
might fortuitously occur and be acknowledged as a solution even if it cannot 
be expected to occur.33 Such an occurrence might then provide sufficient 
reason for expecting it as a solution to future problems. Basically, this is 
Lewis’s argument for the origin of a convention, briefly adumbrated above, 
and the same objection to it is relevant. If the parties could originally conceive 
of the issue as a limited-alternative coordination problem, perhaps some such 
solution to it might be forthcoming. But we have seen that they cannot. 
Because a basis for expectations about others’ behavior is lacking, no act 
possible under the circumstances has greater initial subjective probability than 
any other. Hence any act that may be performed cannot be regarded as a 
solution to the problem of whether to do x or y, since the question of what one 
should do cannot be made determinate in this way. So even if an act x were 
the solution to such a problem, the parties would not regard it as such 
                                                       
33 Gibbard, op. cit. Note 21, pp. 167-70. 
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because they would be unable to conceive the situation in these terms. 
Because there could be no answer to the question of what act to perform, any 
act would be equally acceptable. 
 This is to conclude, finally, contra Sidgwick, that the ideal Utilitarian 
community offers no more of a resolution of the free rider problem than does 
the actual one. The Utilitarian cannot argue that his esoteric morality is a 
temporary practical measure, and not intrinsic to the theory in its ideal 
realization, as Sidgwick wants to do. For in view of the implications of 
Hodgson’s analysis, we seem forced to conclude that secrecy is a necessary 
ingredient in a viable Act-Utilitarian doctrine. Act-Utilitarian reasoning is a 
close analogue of clandestine free rider reasoning in all cases, not only in the 
non-ideal one. And it renders the ideal case impossible in theory. The 
clandestine Act-Utilitarian free rider is a permanent fixture in the Classical 
Utilitarian firmament. 
 
5. The Social Utility of Free Riding 
 Now a Utilitarian may protest that these conclusions are excessively 
rigoristic. She may claim that the worth of the Utilitarian doctrine is amply 
demonstrated in circumstances far less radical than those just described. That 
not everyone could publicly and simultaneously uphold it does not impugn 
its feasibility under actual circumstances, for its relative success as a 
consistent and viable moral rule of conduct has served to distinguish it from 
the spate of seemingly untenable moral views at our disposal. It is, after all, 
the best we can do. Or so it is claimed. 
 I now argue that this protest rests on a failure to pursue the psychological 
implications of consistently adhering to Utilitarianism under actual 
circumstances in which one is, as in Sidgwick’s rendering, a Utilitarian in a 
non-Utilitarian community. I contend, first, that a sincere commitment to the 
maximization of utility under these circumstances necessitates a commitment 
not only to a thoroughgoing policy of secrecy about one’s moral views, but 
thereby to the perpetual covert manipulation of others in the service of one’s 
goals; second, that it is just because ideal conditions can never obtain for the 
consistent Utilitarian that these morally and psychologically repugnant 
consequences of his view are in fact unavoidable under actual conditions; and 
third, that the Utilitarian commitment to maximizing social utility under 
actual circumstances is therefore just as self-defeating in the non-ideal as in 
the ideal case. 
 Assume that I am consistent and fully rational Act-Utilitarian in a non-
Utilitarian community, and that I reveal my convictions only to my closest 
and most trusted friend, who does not share my principles. How can I expect 
this fact about me to influence our relationship? For one thing, this openness 
on my part will presumably structure and inform my friend’s expectations of 
me as a Utilitarian, so as to increase the security and affection of our 
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friendship. But will it? If my friend knows I decide what to do on grounds of 
utility alone, she will justifiably infer that my openness with her is similarly a 
matter of policy – that I would not do it if it did not maximize social utility. 
But my concern with what maximizes social utility clearly transcends the 
particulars of our relationship; it is this larger goal that I consistently keep in 
mind and in terms of which the quality of our relationship finds warrant. And 
if she knows this, she knows my honesty is not merely for the sake of our 
friendship – not, that is, merely for the sake of my respect and affection for 
her, but for something in comparison with which the independent value of 
our friendship pales in significance. Concurring with Sidgwick, I as a 
Utilitarian “perceive friendship to be an important means to the Utilitarian 
end.”34 My friend’s knowing that I view her in this light hardly seems 
auspicious for our friendship. 
 I might, nevertheless, sincerely advise my friend to perform the most 
socially beneficial, utility-maximizing actions, show her my own consistency 
in this regard, and demonstrate the good effects that can be brought about. 
But this will result only if I can somehow convince her that what I tell her to 
do, and demonstrate by example should be done, is in fact what I want her to 
do. For while she has no cause to doubt that I see some course of action for 
her as best, she has no assurance that I think that the best way of getting her to 
do it is by sincerely advising her to do so. Since she knows that my primary 
concern is to maximize utility and not to give her my honest opinion, she 
knows that I might think it best to advise her to do x in order to bring it about 
that she does y (where y is incompatible with, a side effect of, or part of x). In 
fact, my friend’s suspicion on this point may be justifiably extended to all 
facets of our interaction: can she ever be sure that my responses to her are not 
intended to get her to do or think what I think it best for her to do or think, 
independently of whether she agrees with my judgments? It seems that there 
is no way of insuring that even the most minimal conditions of moral 
dialogue are met. As Strawson points out,35 I may seem to engage her in 
moral discourse without really doing so. Notice that this is an interpersonal 
analogue of the instrumentalization dilemma, consequent upon the Humean 
model of motivation, described in Chapter II.3.2.   
 In “Freedom, Blame, and Moral Community,”36 Lawrence Stern argues 
that Strawson fails to distinguish between calculation and manipulation in his 
conception of the “objective” attitude. He defines calculation as “subjecting 
                                                       
34 Sidgwick, op. cit. Note 1, p. 437. 
35 P.F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1974). Strawson’s distinction between the objective and the 
involved attitudes bring out nicely the difference between the perspective a consistent 
utilitarian must assume and that of most other people. 
36 Lawrence Stern, “Freedom, Blame, and Moral Community,” Journal of Philosophy 71 
(1974): 72-84. 
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whatever feelings one has to the constraints of policy, to getting the result one 
is aiming at,” while manipulation is “subverting or bypassing another 
person’s rational or moral capacities for the sake of some result.”37 In therapy, 
for example, he points out that although calculation must enter into the 
attitude of the therapist toward the patient insofar as the patient’s well-being 
is the result being aimed at, manipulation need not, since the therapist can 
make full use of the patient’s rational or moral capacities in furthering this 
goal.  
Although the distinction is well taken, it is important to see how closely 
intertwined these two must be in the attitude of a consistent Utilitarian 
toward anyone else. Here, calculation implies manipulation. For in order to 
promote the result the Utilitarian is aiming at, namely, maximizing social 
utility, it will be necessary to bypass the other person’s rational and moral 
capacities just in case publicly acknowledged agreement on the goal to be 
achieved is lacking – which, as we have seen, must be true for the consistent 
Utilitarian in all cases. For example, the Utilitarian may enter into a friendship 
for reasons of utility, as Sidgewick suggests; but if the other person enters into 
it solely because he likes and respects the Utilitarian personally, and the 
Utilitarian knows this, it is unlikely that the latter will succeed in bringing 
about a commitment to the relationship from the former except by 
manipulation, by getting the other person to commit himself, without openly 
presenting her Utilitarian calculations of how to best maximize utility as a 
reason for doing so. On the other hand, cases in which calculation would not 
necessarily imply manipulation are just those, for example, business 
relationships, in which people are consciously committed to cooperation in 
some enterprise the goals of which are mutually acknowledged. But since 
mutual acknowledgment and cooperation in the goals of Utilitarianism have 
been shown to lead to insuperable difficulties, the implication holds in this 
case. 
 The possibility – indeed, the necessity – of a consistent policy of 
manipulating others and calculating their responses as variables in the service 
of a larger goal reveals a serious problem with the very concept of a consistent 
Utilitarian doctrine, quite aside from the difficulties discussed so far. As we 
saw at the outset, the first principle of Utilitarianism is a special case of the 
nonmoral utility-maximizing model of rationality, in which the particular 
utility to be maximized is general social utility. Now normally, the utility-
maximizing principle is called into use under circumstances that themselves 
determine whether or not the question, “Does this act conduce to G?” is 
relevant; for most goals are such that not all actions, and not all circumstances, 
will obviously bear on their realization. For instance, if I wish to learn 
horseback riding, my taste for foreign films will not be a relevant 
                                                       
37 Ibid., p. 74. 
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consideration in any obvious way. The restricted nature of the goal G itself 
places certain practical, probabilistic constraints on the class of actions that are 
to be assessed for their expediency in bringing it about. Hence G will not form 
some part of the purpose of every action an agent considers. 
 Compare the principle of utility. Where G is “general social utility,” this 
can be further fleshed out in any number of ways. What is important to note is 
that any more specific formula substituted for it (e.g., “everyone’s well-
being,” “the general level of happiness,” “the satisfaction of everyone’s 
wants,” etc.) must be sufficiently general so as not to rule out the happiness, 
pleasure, or satisfaction of wants (however these terms are then suitably 
defined) in advance for some particular person, for in Sidgwick’s Classical 
Utilitarianism, this would be to decrease the total sum of utility. But since 
there is no prior way of determining what makes every person happy or 
satisfied, or what constitutes a person’s pleasure, there is no prior way of 
eliminating from consideration any purposeful action whatever as a possible 
means to this goal. The goal of maximizing social utility is so encompassing 
that any act performed in an interpersonal context must be evaluated for 
whether its consequences are relevant to, or constitutive of, its realization. 
 This means that a concern with social utility must form some part of the 
motivation of a consistent Utilitarian in any interaction he engages in, indeed 
in any plan of action he undertakes: this is the full sense in which 
Utilitarianism provides the only rules of conduct for one committed to this 
doctrine. It may be that some such activities are then found or judged to be 
irrelevant to furthering social utility. But this can only be a consequence, and 
not a presupposition, of an evaluation to which every action is initially 
susceptible. This reveals the extent to which calculation – hence manipulation 
– must inform the Utilitarian’s every decision, action, and deliberate response. 
 So if people know that someone is a committed Utilitarian, they are 
bound to feel somewhat used or manipulated, somewhat suspicious of her 
manifestations of feeling, involvement with, or professed regard for them, and 
somewhat resentful of her attitude. Clearly, it is more expedient for the Act-
Utilitarian to keep her moral convictions to herself, both in this world and in 
the ideal one. But because all such convictions must be clandestine, the 
consistent Utilitarian must, in all of his interactions, free ride on the moral 
transparency and candor practiced by those around him. 
 If a Utilitarian adopts this policy of thoroughgoing secrecy about his 
principles, there is nothing to prevent his doing a great deal of good. In fact, it 
is entirely possible that he may do better than most of us, for his actions will 
be more fully informed by rational Utilitarian deliberation. But he will stand 
in a unique and not wholly desirable relationship to everyone else in the 
world, whether or not they share his convictions. He will, as it were, have to 
keep his own counsel on every occasion. He will be unable fully to confide 
any of his plans, hopes, or intentions to others, or to reciprocate in 
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attachments and dependencies on them, insofar as these involve shared 
commitment and trust; and he will be unable to seek or find confirmation of 
criticism of them in the convictions of others.  
It is questionable how worthwhile a Utilitarian might then find his 
doctrine. For not only would it seem to necessitate a degree of alienation from 
others, the psychological cost of which cannot be repaid. It also requires a 
rather strong, and probably incorrect, assumption about human psychology if 
the agent’s hierarchy of values is to be stable. It needs, that is, to assume that a 
person’s convictions can thrive on purely internal support, that a lack of 
confirmation and esteem of these beliefs by others will not erode or weaken 
their importance and value in the Utilitarian’s own mind. This is not to claim 
that our deepest convictions require public consensus in order to reassure us 
of their validity; it is just to question the sense in which moral principles can 
be believed to be correct if they are in principle acknowledgeable only to 
oneself.  
 This has certain consequences, implicit in the discussion above, for how 
the consistent Utilitarian must regard other people. She must, without 
confiding in them, both do what she sees as best promoting general utility, 
and also do what is necessary to get others to do the same. The telling 
asymmetry of justification we mentioned near the beginning of this discussion 
thus reappears in a stronger form: the Utilitarian acts from well-reasoned 
motives that accord with her deepest convictions, while she requires and 
expects no such deliberation on the part of others. It is sufficient for her 
purposes that they perform the (from her perspective) requisite actions and 
have the requisite thoughts and responses. But however complex or reflective 
these may be, they will have no independent validity for the Utilitarian. She 
accords them importance only insofar as they coincide with her plan. That is, 
she views the opinions, feelings, and deliberations of other people – indeed, 
other people themselves – as instrumental to her goals. 
 Now in our dealings with young children, we often get them to do or 
think things that are instrumental to worthwhile goals we have for them, by 
arranging their environments in certain ways; by dissembling, simplifying, or 
ambiguating the facts in answer to their queries; by carefully selecting the 
states of affairs, behavior, and utterances to which they shall be privy. We 
rightly justify these practices by pointing out a child’s malleability and the 
necessity of paying close attention to formative influences during the years of 
growth. This filtering of influences is necessary, we point out, if children are 
ever to reach a sufficient degree of maturity and inner stability to understand 
and cope with the complexities and perils of the world from which we now 
seek to shield them. Thus a child’s eventual competence, maturity, and 
autonomy adequately justify our covert practice of manipulating his 
environment. Such a practice is rightly held to be ultimately in the child’s best 
interests.  
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Like the Utilitarian, parents have reasons of utility for not disclosing 
some of their intentions and beliefs to their children: they would be 
disruptive, misunderstood, have an untoward effect on psychological 
development, and so on. Like the Utilitarian, parents cannot require their 
children to make a considered judgment or mature confirmation of the 
validity of these beliefs. For this reason, parents, like the Utilitarian, can have 
a satisfying and affectionate relationship with their children, but do not expect 
to form the same complex relationship of mutual affect, trust, dependence, 
and respect that is possible with a friend or equal. Like the Utilitarian, the 
morally best act for a parent is often the one with the most favored 
consequences for others, that is, the children: parents often feel that their 
beliefs and efforts will be sufficiently vindicated if only their children grow up 
to be happy, mature, and productive adults who have recognized the value of 
their parents’ strategies and have developed a minimal gratitude for their 
efforts. These are the worthwhile goals in the service of which they 
manipulate their children. 
 But at this point the analogy with the Utilitarian importantly fails. For we 
have seen that there is, after all, no future state of things with reference to 
which the Utilitarian free rider may justify his policy of secrecy and 
manipulation and in the light of which this policy might eventually be 
dispensed with and commonly validated, in retrospect, as a means to the 
worthwhile goal of moral maturity. That is, there is no point at which the 
attitude of the Utilitarian toward the rest of the community can develop past 
the paternal attitude of a parent toward his child and no point at which the 
Utilitarian can eventually share with others a relationship of mutually 
acknowledged respect as mature, autonomous, moral adults. The consistent 
Utilitarian, then, must permanently regard himself as though he were the only 
adult in a community of children.  
Now multiply this pervasively unhappy attitude by the number of 
consistent Utilitarians, and calculate the social utility thus maximized 
accordingly. The more Utilitarians there are, the less social utility is 
maximized and the more widespread the unhappiness and self-censoring 
alienation inherent in simply being a consistent Utilitarian becomes. 
Conversely, the fewer consistent Utilitarians there are, the healthier one’s 
social relationships, the happier one consequently feels, and the more 
efficiently social utility can be maximized. Social utility can be most efficiently 
maximized, it would seem, by abandoning the commitment to Utilitarianism 
entirely. 
 
 
 
Chapter XIII. Baier's Hume 
 
 
 In this volume so far, I have examined the metaethical views of a wide 
range of twentieth century Humeans, to whom Hume’s own views are of 
varying degrees of interest; as well as the Humean conception of the self these 
views all presuppose. Neither these views nor their presuppositions have 
purported to represent Hume’s actual philosophical theses accurately, either 
in part or in whole. Rather, Hume’s views have been positioned as the 
inspiration, the historical authority, and hence the legitimating imprimatur for 
the more contemporary philosophical views that purport to reconstruct them. 
 Yet Hume’s own views are often cited as refutation of some of the 
arguments I have so far advanced. It is often protested that these criticisms do 
not apply to Hume himself, whose philosophy is much more nuanced and 
complex; and hence that they merely target a straw man – or, at the very least, 
wrongly incriminate Hume through guilt by association. So it is now time to 
take the measure of these protests, by edging toward a direct, exegetical 
confrontation with Hume’s philosophical position itself. In this chapter I 
target one of Hume’s most well-known and highly regarded advocates; one 
who purports explicitly to model her own nuanced and complex 
philosophical views on Hume’s – and who thus offers exegetical insight into 
Hume’s views in the very act of formulating her own. In the next chapter I 
examine Hume’s own arguments independently, in order to ascertain 
whether they provide the warrant that Annette Baier, as well as other, less 
historically-minded contemporary Humeans claim they do. 
In Moral Prejudices,
1
 Baier argues that Hume's view constitutes a radical 
alternative to what she views as the predominant Kantian, Social Contract-
theoretic paradigm in normative moral philosophy. On Hume's view, she 
claims, we must assign highest priority to such "thick" moral concepts as 
caring, trust, and familial and gender relations. Correspondingly, we must 
ignore or reject the traditionally more abstract concerns of moral philosophy, 
such as justice, obligation, and freedom. Baier's account of Hume's own 
conception of the self is notable for its complexity and refusal of reductionism 
as a value in theory-construction. Hence it reaches well beyond the bare bones 
utility-maximizing model of rationality and the belief-desire model of 
motivation appropriated into contemporary metaethics from it. Nevertheless, 
I argue here that, just as Kant incorporated Hume's insights into a yet broader 
and more subtle conception of the self, Baier's own defense of Hume similarly 
presupposes the very Kantian conception of the self she purports to reject. 
                                                
1
 Moral Prejudices, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). Page references 
to this work are parenthecized in the text preceded by “MP.” 
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Section 1 describes and evaluates Baier’s distinctive Anti-Rationalist 
methodology in philosophical argument, what I call the indexical approach; 
and compares it with that of Hume himself. Section 2 examines Baier’s 
attempt to replace Social Contract Theory with an analysis of familial and 
power relations among mutually dependent and morally unequal and 
imperfect human agents. Section 3 traces Baier’s Humean critique of Kant’s 
model of Social Contract Theory and attempt to install Hume as a better role 
model for contemporary moral philosophy. Section 4 evaluates Baier’s 
arguments, and concludes that, just as Hume’s own theses often presupposed 
the foundational assumptions that Kant made explicit, Baier’s case for 
Humean moral philosophy presupposes the Kantian assumptions it is 
supposed to replace. Section 5 reconstructs Baier’s Humean analysis of trust 
as the foundation of her normative moral theory. Section 6 evaluates it with 
respect to several criteria a bona fide moral theory must satisfy, and concludes 
that Baier’s moral theory satisfies them – without, however, dispensing with 
the background, Social Contract-Theoretic moral assumptions she attacks. 
Section 7 evaluates Baier’s indexical approach to philosophical exposition, 
and suggests that the radical and unwarranted extent to which she deploys it 
marks the point of departure between her own philosophical priorities on the 
one side, and those of Hume, Kant, and Socrates on the other. 
 
1. Baier's Humeanism 
 Baier states her allegiance to Hume’s own ethics and epistemology up 
front. The care and sensitivity with which she treats Hume's texts confirm 
this. Baier calls our attention to very many of Hume's little known or 
previously disregarded arguments and pronouncements – for example, his 
account of familial relationships (MP 69), of single motherhood (MP 73), and 
his thesis that knowledge acquisition depends on the structure of 
governmental authority (MP 90). She situates these accounts in the contexts in 
which their significance becomes clear; and she draws forth their implication 
and applications to contemporary issues of concern. Moreover, Baier’s 
insistence on situating Hume's moral philosophy in the context of his 
epistemology and psychology,
2
 even though it would ease her own task to 
treat it in isolation, is exemplary and unusual. She tolerates undogmatically 
Hume's philosophical flaws, and is willing not only to defend his insights and 
contributions, but to take him to task, in print, however reluctantly, for 
inconsistencies, howlers, or morally, politically or intellectually indefensible 
claims – his condescension toward women, for example (MP 52); or his racism 
(MP 291). That is, Baier treats Hume not as an authority to be propped up at 
                                                
2
Baier develops this argument at length in her Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on 
Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991). Page references to 
this work are parenthecized in the text preceded by “PS.” 
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all costs, by dogmatically suppressing or trying to rationalize even his most 
absurd or idiosyncratic pronouncements; but rather as a valued friend, with 
whom she is in deep and continual dialogue of the sort that yields revelations 
of the self, the other, and the world, and with whom careful scrutiny and 
criticism of particular claims, arguments, or choices of words is an expression 
of respect. Ironically, given her Anti-Rationalist views, her approach to Hume 
seems at first glance a paradigm example of Socratic metaethics, practiced 
across time and cultures between two refined philosophical intellects. Part of 
the pleasure of following Baier’s engagement with Hume’s ideas is in her 
ability to ignite in us the same abiding interest in what Hume actually has to 
say, whether it serves her own philosophical agenda or not, that fuels her own 
enduring friendship with him. In the end, I argue, Baier badly betrays Hume’s 
own commitment to Socratic metaethics, and so the foundations of her 
attachment to his thought. But even this betrayal is enacted with the intention 
of extending Hume’s approach into a radically new style of philosophical 
dialogue. 
 The approach to topics of interest to her that Baier shares with Hume – 
and fellow travelers Michael Slote and Bernard Williams – consists in 
forswearing system and abstraction for an associative and concrete approach 
to her topic. I shall call this the indexical approach. The indexical approach is 
itself a practical application of Baier’s more generalized, philosophical distrust 
of theory (MP 194). We have already seen in examining Williams’ views about 
ground projects and Slote’s views about pure time preference that there are 
inherent paradoxes in adopting the indexical approach as a matter of 
principle. But never mind. By the indexical approach, I mean a way of writing 
and arguing philosophy that (1) equates the order of exposition with the order 
of thought; and (2) equates the object of exposition with the objects of 
experience.  I now say something about each of these in turn. 
 
1.1. The Order of Exposition and the Order of Thought 
 Some philosophers try to organize their thoughts for their readership by 
linking them in ways we learn as part of our philosophical training: 
conceptually, logically, or dialectically. This is the order of exposition. Thoughts 
are linked conceptually if the exposition proceeds primarily through the 
conceptual analysis of terms, ideas, and theses – which analyses contain 
further key terms, ideas and theses that are in turn subjected to analysis, and 
so on until the topic has been fully mapped. Much of Harry Frankfurt's work 
can be described in this way. Thoughts are linked logically if the exposition 
proceeds largely through the exploration of the logical relation – entailment, 
disjunction, analogy, contradiction – between premises. Judith Jarvis 
Thomson's work often lends itself to such a characterization. Thoughts are 
linked dialectically if the exposition proceeds largely through the statement, 
criticism and its rebuttal, and further refinement of a thesis. Alan Gewirth's 
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work often satisfies this description. Of course most philosophers, including 
the ones I have named, make use of all of these expositional devices, and 
more, to some extent, in different proportions. 
 All of these devices have in common the imposition of system upon a set 
of thoughts that may not, and often do not, naturally occur in that order. The 
natural order of thought for many philosophers is associative, nonlinear, and 
dependent on factors – environmental, perhaps, or temperamental, or 
chemical – that we do not fully understand and cannot fully control; and the 
task of whipping them into expository shape is more or less onerous to that 
extent. One of the reasons why Hume's Treatise is such a difficult read for 
some of us (and why Baier's mastery of it is therefore so impressive) is that, 
aside from a few unenthusiastic gesturings in the direction of system in his 
exposition – for example, his basic division of the text into sections on 
epistemology, psychology, and ethics; or his adoption of the basic empiricist 
taxonomy of mental contents (ideas, impressions, relations of ideas, etc.), 
Hume is primarily an associative and naturally linear thinker who treats 
topics as they occur to him in connection with those he has already treated. 
Sometimes this leads him to saw off the branch on which he is sitting, as, for 
example, when, after having demolished the concepts of causality, substance, 
space, time, and the self, it occurs to him that he then has to explain how it is 
that objects seem to persist even when our perception of them is 
discontinuous.
3
 His exposition here resembles a particularly savage granny's 
knot, and is just about as much fun to untangle. What saves him for the reader 
partial to system is that he is a seductively good writer.   
 Baier's writing has many of these features, too. As was true for Slote, 
Baier’s approach to the issues of interest to her lends itself well to the essay 
form, because she simply addresses a very loosely connected succession of 
topics as they come to interest her for different reasons – invitations to write 
on particular topics for collections or conferences, personal experience, her 
interest in Hume, her rejection of what others have said, etc., and trusts 
(rightly, for the most part) that they will add up to a coherent whole. "[T]opics 
[do] somehow seem to present themselves," she says,  
and to have some sort of link with topics I [have] addressed at some 
earlier point. ... Many of [my] essays were originally prepared as lectures 
for particular audiences, often at conferences with themes chosen by the 
organizers or as essays for anthologies on a particular theme, so whatever 
unity they have certainly does not come from ... logical step-by-step 
progression ..." (MP xi-xii)  
                                                
3
"Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Book I, Part IV, Section II of A Treatise of 
Human Nature, Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 187-218. Page 
references to this work are parenthecized in the text preceded by “T.” 
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Nevertheless the unified whole Baier's essays add up to is delineated by the 
distinctive character of her philosophical sensibility; and partly definitive of 
that sensibility is her complete disinclination to impose "logical step-by-step 
progression," or even to seek it. By contrast, some philosophers (me among 
them) choose what to write about, when, and in what form, on the basis of 
prior, systematic constraints on what their theory requires. 
 
1.2. The Object of Exposition and the Object of Experience 
 Like Hume, Baier also tends to equate the object of exposition with the 
objects of experience. For she shares with Hume certain philosophical 
interests of an experientially concrete and pragmatic nature. Hume's 
skepticism resulted from a refusal to credit any source, whether epistemic or 
ethical, as authoritative, beyond the evidence of his own experience, and this 
resulted in an attack on almost everything. Like Hume, Baier is an iconoclast 
at heart. And as is true for Hume, her targeted icons include – but are not 
exhausted by – the abstract edifice of rigorous metaethical speculation that, in 
her view, obscures the centrality to human morality of such "thick" ethical 
concepts as love, trust, vulnerability, contempt, responsibility, violence, 
relationship, and family. Like Hume, Baier means to remind us of our fleshy 
embodiedness, our biological and social interdependence, and our fallibility. 
Like Hume, she means to resituate our moral dialogues and deliberations in 
the context of the pervasive and incorrigible uncertainties – about ourselves, 
our relationships to others, and what will happen next – that define our actual 
existence. 
 Baier also targets the impersonal style of abstract philosophical analysis 
that fundamentally characterizes the discipline of philosophy. For it she often 
substitutes anecdotes, narratives, and personal remarks, with less benign 
results. In this enterprise she is faithful to the equation of the object of 
exposition with the object of experience. The experiences are often her own – 
of reactions she has had to others, stories she has heard, events with which 
she has first-hand familiarity.  But in this regard she decisively parts company 
with Hume himself, whose style, though associative in just the manner the 
substantive content of his interests would seem to require, is also relentlessly 
impersonal, analytical, and abstract. I argue in Section 7 below that this 
divergence has fatal consequences for the plausibility of Baier’s analysis. 
 
1.3. Baier’s Project 
 Despite – or perhaps because of – Baier’s similarities with Hume, her 
Humeanism is original. For her familiarity and comfort with detailed scrutiny 
of the historical texts enables her to avoid the embarrassing and all-too-
pervasive spectacle in which ignorance of the history of philosophy leads to 
repeated reinventions of the wheel. To her very great credit, Baier renders 
unto Hume what is Hume's; and this frees her to make her own bid, not 
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merely for greater appreciation for a Humean perspective, but for a shift in 
our conception of the concerns that centrally define the enterprise of 
normative ethics. So Baier’s Humeanism is unlike those of the philosophers 
already considered, in that it embraces rather than avoids the challenge and 
messiness of exegetical confrontation with Hume himself. 
 Essentially, Baier’s bid has two parts, a substantive one and a critical one. 
The substantive part proposes to replace the analysis of moral obligation as 
the centerpiece of normative ethics with an analysis of power relations. The 
subtlety and detail of this substantive part of her project make her difficult to 
typecast as a consequentialist, deontologist, or virtue theorist (those 
taxonomic refuges of metaethicists who have nothing normative to say
4
). The 
critical part of the project proposes to replace what Baier views as the 
dominant authority of a rigidly masculine and sexist Kantian approach to 
normative ethics with what she views as a more sensitive, pragmatic and 
feminist Humean approach. In some places, Baier's criticisms are compelling, 
and require us to rethink the scope and enterprise of normative ethics. But in 
others, her treatment of her adversaries is so careless and disrespectful both of 
her chosen targets and of the enterprise of – yes, abstract – philosophical 
analysis that it is almost impossible to read without losing one's temper, 
particularly if one is a Kantian. I start by examining the substance of her 
objections to the prevailing tradition, and proceed from there to discussion of 
the alternative model she advocates, leaving my very strong reservations 
about some of the methods she deploys to the last section of this chapter. 
 
2. Baier's Critique of Social Contract Theory 
 Shifting our focus from obligation to power relations means replacing the 
analysis and derivation of prescription with description, strategizing and 
problem-solving as our highest normative priorities. There is, in fact, a great 
deal more description than prescription in Baier’s Moral Prejudices – more so 
than readers of moral philosophy books may be used to. She is a keen 
observer of what we actually do, and how we negotiate moral relationships 
both personally and institutionally; and her explicit attachment to personal 
anecdote and autobiography (MP 194) (for which she unnecessarily asks our 
forbearance (MP xii)) should be seen in this context. Her sometimes gory 
accounts of what actually happens – both to her and to others, often in the 
academic context – under the rubric of moral transaction lends first-personal 
authority to her generalizations; and is a necessary antidote to the naive and 
self-aggrandizing assumptions about human nature that ground so much 
contemporary moral philosophy and thus restrict it either to the realm of 
theory or to the genre of motivational, you-can-do-it-if-you-try literature. 
Some respond to this lack of realism with respect to our actual limitations and 
                                                
4
This remark is not merely a dig but also a summary of my arguments in Chapter V. 
Chapter XIII. Baier’s Hume           528 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
flaws by arguing that we must revise downward the values expressed in 
normative moral theory so as to accommodate them.
5
 Baier's consistently 
indexical approach to the problem leads her simply to present us with the 
facts. 
 This should not be taken to imply that no moral ideals or convictions 
stand behind her approach; quite the contrary. But these ideals and 
convictions function more as pragmatic and pluralistic goals to be achieved 
through action of which we are realistically capable, than as impossibly 
abstract and removed standards for the dispensation of praise and blame. 
When Baier makes recommendations – she almost never prescribes – about 
how we should address a particular moral dereliction or issue, one senses that 
she tests their viability against the capabilities and limits of her own moral 
agency. The self-knowledge, humility, and moral engagement these 
recommendations display have far greater authority than the commands, 
coercion, and threats she repeatedly deplores. But we shall see that the 
question of who actually issues such commands, coercion or threats surfaces 
repeatedly. 
 Baier's most far-reaching recommendation is that we need to replace the 
prevailing Social Contract-Theoretic model of moral interaction between 
agents who are conceived as free, equal, and autonomous with a familial 
model of moral interaction between agents who are mutually dependent, 
unequal in power, and connected by material, social, and biological necessity 
(MP 120). Her critique of the Contract-Theoretic model dismantles its most 
basic constitutive concepts, namely those of obligation, the nature of 
individuality, and the presuppositions of equality, freedom of choice, 
rationality, and rights. 
 She begins by attacking the notion of obligation as the central concept of 
ethics. Her objections to this notion are threefold. First, take the foundational 
obligation of promise-keeping. This presupposes that one has been raised to 
take promises seriously; and this, in turn, that we have the obligation to raise 
our children to be morally competent promisors. But this requires that we 
raise our children lovingly, and "an obligation to love, in the strong sense 
needed, would be an embarrassment to the theorist, given most accepted 
versions of 'ought implies can'" (MP 5). For the most part, traditional moral 
theories of the modern era have nothing to say about proper child-raising, 
                                                
5
See, for example, Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of 
Consequentialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); and Susan Wolf, "Moral Saints," The 
Journal of Philosophy LXXIX, 8 (August 1982), 419-438. I do not think it plausible to 
interpret these and other similarly inclined authors at face value, as arguing against 
moral theory altogether, for reasons I have touched in Chapter I and develop at length 
in Volume II.   
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and so nothing to say about how to insure the stability of a community's 
morality over time. On Baier's view, the observation of moral obligations and 
natural duties that characterize a morally competent agent presuppose the 
primary virtue of being a loving parent (MP 6). The importance of child-
rearing, a responsibility traditionally allocated to women, has been 
overlooked, presupposed and exploited by traditional moral theory (MP 9).  
 Second, when we compare the contractual obligation to keep one's 
promise with the range of actual situations we may encounter, about which 
we can make no such contractual provisions – the terrorist plumber who fixes 
my drains but blows up my house, the subversive teacher who imparts the 
history of ethics but might turn a son against his parents – it becomes clear 
that this obligation is a special case not suited to be the foundational or 
definitive one (MP 116-7). 
 Third, to be under an obligation in general implies that one is unfree, so if 
obligation is the central concept of ethics, then the justification of coercion is 
the central problem (MP 4, 12). The Social Contract-Theoretic tradition has 
concentrated on cases in which punitive enforcers of obligation are entrusted 
with more power than the obligated agent, but this neglects that large variety 
of obligations and expectations of others that fail to conform to what Baier 
calls the "coercive model" (MP 13). Moreover, the main support for the 
stability of a moral code cannot be threats and coercion, on pain of infinite 
regress. Rather, it must be – again – the loving parents we trust to raise 
trustworthy moral agents (MP 14). 
 From obligation Baier moves on to the traditional contract-theoretic 
conception of individuality. Following Carol Gilligan, Baier rejects Rawls's 
conception of individuality as defined by one's rational life-plan on three 
grounds. First, it presupposes an obligation of noninterference by others that 
devalues the importance of close association with others (MP 24-5, 119). 
Second, it ignores the necessity of care – and therefore interference – by others 
in the lives of the relatively powerless, in order to avoid their neglect, 
isolation and alienation (MP 24-5, 29). And third, it permits the exploitation of 
those – traditionally women – who voluntarily choose to follow a more 
communal and care-based conception of individual growth. As Baier 
observes, "[a]s long as women could be got to assume responsibility for the 
care of home and children and to train their children to continue  the sexist 
system, the liberal morality could continue to be the official morality, by 
turning its eyes away from the contribution made by those it excluded. The 
long unnoticed moral proletariat were the domestic workers, mostly female" 
(MP 25-6).  
 Baier's attack on the Contract-Theoretic conception of equality is 
essentially that it levels and disregards the actual power imbalances that 
characterize our relationships – between parents and children, states and 
citizens, doctors and patients, large states and small among them. By 
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pretending that these imbalances do not exist in order to bring about their 
eradication, she argues, we obscure from ourselves the true nature of our 
moral relationships to others who are inferior or superior to us in power; and 
so we often do violence to ourselves as well as to them (MP 28). 
 About the Social Contract-Theoretic conception of freedom of choice Baier is 
equally pessimistic. She points out that moral relationships to others – for 
example, of child to parent, or of later to earlier generation, are not always 
freely chosen. Shifting the moral emphasis from contractual justice to care, she 
argues, "goes with a recognition of the often unchosen nature of 
responsibilities of those who give care, both of children who care for their 
aged or infirm parents and of parents who care for the children they in fact 
have" (MP 30). I think what she means here is that elevating care and concern 
for others to a central moral role, rather than simultaneously presupposing 
and devaluing it, as she claims the contract-theoretic tradition does, assigns 
priority to the moral quality of the social relationships we actually have, 
rather than to a conception of ourselves as moral agents who can create the 
ones we want ab nuovo.  
 Baier also levels a frontal attack on the rationalism she finds inherent in 
the Contract-Theoretic moral tradition, i.e. on the "assumption that we need 
not worry what passions persons have as long as their rational wills can 
control them" (MP 30). If unequal power relations – in particular those 
between parent and child – are the moral norm, rather than contractual 
relations among equals, then the primacy of rationality must be re-evaluated 
accordingly (in this conviction I am, obviously, squarely in her camp). 
Rational control may be a necessary condition for adequate parenting, and 
maybe even sufficient in a distant father-figure who has no substantial 
involvement in day-to-day child-rearing. But "primary parents [usually 
mothers] need to love their children, not just to control their irritation" (MP 
31).  
 Finally, Baier's critique of the Contract-Theoretic notion of rights begins 
with her acknowledgement of the fundamental connection between rights and 
speech. To speak at all, she observes, to assert or claim anything, is implicitly 
to assert or claim the universal right to speak and the right to be heard. "We 
are a right-claiming and right-recognizing species," she says, "and these 
claims have a built-in potential for contested universalization" (MP 224-5).  If 
Baier is correct in maintaining that language expresses respect for persons 
(MP 232, fn. 5), and that rights language expresses our emerging self-
consciousness as individuals and the externalization of our individual powers 
(MP 232-3; also cf. 236-8, 240-1), then rights would seem to have a 
foundational role that conflicts with Baier's agenda to displace the Contract-
Theoretic model from ethical primacy.  
 But rights, on Baier's view, are not only individual but also 
individualistic. She finds an inverse correlation between our increasing 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception   531 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
tendency to claim more universal rights, and our decreasing tendency both to 
beg or feel grateful for the granting of those benefits to which we believe 
ourselves entitled, and to respond generously to those who do (MP 226). 
Historically, she reminds us, such claims by some group of the oppressed 
against some class of oppressors were exclusive in nature: of commoners by 
the aristocracy against the king in the Magna Carta; of women and slaves by 
white men against the king in the U.S. Bill of Rights. "Slaves, nonlandowners, 
the poor, women, criminals, children, nonhuman animals have all been out-
groups in relation to those in-groups who have claimed their rights in famous 
proclamations and manifestos" (MP 226), and rights can be manipulated to 
shore up traditional privileges as well as to extend them to the disadvantaged 
(MP 228-9, 231). Because rights are inherently capable of conflict, different 
rights-claiming groups de-emphasize or circumscribe different rights in order 
to claim others as universal (MP 228, 230); and coherence within a list of 
universal rights is purchased at the cost of precision and sometimes even 
presence of specifiable content (MP 228).  
 So on the one hand, rights are often seen as more inherently individual 
and basic than obligations, duties, or responsibilities (MP 237-8). But on the 
other, Baier argues, the preservation of particular individual rights under 
particular circumstances are merely the tip of the iceberg of morality that are 
"supported by the submerged floating mass of cooperatively discharged 
responsibilities and socially divided labor" (MP 241); and the rules of 
discussion that must be observed in order for a speaker to be heard 
demonstrate this (MP 241-2). The individuality of rights is a foundational 
social fact about language-producing creatures. But the individualism of 
rights reveals it to be a cooperative social enterprise and so not as 
foundational as first appears. 
 
3. Baier's Case for Hume over Kant 
 Baier observes that since Hume preceded Kant, we know what Kant 
thought about Hume, but not what Hume might have thought about Kant 
(MP 268). She proposes to remedy that asymmetry, by mounting a Humean 
critique of these defects of the Kantian Social Contract-Theoretic model. She 
thinks these defects, and many others, can be remedied by turning from Kant 
to Hume as a source of guidance for fashioning a contemporary, realistic, and 
fully responsive moral philosophy. As a beleaguered Kantian, I find odd her 
assumption that Kant provides the dominant model for contemporary moral 
philosophy, and have at least suggested the pervasiveness of the Humean 
model in preceding chapters. But of course an aggrieved sense of 
philosophical deprivation is not the exclusive preserve of either camp. 
 Begin with Kantian Rationalism. Here Baier suggests we substitute 
Hume's concept of reflexion. She characterizes reflexion as a "response to a 
response ... a sentiment directed on sentiments" (MP 72, 81-3); and 
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impressions of reflexion as "feeling responses to how we take our situation to 
be" (MP 131). Baier thinks Hume's sentiment-based concept of reflection 
performs the same function as Kant's concept of reason (MP 72), but without 
its coercive and individualistic connotations (MP 62). Reflection and 
premeditation will "make a difference to the operation of natural motives and 
passions" (MP 66), just as Kantian reason is purported to do. Like Kantian 
reason, it separates mature and self-critical moral agents from mere 
conformers (MP 72). And Humean reflection carries with it the same potential 
for self-deception, i.e. the tendency to overlook or dramatize our moral 
derelictions in ways that obscure our effective moral beliefs (MP 67). 
Moreover, there is a developmental progression in levels of reflection, from a 
child's instinctive feeling of sympathy for another, to our more considered 
sympathy for another's resentment at insult or injury, to the "reflexive turning 
of these capacities for sympathy, for self-definition, and for conflict-
recognition onto themselves, to see if they can 'bear their own survey'" (MP 
72). Humean reflection, Baier concludes, thus can provide an account of moral 
development analogous and in some ways superior to the prevailing Kant-
Piaget-Kohlberg model.  
 Finally, Humean reflection may play the same authoritative role in 
deliberation as reason: Hume's reduction of rational inference as traditionally 
understood to custom and habit is coupled with the stipulation that those 
customs and habits of thought are authoritative that survive the test of 
reflection (MP 81). This Baier interprets as meaning, first, that we must be able 
to continue the custom or habit in question even after we have "thought long 
and hard about its nature, its sources, its costs and consequences" (MP 81); 
and second, "we must be able to turn the habit in question on itself and find 
that it can 'bear its own survey'" (MP 81-2).  
 The most authoritative survey is that which is administered by the 
passions, including socially dependent ones, on all the operations of the mind 
traditionally identified with reason – understanding, memory, demonstration, 
causal inference, and the assumptions of physical and mental continuity. Of 
these the passions ask, "'Would we perish and go to ruin if we broke this 
habit? Do we prefer people to have this habit of mind, and how important do 
we on reflection judge it that they have it?'" (MP 82). Baier defends this 
method of reflective survey as our only resource for evaluating our values. 
"We ... can do no more," she argues, "to revise lower-level evaluations, than to 
repeat our evaluative operations at ever higher, more informed, and more 
reflective levels" (MP 84). Humean reflection, according to Baier, thus trumps 
Kantian reason on two counts:  first, Kantian reason itself is nothing more 
than custom and habit; and second, it, like all such habit must be subjected to 
higher-order authoritative evaluation by directing the passions upon it. 
 Interestingly, Baier’s advocacy of Humean reflection as a better substitute 
for reason represents a revision from her earlier identification of reason with 
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Humean belief in A Progress of Sentiments. There she drew heavily on Hume’s 
remarks at T 118-120 about the causal influence of belief on the will, passions, 
and action, in order to resist the implications of Hume’s infamous claim at T 
415 that “[r]eason is, and out only to be the slave of the passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” Baier argued 
as follows: 
Belief and obsessive or even passing thoughts influence our passions and 
motives, and so influence our will. Hume takes this point to be already 
established long before he gets to his most famous and infamous Book 
Two claims about the impotence of “reason alone” to produce or prevent 
any action. 
 He begins the resumed discussion by claiming that popular and 
traditional philosophical talk of ‘the combat of passion and reason’ is 
strictly nonsense (T 413-415). Since passions incorporate the influence of 
reason, since they presuppose beliefs, they would be in combat with 
themselves if they resisted the influence of belief (159). 
The final sentence of the above citation is not to be found in Hume’s Treatise. 
Rather, it is Baier’s own reasoning in defense of Hume’s claim in the 
preceding sentence. In the following chapter I suggest how very much at odds 
it is with the other, surrounding claims Hume makes in that section. But for 
present purposes it is sufficient to note Baier’s (1) implicit recognition of the 
distinction between the passions on the one hand and reason/belief on the 
other; and (2) seeming equation of belief “and obsessive or even passing 
thoughts” with that reason which Hume argues repeatedly is reducible to 
custom and habit. In Baier’s Progress of Sentiments, then, the fundamental 
distinction is between the passions, and the habits of thought we identify as 
reason and/or belief. 
However, Hume’s characterization of belief as itself “an act of the sensitive, 
[rather] than of the cogitative part of our natures” (T 183; italics in text) may have 
led Baier to rethink this seeming equation. If that which “influence[s] our 
passions and motives, and so influence our will” (PS 159) is “an act of the 
sensitive [rather] than of the cogitative part of our natures” (T 183), whereas 
“reason … exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion” (T 417), then 
clearly it is the sensitive part of our natures rather than reason that influences 
our passions, motives and will for Hume; and “belief and obsessive or even 
passing thoughts” may, as sensitive, enter into the “reflective survey” (MP 81-
2) conducted by the passions upon all of our habits and customs. Thus in 
Moral Prejudices, belief and the passions are on the same, “sensitive” and 
motivationally effective side of our natures, whereas reason is on the 
“cogitative” and motivationally impotent side. The passions administer the 
most authoritative survey of our customs and habits because only the 
passions, guided by their sensitive beliefs, can change them. 
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 Baier thinks a Humean ethics has, in addition, several further advantages 
over a Kantian one.  First,  
Hume's ethics, unlike Kant's, make morality a matter not of obedience to 
universal law but of cultivating the character traits which give a person 
'inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity,' and at the same time 
make that person good company to other persons. ... To become a good 
fellow-person one doesn't consult some book of rules; one cultivates one's 
capacity for sympathy ....  Hume's ethics ... does not reduce morality to 
rule following (MP 54-55).  
 Second, Hume is more of a cultural and historical relativist than Kant. 
Whereas the latter regards reason as the source of moral rules and views them 
as universal, Hume regards them as generated by self-interest, instrumental 
reason, custom, tradition, chance and human preference, and as varying 
among different communities (MP 55). Baier regards this as self-evidently in 
Hume's favor, since it conforms more closely to the facts of human social life. 
 Third, Humean ethics does not ascribe priority to relationships among 
autonomous equals, as the Kantian Contract-Theoretic model does (MP 60). 
Rather, Hume assigns a central role to the family, by beginning his analysis of 
cooperation with that within the family between parents and children, who 
are unequal and dependent; and with what he describes as "the strongest tie 
the mind is capable of" (T 362), i.e. that between parents and children. In being 
intimate, unchosen, and between unequals, this relationship stands in sharp 
contrast to the Kantian Contract-Theoretic model (MP 60-61). Baier faults the 
latter on this score, for its emphasis on self-chosen commitments and 
consequent inability to account for the "duties both of young children to their 
unchosen parents, to whom no binding commitments have been made, and of 
initially involuntary parents to their children" (MP 61).  
 Fourth, whereas the aim of a Kantian Contract-Theoretic morality is 
freedom, and the problem how to achieve it given conflict with others who 
want it equally, the aim of Hume's morality is to solve the "deeper ... problem 
of contradiction, conflict, and instability in any one person's desires, over 
time, as well as conflict among persons" (MP 61). Conflict internal to the agent 
and conflict among agents are mutually interactive; and this, Baier thinks, 
further highlights the contrast with a Kantian ethics that conceives moral 
agents as independent, autonomous, and distanced. 
 Baier devotes a great deal of attention to the relative cruelty of Kant's and 
Hume's ethics, though she declines to say what she means by the term 
"cruelty" (MP 269). Her target is the comparative pressures that are exerted on 
moral agents to get them to conform to the moral norms in question, and the 
punitive measures that are taken when they fail to do so (MP 268). Whereas 
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Kant's is what she and Allan Gibbard
6
 would call a guilt morality that 
redirects others' anger at our faults through the attribution, feeling, and 
punishment of guilt, Hume's is what Baier describes as a shame morality (MP 
270), in which moral motivation is inspired through approbation of virtue, the 
sense of virtue, and "also the principles, from when it is deriv'd. So that 
nothing is presented on any side, but what is laudable and good" (T 619). So 
instead of feeling guilty for doing what is wrong, one feels shame for not 
measuring up to "what is laudable and good." Here anger at injury, hatred, 
and the need for revenge is, as for Kant, expressed through law enforcement; 
but we attempt to prevent such feelings from "rising up to cruelty," "the most 
detested of all vices" for Hume, by expressing our approbation of those in 
whom these passions are reflectively controlled, i.e. by hatred for cruelty, for 
excessive hatred, for revenge that is bloodthirsty and out of control (MP 271).  
 Baier points out that Hume frequently appeals "to what we would be 
gratified or 'mortified' to have others discern in us, to what 'renders a man 
either an object of esteem and affection or of hatred and contempt” (E 
138/174).
7
 Other terms of evaluation Hume frequently uses are "'honorable 
and shameful, lovely and odious, noble and despicable " (E 173/214), as well 
as aversion and disgust (MP 281). And Hume seems to rely on the shaming 
practices of public scorn and social ostracism to instill the relevant virtues 
(MP 282). But, Baier argues, this may sound worse in theory than it could 
possibly be in practice, since "[w]e cannot all be shunned, and even if we can 
all be occasionally derided, this must be merely occasional. Unless just a few 
of us display any Humean vices in a high degree, then we simply cannot 
make avoidance our normal response to perceived vice in others" (MP 282). 
Thus unlike Kantian morality, which is expressed in "stern imperatives, 
demanding direct obedience," Hume's is "morality with a light touch," 
expressed in the optative mood, as "a list of welcome characteristics, with 
enforced commands carefully limited to where they are needed and known to 
be effective in controlling 'incommodious' passions or in protecting others 
from their fallout" (MP 289). 
 Kant's almost unconditional approval of Lex Talionis as a principle of just 
punishment – public humiliation for the public humiliator, death for 
convicted murderers, castration of rapists and pederasts, and total ostracism 
                                                
6
Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1990), pp. 297-298. 
7
David Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles 
of Morals, Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). 
Paragraph/page references to this work are parenthecized in the text preceded by “E.” 
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from human society for those guilty of bestiality,
8
 grates on the sensibility that 
employs "laughter more than hectoring commands" (MP 289), and for this 
Baier takes him to task. "One wonders," she comments, "about the moral 
quality of mind and heart of the moral philosopher who is so sure of who 
deserves death, castration, and ostracism, and so sure that rational social 
contracts will provide jobs for executioners, castrators, and deporters" (MP 
273). She questions Kant's edict that we should require of ourselves what God 
would require of us, and to judge ourselves as harshly; and ridicules him for 
then suggesting that we should cultivate the enjoyment of self-discipline: 
"This could be seen as deontology's bad conscience, its backhanded 
concession to a more Epicurean ethics. ... Nietzsche's comment ... seems fair 
enough: that a bad smell of sado-masochism, the reek of blood and torture, 
lingers on the categorical imperative" (MP 276-277). 
 In comparison, Hume is the very model of lenience: According to Baier, 
his statement that the merits of human beings would be scarcely worth the 
value of a supper to the righteous and a drubbing to the wicked
9
 shows his 
disinclination to inflict any harm on an agent in retribution for one dereliction, 
when that harm may cause suffering to the entire character (MP 273-4). On 
Baier's view, it is not possible to localize punishment within a person so as to 
reform the vicious part without injuring the virtuous part; and she believes 
that we should always look "for the social fault behind the individual fault," 
and take "the responsibility for evil to be shared, never localizable in 
individual criminals" (MP 288). She does not explicitly draw the implication 
that we should therefore refrain from punishing individuals at all, but this 
would be a natural inference. 
 Baier is particularly incensed by Kant's reasoning regarding how to 
handle unmarried mothers who commit infanticide. He advocates leniency on 
the grounds that the victim is not a person whom the law need protect, not on 
the grounds of sympathy for the mother's social disgrace. While all human 
deaths require retribution, Kant thinks that God, rather than a human court is 
the appropriate avenger in this case, since the function of human magistrates 
is to apply human law to those within its scope.
10
 "I should think that Kant's 
current defenders and admirers must find [this] discussion particularly 
difficult to recast in a sympathetic way," she comments (MP 277). "This is a 
pretty shocking and cruel bit of Kantian moral reasoning, cruel in its apparent 
disregard of the fate of innocent victims" (MP 278).  
                                                
8
Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), Pt. I, The Doctrine of Right, on the right to punish, pp. 140-145, 168-169. 
9
David Hume, Essays: Moral Political and Literary, Ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 
Ind.: Liberty Classics, 1985), pp. 594-5). 
10
 Gregor, Op. cit. Note 8, pp. 144-145. 
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 However, the situation only becomes worse, in Baier's opinion, when it 
comes to Kant's treatment of female unchastity. He regards female chastity 
and military honor as similar in that both are worthy of defense, and deplores 
the actual human behavior, and ineffective social institutions, that fall so far 
short of preserving these ideals in practice. As a counterpoint, she quotes 
approvingly Hume's explanation, that all human beings, particularly women, 
are prone to the temptations of pure time preference; and that the real 
barbarity consists in the hypocrisy and cruelty of men who impose on women 
the constraint of chastity and the punishment of its violation through shame 
(T 571-2, cited at MP 278). But since it is too difficult to prove female 
unchastity or illegitimate paternity in a court of law, shaming a suspect 
through "bad fame" is the most practical solution (MP 279). 
 Drawing on Gibbard's analyses of shame and guilt, Baier rightly raises 
the question of whether shaming a moral derelict is, in fact less cruel as a 
social sanction than punishing the guilty for a moral dereliction. As Gibbard 
points out, it is possible to be made to feel shame for things that are not under 
one's voluntary control, such as one's physical appearance or class 
background. Moreover, shame is provoked, not by others' anger at one's 
actions, but by others' disdain and ridicule, which Kant himself describes as 
"[w]anton faultfinding and mockery, the propensity to expose others to 
laughter, to make their faults the immediate object of one's amusement, .. a 
kind of malice, ... in order to deprive [them] of the respect [they] deserv[e], 
...[which] has something of fiendish joy in it; and this makes it an even more 
serious violation of one's duty of respect for other men."
11
   
 Many psychologists treat anger as itself a secondary reaction to feelings 
of pain caused by a perceived aggressor, and this links anger and so the blame 
and attributions of guilt in which it is expressed with perceived harm or 
wrongdoing. By contrast, disdain or derision expresses merely a 
disapprobation of someone for failing to live up to the norms of one's group, 
independently of the moral status or legitimacy of these norms. As Baier 
observes, "What people feel shame for will depend on what they expect others 
to sneer or laugh at or treat as grounds for excluding them from some 
charmed circle of initiates" (MP 279). So shame bears no necessary relation to 
actual moral dereliction, of the sort that guilt does, and therefore can extend 
to all of one's perceived flaws, not only the voluntary or moral ones.  
 The power and undiscriminating sweep of a shame morality leads Baier 
to ask,  
Who would not opt for Kant's version of the moral world, if the 
alternative is a social world with some version of a shame morality, 
where each faulty person faces this threat: somehow get rid of your 
character fault, or rid us of your faulty presence, or stay and put up with 
                                                
11
Ibid., Ak. 467. 
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our disdain, mockery and avoidance (MP 280) ... Is the Humean morality, 
which boasts of its nonmoralistic avoidance of 'useless austerities and 
rigours, suffering and self-denial' ... really so gentle if it condones 
derision, scorn, disdain, and avoidance of those who do not measure up 
to to its standards? ... The cost of a nonmoralistic Humean epicurean 
morality, its may seem, is even higher than that of Kantian moral law 
enforcement (MP 283). 
 Baier has six answers to this question in defense of Hume. First, as we 
have already seen (MP 282), we could not universalize a maxim of social 
ostracism and ridicule, on pain of incoherence, so shaming practices must be 
occasional and limited in scope rather than the rule. Second, a Humean can 
criticize cruel laughter, disdain, and excessive scorn, and the personalities that 
give them voice (MP 284); and use these shaming practices themselves against 
their practitioners (MP 286). Third, we can attempt to improve ourselves, not 
through self-inflicted austerities or self-improvement programs, but rather 
through changing our circumstances or occupation (MP 284-5). Fourth, we 
can work to redesign educational and social customs in order to control 
hurtful derision and criticism of others (MP 284-5). Fifth, we can keep our 
disdain for others to ourselves, so as not to hurt their feelings (MP 287). And 
finally, we can, as we have seen, keep in mind to look "for the social fault 
behind the individual fault," and take "the responsibility for evil to be shared, 
never localizable in individual criminals;" we can promote "the articulation of 
shared standards of character assessment, and of application of them to 
particular persons only when the hurt involved in this application can 
reasonably be expected to do some compensatory good" (MP 288). In sum, we 
can limit the damage caused by shaming practices by engaging in them 
sensitively, infrequently, and wisely; and by reforming educational and social 
institutions and practices so as to minimize and control them. 
 
4. An Assessment of Baier's Critique 
 Others besides Baier have criticized the Kantian Contract-Theoretic 
model for being insensitive to the special and sometimes overriding 
obligations we may have toward life partners, family, or close friends.
12
 But 
unlike Baier, most have misunderstood their target as metaethical rather than 
normative. The consequence has often been that they have shot themselves in 
the foot. They have concluded, self-defeatingly, that we should therefore do 
away with moral theory, as though they themselves were not doing moral 
                                                
12
Notably Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism and Morality (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1980); Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character and Morality," in Moral Luck 
(New York: Cambridge, 1981); Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical 
Theories," The Journal of Philosophy LXXIII, 14 (August 12, 1976), 453-466; Susan Wolf, 
"Moral Saints," op.cit. Note 5. 
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theorizing in claiming this; or with impartiality, as though they did not intend 
these very claims to apply impartially; or with moral ideals, as though the 
compassionate acceptance of agents' moral flaws and imperfections were not 
itself a moral ideal. None have suggested, as Baier does, that a familial model 
of interconnected but unequal power relationships among morally imperfect 
agents itself should be the measure of moral analysis.  
 This is a much harder suggestion to refute, because it conforms so much 
better than the Contract-Theoretic model, even in the professional and market 
spheres, to the actual facts of our lives. Baier stresses the neglect by the Social 
Contract-Theoretic tradition of the roles of women and children. But in reality 
it applies no more closely to the roles of actual men, who are just as 
dependent, unequal in power, and involved in intimate relationships as 
women. That Baier's Humean familial model is so much more directly 
relevant does not make it any easier to live up to – to refrain from emotionally 
abusing our children when they get on our nerves, for example; or from 
publicly one-upping our spouse for their household incompetence out of 
barely repressed hostility; or from undermining a colleague who is treading 
on our professional turf. So it does not quiet the typical Anti-Rationalist 
complaint that normative moral theory is too demanding, nor license its 
conclusion that we should just all relax and do what we like. Baier's 
recommendations are just as demanding, if not more so; and they are very far 
from licensing us to relax and do what we like. The challenge Baier's thesis 
presents is rather to show why the Social Contract-Theoretic model should be 
retained at all, if it bears no realistic relationship to what we actually are and 
do. 
 Kant's favorite tactic for de-fanging Hume is the one I am deploying 
throughout this project: to accept but subsume Hume's analysis of something 
– causality, substance, the self, practical reason – as a special case under one 
that is deeper and more comprehensive in scope. As a good Kantian, I believe 
this tactic will work particularly well against Baier's Humean analysis. 
Specifically, I think it can be shown that there is plenty of room for both the 
familial and the Contract-Theoretic model within a fully elaborated moral 
theory; and that the relation of the familial model to the Contract-Theoretic 
model is one of lower-level generalization to higher-level theoretical construct 
within such a theory. I do not try to defend this claim until Volume II, 
Chapter V.5.2. But I can try here merely to suggest some ways in which Baier's 
recommendations for revising the central orientation of normative moral 
theory are not as incompatible with Kantian Social Contract Theory as she 
makes them out to be. 
 The importance for normative moral theory of the question of how to 
raise children to be responsible moral agents and so insure the moral stability 
and continuity of a community, and of how this essential activity should be 
conceptualized within any such theory that purports to have practical 
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application, cannot be overestimated. Baier is right to bring this issue to the 
foreground. Even if we knew what perfect parenting would look like, which 
we don't, we still would have no way of bootstrapping ourselves into that 
ideal, and so of avoiding the cross-generational transmission of moral defects 
and dysfunctions to our children. Under these circumstances, how should we 
conceptualize our own moral roles as concerned parents, teachers, and 
citizens? And what, then, is the point of normative moral theory, other than 
ineffectual wishful thinking? 
 Now Baier argues that the primacy to moral theory of child-rearing 
implies that obligation cannot be the primary concept, since we cannot make 
sense of an obligation to love our children. But this does not follow. For surely 
the one question we must all ask ourselves in response to Baier's challenge is 
what, given that none of us are paragons of love, patience, or sympathy, our 
obligations to our children realistically are. And it is hard to avoid the Kantian 
answer that at least part of our obligation is to cultivate these virtues in 
ourselves to the best of our abilities, as well as to work to reform social and 
educational institutions that can make these obligations easier to discharge. 
 Among these obligations, of course, would be that of raising our children 
to take promise-keeping seriously, and so to become "morally competent 
promisors." But that kept promises are compatible with more severe moral 
betrayals does not show that keeping promises is not an essential and basic 
moral obligation. One difference between a morally competent promisor and 
a moral hypocrite is that the former does not adhere to the letter of the law 
while violating its spirit: does not, for example, fulfill his contract to fix your 
plumbing while blowing up your house, or tune up your car while destroying 
its muffler, or promise to write you a favorable job recommendation that in 
fact damns you with faint praise, or to mediate your domestic conflict while 
seducing your spouse. Unlike a moral hypocrite, a morally competent 
promisor does not cross her fingers behind her back, or silently recite escape 
clauses to herself under her breath while she is making you a promise.  
 Particular promises have meaning and stability only against a 
background of shared assumptions about what constitutes honest and reliable 
behavior. Morally competent promisors share the assumption that making 
and keeping a particular promise is an instance of an effective, pervasive, and 
rule-governed social practice of promising, not an exception to a pervasive 
social practice of dishonesty, betrayal and opportunism. To show that this 
assumption may be misplaced under certain circumstances does not show 
that promise-keeping is not a central or definitive moral obligation, nor that 
obligation is not the primary concern of imperfect moral agents who are 
obligated to do their imperfect best. 
 Baier is also to be commended for highlighting the practical moral 
importance of the intimate, dependent, involuntary and unequal power 
relationships in which we are embedded – as parents, children, spouses, 
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colleagues, friends, and citizens. And she is surely right to argue that analysis 
of the use and abuse of power and responsibility should play a much more 
prominent role in the construction of normative moral theory than it does. Yet 
does this imply the irrelevance, or even the noncentrality to moral discourse, 
of the Contract-Theoretic concepts of freedom, autonomy, individuality, 
equality and individual rights? I am not convinced. For it is only with the aid 
of these concepts that we can understand what is wrong with neglecting the 
important contributions of women and mothers to the creation of a moral 
community in which the benefits of freedom of choice, voluntary association, 
or autonomy of life-plan are available to others; or in which these benefits 
might be rejected for others in which care, concerned intervention in the lives 
of the powerless, and grass-roots political work in one's community of origin 
rather than one's community of choice have greater priority.  
 Similarly, it is only with the aid of the Social Contract-Theoretic concepts 
of freedom, equality, individuality, autonomy and rights that we can 
understand what is wrong with failing to respect the special needs of 
children, or with failing to treat them as individuals, or with assigning them 
too much or too little power and responsibility for themselves and their 
environment in relation to their age. And it is only with the aid of these 
concepts that we can come to understand the responsibilities and obligations 
of those with greater power – in the home, workplace, marketplace, or social 
or civil sphere – to those who have less. It is hard to see how we could come 
to grasp the moral implications of unequal power relations in any of these 
contexts, without these background Contract-Theoretic concepts to give them 
meaning. 
 What we see from Baier's analysis is that women, mothers, children and 
other disenfranchised groups have the same rights as those who traditionally 
have arrogated those rights to themselves. But we need the background 
Contract-Theoretic concepts of rights, freedom, equality, and individuality as 
a measure in order to understand what is amiss. Of course this does not imply 
that everyone in actual fact is or should be exactly alike in degrees of freedom, 
autonomy, or power. No Social Contract Theorist claims this. That traditional 
Social Contract-Theoretic assumptions do not apply concretely and 
realistically to actual human agents does not show that they are not central to 
moral theorizing. What it shows is that they cannot be expected to do the 
practical work Baier rightly expects the lower-level generalizations of a 
normative moral theory to do. But no Social Contract Theorist claims that they 
can. 
 Now we have also seen in Section 2 that Baier has particularly harsh 
words for Kantian Rationalism, i.e. the assumption that all we need do 
morally is to subject our passions, whatever they are, to rational control. Kant 
himself did not make this claim, and I know of no Kantian who has. Kant 
himself devoted a great deal of thought to the question of how to cultivate 
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those moral virtues of feeling and sensibility that would make effortless the 
enactment of duty,
13
 and in fact presupposed love of others, and sympathy, as 
a precondition of subjection to the moral law.
14
  
 But again it is hard to see how Baier's agenda of replacing rational control 
with parental love as a condition of raising morally healthy agents can ever 
get off the ground, if we are not even allowed to exercise rational control in 
order to cultivate the parental love she advocates. We are none of us angels of 
compassion, and often do feel – in addition to love – irritation or anger at our 
children. We can either vent that anger at our children, or we can control it. 
Baier cannot possibly think it would serve the cause of raising morally healthy 
agents (or moral authenticity, either) to make a practice of venting it. So what 
would she have morally committed parents and teachers do? Evacuate their 
children to an air raid shelter when they feel an outburst of temper coming 
on? Give them up for adoption if one judges oneself too irascible to raise 
them? 
 What she says we should all do, under such circumstances, is to exercise 
Humean passional reflection rather than Kantian rational control. The 
problem here is that her analysis of Humean reflection is not sufficiently 
distinguishable from Kant's actual conception of reason to do the job. Take her 
description of reflection as "a response to a response ... a sentiment directed 
on sentiments" (MP 72), and Hume's own characterization of passions as 
"'returns upon the soul' of remembered experience of good and of evil" (MP 
83). We can feel a desire for a desire, or anger about our anger, or gladness for 
our joy. But to desire a desire is to desire an intentional object we must be able 
to identify as a desire. To feel angry at our anger is to react to an intentional 
object we must be able to identify as our anger. In the first case the object of 
our intentional attitude may or may not be a remembered experience; in the 
second case it is. In either case, in order to remember the experience of good 
or evil that now returns upon the soul as the object of our desire or anger 
respectively, we must be able to conceive it as being the kind of object it is. 
This point merely generalizes to all intentional objects the representational 
analysis of desire offered in Chapter II.2.1. In all such cases, we must be able 
to judge the intentional object by ascribing predicates to it as subject in a 
categorical indicative judgment.  
 This is the essence of reasoning for Kant. It is not necessarily linguistic, 
but it is necessarily conceptual; i.e. it involves what Hume would call "ideas." 
And in order to have had the experience that now returns upon the soul in the 
first place, and to which we are now responding passionally, we had to have 
made a similar judgment about the extrinsic state of affairs to which that 
                                                
13
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Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception   543 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
experience itself was a response. So Kantian judgment, and therefore reason, 
is intrinsically involved in our passional responses, both to extrinsic states of 
affairs and to other passions themselves. 
 Hume would not deny this. Baier seconds Hume's "excuse" for beginning 
his analysis with ideas rather than passions, which is that most passions 
depend on ideas, and "as it is by means of thought only that any thing 
operates upon our passions, and as these are the only ties of our thoughts, 
they are really to us the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the 
mind must, in a great measure, depend on them" (T 662). Baier interprets this 
passage as showing the primacy of practical reason that theoretical reason 
serves (MP 77). But this is not what Hume says here, nor what the passage 
implies. What Hume says is that passions presuppose the ideas to which they 
are responses, and that the order and association of ideas presuppose the 
passional responses that connect them. Passions respond to ideas, and ideas 
are associated by passions. What the passage implies, then, is that ideas and 
passions are mutually dependent. But if passions respond to or are caused by 
ideas, and actions respond to or are caused by passions, then by transitivity of 
causality actions respond to or are caused by ideas. So not only does this 
passage not claim the primacy of practical over theoretical reason. It implies 
just the opposite. 
 Now Kant would not disagree that, so far as empirical experience is 
concerned, ideas, i.e. particular categorical indicative judgments, do, indeed, 
seem to be associated by passions or other contingencies. These are the 
empirical mental habits and customs to which Hume reduces reasoning. Kant 
would simply add that a necessary precondition for such empirical mental 
experience is the a priori connection of these ideas by the transcendental forms 
of judgment he lists in the Table of Judgment in the first Critique.
15
 For Kant, 
these forms of judgment describe the ways in which genuine reasoning must 
occur; that is what makes them transcendental. And Kant tells us that reason 
in general, not just the categorical imperative, compels our respectful 
attention (Achtung), if not always our submission to its dictates.  
 Baier's account of reflection, and particularly her description of our 
attempts to ascertain whether those mental habits and customs to which she 
and Hume reduce reason can "bear their own survey," illustrates the 
subordination of empirical mental activity to the transcendentally rational 
constraints on which Kant insists. As we have seen in Section 3, Baier 
describes this survey as itself administered by the passions, including socially 
dependent ones (MP 82). And she argues that we can do no more than repeat 
this operation at ever higher levels (MP 84). But if this were all there were to 
it, there would be no point in conducting the survey in the first place, since we 
                                                
15
Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, herausg. Raymund Schmidt (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
1976), A 70/B 95. 
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could always ask the same questions about the passions administering the 
survey as about those being surveyed. As we have already seen in discussing 
Frankfurt, we would be stuck in an infinite regress.  
 So when we feel compelled to "[think] long and hard about [a mental 
habit's] nature, its sources, its costs and its consequences" (MP 81), and to ask 
ourselves the question, "[H]ow important do we on reflection judge it that 
[people] have [this habit of mind]?" (MP 82), we are not evaluating our 
associative mental habits against the criteria of other associative mental habits 
that are just as contingent and empirical. If we were, the questions just quoted 
would not have the special urgency, status or finality in such a survey that 
they do. Questions that invoke the nature, causes, costs, consequences and 
importance of a thing by definition call on rational criteria for evaluating it. 
Other questions we could ask, for example, about a mental habit's frequency, 
content, duration, and simplicity, or about how amusing we on reflection 
judge it that people have this mental habit, do not.  
 Clearly these latter questions are irrelevant to Baier's reflective survey, 
even though they may just as passionally associated. But any attempt to 
analyze the passional association of ideas that necessarily is not irrelevant to 
serious reflective survey will invoke precisely the rationality criteria that Baier 
claims to have jettisoned. So what we are doing, rather, is heeding the 
demand of reason – in Kant's transcendental sense – that all such associative 
empirical mental habits conform to its constraints. We are evaluating our 
empirical mental habits with reference to criteria that recognizably constitute 
the concept of rationality. So just as for Kant, Hume's passions, and the 
passional association of ideas, must bear the survey, not of other passions, but 
of reason; and Baier does not provide a genuine alternative to the rational 
control of them she claims to reject. 
 Is the Kantian requirement of rational control, and its background 
normative theory, more cruel than Hume's "morality with a light touch"? In 
the end, Baier does not seem to think so. She expresses great indignation for 
Kant's support of Lex Talionis, but then faults him for his unwillingness to 
apply similarly harsh justice to unmarried mothers convicted of infanticide. 
She castigates punishment for its contagiously harmful effects on already 
faulty character, and for erroneously individualizing moral fault that in fact is 
shared. But she advocates it anyway, on cost-benefit grounds. And after 
detailing, with great honesty, the hurtfulness of the shame-based morality to 
which she believes Hume to be committed, her six defenses of Hume merely 
describe ways in which the damaging effects of such a morality might be 
contained. There is no suggestion that this morality is any less cruel than it 
might first appear, and none that it is, in the end, less cruel than Kant's.  
 In fact, in the end she concedes the role of punishing moral derelicts to 
Kantian magistrates when she says that "[t]he deliberate, contrived, and 
calculated hurting of the faulty person, in order to reform him, will be left to 
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magistrates and other licensed coercers. The good Humean will want to keep 
a careful check on how such persons (parents, schoolteachers, judges, police, 
prison guards) are exercising this grave responsibility. Morality must be 
solemn when it ... endor[ses] society's self-protective coercive activities" (MP 
288). So it seems that Baier's Humean morality ascribes much greater value to 
rationality, justice, "stern imperatives", and just punishment than first 
appears. To find a genuine alternative to the Kantian Social Contract Theory 
she deplores, we must turn to Baier's substantive analysis of trust. 
 
5. Baier's Analysis of Trust 
 Appropriate trust, as Baier characterizes it, is centrally connected with the 
notions of good will, power, and making oneself vulnerable to another. She 
defines trust as a belief-informed and action-influencing attitude (MP 10, 132) 
that makes one more vulnerable to harm from another, in the confidence that 
the other will not use their discretionary power to harm one because there is 
no reason to do so (MP 11, 133, 152, 187 fn. 9); as reliance on another's good 
will; and as a vulnerability one accepts to another's possible but not expected 
ill will (MP 99, 105). Relying on someone is nevertheless different from 
trusting them, in that the former concerns only their dependable habits, 
whereas the latter concerns their good will (MP 98). Trust involves allowing 
others to exercise discretionary powers to take care of something (or someone) 
one cares about (MP 105). Trust involves the paradox that "in trusting we are 
always giving up security to get greater security, exposing our throats so that 
others become accustomed to not biting" (MP 15). 
 Trust becomes pathological when, first, the enterprise whose workings 
trust improves is evil, as are the trustworthy members of a death squad (MP 
131). Second, the enterprise in general may be benign, but its treatment of 
some of its members unfair. In that case, their trust is equally unhealthy, as is 
the trust employees may feel toward an employer "whose exploitation of 
workers is sugar-coated by a paternalistic show of concern for them and the 
maintenance of a cozy familiar atmosphere of mutual trust" (MP 131). Third, 
the attitude of trust can be faked, and backed instead by vigilance or threat 
advantage, as is a wealthy wife's who suspects her husband of adultery (MP 
132).  
 Trust may become unhealthy, fourth, when the trustor is too quick to call 
the trusted to account; and fifth, when the trusted misuses her discretionary 
powers, perhaps through laxity or risk-taking, or, at the other extreme, 
through reliance on a rigid rule that excludes discretionary power altogether, 
as when one's spouse can be trusted to remember one's birthday because he 
has given his bank a standing order to send flowers every year on that date 
(MP 136). Sixth, trust may degenerate into mutual predictability, when what 
should have depended on discerning judgment as to the trustor's best 
interests becomes merely a reflexive habit of behavior, as when a university 
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administration distributes equal benefits to every department because it 
would involve unwanted work to find out which ones deserved them and 
which ones did not (MP 136-138). Seventh, trust may dwindle into constant 
vigilance, checking and testing of the trusted's capacity to carry out her 
responsibilities; or, eighth, may balloon out of proportion for fear of insulting 
the trusted by requiring any checking or testing whatsoever (MP 139). 
Pathologies of trust and distrust, Baier concludes, "occur where there is the 
will to monopolize and hang on to power, to keep the underdogs under, to 
prevent inferiors from advancing" (MP 147). 
 One way of violating trust is by taking on the care of more than one was 
entrusted with (MP 101), as does, for example, the secretary who makes it his 
business not only to retype one's manuscript, but to edit it for felicitous 
phrasing. So trusting someone also involves trusting them to recognize the 
limits of the discretion entrusted to them; and the more discretion they have, 
the harder it is to determine when those limits have been exceeded (MP 103). 
Trust can also be violated, not only through ill will, but also through 
incompetence or negligence, as for example, happens when you entrust a 
friend with a confidence who then forgets its confidentiality and relates it as 
an entertaining anecdote at a party. Concealing ill will under the cover of 
discretionary use of trust, or of incompetence, is yet a further violation (MP 
104-5, 135). 
 What is the difference between morally justified trust and foolish trust? 
When is my trust in someone warranted, and when is it properly 
undermined? Trust is rational, for Baier, if there is no reason to suspect in the 
trusted overriding motives that conflict with the demands of trustworthiness 
as the trustor sees them (MP 121). So, for example, if a husband has reason to 
suspect that his wife is raising their daughters to dislike men, he has reason to 
withdraw trust in his wife's decisions; or if her motives for not doing so are no 
longer outweighed by the anticipated costs to her of his withdrawing his 
economic support. The husband must judge whether and how ambivalent his 
wife's motives are in order to establish whether it is rational to continue to 
trust her (MP 122). Rational trust is compatible with some degree of suspicion 
or vigilance. But when the trustor must rely solely on threats or pressure he 
can exert to maintain the relationship, or when the trusted must rely on 
concealing breaches of trust, then the relationship is morally rotten, and can 
be expected to deteriorate when these facts are made explicit (MP 123). So a 
trust relationship is morally decent, Baier suggests, when no such threats or 
concealments are necessary (MP 123, 124, 128). If the relationship can survive 
the mutual awareness by both trustor and trusted of each other's reasons for 
being able to rely on the other to continue the relationship, then the 
relationship is morally sound (MP 128).  
 But in the end, there can be no rules about when or where or whom to 
trust; to what extent we should rely on or question our instincts about those 
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we instinctively distrust; or how often we are justified in forgiving a betrayal 
of trust (MP 139, 141-142). And rigid rules and algorithms will not help wise 
individuals or a wise society guard against the untrustworthy (MP 160). 
Nevertheless, giving another the benefit of the doubt as a rule of thumb is 
justified on the grounds that "[t]here are few fates worse than sustained self-
protective self-paralyzing generalized distrust of one's human environment. 
The worst pathology of trust is a life-poisoning reaction to any betrayal of 
trust" (MP 145), given that "the trust-dependent goods are the most precious" 
(MP 146).  
 Moreover, to protect our ability to trust we can use our powers of 
judgment, both in case-by-case decisions and in the design and overhaul of 
social institutions (MP 160, 176), and the rules and recipes we have derived 
from experience for designing lasting schemes of cooperation (MP 161). 
"'Ingredients' such as empowerment of the more vulnerable, equal respect, 
balance of power, provision for amendment, a place for the hearing of 
grievances, all give us ideas that we could try incorporating into rules for the 
design of other stable schemes of trust-involving cooperation, so that all trust 
comes closer to being mutual trust, and so also to mutual vulnerability" (MP 
161-2).  
 There are also some forms of trust that strengthen and extend the practice 
of trusting, for example, those in which trust is reciprocal and both parties are 
at least roughly equal in power and vulnerability. Contract, solemn vows, the 
appointment of a godparent, guardian or trustee are ways in which the more 
powerful can selectively disempower themselves and so avoid the temptation 
to abuse or manipulate their power (MP 178). Trust in one's own judgments of 
trustworthiness, what Baier calls "meta-trust," is almost always, she thinks, 
preferable to the ultimately disabling effects of distrust (MP 185), even though 
"[t]he more one knows about people (oneself included), the less one has 
occasion strictly to trust them, or to trust trusting them" (MP 187). Finally, 
trust in sustained trust, "in full knowledge of its risks as well as its benefits, 
and trustworthiness to sustain trust may well be the supreme virtues for ones 
like us, in our condition" (MP 185, 197, 201). In the end, Baier thinks, we 
simply have to make a commitment to value and practice it, despite the risks 
and betrayals, in order to further a community grounded in trust, in which 
such risks and betrayals are minimized. 
 On Baier's view, the concept of trust brings together "men's theories of 
obligation" with "women's hypothetical theories" of love and care (MP 10), by 
generalizing central moral features of obligations, virtues, and loving along 
with such relationships as those between teacher and pupil, confider and 
confidant, worker and co-worker, and profession and client (MP 15). A moral 
theory that spelled out the conditions for appropriate trust would, therefore, 
include a morality of love, as well as supplement a morality of obligation: "to 
recognize a set of obligations is to trust some group of persons to instill them, 
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to demand that they be met, possibly to levy sanctions if they are not, and this 
is to trust persons with very significant coercive power over others. ... the 
morality of obligation, in as far as it reduces to the morality of coercion, is 
covered by the morality of proper trust." What obligations we have and what 
virtues we should cultivate is a matter of what it is reasonable to trust 
ourselves to demand and expect from one another (MP 12), so not only 
obligations but virtues as well presuppose the concept of trust. Indeed, 
virtually all aspects of implementing a moral code within a community, on 
Baier's view, depend whom we can trust, and how far, to do what jobs, 
whether parental, political, coercive, or social (MP 14).  
 One reason why the concept of trust is so foundational to moral theory, 
on Baier's view, is because it is so pervasive. Threats and coercion could not 
be the main support for a moral code, she argues, for fear of an infinite 
regress: Either there must always be more coercers to threaten the coercers to 
do their job of coercing our compliance, or else we must finally trust some 
such coercers to do so without any such backups (MP 14, 164). Thus trust 
conditions our relationships not only with friends and family and colleagues, 
but with strangers and even with enemies (MP 98). In all such cases, we 
observe conventions of behavior that we trust others not to violate – for 
example, not to give us false directions when we ask for help in a foreign city, 
and not to shoot after we have waved the white flag in war. "We trust those 
we encounter in lonely library stacks to be searching for books, not victims. 
We sometimes let ourselves fall asleep on trains or planes, trusting 
neighboring strangers not to take advantage of our defenselessness. We put 
our bodily safety into the hands of pilots, drivers, and doctors with scarcely 
any sense of recklessness" (MP 98). In such cases we trust others not to violate 
our persons, our property, or our autonomy (MP 103).  
 Contract-Theoretic morality traditionally has focused on the very limited 
form of trust involved in promising and the fulfillment of contract, Baier 
thinks, because most of the great moral theorists – she cites Hobbes, Butler, 
Bentham, and Kant – were "a collection of clerics, misogynists, and puritan 
bachelors ... who had minimal adult dealings with women," and so made 
central to their moral analyses "cool, distanced relations between more or less 
free and equal adult strangers, say, the members of an all-male club, with 
membership rules and rules for dealing with rule breakers and where the 
form of cooperation was restricted to ensuring that each member could read 
his Times in peace and have no one step on his gouty toes" (MP 114).  
 By contrast, those who are more engaged socially as lovers, husbands, 
and fathers with women, the ill, the very young, and the elderly – here she 
cites Hume, Hegel, Mill, Sidgwick, and maybe Bradley – will have a more 
complex view of moral relations (MP 114). The reason the great moral 
theorists did not focus on the forms of trust that embed one in dependent, 
unequal, noncontractual and nonvoluntary social relationships was that they 
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were too invested in collectively exploiting women in those roles to confront 
their own moral hypocrisy (MP 115). The prevailing interest in current moral 
philosophy in Prisoner's Dilemma problems carries the obsession with "moral 
relations between minimally trusting, minimally trustworthy adults who are 
equally powerful" into the contemporary context (MP 119). 
 But Baier argues that Social Contract-Theoretic morality cannot explain 
trust when the relation between trustor and trusted is radically unequal in 
power, as between infant and parent; and that it is the negligence of such 
relations that has led philosophers to think that trust can be explained in 
Social Contract-Theoretic terms (MP 106, 109). "Contract," she maintains, "is a 
device for traders, entrepreneurs, and capitalists, not for children, servants, 
indentured wives, and slaves. They were the traded, not the traders, and any 
participation they had in the promising game was mere play" (MP 113). She 
applauds Nietzsche for stating plainly what other liberal theorists refused to 
acknowledge, i.e. that Social Contract Theory must conceive women in their 
traditional roles as housewives and mothers as property and as predestined 
for service. And even when women are fully equal to men as moral subjects, 
the continued expectation that they will take responsibility for bearing and 
caring for children displaces the central role of voluntary agreement to 
Contract-Theoretic morality. "Since a liberal morality both must let this 
responsibility rest with women, and yet cannot conceive of it as self-assumed, 
then the centrality of voluntary agreement to the liberal and contractarian 
morality must be challenged once women are treat as full moral fellows" (MP 
113-114). 
 By contrast with the Contract-Theoretic conception of trust, infant trust is 
comparable to trust in God, for Baier, in that it is total and fully dependent. It 
is unique in that it "normally does not need to be won but is there unless and 
until it is destroyed .... Trust is much easier to maintain than it is to get 
started, and is never hard to destroy. Unless some form of it were innate, and 
unless that form could pave the way for new forms, it would appear a miracle 
that trust ever occurs" (MP 107, 195). As Baier observes, this fact makes it 
difficult to see how the hypothetical Hobbesian conversion from distrust in 
the state of nature to mutual trust in the social covenant can be 
psychologically realistic. Once a child realizes that her parents are not God, 
the best reason for her to continue trusting them to take care of her best 
interests is that she sees her best interests as a good for them, too; i.e. that she 
feels loved (MP 108). As she approaches adulthood and her parents approach 
dependent old age, the power relations between them may equalize and then 
imbalance in the other direction. But at no stage, Baier maintains, can these 
relations, even at their most equal, be understood in terms of a mutual 
contractual exchange (MP 109). 
 Moreover, any account of trust that makes that between infant and parent 
central cannot depend on the use of concepts and abilities that an infant does 
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not have (MP 110). This means that such an account cannot project or 
"reconstruct" trust in terms of voluntary acts, consciously acknowledged risks, 
or deliberately imposed controls on the damage done by potential violations 
of trust (MP 110-111). Rather, the initial assumption must be of automatic or 
unconscious or unchosen mutual trust. And "[w]hat will need explanation 
will be the ceasings to trust, the transfers of trust, the restriction or 
enlargements in the fields of what is trusted, when, and to whom, rather than 
any abrupt switches from distrust to trust" (MP 111). This is why Baier's 
analysis of trust is silent on matters of choice and deliberation, and why she 
doubts the ability of Social Contract Theory, which relies on such 
assumptions, to explain it. "[T]rust," she observes, "in those who have given us 
promises is a complex and sophisticated moral achievement" that takes for 
granted less artificial and less voluntary forms of trust, for example, in friends 
and family, and in others sufficient to engage with confidence at least in 
minimal simultaneous transactions and exchanges (MP 112). 
 
6. An Assessment of Baier's Analysis of Trust 
 In this brief summary I have not done justice to the subtlety and scope of 
Baier's treatment of the topic of trust, nor to the range of significant and 
complex moral phenomena she brings to our attention. Baier maintains that a 
women's (normative) moral theory, of which she thinks there are none, "will 
need not to ignore the partial truths of previous theories. It must therefore 
accommodate both the insights men have more easily than women and those 
women have more easily than men. It should swallow up previous theories" 
(MP 4). In her vehement rejection of Kantian Social Contract Theory, it cannot 
be said that her analysis attempts to meet these criteria, though I have already 
suggested that it might to a greater extent than she would prefer.  
 On the other hand, Baier's analysis does seem to satisfy her description of 
"paradigm examples of moral theories." These, she claims, have a "broad 
brushstroke" comprehensiveness and coherence, a fairly tight systematic 
account of a large area of morality, with a keystone supporting all the rest," 
which are, she thinks, the antithesis of the "mosaic method" of "assembling a 
lot of smaller-scale works until one [has] built up a complete account" (MP 3). 
This distinction certainly will not work to classify Rawls, our quintessential 
moral theorist, in the right way, since his theory of justice has both sets of 
features, the first with regard to structure, the second with regard to temporal 
process of construction.
16
  
                                                
16
The early "building blocks" of Rawls's Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1971) include "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics," The 
Philosophical Review 56 (1951), 177-197; "Justice as Fairness," The Philosophical Review 57 
(1958); "The Sense of Justice," The Philosophical Review 62 (1963); “Constitutional Liberty 
and the Concept of Justice," Nomos VI: Justice, Ed. C. J. Friedrich and John Chapman 
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 So does Baier's. Her approach is mosaic, through the series of essays in 
which Moral Prejudices consists. It is true that her account is less tight and 
systematic than the above summaries would make it seem. As is clear, I have, 
in this exposition, extrapolated claims and arguments from a large variety of 
her essays and reorganized them according to my own requirements of 
system. Nevertheless, the elements of coherence and comprehensiveness of 
the area of morality she covers, and even the "keystone supporting all the rest" 
are there for any reader to see. The keystone is, of course, her analysis of trust, 
and the moral norms it generates by way of her analyses of pathological trust, 
betrayals of trust, rational trust and morally decent trust. There are even what 
I described in Chapter V.1.2 as practical decision-making principles in her 
account of how to protect our ability to trust.  
 Moreover, Baier makes a forceful case for the comprehensiveness of her 
account by arguing, first, that the concept of trust is presupposed by those of 
virtues and obligations; second, that its pervasiveness trumps Contract-
Theoretic attempts to ground social equilibrium in coercing the fulfillment of 
obligation, by capping a threatened infinite regress of coercers; and third, that 
it can explain important moral phenomena, namely moral transactions among 
agents unequal in power, that Social Contract Theory cannot explain. One 
does not have to agree with these arguments to see that she has made the 
case. 
 Baier offers further criteria that a genuine moral theory of trust should 
meet when she claims that "[a] moral theory which made proper trust its 
central concern could have its own categorical imperative, could replace 
obedience to self-made laws and freely chosen restraints on freedom with 
security-increasing sacrifice of security, distrust in the promoters of a climate 
of distrust, and so on" (MP 15). These are criteria her own account of trust 
does, in fact, satisfy. Its categorical imperative may be identified as "trust in 
sustained trust and trustworthiness to sustain it" (MP 185, 187).  
 Now Baier withdraws this suggestion on the next page with the 
disclaimer that she is "not really concerned to elevate any virtue to 
supremacy. Even if we could effect some sort of unification of the virtues by 
relating them all to due trust and due trustworthiness" – and she then 
proceeds to point out several of the frequently neglected virtues such as tact, 
discretion, resilience, and alertness to the oppression of the silenced, that 
would become more salient relative to trust relationships – "we will still need 
a whole host of virtues, more or less democratically ruling in our souls, 
                                                                                                     
(New York: Atherton Press, 1963); "Distributive Justice," in Philosophy, Politics and 
Society, Third Series, Ed. Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1967); "Distributive Justice: Some Addenda," Natural Law Forum 13 (1968); and "The 
Justification of Civil Disobedience," in Civil Disobedience, Ed. H. A. Bedau (New York: 
Pegasus, 1969). 
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balancing each other's likely excesses. ... it is not part of my present aim to 
show that due trust and due trustworthiness can lord it over other virtues. My 
aim here is less imperial, more modest – to imitate Hume ..." (MP 188). 
 But in this instance Baier's characteristic humility calls Uriah Heep too 
vividly to mind. Her call for the "democratic rule" of our souls by "a whole 
host of virtues, ... balancing each other's likely excesses," cannot be given too 
much weight without a solution to the problem of moral paralysis such a 
motivational cacophony would generate. Similarly, her worries about the 
"imperialism" of "elevating any virtue to supremacy" cannot be taken 
seriously, first of all because there is nothing wrong with the so-called 
"imperialism" of trying to construct a unified and comprehensive moral 
theory,
17
 and second of all, because Baier has done precisely that. Whether she 
likes it or not, and whether one agrees with it or not, she has produced a 
genuine moral theory according to her own criteria of what one would look 
like. And if she really thinks no woman before her has done so, then she is the 
first. She might just as well stop squirming and get used to her achievement. 
 There, is of course, more to say. There are certain fundamental cases of 
trust relationship that Baier does not discuss; and to bring these up is to again 
raise the question of whether Baier has succeeded in distancing herself from 
the Kantian Contract-Theoretic model as fully as she wishes. In particular, 
Baier does not discuss the vulnerability a moral wrongdoer displays to her 
victim, and the trust in her victim's moral rectitude the wrongdoer must have, 
in order to admit guilt, apologize, or request forgiveness. The ability to 
perform each of these acts presupposes that the victim can be trusted to show 
compassion and refrain from using the wrongdoer's vulnerability to shame, 
punish, or exploit her. And to presuppose that the victim can be trusted in 
these ways is no more or less than to presuppose that the victim will continue 
to fulfill certain moral obligations toward the wrongdoer despite the moral 
wrong done him. That is, it is to presuppose that the wrongdoer does not, in 
the very act of harming the victim, drag the victim down to the wrongdoer's 
level. What the wrongdoer needs to trust in order to thus make amends, is 
that the victim will retain the role of moral agent even after the wrongdoer 
has deserted it; that the victim will not be, literally, demoralized by the wrong 
done him. 
 The prevalence of moral wrongdoing, writ small as well as large, makes 
this type of moral vulnerability exceedingly widespread. We each experience 
it in the defensiveness with which we react to the mere suggestion that we 
have acted unethically in any respect, as though it were realistic to conceive 
                                                
17
There has got to be a limit to how much political correctness even the most politically 
interested among us can stand. Can Baier in fact really believe, not only that no women 
have constructed a moral theory (MP 2), but that, because of its Kantian approach and 
"imperial" ambitions, no women should? 
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ourselves as paragons of moral virtue in the first place. But the distrust of 
putting oneself further in one's victim's power by owning responsibility and 
apologizing for one's wrongdoing – and thereby making oneself even more 
vulnerable – also can be measured by the extreme psychological difficulty of 
doing so. This is evidence of the extent to which a shame morality in fact 
prevails. It is just too frightening and dangerous to put oneself at risk with 
another person to that extent, and too traumatizing even to consider 
submitting oneself to the shaming and ego-crushing punishment the other 
could then inflict. Consequently, such behavior is very, very rare. Certainly no 
one could plausibly argue that owning responsibility and apologizing for 
moral wrongdoing is, in this culture, a prevalent and motivationally effective 
norm. The humility, trust, and moral spine needed to perform these acts, and 
the moral tolerance by the victim they presuppose, demand far too much of 
most ordinary moral agents.  
 Far more common, when one comes to recognize one's moral 
wrongdoing, is simply to then treat the victim as though no such wrong had 
been done; and dismiss the victim as irrational, or punish him further, if he 
protests or refuses to collude in this fantasy. The purpose of the pretense is to 
impose forgetting as a substitute for forgiving, and thereby to fortify one's 
delusion of moral impregnability against possible attack. This makes any 
reproach or blame from the victim appear as an undeserved blot on the 
wrongdoer's unblemished moral character. Creating and maintaining the 
delusion of moral invulnerability through pretense and willed amnesia is a 
well-established custom in European-American culture for deflecting 
responsibility, not only for personal but also for institutional and historical 
wrongdoing against victimized groups and individuals. 
 For example, here is an anecdote to rival even the goriest Baier serves up. 
An African American woman writer was invited by a group of European 
American colleagues to contribute an essay to an edited collection. She 
accepted, and sent them a summary of the topic on which she proposed to 
write. She received in response a letter from the least professionally powerful 
of the editors, accepting and applauding her proposal. Shortly thereafter she 
received another letter from all of them requesting that she write on a 
different topic because, in their opinion, she would not be able adequately to 
defend her chosen thesis. When she wrote back to protest the arrogance and 
condescension of this judgment, she received a third letter from all of them, 
explaining that the real problem was that her chosen topic was too 
controversial and against the grain of received interpretation. After she wrote 
again to protest this outright attempt to suppress her work, she learned from 
the publisher of the volume that her name and abstract had been dropped 
before the book proposal was sent to outside referees. When she again wrote 
to protest that she was not being treated fairly, she received a hostile and 
menacing letter from the most professionally powerful of the editors, advising 
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her that if she wanted to continue to participate on any level in this project, 
she was to drop the matter immediately and say no more about it. After 
repeated and vehement written protests against this behavior, which by now 
included not only arrogance, condescension, and censorship but also verbal 
abuse and intimidation, she was finally sent a contract by the publisher. The 
next time she encountered the editors at a professional function, they greeted 
her with a smile and a wave. One remarked how nice it was to see her. 
 Now of course there are many reasons why the editors might have 
declined at any point simply to admit wrongdoing and apologize for their 
behavior. One possibility, of course, is that they did not regard her as worth 
apologizing to, any more than I would consider apologizing to an ant I had 
squashed while walking through the grass. Another is that they did not at any 
point regard themselves as having done anything to apologize for, any more 
than I would think I had committed a moral wrong by squashing the ant in 
the first place. But the most plausible explanation is that, having already made 
themselves morally vulnerable to her by revealing their unpleasant beliefs 
and motives, they regarded it as too risky to increase their moral vulnerability 
to someone they now expected to use it in retaliation. So in defense of that 
anticipated retaliation, they chose instead to compound their moral 
dereliction with hypocrisy and evasion of accountability. Thus, their moral 
wrongdoing – itself an expression of mistrust and uncollegiality – made it 
impossible for them to trust her not to behave as contemptibly toward them 
as they had toward her. Their moral wrongdoing itself destroyed any possible 
climate of trust in which an apology would have been a realistic option, and 
exacerbated the extent of the wrong they committed. 
 This is the kind of case that illuminates the sense in which trust always 
depends on the fulfillment of reciprocal obligations between trustor and 
trusted. A necessary condition of the trustor's extending trust to the trusted is 
that the trustor not consciously have offended morally against the trusted in 
such a way as to undermine the trustor's own belief in the trusted's essential 
good will toward him. That is, the trustor is obligated to treat the trusted with 
respect as an end in herself. Now it may happen that the trusted may be of 
such a psychological makeup that no amount of respectful treatment is 
sufficient to guard against the development of suspicion and ill will toward 
the trustor. I discuss this possibility at greater length in Volume II, Chapter 
XI.4. But this contingency does not vitiate the trustor's obligation to do the 
best he can.  
 Similarly, a necessary condition of being genuinely trustworthy, as 
opposed to merely seeming that way, is that the trusted be prepared to act in 
such a way as to continue to be worthy of such respect, even if it is not 
forthcoming. That is, the trusted is obligated to uphold those "stern 
imperatives" against moral wrongdoing even if she is the victim of it. Again it 
may happen that the moral wrongdoing the trusted suffers is so insulting, 
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painful or damaging that it simply is not in her power to continue to conduct 
herself with moral equipoise in its aftermath, rather than lash out in self-
defense against those who have inflicted it. But again this does not relieve her 
of the obligation to do the best she can. 
 These obligations hold regardless of the relative power imbalances 
between trustor and trusted. Infant trust trivially satisfies these requirements, 
regardless of how counterintuitive it may be to conceive of infants as having 
obligations. If, in accordance with Baier's strictures against accounts of trust 
that invoke concepts and abilities infants do not have, infants cannot have 
obligations because they cannot be said to act, they also cannot morally offend 
against the trusted for the same reason. There is nothing infants can do to 
their caretakers that would undermine their instinctive (but nevertheless 
rational) belief in their caretakers' essential good will toward them. This is 
part of why an infant's unconditional dependence can inspire a caretaker's 
unconditional love.  
 On the other side, a necessary condition of being a good parent or 
caretaker of infants is that one continue to refrain from moral wrongdoing 
against one's charges, even if one feels, or comes to feel, that one's children 
have violated this prohibition against oneself, for example, through their 
demands on one's attention, patience or resources that are felt increasingly as 
excessive and oppressive as they gain independence and maturity. If these 
obligations hold for the radical inequalities of power between infants and 
caretakers as well as for the roughly equal power among professional 
colleagues, they hold for all cases of moderately unequal power relations in 
between.  
 Now I think Baier overlooks the role of such obligations, not because of 
her Humean distaste for them, but rather because her analysis of trust focuses 
primarily on the trustor rather than on the trusted. Her primary concerns are 
what trust is; whom we can trust, and under what conditions; when our trust 
misfires, when it is unhealthy, irrational, or morally corrupt; and how to 
protect our ability to go on trusting in the face of repeated betrayals. That is, 
she works almost entirely from a perspective of epistemic ignorance as to 
when and whether trust is justified.  
 To answer these latter questions without appealing to justificatory 
principles is impossible. But when she turns her attention to principles of 
trustworthiness such as those Thomas Scanlon offers,
18
 she rejects them as 
"unhelpful rules," "algorithms" (MP 160), and reliance on "our Kantian 
rational capacity to be law-abiders" (MP 151) as mere obstructions to the free-
form, case-by-case use of our "powers of judgment" (MP 160). This builds on 
Baier’s earlier attempt in A Progress of Sentiments to valorize judgment for 
                                                
18
 Thomas Scanlon, "Promises and Practices," Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (Summer 
1990), 199-226. 
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Hume as the “great enlarger of our reason” (PS 283; see generally PS 281-284).  
“Our capacity for judgment,” she claims, “outruns our capacity to reduce our 
judgments to rule” (PS 281). But in fact judgment just is the application of 
general rules and principles to particular cases, and so part of what Baier 
needs to answer these questions. And her major objection to Scanlon's 
analysis is that our behavior provides no evidence that we accept his 
suggested principles (MP 134, 141-142), nor that we necessarily want anything 
so restrictive as can be encapsulated in any principle (MP 168-176).  
 But the pressing question is not what we in fact do or do not want or 
accept, any more than it is whether or not we want to do what we must to 
protect our ability to trust, or to contain the damaging effects of a Humean 
shame morality. My suggestion is that these two problems are related:  We 
increase our ability to trust to the extent that we decrease the shaming 
consequences of openly acknowledging our moral vulnerability; and we do 
that to the extent that we meet our moral obligations to treat one another with 
tolerance, compassion, and respect, i.e. as ends in ourselves. The question, 
then, is rather what is morally required in order that a climate of trust can 
flourish, in which a rational and morally decent trustor can function.  
 Essentially, Baier's analysis answers the tactical question of how best to 
protect our moral innocence in an environment we must always fear is 
morally corrupt. Under the circumstances, that is an important and realistic 
question to try to answer. But if we want to know how, strategically, to create 
a moral environment in which such self-protective, blind groping for security 
is unnecessary, we need to know what reciprocal moral obligations we must 
voluntarily shoulder in order to realize that state of affairs. That we are 
required to fulfill certain basic moral obligations of trustworthiness, tolerance, 
compassion, and moral dependability in order that we each may feel 
reciprocally comfortable in exposing our weaknesses, flaws, dependencies, 
and moral vulnerabilities to one another is a fact that Baier's objections do not 
refute. So although her analysis of trust once again succeeds in making a 
persuasive case for reorienting the focus of normative ethics accordingly, it 
does not do so at the expense of the Kantian Contract-Theoretic model she 
purports to reject. 
 
7. An Assessment of Baier's "Stylistic Experiment" 
 My treatment of Baier’s version of Hume has so far not mentioned the 
very unusual, pervasive and disturbing style of exposition of Moral Prejudices  
– that element of it that best explains its title; and, in addition, most fully 
justifies my description of it in Section 1 as taking a quintessentially Humean 
indexical approach. Because this element figures very prominently in the 
experience of reading this book, I examine this aspect of it in some depth in 
this concluding section, and describe its effect on the reader. I suggest that 
Baier takes the indexical approach to doing philosophy far beyond the limits 
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Hume himself would have allowed; and that this, perhaps more than 
anything else, demonstrates Hume’s (unlike Baier’s) final allegiance to the 
very model of rationality – the Kantian model – he claims to repudiate. 
 I said in Section 1 that Baier challenges the standard, impersonal style of 
philosophical exposition with what she describes as a "stylistic experiment." 
Thus she argues that "[t]he impersonal style has become nearly a sacred 
tradition in moral philosophy, and examples of departure from it ... are not 
altogether encouraging .... The selective anecdote ... certainly has its own 
dangers, including those of bias. Nevertheless it seems to me time to 
experiment a bit with styles of moral philosophy, especially for those of us 
who, like Hume, hope that moral philosophy can be accurate without being 
'abstruse' and might even 'reconcile truth with novelty'" (MP 194-5). From this 
passage we can infer that Baier's "stylistic experiment" will sometimes 
substitute personal remarks for impersonal judgments, selective anecdotes for 
extended analysis, and will run the risk of bias that attends such 
philosophically novel methods of argument. The passage occurs toward the 
end of Moral Prejudices, but by the time one reaches it one feels that its 
promise has been, unfortunately, more than fulfilled. The effect of Baier's 
stylistic experiment is to undermine the credibility of her arguments. 
 I have already cited some examples. There was her simplistic reduction of 
Kant's moral philosophy to rule-following, to "consulting some book of rules" 
(MP 54-55). And there was her ad hominem (and incidentally false, according 
to some of Kant's biographers) caricature of Kant (among others) as a 
misogynist and puritan bachelor "who had minimal dealings with women" 
(MP 114). Then there was her rush to judge Kant's "quality of mind and heart" 
(MP 273) for supporting Lex Talionis, without even considering the possibility 
that Kant's sympathy for and outrage on behalf of the victims of murder, rape, 
or pederasty might have had something to do with it; and her lurid 
characterization of Kant's ethics as sado-masochistic and "reeking of blood 
and torture" (MP 276-277), which might have been excusable coming from 
Nietzsche, who was, when he originally wrote this, probably starting to 
exhibit signs of the syphilitic insanity that would eventually kill him. And 
there was her immediate and unfounded speculation that Kant's "shocking" 
refusal to condemn unmarried mothers guilty of infanticide (MP 277) must 
have been motivated by cruelty.  
 But there are so many more instances of Baier's insulting jibes at Kant, 
and her perfunctory misrepresentations of his views, that it would be a waste 
of time to catalogue all of them.
19
 She frequently conflates Kant's own views, 
                                                
19
I have done so nevertheless, to gratify the perversely titillated reader on the prowl, out 
slumming for lowlife philosophical exegeses: At MP 26 Baier dismisses Kant's concepts 
of rights, freedom and autonomy on the grounds that women's oppressors thought 
highly of autonomy, too, as though the trouble with suspect moral values was who held 
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the views of some particular Kantian such as Rawls or Scanlon, and some 
fictional collection of straw men – "the Kantians, or "contractarians" – whose 
purported views are too implausible to take seriously. Take, for example, her 
criticism that a Kantian Contract-Theoretic morality focuses merely on 
freedom under conditions of interpersonal conflict, whereas Hume attempts 
to solve the "deeper problem" of intrapersonal conflict and instability over 
time (MP 61). Clearly she cannot be leveling this criticism at Kant, who 
produced an epistemology articulating conditions for the unity of intuition, 
                                                                                                     
them and how they were manipulated rather than what they were (also see MP 263 for 
more specious arguments that "Kant's much admired version of autonomy ... turns out 
on closer inspection to be a monopoly of a few representative propertied males"). At MP 
30 she verbally cartoons a "Kantian picture of a controlling reason dictating to possibly 
unruly passions," which, I have already argued, was not Kant's view, nor that of any 
Kantian I know of. At MP 84-87 she gratuitously attacks Kant's categorical imperative 
procedure as isolationist, his concept of autonomy as selfish, and his concept of the 
kingdom of ends as inherently patriarchal and lacking "procedures for shared decision-
making." At MP 88 she faults Kant (1) for his assumption that the same reasoning 
capacities exercised on the same subject matter under the same conditions will produce 
agreement among the reasoners, on the grounds that actual rational people do disagree, 
(2) for neglecting to explain how to judge only matters of interpersonal concern – as 
though the kingdom of ends formulation of the categorical imperative did not address 
this very question, and (3) for failing to free his mind of religious prejudice, as though 
he had not argued repeatedly and bravely, against governmental pressure, that God's 
commands must obey reason rather than vice versa. At MP 115 she claims that only 
philosophers who do not "remember what it was like to be a dependent child or who 
[do not] know what it is like to be a parent or to have a dependent parent, an old or 
handicapped relative, friend, or neighbor will find it [plausible] to treat such relations 
as simply cases of co-membership in a kingdom of ends," thereby adding the 
presumption of authorial omniscience with respect to various philosophers' memories 
to her caricature of Kant's kingdom of ends. At MP 248 she lampoons Kant's concept of 
the social relations among nations as "a sort of Leibnizian harmony of moral monads." 
At MP 250 she faults Kant for the "elitist or at least selective individualism" of his 
thought. Aat MP 255 and 257 she makes much of Kant's sexism, as though every male 
philosopher in the history of philosophy with the possible exception of Mill were not 
also patently sexist. At MP 277 she faults Kant for seeing a link between formulations 
and applications of the categorical imperative on the one hand and the mores of his 
own society on the other, as though this redounded to the discredit of the categorical 
imperative. And at MP 290 she suggests that "it might be easier for men than for women 
to be helped to self-definition by a reading of the full corpus of Kant's works," thereby 
managing to insult and confuse simultaneously all the women who have found it easy 
to be so helped and all the men who have found it difficult. Of course none of this 
prevents Baier from enlisting Kant in her own cause when this is convenient: As we 
have already seen, she uses a universalization argument to minimize the damage that 
would be done in a society governed by shaming principles, appeals to "rules and 
recipes" that may help us design lasting schemes of cooperation, and to the presence of 
a categorical imperative as one of the benchmarks of a genuine moral theory. 
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understanding and reason within the self, a moral philosophy that attempts to 
reconcile empirical inclinations with the demands of reason within the self, 
and an aesthetics that explores the relation between feeling and judgment 
within the self. And she cannot be thinking here of Rawls, who devoted a 
good third of his Theory of Justice to such questions of intrapersonal conflict as 
the relation between self-interest and impartiality, envy and equality, self-
respect and just distribution, rationality, prudence, and moral development. 
So at whom, exactly, are these criticisms supposed to be directed? On this 
Baier offers no guidance. 
 Or consider her critique of Rawls's Kantianism. Baier reasons that since 
Rawls, who is "one of the ablest and most influential defenders" of the 
American liberal tradition, appeals to Kant and "sees Kant ... as giving us a 
moral and social philosophy which best articulates the basic principles of this 
nation's scheme of cooperation," she may turn to an examination of Kant "to 
understand what relationship there is, and is believed to be, between 
individual autonomous persons and the life that they live together under one 
constitution and one set of laws, and between individual and collective 
responsibility" (MP 253). Fair enough. But she does not examine that part of 
Kant's thought that influenced Rawls, i.e. primarily the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, or how Rawls himself interprets Kant.  
 Instead, Baier chooses to look at texts and passages in Kant's writings – in 
Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals – that are largely irrelevant to 
Rawls's inspiration. So when she then complains that Kant does not, in those 
places, have much to say on the relation between individual and collective 
responsibility (MP 253), or that Kant's conception of republicanism 
underwrote the economic oppression of women (MP 255-257), or that Kant 
grants neither a legal nor a moral right of rebellion against tyranny (MP 258), 
and that "[t]his may seem an odd version of republicanism, and of the moral 
ideas behind it, to be taken as the model for a representative democratic 
republic such as this one, which began in a revolution. ... Can this be a variant 
of the republican ideal which inspired the Founding Fathers of this nation?" 
(MP 259), we no longer have any idea of to whom she is addressing these 
criticisms, or why. 
 Baier claims to want to "provoke the Kantians into explaining just how 
his ethics can escape the charges [she] make[s]" (MP xii). But the problem is 
that most of her charges are based on mischaracterizations too elementary to 
constitute a worthwhile challenge to Kantians. In such cases one wants 
suggest, rather, that she simply go back to the text and attend to it with the 
same care she gives to Hume – particularly since when she does so she rarely 
makes these mistakes.
20
 Baier often remarks that she will leave it to others to 
                                                
20
See, for example, her sensitive treatment of the contrast between Kant and Hume on 
love and the dangers of intimacy (MP 34-36, 38, 39-42, 45); or her disapproving but 
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be fair to Kant (MP xii, 269, 290); but that is her job.  She does not have to like 
Kant. But if she is going to discuss his views, it is her intellectual obligation to 
read him carefully and represent his views accurately to the best of her ability. 
The disrespect and lack of fidelity with which she often represents Kant's 
views express her philosophical distaste for him much more strongly than any 
objections – which are correspondingly unwarranted and unpersuasive – she 
actually levels against him. One would have thought she would have wanted 
not merely to express that distaste, but to give it a sound philosophical 
justification. 
 Then there is her stereotyping of women. Given that so many other 
European American, middle-class women academics have made the same 
mistake, it would be unfair to single out Baier for her embrace of Carol 
Gilligan's conclusions about female moral development, based, as they are, on 
a research sample that is so extremely provincial with respect to race and 
class.
21
 But it is not unfair to expect from a major philosopher more careful 
and qualified empirical generalizations than that "[in] women's moral 
outlook, ... [there is] the tendency of the care perspective to dominate over the 
justice perspective in their moral deliberations" (MP 52); or that "women's 
[moral] theory, expressive mainly of women's insights and concerns, would 
be an ethics of love," whereas "men theorists' preoccupation [has been] 
obligation" (MP 4).
22
 And it is not unfair to expect more searching and 
nuanced speculation than that maybe "reflective women, when they become 
philosophers, want to do without moral theory, want no part in the 
construction of such theories" (MP 2).   
 These ill-considered remarks about what "reflective" women are 
presumed to want are particularly objectionable. Baier says that Gilligan's 
research tells us how "intelligent and reflective twentieth-century women see 
morality, and how different it is from that of ... the men who eagerly assent to 
the claims of currently orthodox contractarian-Kantian moralities" (MP 115-
116; emphasis added). So what of all the women philosophers engaged in 
Kant scholarship or in reconstructing a Kantian morality? What of the women 
political philosophers who not merely "eagerly assent" to but indeed assert 
and actively defend the claims of "contractarian-Kantian moralities"? Are we 
perhaps just not intelligent and reflective enough? Or trapped in the wrong 
century? Or not real women?  
                                                                                                     
nevertheless fair treatment of Kant's analysis of beneficence and debt-avoidance (MP 
190-191). 
21
 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
22
Particularly since her normative views are so much more nuanced and sophisticated 
than these crude categorizations would suggest. See, for example, her recent "Note on 
Justice, Care, and Immigration Policy," Hypatia 10, 2 (Spring 1995), 150-152. 
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 Of course Baier is, as we have already seen, no kinder to male 
philosophers, those "members of an all-male club" of "misogynists" and 
"puritan bachelors" concerned only to "read [their] Times in peace and have no 
one step on [their] gouty toes" (MP 114). To that Baier feels compelled to add 
that the preoccupation with Prisoner's Dilemma problems is a "big boys' 
game," and "pretty silly" (MP 2); that deontological principles are inherently 
"authoritarian" (MP 216) and "patriarchal" (MP 222); and that contract is a 
"male fixation" (MP 114). 
 In the very first pages of Moral Prejudices Baier notes the dangers of 
generalizing on such matters (MP 1, 2), and then declares that since 
"exceptions confirm the rule," she will "proceed undaunted" nevertheless (MP 
2). But Baier's is the kind of generalizing that, when encountered in historical 
texts written by male philosophers, lead us to counsel our undergraduates on 
the challenge of reading philosophical texts carefully, and of patiently culling 
the deep philosophical insights from the chaff of personal prejudice and social 
anachronism that flaws every historical work. Seeing such personal prejudices 
expressed in print by a contemporary feminist philosopher concerned to fight 
against stereotypes of women certainly presents a pedagogical challenge, if no 
other kind. 
 But it is when Baier gets to her unfounded speculations about the 
biological limitations on women's professional potential that she inflicts the 
most serious damage on the women she means to support. She wonders 
whether "enough women professionally [will] survive their high estrogen 
years;" whether "they [will] be able to squeeze out enough articles while they 
are menstruating, gestating, and lactating;" and whether we should not expect 
them to hit their intellectual prime around age 50 when all that is behind them 
(MP 298) – forgetting, it seems, that that is roughly the age at which both Kant 
and Rawls began to produce their major philosophical contributions as well. 
Baier is, of course, entitled to her views about women and their intellectual 
and professional potential. But expressing in print her view of women as 
virtual slaves to their biology, whose capacity we must question, during their 
childbearing years, to do anything more than extrude various organic 
effluvia, including maybe an article or two every now and then, reinforces 
some of the ugliest and most damaging stereotypes – of women as cows, to 
put it bluntly – we have suffered. No male philosopher could get away with 
such pronouncements. Richard Brandt's notorious comparison of a 
hypothetical woman to a dog who is confused about what kind of feed it 
wants pales by comparison.
23
  
 It is impossible to doubt the depth and integrity of Baier's feminist 
commitment. So it is difficult to know what to make of all this. We have 
                                                
23
Richard Brandt, "Rational Desire," APA Western Division Presidential Address, 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association XLIII (1969-1970), 43-64.  
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already seen that Baier explicitly rejects at least some of the traditional 
standards of philosophical analysis, and that she means to experiment with 
replacing extended impersonal analysis with a more personal, anecdotal style 
in a Humean spirit. When she flatly declines to say what she means by the 
word "cruel" at the beginning of her inquiry into whether Kant's ethics is more 
cruel than Hume's, she thereby rejects absolute adherence to the injunction 
that we try to instill in introductory philosophy courses to define one's key 
terms. Similarly, when she simply leaves in the text inconsistent statements, 
such as suggesting that trust in sustained trust may be a "supreme virtue" at 
MP 185 and denying that she intends to suggest this at MP 188, or suggesting 
at MP 168 that foundational trust can be spelled out in a moral principle, and 
at MP 182 that it cannot be, it is the principle of consistency itself – or perhaps 
merely Kant's injunction to synthesize that manifold under rule-governed concepts! 
– that she challenges. Here and elsewhere her stylistic experiment calls into 
question many of the most traditional and familiar standards that 
philosophers have taken for granted. In this respect she transgresses the 
rationalistic limits of Socratic metaethics that Hume himself so scrupulously 
observes. 
 I close this chapter by describing what I see as the dangerous 
consequences of Baier's stylistic experiment, by connecting it to her 
substantive project of putting the analysis and reparation of power 
imbalances at the center of normative ethics.24 One characteristic of the 
discipline of philosophy in which we all can take pride is that there are 
identifiable professional standards of competence to which we are trained to 
adhere – standards we have inherited from Socrates himself. I spelled out 
these standards in Chapter I, but it does no harm to review them here. We are 
all, regardless of professional power or status, trained to discern when an 
argument is good or bad, consistent or inconsistent, superficial or searching, 
original or derivative, rigorous or sloppy, accurate or misleading, all 
regardless of the power or status of the individual who makes it. Most 
philosophers have a personal commitment to these standards independent of 
                                                
24
An earlier version of this chapter expressed my animadversions toward Baier's 
stylistic experiment much more vehemently and subjectively, in an attempt to convey 
how personally offensive and threatening I found her rejection of traditional 
philosophical standards. In part this was inspired by some sympathy with her challenge 
to the impersonal style – specifically, when it is exploited passive-aggressively to mask 
such personal animadversions under the guise of objectivity. This would be a legitimate 
criticism; and it may well be that to this brand of intellectual prevarication voicing one's 
biases openly and candidly, as Baier does, is the only antidote. Nevertheless, if one 
believes one's personal animadversions to be objectively warranted, then one ultimately 
undermines their objective force by framing them merely as personal prejudices. 
Whether or not Baier believes her philosophical views to be anything more than 
prejudices is at issue, as is what she effects by so often asserting them as matters of fact. 
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their own professional power or status in the field. Their ability to discern, 
independently of the professional repercussions of doing so, whether and to 
what extent an argument meets these standards, whether it be their own or 
someone else's, and regardless of the power or status of the individual who 
makes it, can be an important source of professional pride and self-confidence 
that more than outweighs the disadvantages of whatever power inequalities 
they may experience. Indeed, as I argued in Chapter I, most philosophers 
recognize the personal commitment to and application of these standards of 
competence as the great equalizer that makes professional power imbalances 
irrelevant to unbiased judgments of philosophical worth. 
 Of course not all individual philosophers invariably rely on these 
standards in making such judgments. Sometimes some individuals are too 
pressed for time to read a person's work carefully, or too far removed from 
the person's area of specialization to be confident of their ability to judge its 
worth accurately. In such cases, some may rely on other criteria they believe 
bear a lawlike relationship to philosophical worth, such as the person's 
educational pedigree, department ranking, class or ethnic background, 
gender, or race. And sometimes their high regard for these other criteria, 
which bear no lawlike relationship to philosophical worth, obscures or 
outcompetes the standards of philosophical competence that define it. The 
result is class-, gender-, or race-biased professional judgments that trade 
philosophical worth for sociocultural status; and thereby both drag down 
those standards of competence, and also reinforce the power imbalances that 
those standards of competence were supposed to equalize. 
 When an eminent philosopher of Baier's stature flouts these standards, 
her audience gets two messages: first, that she does not consider herself to be 
bound by them; and second, that she does not regard them as important. If 
the first message accurately represents her thinking, so much the worse for 
the quality of her work, regardless of the disciples she may attract. But if the 
second does, so much the worse for the quality of the discipline, whether one 
subscribes to the enterprise of Socratic metaethics or not. For the effect of the 
power, visibility and influence of her example is to ridicule, not only those 
standards, and the central intellectual values that make philosophy worth 
doing despite the professional corruptions of the field; but in addition those 
who view these standards and values as an important source of philosophical 
integrity and intellectual independence.  
 So it is not enough simply to observe that Baier often commits the genetic 
fallacy, or the inductive fallacy, or depends on ad hominem argument, any 
more than it would be enough merely to observe that she substitutes biased 
personal remarks for reasoned argument. These neutral observations do not 
address the public effect of her "experimental" methods. Baier rightly argues 
that we must trust others to discern our personal bias because we are so bad 
at discerning our own (MP 194). But we are not so bad at it that we cannot be 
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held to account for monitoring and managing our own personal biases at all. 
Baier does not need our help in discerning her personal biases, because as a 
philosopher and intellectual, trained to avoid such biases, she already knows 
what they are. By stating them explicitly nevertheless, without qualification or 
self-criticism, she effectively signals that it is not important to avoid them, and 
so that anyone who criticizes her on these grounds need not be taken 
seriously. 
 The consequence is that Baier thereby contributes, however 
unintentionally, to the progressive deterioration and devaluation of these 
standards; and so to a practice of professional evaluation that is less and less 
independent of those very power inequities – pedigree, connections, race and 
gender – she in her own trenchant analysis so eloquently deplores. She makes 
it permissible to dismiss someone's views based on name-calling or spiteful, 
negligent and misleading caricatures; and to applaud someone's views merely 
because they cleave to the preferred political ideology or are of the preferred 
gender or race. Her example licenses serious attention to such considerations 
of an argument's worth as, for example, whether the person who made it is a 
bachelor or a husband, childless or a parent, a man or a woman, of child-
bearing age or past it – as though these had anything to do with its soundness. 
In effect she endorses such irrelevancies as legitimate refutations of an 
argument or view, and thereby, by implication, similarly irrelevant 
considerations for its acceptance, such as whether or not the person who 
made it is an upper middle-class, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, highly pedigreed 
male in a top ten department. Her decision to flout traditional philosophical 
standards has the effect of undermining the very moral and political agenda 
she wishes to advance. 
 It is possible to interpret Baier's stylistic experiment as an attempt to fight 
fire with fire, i.e. to assault this entrenched but largely unspoken tradition by 
administering to it a dose of its own medicine. It would not be difficult to 
sympathize with the line of reasoning that the only way to put a stop to a 
longstanding tradition of gender-, race- and class-biased professional 
judgment is to turn the tables on its perpetrators, and give them an explicit 
taste of what it feels like to be on the receiving end, by mimicking it publicly. 
But this, too, would be ultimately a self-defeating strategy. For by 
participating in this degrading practice, Baier effectively legitimates it at the 
same time that she cheapens her own attempt to fight it.   
 What Baier’s “stylistic experiment” proves most clearly, through its 
transgression of traditional philosophical standards of reasoning and analysis, 
is the absolute centrality to any recognizably philosophical discourse of the 
very criteria of transpersonal rationality it was Hume’s primary objective to 
diminish. By carrying the indexical method so far beyond those of other Anti-
Rationalists – indeed, to the point at which the method disintegrates into 
incoherent conversational sniping, Baier in effect closes the case in favor of its 
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Rationalist antithesis. So in the end, Baier not only does not make the case 
persuasively for Hume over Kant. She accomplishes exactly the opposite, by 
effectively conceding to Kant – or to a Kantian conception of the self – the 
very intellectual territory that set Hume and Kant at odds. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter XIV. Hume’s Metaethics 
 
 
We now arrive at Hume’s own pronouncements about the seemingly 
insoluble problems about moral motivation and rational justification with 
which this volume began. Up to this point I have said very little of substance 
about the transpersonal conception of reason that Humeans disparage as 
motivationally impotent and that a true Kantian would valorize as both 
motivationally and theoretically potent. I say a great deal about that 
conception in Volume II. But in discussing Hume’s actual analysis it is 
necessary to preview that longer discussion, if only in broad outline.  
The transpersonal conception of reason enfolds what I shall describe as a 
traditional view, according to which reason functions to, among other things, 
make inferences and categorical and hypothetical judgments, formulate 
hypotheses, and derive conclusions from evidential statements, deductive 
premises, and syllogisms. Reason on this traditional view is a logical arbiter, a 
calculator and discoverer of the relations between abstract concepts and states 
or events in the world. This is the very weak, conventional and widely 
accepted conception of reason to which Gewirth referred; and it is, as I have 
just argued in criticizing Annette Baier’s interpretation of Hume, an important 
part of the transpersonal conception of reason on which the enterprise of 
Socratic metaethics, and indeed the practice of Anglo-American analytic 
philosophy more generally, relies. 
Many have taken the utility-maximization model of rationality dissected 
in Chapters III and IV to be a direct consequence of the traditional view of 
reason. As we saw there, the utility-maximization model accepts the 
traditional view of reason as a purely theoretical or logical capacity, and 
assigns it the instrumental function of ascertaining, through investigation and 
calculation, the most efficient means possible of achieving our desired final 
ends, whatever these may be. Call this the positive utility-maximization thesis. 
Reason on the traditional view has two tasks, according to this positive thesis. 
Its primary task is to maximize utility; to discover the relations among 
phenomena such that they can best be utilized to satisfy our desires. Its 
secondary task is the examination of these phenomena themselves, for the 
purpose of discovering those objects or states of affairs that themselves best 
satisfy our desires. Such examination may run the gamut from 
methodologically rigorous scientific inquiry in general, i.e. the discovery of 
what phenomena there are, to a more restricted and informal scrutiny of 
particular objects, in order to discern or infer whether, or to what extent they 
have the qualities we desire. I call this task "secondary" because on the utility-
maximization model of rationality, it is a special case of the primary task of 
reason, i.e. the utilization of our intellectual capacities in the service of 
realizing our desired final ends. Clearly the discovery of possible objects that 
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satisfy our desires is itself an end that reason may be used to achieve. Thus on 
this view we are thinking rationally if we successfully and appropriately 
perform those intellectual operations characteristic of theoretical reason on the 
traditional view. We are acting rationally if we successfully deploy these 
operations in realizing our desired final ends. 
We saw in Chapter III that one immediate implication of the utility-
maximization model of rationality as I have stated it is that reason has 
nothing to say about whether one’s desired final ends themselves are rational; 
thus were generated the problems of rational final ends and moral 
justification discussed earlier in this volume. Call this the negative utility-
maximization thesis. Like the positive utility-maximization thesis, this negative 
one does not follow from the traditional view of reason, but it does follow 
from the utility-maximization model of rationality. For this model regards 
reason itself as nothing more than a means for achieving our ends. Of course 
reason, on this view, may enable us to discover what ends we genuinely want, 
and may enlarge the scope of ends from which we may choose. But as we 
have seen in discussing Frankfurt, Watson, Williams, Slote, Rawls, Brandt, 
and others, it provides no criteria for identifying those ends themselves as 
rational, independently of their efficiency as means for promoting further 
ends to which they may be subordinate. Reason functions solely as the unique 
second-order means for determining the logical or material first-order means 
to our ends, whatever they may be. Together the positive and negative theses 
constitute an informal characterization of the utility-maximization model of 
rationality. I argue here that Hume himself embraces both theses; therefore 
the utility-maximization model of rationality in its entirety; and therefore the 
belief-desire model of motivation that furnishes its conative force. 
Although this model is first articulated in Hobbes’ Leviathan, the positive 
and negative theses of the utility-maximization model of rationality receive 
their first detailed explication and justification in Hume's Treatise1, and the 
negative thesis is defended most forcefully there. Hume's most celebrated 
passages include those in which he characterizes reason as nothing but the 
"slave of the passions" (T 415), and as wholly silent on the question of whether 
I should "chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or 
person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little contrary to reason," Hume 
continues, "to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater, 
and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter" (T 416). These 
                                                
1David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1968). Henceforth all page references to the Treatise will be parenthecized in the 
text, preceded by T. All paragraph/page references to the second Enquiry (David 
Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1966), will also be parenthecized in the text, preceded by E. 
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claims certainly seem counterintuitive in the ways earlier described, and 
commentators on Hume have not been happy about taking them at face value. 
We are often told that Hume took a perverse pleasure in attention-getting 
hyperbole,2 and that we should therefore take them with a grain of salt. 
However, if the only evidence given for Hume's putative perversity were the 
passages we are instructed to disregard, it would not be evidence enough; nor 
would it be consistent with the honorable convention of showing respect for a 
thinker by assuming that she means what she says. But Annette Baier is not 
alone among those of Hume's commentators who have attempted the more 
ambitious project of finding positive and substantive evidence that Hume did 
not mean what he said in these passages; of fashioning a more constructive 
account of reason's role in constraining us to rational final ends elsewhere in 
the Treatise; and hence of showing that the many objections to the negative 
utility-maximization thesis discussed in Chapters VIII and IX are misplaced. 
However, I do not agree with these more charitable interpretations of 
Hume. I argue here that a detailed reconstruction of Hume's arguments on 
these matters does not support these well-intentioned defenses of Hume; that 
he means exactly what he says in the controversial passages, and therefore 
embraces the utility-maximization model of rationality wholeheartedly; and 
consequently, that the many objections discussed in the foregoing chapters of 
this volume must be allowed to stand. I begin in Section 1 by demonstrating 
that on the face of it at least, Hume's view of rationality is straightforwardly 
identifiable as the utility-maximization model. I then argue in Sections 2 and 3 
that this is fully consistent with his larger project of denying the motivational 
efficacy of reason. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to elaborating in considerable 
detail a particularly compelling version of an argument claiming to show that 
Hume does impose restrictions on the range of final ends identifiable as 
rational, and Section 6 to refuting that argument. 
 
1. Hume's Model of Reason 
 That Hume accepts the traditional view of reason described above is not 
difficult to ascertain. His conception is first introduced in Book I of the Treatise 
of Human Nature, where he divides reason into three kinds: (1) knowledge, 
                                                
2See, for example, in addition to Baier’s discussion in A Progress of Sentiments, Henry 
David Aiken, "An Interpretation of Hume's Theory of the Place of Reason in Ethics and 
Politics," Ethics 90 (October 1979), 68; D. D. Raphael, "Hume's Critique of Ethical 
Rationalism," in William B. Todd, Ed. Hume and the Enlightenment (Edinburgh: The 
University of Edinburgh Press, 1974), 19; David Fate Norton, David Hume: Common-
Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 100; 
David Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1981), 40, 47.  
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which he describes as a feeling of certainty or assurance produced by the 
comparison of ideas, (2) proofs, or arguments derived from causal 
relationships about whose soundness we feel no doubt or uncertainty, and (3) 
probability, which is that evidence about which we continue to feel 
uncertainty. Probability is then subdivided into chance, which Hume defines 
as the negation of a cause, and causes, which he characterizes as a constant 
conjunction of events which produces in us a habit of associating the idea of 
the one with the idea of the other (T 124).3  
 However, categories (2) and (3) partly collapse into each other, for Hume 
has earlier argued that certainty arises solely from the comparison of ideas 
and the discovery of unalterable relationships such as resemblance, 
proportion in number and quantity, contrariety, etc.; and that none of these 
are implied in the claim that whatever has a beginning has a cause (T 79). 
Causal relationships are therefore neither intuitively nor demonstrably 
certain. Therefore nothing, in point of fact, satisfies Hume's description of a 
proof (2); and causal relationships are a species of probability. This conclusion 
is partly confirmed by Hume's claim, a few pages later, that 
[t]he gradation ... from probabilities to proofs is in many cases insensible; 
and the difference betwixt these kinds of evidence is more easily 
perceived in the remote degrees, than in the near and contiguous (T 131). 
Hence the basic categories of reason are knowledge, consisting in the 
comparison of ideas which gives rise to a feeling of certainty, and probability, 
i.e. that uncertain evidence arising from the observing of actual events. 
 Hume's later treatments of reason change his terminology but not this 
basic twofold division.  In Book II, Section III ("Of the Influencing Motives of 
the Will"), Hume distinguishes between abstract or demonstrative and 
probabilistic reasoning (T 413-14). The first concerns only the abstract 
relations of ideas, which we may assimilate to Hume's earlier description of 
knowledge as consisting in the comparison of ideas – category (1) above; the 
second consists in an inquiry into the relationship between and among objects 
of experience, i.e. their causal relations – category (2)/(3) above. And as we 
have already seen, causal relations can be ascertained only with varying 
degrees of probability. This is then later confirmed, by implication, when 
Hume characterizes reason as consisting in two basic operations of the 
understanding: (1’) the comparing of ideas; and (2’) the inferring of matters of 
fact (T 463).4 
                                                
3This characterization of what I call the "traditional view" is, I think, consistent with 
what Barbara Winters describes as the "naturalistic conception." See her "Hume on 
Reason," Humes Studies V, 1 (April 1979), 20-35. 
4Thus I find no evidence for David Miller's contention that in Book II, Hume uses the 
term "reason" to cover all the operations of the understanding, including imagination, 
Chapter XIV. Hume’s Metaethics           570 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
 Hume also characterizes reason as the discovery of truth or falsehood. 
This consists in the agreement or disagreement to the actual (Hume uses the 
term "real") relations of ideas, or to actual existence and matters of fact (T 458). 
Hume's intent in this passage is to argue that our actions, passions, and 
volitions can disagree with neither. What can agree or disagree, either with the 
real relations of ideas or with real existence and matters of fact, i.e. what can 
conform to reason in this way? Hume has already argued that this role is 
filled by our prior, unreflective ideas and impressions (T 415). These must 
conform or fail to conform to the ways in which ideas or events are in fact 
related. 
 Hume charts the relations between demonstrative and probabilistic 
reasoning in Book II, Section III of the Treatise, and there we find the relation 
to be essentially one of means to ends: 
Mathematics, indeed, are useful in all mechanical operations, and 
arithmetic in almost every art and profession: But 'tis not of themselves 
they have any influence. Mechanics are the art of regulating the motion of 
bodies to some design'd end or purpose; and the reason why we employ 
arithmetic in fixing the proportions of numbers, is only that we may 
discover the proportions of their influence and operations. ... Abstract or 
demonstrative reason, therefore, never influences any of our actions, but 
only as it directs our judgment concerning causes and effects, which leads 
us to the second operation of the understanding (T 413-14; italics in text). 
Hume then goes on to describe how, when we are confronted by an object 
that causes us pleasure or pain, we feel an attraction or aversion to it, which in 
turn makes us "cast our view on every side, comprehend[ing] whatever 
                                                                                                     
judgment, and belief (Miller, pages 40 and 47; op. cit. Note 2). Miller earlier refers to the 
passage in the Treatise in which Hume states that "[w]hen I oppose the imagination to 
the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it 
to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative and probable 
reasonings" (T 117-18). Miller remarks on this passage that "[i]n the last sentence 
'reason' is expanded to include the rule-governed imagination, which forms all 
'probable' judgments (i.e. judgments concerning matters of fact not immediately present 
to the senses), and contrasted with the 'fanciful' imagination. In seeking to eliminate one 
source of confusion, Hume has inadvertently introduced another (the broader sense of 
'reason' is frequently used by Hume in expounding his moral philosophy)" (Miller, page 
27 fn.). But I fear the muddle here is not Hume's. Surely Hume means to say that 
imagination is the faculty by which we form our fainter ideas except for our demonstrative 
and probable reasonings, which are formed by the faculty of reason. Presumably the point of 
the contrast between reason and imagination is to distinguish between those faint ideas 
which are formed by nonrational mental processes and those which are formed by 
"demonstrable and probable reasonings." I do not see that Hume has expanded his use 
of the term "reason" at all. 
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objects are connected with [the] original one by the relation of cause and 
effect" (T 414). 
 Thus Hume's conception of reason is a hierarchically structured series of 
means to the ends we adopt. At the top of the hierarchy, we find abstract or 
demonstrative reasoning:  the comparison of abstract ideas that characterizes 
mathematics and arithmetic. But abstract reasoning is merely a means 
enabling us to calculate probabilities more accurately. At the second level in 
the hierarchy, then, we find probabilistic reasoning:  that brand of calculation 
that is concerned with causal relations between events. However, this too is 
merely a means to the further end of pursuing pleasurable objects and 
avoiding painful ones. We thus find this goal at the first and bottom level of 
the hierarchy, for it itself is not a means to any further end. The general 
appetite to good (or pleasure) and aversion to evil (or pain)5 "arise originally 
in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any 
preceding thought or perception" (T 276). So for Hume, abstract reasoning is a 
means to probabilistic reasoning; probabilistic reasoning is a means to the 
rational manipulation of empirical conditions; and this in turn is the means to 
the objects of our desires. Hume not only accepts the traditional view of 
reason as essentially inference and calculation, but also, apparently, the 
positive utility-maximization thesis. 
 Hume makes his adherence to this thesis clear in a number of places. 
Directly after limning his hierarchical picture of reason, he goes on to explain 
how, when we incline or are averse to some particular object, based on the 
amount of pleasure or pain we expect from it, we utilize our reason in order 
to discover the causal relations that lead to or away from it, and design our 
actions accordingly: 
Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according 
as our reason varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. ... It can 
never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and 
such other effects, if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us (T 
414). 
Later, in Book III, Section I ("Moral Distinctions Not Deriv'd From Reason"), 
Hume articulates this view of reason's function even more explicitly: 
[R]eason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have an influence on our 
conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by 
informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; 
or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford 
us the means of exacting any passion (T 459; emphasis added). 
                                                
5Hume identifies them at T 276 and 439. 
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That reason can function only as a means to achieve objects we desire, either 
by alerting us to the existence of such objects, or by charting the causal path to 
their attainment, implies not only Hume's acceptance of the positive utility-
maximization thesis, but indeed the negative one as well. For that reason can 
only be a means to our ends clearly implies that it does not function to 
circumscribe those ends themselves.  
 Both of these theses are buttressed further by Hume's claims in the 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. His adherence to the positive thesis 
is supported by his claims that 
nothing but [reason] can instruct us in the tendency of qualities and 
actions, and point out their beneficial consequences to society and their 
possessor (E 234/285). 
and that it 
directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by 
showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery (E 
246/294). 
As in the Treatise, Hume is quite explicit on the point that, just as reason 
discovers causal means for the realization of particular ends, similarly reason 
itself is the means by which we discover those causal relationships most 
suitable to their attainment. 
  Hume is most explicit in his affirmation of the negative utility-
maximization thesis in the Enquiry. There he maintains quite clearly that 
the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted 
for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and 
affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual 
faculties (E 244/293; italics in text). 
Similarly, he argues that we require the sentiment of humanity, i.e., a feeling 
for the happiness of mankind and a resentment of their misery, in order to be 
motivated to promote these ends; for 
were the end totally indifferent to us, we should face the same 
indifference to the means ... reason instructs us in the several tendencies of 
actions, and humanity makes a distinction in favor of those which are 
useful and beneficial (E 235/286; italics in text). 
In both passages the point is the same:  It is not reason, but rather our 
passions and sentiments, which determine the ends that reason helps us 
achieve. Thus Hume's view satisfies the two essential conditions of the utility-
maximization model of rationality. 
 
2. Hume's Model of Motivation 
 The view I have attributed to Hume can be understood in two ways, and 
the discussion so far has emphasized only one of them. I have been concerned 
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to show that for Hume, there can be no conception of rational final ends, i.e. 
ends that conform to the prescriptions of reason. This is because Hume's 
utility-maximization model of rationality issues no such prescriptions. Its 
purview is confined solely to the discovery of means to those ends, and 
imposes no criteria of rationality on those ends themselves. The passages 
adduced so far seem clearly to point to this conclusion. But Hume's intention 
was more comprehensive. He wanted to show not only that reason could not 
determine rational ends of action, but also that it could not motivate action 
either. That is, Hume defended the belief-desire model of motivation. 
 This project was fueled by an interest in refuting the position, 
championed by Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston, that the conclusions of 
theoretical reason – i.e. the capacity to analyze and to perform logical 
operations – concerning the meaning of moral propositions were sufficient to 
incite one to morally virtuous action. Samuel Clarke offered an analysis of 
morally right actions as those which are self-evidently fitting or suitable to the 
circumstances in which they occur. This suitability or fitness is generated by 
natural proportional relations and uniformities that obtain among natural 
objects and events, just as they do among geometrical and mathematical 
entities. Hence, he argued, it is self-contradictory to will acts that are 
recognized to be unsuitable to their circumstances, i.e. immoral.6 Wollaston, 
on the other hand, rejected Clarke's analysis of rightness as fittingness. 
Instead he held that moral actions are those which assert logically true 
propositions, while immoral actions are self-contradictory.7 Thus his 
conception of moral rightness is equivalent to that of truth. However, both 
Clarke and Wollaston concurred in the belief that these convictions were 
discoverable a priori by theoretical reason, i.e. that a simple examination of the 
nature of action and its circumstances would reveal those actions which were 
morally right. And significantly, both believed that mere recognition of these 
"moral facts" placed the agent under obligation to act in conformity with 
them.8 
 Against this view, Samuel Clarke's two foremost critics, John Clarke and 
Francis Hutcheson, argued that moral propositions did not analyze the nature 
of moral action, but rather were concerned with moral obligation. For since 
the mere recognition of fittingness or self-consistency had no conative force, 
                                                
6
Samuel Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, 
Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, The British Moralists, Vol. II (New York: Dover, 1965), 4-6. See the 
discussion of Clarke by Rachel Kydd, Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise (New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1964), Chapter I. 
7William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, in Selby-Bigge, ibid., 362-4. See 
Kydd, ibid. 
8Clarke, op. cit. 12-14, 16-17, 23-4, 31-3; Wollaston, ibid. 370-1; Kydd, op. cit. 28-36. 
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such propositions could not move an agent to do or refrain from any act, 
hence could not be central to a true analysis of moral propositions.9 The 
central topic of moral philosophy was thus what we are obligated to do. 
Conflating what we are obligated to do with what we are compelled or obliged 
to do, both then conclude that an action cannot be called obligatory unless the 
agent feels impelled to perform it. So either reason had to be rejected as the 
source of morality, or else reason itself had to discover its own special motive 
to action.10 
 Hutcheson is clearest on this latter requirement, and most pessimistic 
about its fulfillment. He maintains that we can only be moved to action by 
"exciting reasons," and these are dependent on our desires. But (as Kydd 
points out) since our desires are empirical, a priori rational analysis cannot of 
itself incite us to action: 
As if indeed reason, or the knowledge of the relation of things, could 
excite to action when we proposed no end, or as if ends could be 
intended without desire or affection.11 
 Hutcheson's claims bear further consideration. His point in this passage 
is twofold. First, rational a priori analysis bears no relation to desires and 
emotions, and only these can motivate us to action. But second, the reason 
theoretical reason fails to move us to action is not only because it is neither a 
desire nor an emotion. It fails because it provides us with no end about which 
we might be able to feel a desire or aversion or emotion. So even if theoretical 
reason could fashion some object proved by analysis to be ultimately 
worthwhile (such as Kant’s highest-order, transcendent ideas of God, freedom 
and immortality), this would be irrelevant to the moral enterprise if it were 
not the object of a desire. Hence desires and affections are not significant 
merely because they move us to act; impulses, whims, and uncontrollable 
urges do so as well. Desires are significant because they posit ends that we 
desire to achieve, and that therefore move us to try to achieve them. 
 Two implications of Hutcheson's argument follow directly. First, a 
necessary condition of an object's having moral value is that it be able to 
motivate us to action, i.e. that it be an object of desire. Second, reason provides 
no such motivating ends. The conclusion is clear:  Reason provides no moral 
motivation to action. But if reason provides no motivating ends, and if we can 
be motivated only by ends we desire to achieve, then reason does not 
determine the ends we desire to achieve; these can be determined only by 
                                                
9Kydd, op. cit. 23. 
10Kydd, op. cit. 38. 
11Francis Hutcheson, Illustrations on the Moral Sense, Ed. Bernard Peach (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1971), 122. 
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instincts, affection, and desire.12 This conclusion is recognizable as Hume's 
negative utility-maximization thesis. 
 As with Hume, this negative thesis is buttressed by Hutcheson's answer 
to the question, 
[A]re there no exciting reasons, even previous to any ends, moving us to 
propose one end rather than another? To this Aristotle long ago answered 
that 'there are ultimate ends desired without a view to anything else.' To 
subordinate ends those reasons or truths excite, which show them to be 
conducive to the ultimate end, and show one object to be more effectual 
than another; thus subordinate ends may be called reasonable. But as to 
these ultimate ends, to suppose exciting reasons for them, would infer 
that there is no ultimate end, but that we desire one thing for another in 
an infinite series.13  
Here Hutcheson does not mean to deny that we are motivated to achieve final 
ends. Rather, he is denying that we are motivated by rational considerations 
to achieve those ends. His point is that reason plays no role in the choice of 
final ends. Furthermore, reason does play a role in investigating and 
determining the most effectual subordinate ends, i.e. means to those final 
ends.14 This view is recognizable as Hume's positive utility-maximization 
thesis. 
 Thus Hume's task was twofold. First, it was necessary to clearly delineate 
the actual scope and limits of reason, in order to demonstrate conclusively the 
conviction he shared with Hutcheson and John Clarke that no truth of reason 
could of itself incite an agent to action, much less moral action. Second, Hume 
had to provide a positive and detailed account of the passions in order to 
show just what the true origins and motives of moral action actually were. 
These enterprises form most of the subject matter of Books II and III of the 
Treatise of Human Nature, and account for his adherence to both the positive 
and the negative utility-maximization thesis. 
 For it is of course significant that both Hume and his ally Hutcheson 
assume almost without a second thought the truth of the negative utility-
maximization thesis as an argument supporting their convictions about 
                                                
12This point is supported, and not undermined, as Kydd seems to think (op. cit., 39-40), 
by his later assertion that  
He acts reasonably, who considers the various actions in his power, and forms true 
opinions of their tendencies; and then chooses to do that which will obtain the 
highest degree of that to which the instincts of his nature incline him (ibid. 126). 
13ibid., 123. 
14Cf. Note 17 and also ibid., 115-16, where he describes reason as the "sagacity in 
prosecuting any end," and as the finding of means to promote both the public and 
private good. 
Chapter XIV. Hume’s Metaethics           576 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
reason's irrelevance to moral, and in general behavioral, motivation. Both 
suppose that reason's inability to determine rational ends, and its limited 
function as a mere means for achieving those ends are in some sense 
indicative of its inability to motivate an agent to action. The implicit reasoning 
seem to be that a necessary condition of motivation is an object of desire, 
which they equate with an end, and that if reason cannot determine such an 
end, it cannot move one to action. Hutcheson follows this line of reasoning 
straightforwardly: He argues that a rational end is a necessary condition of 
rational motivation, and that since our ends are ultimately determined by our 
nonrational desires, this condition cannot be satisfied. 
 Hume's strategy is subtler, and more problematic. His objective is to 
demonstrate the mutual independence of reason and motivation. But as we 
shall see in Section 3, his arguments depend on confusing a motive and an 
end of action. This confusion then leads him to conclude, from the 
imperviousness to rational standards of certain ends, to the imperviousness to 
reason of our motives for acting – just as Hutcheson does. However, this 
thesis will need to be evaluated independently of Hume's arguments, for they 
do not prove what he thought they did. 
 Hume begins by considering the role of passion, and then later makes the 
role of reason his starting point. The rest of this section will be devoted to the 
first, and Section 3 to the second. His first argument, then, is that reason 
cannot incite us to action. Only the prospect of pleasure or the avoidance of 
pain from an object can do that (T 414). He states quite clearly that reason has 
no motivational efficacy (T 415), and later characterizes it as "of itself ... utterly 
impotent [to excite passions, and produce or prevent actions]" (T457). 
Moreover, in his own summation of his argument of Book II, Part III, Section 
3, Hume takes himself to have "prov'd, that reason is perfectly inert, and can 
never either prevent or produce any action or affection" (T 458). Nor can 
reason oppose our desires, for only another desire or passion can oppose a 
desire or passion, and if this could originate in reason, then reason would, on 
the contrary, be capable of inciting us to action. And Hume has just argued 
that it is not. Thus Hume's first claim is that only passions can oppose each 
other, and only passions can motivate actions. Reason, it seems, is excluded 
from the scene. 
 However, there are passages in the Treatise that have seemed to many to 
commit Hume to at least some minimal motivational role for reason, and 
these must be examined. First, there are the passages in Part III, Section 10 of 
Book I, "Of the Influence of Belief" on which we saw that Baier relies. There 
Hume tells us, for example, that "the effect ... of belief is to raise up a simple 
idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the 
passions" (T 119; emphasis added). He also states that "belief is almost 
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absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions" (T 120). The implication 
would seem to be that belief constitutes an identifiable link in the causal chain 
between the presence of the object and the agent's exertion in its service. If 
belief is motivationally influential in exciting the passions, which in turn 
cause action, then to the extent that true belief satisfies criteria of reason, 
reason must be capable of motivational influence as well. 
 However, one of the premises contained in this line of reasoning is 
subject to doubt: belief may be motivationally influential, but not even true 
belief is a species of reason for Hume. To see this, consider first Hume's 
detailed account of how facts become "the object of faith or opinion": 
When any affecting object is presented, it gives the alarm, and excites 
immediately a degree of its proper passion; ... This emotion passes by an 
easy transition to the imagination; and diffusing itself over our idea of the 
affecting object, makes us form that idea with greater force and vivacity, 
and consequently assent to it, according to the precedent system (T 120). 
The steps in the process are (1) the affecting object causes a passion; (2) this 
passion is transferred to the imagination; (3) in the imagination, the passion 
infuses our idea of the object; (4) this infusion imparts greater force and 
vivacity to the idea, "imitating," as Hume has said shortly before, "the effects 
of the impressions;" (T 119); (5) the greater intensity of this idea, and its 
approximation to an impression causes us to assent to it. "Belief," Hume tells 
us, "is nothing but a more vivid and intense conception of any idea" (T 119-20). The 
implications are four. First, belief is composed of an idea and a passion 
"diffused over" it. Second, the causal factor in belief is the passion that precedes 
the idea it infuses, not the idea itself. Third, since reason, as we already know, 
concerns only relations of ideas and matters of fact, reason is no more causally 
efficacious than are ideas as such. And finally, therefore, belief, qua passion-
infused idea, is not a species of reason. 
 This account of the influence of belief is borne out by Hume's earlier 
analysis of the nature of propositional belief in Sections 6 and 7. There Hume 
distinguishes between belief in those propositions proved by intuition or 
demonstration, and those concerning causation and matters of fact (T 95). We 
are determined to believe the former either immediately or by the 
interposition of other ideas. This chain of ideas, i.e. inference, depends solely 
on the union and association of ideas in imagination, not on reason (T 92). By 
contrast, whether we believe a proposition about matters of fact or its 
negation is determined by which of the two ideas is related to or associated 
with a present impression, thus increasing its force and vivacity (T 96; also T 
86, 93). As Hume frequently reminds us, belief is a particular manner of 
forming an idea (T 95, 96, 97). A belief that has motivational influence, then, is 
an idea whose accompanying impression has sparked the passion that infuses 
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it and has thereby rendered it particularly forceful and vivacious. Again it is 
the impression and the passion preceding the idea that are motivationally 
efficacious, not reason. 
This conclusion is further supported by Hume's claims that belief is 
merely a certain feeling or sentiment (T 153, 624); that it is not itself an idea (T 
184, 623-26) or a simple act of thought (T 184); and that it is more properly an 
act of the sensitive than the cognitive faculties (T103, 183-5). Hume in the 
Enquiry makes the point even more strongly: He characterizes belief as "the 
true and proper name of [an indefinable sentiment or] feeling" (E 40/48-9); he 
contends that 
[B]elief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in the 
manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind. I confess, that 
it is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling. ... But ... we can go no 
farther than assert, that belief is something felt by the mind, which 
distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the 
imagination. It gives them more weight and influence; makes them 
appear of greater importance; enforces them in the mind; and renders 
them the governing principle of our actions (E 40/49-50; italics in text). 
These passages lend support to the thesis that what identifies something as a 
belief is the passion that imbues it, not the idea that gives it content. Having 
come to believe something, it may well be that our believing it causally 
influences the passions that cause us to act. But the source of its causal 
influence is the passion that infuses it; this in turn influences the passions that 
directly cause us to act. It is thus false, according to Hume's account, to infer 
that reason itself has any such influence on action. 
 However, there are two other sets of passages that may seem to engender 
similar inferences. Hume often claims that reason alone cannot influence the 
will (T 413, 414, 457); that reason can "excite" a passion only "by informing us 
of the existence of something which is a proper object of it" (T 459); that an 
action "may be obliquely caus'd by [a judgment], when the judgment concurs 
with a passion" (T 459; italics in text); that reason "may, indeed, be the mediate 
cause of an action, by prompting, or by directing a passion" (T 462); and that 
"the blind motions of the [affections], without the direction of the 
[understanding], incapacitate men for society" (T 493). These passages have 
suggested to some that reason may be at least a necessary (if not sufficient) 
motivational influence on a passion.15  
                                                
15See Henry David Aiken, "An Interpretation of Hume's Theory of the Place of Reason 
in Ethics and Politics;" and David Fate Norton, David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, 
Sceptical Metaphysician, op. cit. Note 2. As far as I can tell, W. D. Falk (in "Hume on 
Practical Reason," Philosophical Studies 27 (1975), 1-18) does not make this mistake. 
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Here the problem lies in the scope of the word "cause" as we, and Hume, 
choose to use it. It would seem that Hume, and some of his commentators, 
have failed to make the distinction between a necessary condition and a 
contributing cause. Something is a necessary condition for an action if the action 
would not have been performed without it. Something is a contributing cause 
of an action if, independently of other causal factors with which it is 
conjoined, it exerts some causal influence on the agent to perform the action. 
There is no necessary connection between necessary conditions and 
contributing causes of some event. Suppose, for example, that I discover a 
craved cherry pie on the table. I am moved to approach the table. Does my 
discovery of the pie move me toward the table? Surely not. If I discovered the 
pie without wanting it, it would have no such influence. Rather, it is my 
desire for the pie that has this effect on me. Of course my discovery of the pie 
on the table is a necessary condition of my approaching the table (rather than, 
say, the window). In that sense, my discovery "directs" or "prompts" me 
toward the table. But not everything that is required in order for an event to 
occur can be sensibly described as a contributing cause of its occurrence.16 In 
particular, my discovery of the pie is a necessary condition of my action, but 
not a contributing cause of it; for, as Hume often notes, reason by itself has no 
causal influence whatsoever.  
The suggestion, then, is that when Hume uses words such as "prompts" 
or "directs", he is referring to a particularly salient necessary condition of 
action, i.e. reason – not a contributing cause of it. This interpretation enables 
us to resolve the passages just cited with Hume's immediately preceding 
claim to have "prov'd, that reason is perfectly inert, and can never either 
prevent or produce any action or affection" (T 458; emphasis added). That 
Hume regards these two points as mutually consistent is made clear in the 
Enquiry, when he states that  
[r]eason being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs 
only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the 
means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery (E 246/294).  
That reason directs or prompts, then, does not imply that reason motivates; 
quite the contrary, on Hume’s account. 
 Finally, there are the passages surrounding Hume's account of the origin 
of the artificial virtue of justice. Hume tells us that society is advantageous for 
the purpose of compensating individual defects, achieving equality or 
                                                
16 Of course some contributing causes of action are necessary conditions, as Hume 
recognizes (E 76/60). But in this passage he accords no higher priority to this quasi-
nomological definition of cause than he does to his own inductive one offered later in 
the same paragraph. 
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superiority relative to others, augmenting individual abilities, and providing 
personal security (T 485) and protection of personal goods (T 488). But, he 
adds, "in order to form society, 'tis requisite not only that it be advantageous, 
but also that men be sensible of these advantages" (T 486), and that they gain 
this sensitivity from experiencing a family. On the other hand, our innate 
selfishness and partiality works against the cooperation with others that 
enables society to perform this role. "From all which it follows," Hume 
concludes, "that our natural uncultivated ideas of morality, instead of 
providing a remedy for the partiality of our affections, do rather conform 
themselves to that partiality, and give it an additional force and influence" (T 
489). Where might we find a remedy for the partiality of our affections? 
Hume's answer follows: 
The remedy, then, is not deriv'd from nature, but from artifice; or more 
properly speaking, nature provides a remedy in the judgment and 
understanding, for what is irregular and incommodious in the affections 
(T 489). 
Some commentators17 have taken Hume to mean here that reason 
compensates for the partiality of the affections, hence provides a more stable 
source of motivation than they alone could supply. But first, this is not what 
Hume means; and second, even if it were, it would not imply that reason had 
motivational influence. That Hume does not mean to identify reason as the 
remedy for our partiality is suggested by his characterization of the remedy as 
"deriv'd from artifice"; reason, surely, is not derived from artifice. But Hume's 
real meaning can be seen more clearly by his subsequent remarks in the same 
paragraph: He explains that the remedy for social disturbance must consist in 
"putting [external goods], as far as possible, on the same footing with the fix'd 
and constant advantages of the mind and body," so as to limit "their looseness 
and easy transition from one person to another." "This can be done," he avers, 
after no other manner, than by a convention enter'd into by all the 
members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of those 
external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what 
he may acquire by his fortune and industry (T 489). 
The remedy for our partiality, then, is not reason, but rather the rules of 
justice, which ensures social equilibrium by enforcing the rules of private 
property. At most, reason is the source of the rules we devise for this purpose. 
Thus to say that nature provides a remedy in the judgment and 
understanding is not to say that nature provides the judgment and 
understanding as a remedy. Hume asserts the former, but not the latter. 
                                                
17For example, David Fate Norton (page 134, op. cit. Note 2). 
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 But suppose reason were Hume's remedy for the partiality of our 
affections? Would this show that it had motivational influence? I think not, for 
Hume makes it quite clear, in this paragraph and in the subsequent 
discussion, that we devise and implement the rules of justice for purely 
instrumental reasons, i.e. so that we may each enjoy our possessions in peace 
and security: 
By this means, every one knows what he may safely possess; and the 
passions are restrain'd in their partial and contradictory motions. Nor is 
such a restraint contrary to these passions; for if so, it cou'd never be enter'd 
into, nor maintain'd; but it is only contrary to their heedless and impetuous 
movement (T 489; emphasis added). 
Clearly Hume means to deny any suspected departure from his earlier 
doctrine regarding the slavish and purely instrumental role of reason relative 
to the passions. Reason, under the guidance of self-interest (T 492), generates 
the rules of justice as means for restraining the passions, which in turn is the 
means to the safe enjoyment of property. Reason does not causally oppose the 
passions, but rather directs them in the sense noted above (T 493). Hence the 
role of reason in engendering the rules of justice is not only fully consistent 
with Hume's doctrine of Book II regarding reason's motivational inefficacy; it 
is an instance of that doctrine. We have yet to find the clear evidence of a 
conflicting doctrine upon which some of Hume's commentators have insisted. 
 
3. The Passions from the Viewpoint of Reason 
 Recall that Hume's doctrine of the motivational inefficacy of reason was 
the first of two lines of thought, the first taking the viewpoint of the passions, 
the second taking the viewpoint of reason. Now let us consider this second 
line of attack more closely. Reason, as Hume has already established, consists 
in the conformity to truth, either of abstract relations between ideas or of 
experienced matters of facts, of our previous ideas and impressions. The 
passions, on the other hand, are neither. They are "original modifications of 
existence" that do not represent anything, and therefore do not represent it 
either truly or falsely: 
'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be 
contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the 
disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects which 
they represent (T 415). 
Only when a passion is accompanied by a false judgment, either about the 
existence of an object of the passion, or about the best means for attaining that 
object, can it be said to be contrary to reason; "and even then 'tis not the 
passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment" (T 416). 
Thus just as reason can no more oppose the passions than a logical argument 
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could oppose a stone falling through the air, similarly the passions can no 
more be contrary to reason than a falling stone can be contrary to a logical 
argument. 
 This is the context in which one of Hume's most explicit avowals of the 
negative utility-maximization thesis must be understood. Directly following 
the argument that a passion can be opposed to reason only in that the 
judgment which accompanies it might be, Hume says 
(A) 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole 
world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to 
chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person 
wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my 
own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent 
affection for the former than the latter. A trivial good may, from certain 
circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest 
and most valuable enjoyment; nor is there anything more extraordinary 
in this, than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise up a hundred by 
the advantage of its situation (T 416). 
In passage (A) Hume apparently means to exemplify his previous argument 
by citing a few illustrations of passions one might think, at first glance, were 
contrary to reason. But Hume means to provoke us, through these 
illustrations, into further reflection on his argument, and ultimately into 
arriving at the opposite conclusion. 
 This plan is glaringly unsuccessful. First of all, as Baier points out, it 
would be contrary to reason, in fact self-contradictory, to “prefer the 
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger,” because my 
finger is part of the world.18 Second, Hume has just argued that a passion, 
"such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security" (T 416), cannot be 
contrary to reason because it "contains not any representative quality, which 
renders it a copy of any other existence or modification" (T 415). But passions 
must take intentional objects:  We hope for something, are afraid of something, 
despair of, over, or about something. Hence the sense in which they contain 
no "representative quality" is obscure at best.19 
 To be sure, Hume carefully distinguishes between a passion, the cause of 
the passion, and the object of the passion. A passion, as defined by Hume, is a 
"violent and sensible emotion of mind, when any good or evil is presented, or 
                                                
18 Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s Treatise (Cambridge: 
Harvard University, 1991), 165. 
19Baier rightly describes this as “one very silly paragraph that has perversely dominated 
the interpretation of [Hume’s] moral psychology … [and] is, at the very least, 
unrepresentative of Hume’s claims about passions in the preceding and following parts 
of Book Two.” Ibid., 160. 
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any object, which, by the original formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite 
an appetite" (T 437). Thus the passion, strictly speaking, is merely the set of 
physiological and psychological sensations caused by some object or 
circumstance. In itself, this set does not represent anything; it is an "original 
modification of existence." 
 In discussing the indirect passions of pride and humility, Hume also 
distinguishes between the cause of the passions and their objects: 
… betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct 
their view, when excited. ... The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is 
that of the cause, or productive principle. This excites the passion, 
connected with it; and that passion, when excited turns our view to 
another idea (T 278). 
In the context of this discussion, Hume means to distinguish as the cause of 
the passion that intentional object we feel pride or humility about: 
Every valuable quality of mind ... wit, good sense, learning, courage, 
justice, integrity; all these are the causes of pride. ... A man may [also] be 
proud of his beauty, strength, agility. ... But this is not all. ... Our country, 
family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, ... any of these may 
become a cause either of pride or of humility (T 279). 
The object of the passion, on the other hand, is in each case the self, i.e. that 
object in relation to which the ideas of "valuable qualit[ies] of the mind, ... the 
body likewise, ... [and] whatever objects are in the least ally'd or related to us" 
(T 279) can excite such sentiments in us.20 Thus the cause of a passion for 
Hume is that which we might be inclined to describe as its intentional object, 
while the object of the passion for Hume is equivalent to what we might 
describe as its cause, i.e. self-aggrandizement. 
 However, in discussing the direct passions of desire and aversion, grief 
and joy, hope and fear, and volition (T 438), Hume often equates the object of 
a desire, i.e. that to which the passion is directed, with what he calls its cause, 
for example, when he claims that contrary passions arise from different objects 
of desire or aversion respectively (T 441, 443). Here he allows the possibility 
that that which causes a passion, e.g. a freshly-baked apple pie, can be the 
object of the passion as well. 
 Nevertheless, in spite of Hume's care in distinguishing the cause and 
intentional object of a passion from the passion itself, it is not plausible to 
argue that passions cannot be irrational on the ground that in themselves they 
do not represent or judge anything. For this distinction between the passion 
and its intentional object is suspect. It is not easy to imagine how we might 
                                                
20
Also see Annette Baier, "Hume's Analysis of Pride," The Journal of Philosophy LXXV, 1 
(January 1978), 27-40. 
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identify a particular passion independently of its intentional object. Surely we 
need the death of the close friend, the threat of violence, or the sight of the 
disgorged calf hanging in the butcher's window in order to distinguish 
respectively grief, fear, or aversion. The knotting of the stomach, increased 
heart rate, and tightness in the temples alone do not suffice to distinguish 
between them – nor, indeed, from particularly intense pleasurable experiences 
of certain sorts. The intentional object of the passion is part of what identifies 
it as a particular passion. 
 Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine a case in which the intentional 
object of the passion is not a necessary part of the cause of the passion, as 
Hume rightly suggests. Even neural stimulation would not disconfirm this 
hypothesis. But these two considerations taken together suggest that a passion 
always includes, or at least is accompanied by, some "representative quality," 
i.e. that object which is intentionally represented. So either passions are 
intrinsically representational, or else they are always "accompany'd with some 
judgment or opinion" concerning "the existence of objects" (T 416). 
 This conclusion is borne out by the examples Hume cites in passage (A), 
all of which make reference to intentional objects. Surely it is at least the ideas 
of the destruction of the whole world and of the scratching of my finger that 
causes me to prefer the one to the other; surely it is at least the idea of the 
unknown Indian that causes me to desire to prevent his uneasiness more than 
my total ruin. Indeed, it is hard to imagine giving a complete description of 
any particular passion without referring to its intentionally represented object. 
But this means that passions can, then, be unreasonable, or contrary to reason 
after all, for they always involve at least a "supposition of the existence of the 
object" (T 416), about which one may be mistaken. 
 Of course a subject need not suppose the object of a passion to have 
material, empirical existence. Hume would scarcely maintain that any such 
object must be supposed already to exist in this strong sense. For this would 
imply that we could only aspire to bring into material existence that which 
already had it; hence that the desire to achieve or realize our ends played no 
part in motivating us to action. There is no reason to think Hume held this 
view. Nor is this supposition required by Hume's notion of intentional 
existence: 
To reflect on anything simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing 
different from each other. That idea, when conjoined with the idea of my 
object, makes no addition to it. Whatever we conceive, we conceive to be 
existent (T 66-67). 
When we conceive of some object or state of affairs we deplore, or wish to 
attain through action, we suppose it to exist as intentional object of our grief 
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or desire respectively. We add nothing to this conception by ascertaining 
whether it exists in a stronger, material sense as well. 
 But this supposition is a judgment made by our reason, and can be true 
or false, for it is possible to deplore or desire something that cannot exist even 
in the weak sense, i.e. a self-contradictory object, such as a department chair 
who is both just and also partial to oneself. This is the only kind of object 
which can exist neither as a conceived possible empirical reality to be attained 
through some course of action, nor as that actual state of affairs which caused 
the subject to conceive it in the first place. But we might nevertheless 
mistakenly suppose it could. We might fail to recognize the self-contradictory 
nature of the object (for example, as when the desired end is to ensure the 
intact survival of my finger compatibly with the destruction of the whole 
world). Thus the suggestion is that we understand Hume's criterion of 
irrationality as involving a mistaken supposition about the intentional 
existence of the object and not its material existence: We are irrational, in this 
sense, if we conceive a state of affairs which, because it is internally 
inconsistent, cannot even be a genuine object of a passion. 
 This implies that Hume's claims in passage (A) are correct, but not for the 
reasons he gives. Hume's overall strategy has been to advance a variant on 
Hutcheson's claim: From the purported non-irrationality of the preferred ends 
cited in passage (A), we are to conclude the similar imperviousness to rational 
criteria of our motives. And he has partially succeeded in this enterprise. The 
choices and preferences he cites are not indeed irrational, but not because they 
"contain no representative quality" and hence cannot be contrary to reason. 
They are not irrational because they do not violate the only requirement on 
ends that Hume by implication proffers: internal logical consistency. But this 
is in truth no constraint on the range of possible objects of desire at all. It 
requires merely that any such intentional object be a possible object of desire, 
i.e. that it not be self-contradictory; and not that it conform to any further 
requirements such objects themselves must satisfy. 
 Thus passage (A) provides strong evidence for the negative utility-
maximization thesis. For here Hume maintains explicitly the immunity to 
rational criticism of ends one might intuitively regard as irrational. And he 
implicitly maintains the conformity of any such end to the requirement that 
they be possible ends at all. But clearly, this is to require merely that an end be 
an end. It is not to require that it be rational. Hence, it seems, the 
corresponding passion is immune to rational criticism as well. 
 But now we must ask whether Hume's, as well as Hutcheson's, overall 
argument proves what these writers suppose it proves. Does it in fact follow 
from the fact that reason imposes no constraints on possible ends that it 
imposes no constraints on their corresponding passions? The connection 
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between rational ends and rational motivation is surely not as intimate as 
Hume and Hutcheson appear to think. For even if we accept the necessary 
conjunction of a passion with its intentional object, this commits us to the 
necessary conjunction neither of the passion with its sufficient cause, nor of 
the passion with any particular end that passion may cause us to desire. 
 Many things can cause us to feel, say, joy. Remembering something 
achieved or overcome may cause us to feel joyful. The thing achieved or 
overcome is then the intentional object of the passion, and also originally 
causes it. But it can also be the intentional object of the passion without being 
a sufficient cause of it, as would be the case if it were not the memory of our 
previous achievements, but rather someone's present praise of them, which 
causes us to feel joy in those past achievements. Similarly, the feeling of joy in 
our past achievements may extend into joyful anticipation of future ones. 
Here the object of the feeling of joy would be a desired end, i.e. anticipated 
future achievements, while its cause would be the remembered past ones. 
Thus an identifiable passion – joy in something – is logically independent of 
both its cause and the end it causes us to desire. Either can function as the 
intentional object of the passion. Although we require some such intentional 
object in order to be able to identify the passion, this object need be strictly 
identifiable with neither its cause nor its desired end.  
However, either its cause or its desired end may motivate an agent to 
action. Joy or pride in our past achievements may move us to take on some 
new challenge, independently of our enthusiasm for that new project in itself. 
Or, it may be just and only our enthusiasm for that new project which moves 
us to action, independently of the feelings of anxiety, fear, uncertainty, or self-
doubt it may simultaneously cause us to have. Since a passion can take either 
its cause or its end as its intentional object, the immunity to reason of its end 
does not necessarily imply the immunity to reason of that passion itself. 
 Now suppose it true, as has already been argued, that a passion cannot 
be unreasonable or irrational, even if it must contain an intentional object. 
Does this imply that its ends also cannot be unreasonable or irrational? At 
first glance it would appear that this does not follow. For if the passion can be 
distinguished from its desired end (as, for example, in the case where the 
passion's intentional object is its cause but its cause is not its end: My joyful 
memory of past achievements causes me to take on a new challenge, even 
though I do not desire that challenge in its own right), then to show that a 
passion cannot be irrational proves nothing about its end. Apparently, the 
passion could be immune to rational criticism although its end were not. 
 But within Hume's framework, this appearance is misleading. For 
although an end can be detached from some passions, such as joy, enthusiasm, 
grief, or reluctance, it cannot, for Hume, be detached from desire or aversion 
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for that end. This is the only basis on which Hume permits the object in 
question to count as an end for us at all (T 414); and desire and aversion 
themselves are direct passions. 
 Many states of affairs may cause us to desire something. Among those 
not identical with the object of the desire are envy, malice, generosity, etc. But 
in addition to these causes, we must also count as necessary, if not sufficient, 
the thought of the object itself, considered as a source of pleasure or pain. We 
cannot experience that passion Hume calls "desire" without simultaneously 
experiencing the thought of that object our desire is a desire for. So the object 
of desire, or end, is a necessary concomitant of at least two of the passions: 
desire and aversion. 
 Moreover, desire or aversion must be necessary concomitants of all the 
other passions, for Hume, in so far as these motivate the agent to seek an 
object of pleasure or avoid an object of pain (T 414, 417). We could not blindly 
take on the new project, merely out of joy in our past achievements. For this 
alone would not be sufficient to determine our choice of that one end over 
many others. Out of joy in our past achievements alone we might as easily 
choose to rest on our laurels as to press on to something new. Although this 
joy might well override any fondness or enthusiasm we might feel for the end 
in its own right, there must be at least enough interest to determine our choice 
of that end rather than some other; and Hume supplies no alternative to 
desire, for example an account of intention as causally efficacious, that would 
satisfy this desideratum.21 
 Hence for Hume the very fact that we adopt some particular end 
indicates the presence of a desire for that end. Conversely, the presence of 
desire is sufficient to indicate an end or purpose, since desire is one of those 
passions that must take an intentional object. Hence the presence of desire can 
be tautologically construed as a necessary ingredient in any combination of 
passions that can motivate us to action, just as the contemporary belief-desire 
model of motivation would require. So if the passions are the sole sources of 
behavioral motivation, and if the passions cannot be contrary to reason, then 
the ends they lead us to adopt cannot be irrational either. The absence of 
rational constraints on desire is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for 
the absence of rational constraints on ends. Thus we must conclude that 
Hume not only accepts the traditional view of reason, but actively embraces 
both the positive and the negative utility-maximization theses – for more 
reasons even than he himself explicitly gives. 
 
                                                
21As, for example, Kant arguably does. 
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4. The Principles of Variability 
 I now consider an argument that may incline some Hume scholars to an 
opposite conclusion, i.e. that in spite of the evidence to the contrary already 
assembled, Hume does in fact provide a positive account of what amounts to 
rational constraints on ends.22 In Book I, Part IV, Section 4 of the Treatise, 
Hume distinguishes between those principles  
which are permanent, irresistible, and universal; such as the customary 
transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes: And the 
principles, which are changeable, weak, and irregular. ... (T 225) 
such as the superstitious inclination to impute a faculty or occult quality to 
phenomena we cannot otherwise explain (T 224). He argues that the former 
are received by philosophy for the simple reason that human life would be 
impossible without them: "[They] are the foundation of all our thoughts and 
actions, so that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish 
and go to ruin" (T 225). Of course Hume does not claim that such “permanent, 
irresistible, and universal” principles – let us call them PIU principles – are 
rational, nor that they are logically or conceptually necessary. They are 
necessary merely for the survival of human nature, of our capacities for 
thought and action. But as I have argued in Chapter XIII.7, philosophy is, 
even for Hume, the discipline of rational thought par excellence. So it might be 
argued, at least, that the reception of the PIU principles by philosophy is 
strong evidence of their rationality. 
 Later, in discussing the problem of freedom of the will in Book II, Hume 
identifies those natural principles which govern human behavior as being of a 
piece with PIU principles. He argues, for example, that 
whether we consider mankind according to the differences of sexes, ages, 
governments, conditions, or methods of education; the same uniformity 
and regular operation of natural principles are discernible. Like causes 
produce like effects; in the same manner as in the mutual action of the 
elements as powers of nature (T 401). 
Hume then goes on to assert that just as the cohesiveness of matter arises from 
necessary principles, similarly, human society is founded on principles that 
are just as necessary. Indeed, we can be even more certain of such necessary 
natural principles governing human social phenomena than we can in the 
                                                
22
The argument as I present it is a variant on that offered by David Miller, 37-39 (op. cit. 
Note 2), although Miller does not claim rational, but rather merely reflective and 
analytical status for the PIU principles. I am grateful to Louis Loeb for originally calling 
my attention to the passages on the PIU principles, and for discussion of them, although 
the use I make of them here is my own. Loeb develops this notion in a different 
direction in "Cartesian Epistemology Without Divine Validation of the Cognitive 
Faculties" (unpublished paper, 1985). 
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case of natural phenomena, for we are more successful in explaining the 
former than the latter: 
[T]he different stations of life influence the whole fabric, external and 
internal; and these different stations arise necessarily, because uniformly, 
from the necessary and uniform principles of human nature. ... There is a 
general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operations of 
the sun and the climate. There are also characters peculiar to different 
nations and particular persons, as well as common to mankind. The 
knowledge of these characters is founded on the observation of an 
uniformity in the actions, that flow from them; and this uniformity forms 
the very essence of necessity (T 402-3). 
 What are the certain principles of human behavior that Hume has in 
mind? These can be divided into two categories: (1) those principles 
describing the influence of sensory limitations and the violent passions on 
human behavior, which I shall refer to as principles of variability; and (2) those 
describing the modifying influence of the calm passions, which I shall call 
principles of stability.23 A violent passion is, as we saw, a "violent and sensible 
emotion of mind, when any good or evil is presented" (T 437), whereas calm 
passions are "affections of the very same kind ... but such as operate more 
calmly. ..." (T 437) 
tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, are more 
known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These 
desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in 
our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and 
kindness to children, or the general appetite to good and aversion to evil, 
consider'd merely as such (T 417). 
Whether a passion is calm or violent depends on the individual's temper, the 
circumstances and situation of the object, the intensity of other simultaneous 
passions, its degree of habituation, and the extent to which it excites the 
imagination (T 438). 
 Hume's account of the relationship between (1) and (2) is basically as 
follows. Possible objects of desire undergo modification and distortion in 
perceived degrees of desirability, accordingly as the passions that adopt them 
vary in violence or intensity (or "vivacity"), and as other contingent conditions 
vary. The variability in the violence of the passions depends upon just the 
                                                
23By contrast, Miller (ibid.) takes Hume's PIU principles to refer solely to general, higher-
order rules by which our first-order beliefs and inferences can be corrected (see T 146-
50, and Book I, Part III, Section 15, "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects"). This 
is where my understanding of the PIU principles diverges from Miller's: Miller thinks 
Hume means to refer only to principles governing our judgments, whereas I contend 
that he means to refer to principles governing our behavior more generally. 
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contingent circumstances that generate them. However, the distortive effect of 
these circumstances is partially corrected by the operations of the calm 
passions, which are often mistaken for reason. Let us now examine this 
account more closely. I treat Hume's principles of variability in this section, 
leaving his principles of stability for Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, I again 
recur to and dispose of the general argument that claims that Hume does, in 
effect, impose rational constraints on ends. 
 In the Treatise, Hume enumerates the principles falling into the first 
category in greater detail:   
 
(a) We are more inclined to pursue a good when it is near to us than 
when it is remote, because the nearer it is the more violent the passion it 
causes, and we are more easily impelled to action by violent than by calm 
passions (T 319; also 427-34).  
(b) Similarly, we are more strongly impelled to pursue or avoid an 
object about which we experience conflicting passions than we would be 
otherwise, for these increase the intensity of the predominating passion 
we feel toward it (T 421).  
(c) Uncertainty in the apprehension or prospects of realizing the 
object, on the other hand, tends to increase our enthusiasm for it much as 
security tends to replace enthusiasm with boredom (T 421-22).  
(d) Custom and repetition in the performance of certain actions can 
transform the accompanying violent passion into a calm one. For they 
give rise to a facility in performing the action. On the one hand, this 
facility is an additional source of pleasure (up to a certain point) that 
motivates us to repeat the action. On the other hand, repetition 
transforms the action into a settled habit of conduct we perform without 
feeling intensely motivated to do so (T 422-4; cf. 426).  
(e) Finally, our imagination increases our pleasurable anticipation of 
achieving some object, insofar as our prior experience of it enhances our 
conception of it, as does our memory of it (T 424-6).  
 
These are most prominent among Hume's principles of variability. In a 
significant passage in the Enquiry, to which I shall recur, Hume summarizes 
these circumstances when he maintains that 
when some of these objects approach nearer to us, or acquire the 
advantages of favorable lights and positions, which catch the heart or 
imagination; our general resolutions are frequently confounded, a small 
enjoyment preferred, and lasting shame and sorrow entailed upon us (E 
239; cf. T 536). 
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 Is it only objects of desire that we must appraise cautiously in order to 
correct our distorted or prejudiced perceptions of them? Are objects of desire 
the only subjects of principles of variability? Hume has already answered this 
question in the negative. It is not merely the violence of our passions that 
color our perceptions, but our sensory limitations as well: 
[T]he senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on; ... we must 
correct their evidence by reason, and by considerations, derived from the 
nature of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposition of 
the organ, in order to render them within their sphere, the proper criteria 
of truth and falsehood (E 117/151). 
Thus all objects of perception, including objects of desire, are subject to the 
distortions arising from the limitations of individual circumstances: our 
spatiotemporal relation to the object, our personal constitution, the 
psychological background against which we apprehend the object, and the 
intensity of the sentiments aroused by it. 
 Hume makes equally clear that it is not only perceived objects that are 
susceptible to this distortion, but perceived subjects as well. In the Enquiry, 
Hume argues eloquently that all human beings have instincts of sympathy 
and benevolence, even if these vary enormously among individuals and 
circumstances. Two factors determining the intensity or violence of our 
sentiment of sympathy or approval for someone's moral behavior are (1) the 
extent to which the person's actions affect us personally; (2) the person's 
spatiotemporal proximity to us. Hence our sentiments are more deeply 
aroused by a statesman serving our own country, now, than by one serving 
another country or one whose actions occurred in the distant past (E 185/227). 
Hume explicitly maintains that we must correct the inequality of our 
responses to the two cases in the same way, and for just the same reasons, as 
we must when making perceptual judgments or choosing among desired 
objects: 
[W]here the good, ... [is] less connected with us, [it] seems more obscure, 
and affects us with a less lively sympathy. We may own the merit to be 
equally great, through our sentiments are not raised to an equal height, in 
both cases. The judgment here corrects the inequalities of our internal 
emotions and perceptions; in like manner, as it preserves us from error, in 
the several variations of images, presented to our external senses. ... And, 
indeed, without such a correction of appearances, both in internal and 
external sentiment, men could never think or talk steadily on any subject; 
while their fluctuating situations produce a continual variation on 
objects, and throw them into such different and contrary lights and 
positions (E 185/227-8). 
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 This argument is derived, in essence, from a similar one Hume makes in 
the Treatise. There he is concerned to refute the objection that since our moral 
sentiments vary while our moral appraisals do not, these appraisals are not 
based on our moral feelings but rather on reason. Hume's response is that our 
moral judgments themselves are based on "a moral taste, and from certain 
sentiments of pleasure or disgust, which arise upon the contemplation and 
view of particular qualities or characters" (T 581). Hume's point here is an 
important one: It is that judgments, thought to issue from reason conceived as 
distinct from the passions, are not in fact independent of those passions or 
sentiments, but rather are generated by them. Thus the same feelings – 
pleasure or aversion – arise in response to perceiving moral qualities as they 
do in response to other sorts of possible objects of desire. Hume concedes, as 
before, that these sentiments  
must vary according to the distance or contiguity of the objects ... our 
situation, with regard both to persons and things, is in continual 
fluctuation. ... Besides, every particular man has a peculiar position with 
regard to others; and 'tis impossible we cou'd ever converse together on 
any reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, 
only as they appear from his particular point of view (T 581). 
So moral judgments about persons as well as nonmoral ones about objects of 
desire and perception are susceptible to distortion, insofar as they are colored 
by our own variable circumstances. Each of these types of objects contribute 
to the subject matter of Hume's principles of variability, for each is a type of 
object with respect to which our judgment must be distorted by the very 
subjectivity of our situation itself. I shall call the perception conditioned by 
this situation the subjective perspective. 
 I suggested that the calm passions are claimed by Hume to provide a 
partial corrective to the subjective perspective, and that their workings 
constitute the subject matter of what I termed principles of stability. In the 
following section, I elaborate this suggestion in detail. 
 
5. The Principles of Stability and the Objective Perspective 
 Hume immediately continues the above discussion by arguing that we 
correct these variations in our sentiments and perceptions by fixing on what 
he describes as "some steady and general points of view; and always, in our 
thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation" (T 
581-2). He contrasts this steady and general point of view with the actual 
variations in viewpoint that occur because of the changes in our particular 
circumstances, arguing that our use of language disregards such fluctuations, 
and expresses "our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remained in 
one point of view" (T 582). However, he contends, we do not thereby fully 
Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception    593 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
succeed in correcting the waywardness and partiality of our feelings through 
behavior that is consistent with this stable and general view: 
[R]eason requires such an impartial conduct, but ... 'tis seldom we can 
bring ourselves to it, and ... our passions do not readily follow the 
determination of our judgment. This language will be easily understood, 
if we consider what we formerly said concerning that reason, which is 
able to oppose our passion; and which we have found to be nothing but a 
general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant 
view or reflexion (T 583). 
The last sentence summarizes Hume's earlier argument of Book II, Part III, 
that reason, far from opposing and controlling the passions in the service of 
morally obligatory behavior, is in fact of a piece with them, and that we 
mistake certain passions for the motivating influence of reason only because 
they operate tranquilly rather than violently on us (T 417, 437). 
 But for our present purposes, this passage is significant for the additional 
light it sheds on the "steady and general view" that corrects the contingencies 
of our individual perspectives. For here Hume further characterizes this view 
as impartial, reflective, distant, often mistaken for the operations of reason, 
and the basis for a "general calm determination of the passions." Thus the 
basic picture is that of a perspective that corrects for individual contingencies, 
changes, and partiality of vision by being stable where individual perception 
is fluctuating; general where individual perception is confined to the 
particular perspective dictated by its own relation to the object; impartial or 
judicious where individual perception is biased in its view by its location 
relative to the object; and reflective where individual perception is impulsive 
and unselfconscious in its appraisal of the object. Finally, this perspective 
provides the foundation for the tranquil and undisturbed workings of the 
calm passions, which are consequently mistaken for the operations of reason. 
Let us call this the objective perspective. 
 The basic argument in support of the objective perspective would appear 
to be as follows: 
 
(P.1) Nearness and remoteness to the object of appraisal is a function 
of psychological as well as spatial or temporal proximity to the 
individual; 
 (P.2) The violence and intensity of our passions decrease with the 
object's psychological distance from the self, much as they do with its 
spatial or temporal distance from the physical location of the individual; 
 (C) The greater the spatiotemporal or psychological distance of the 
object from the individual, the more nearly we approach the objective 
perspective. 
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That Hume maintains (P.1) follows from the variety of objects he subjects to 
his principles of variability, of which we have already spoken. (P.2) follows 
from his many and detailed discussions of the disturbing and distinctive 
effects of the object's spatiotemporal and psychological proximity to the 
individual, which we have also already reviewed (e.g. T 489, E 234). (C) 
follows from the premises plus the implicit assumption that the objective 
perspective is to distance as the subjective perspective is to proximity. We find 
support for this assumption in Hume's own repeated use of the phrase 
"distant view" to characterize this perspective (e.g. T 583, E 196/239). We can 
then further describe the objective perspective as one that involves 
psychological and emotional distance from just those objects that are 
psychologically and spatiotemporally – therefore emotionally – closest to us: 
considerations of self-interest, immediate sources of pleasure, proximate 
objects of gratification, etc. To distance ourselves from these objects is 
precisely to view them as though from that psychological or spatiotemporal 
distance at which they would not affect the passions as violently and distort 
our judgment as completely as they otherwise do. 
 This interpretation is further confirmed by the following important 
passage from the Enquiry, which I quote in full: 
(B) All men, it is allowed, are equally desirous of happiness; but few are 
successful in the pursuit; one considerable cause is the want of strength of 
mind, which might enable them to resist the temptation of present ease or 
pleasure, and carry them forward in the search of more distant profit and 
enjoyment. Our affections, on a general prospect of their objects, form 
certain rules of conduct, and certain measures of preference of one above 
another: and these decisions, though really the result of our calm 
passions and propensities (for what else can pronounce any object 
eligible or the contrary?) are yet said, by a natural abuse of terms, to be 
the determinations of pure reason and reflection. But when some of these 
objects approach nearer to us, or acquire the advantage of favorable lights 
and positions, which catch the heart and imagination; our general 
resolutions are frequently confounded, a small enjoyment preferred, and 
lasting shame and sorrow entailed upon us. And however poets may 
employ their wit and eloquence, in celebrating present pleasure, and 
rejecting all distant views to fame, health, or fortune; it is obvious that 
this practice is the source of all dissoluteness and disorder, repentance 
and misery (E 196/239). 
In passage (B) Hume makes a number of important points. First, he amplifies 
further his conception of the objective perspective. For here we see that this 
perspective requires us not merely to distance ourselves emotionally from our 
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most proximate interests, objects of desires, and appraisals, but explicitly to 
assume the vantage point of a psychologically or spatiotemporally remote 
interest, object of desire, or appraisal in order to achieve this. 
 These two are distinct. I can detach myself from my closest concerns by 
emotionally withdrawing from them. By repressing diminishing, or subduing 
the intensity of my desire for a Black Forest Torte, I achieve a certain 
detachment from this desire. It ceases to upset my composure, hence permits 
me to reflect on it more tranquilly, or consider with greater liberality features 
of it that my emotional investment in it might otherwise obscure or bypass 
altogether. A person who is not temperamentally susceptible to tempestuous 
feelings is able to view most of his interests and desires with greater 
intellectual clarity and equanimity, for it allows him to analyze and explain 
such things without the unbalancing impediment of emotional involvement. 
 But emotional detachment is not sufficient for achieving the objective 
perspective. For it does not follow from my lack of emotional upheaval over 
my most proximate objects of desire or appraisal that I therefore do not, 
because of their proximity, mistakenly ascribe to them primary value. That is, 
it does not immediately follow from the assumption that the calm passions 
are governing one's behavior that one thereby appraises objects of desire 
judiciously. It is hardly unusual to encounter a person who is both calm and 
biased; whose emotional tranquility is matched only by a staunch conviction 
in the primacy of her personal interests above general ones. Hence it is not 
enough to distance oneself merely from the distorting effects of the violent 
passions, for this degree of detachment is nevertheless consistent with 
maintaining the subjective perspective. Unbiased and judicious judgment 
requires, in addition, that one view one's subjective perspective itself from a 
distance. And this requires not just emotional detachment, but intellectual and 
psychological distance from one's concerns as well. Hume's specification that 
one assume the vantage point of distant concerns makes this requirement 
explicit. 
 However, concerns can be distant in two ways. They can be distant from 
the constellation of interests, desires, beliefs, and judgments that constitute 
my present self, but nevertheless proximate to the constellation that I now 
know will compromise my future self, or my overall self considered through 
each moment of time. This would be the stance of enlightened self-interest. 
Alternately, concerns can be distant from my self simpliciter, i.e. such as will 
never constitute part of myself from any temporal perspective, hence can 
never be subsumed under the rubric of self-interest. This would be the 
transpersonal stance of strict impartiality. I discuss the concept of impartiality 
in detail in Volume II, Chapter VI. 
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 Some have interpreted Hume's sketchy remarks about the objective 
perspective, both in the Treatise and in the Enquiry, as referring to the stance of 
strict impartiality.24 And indeed this interpretation is supported by Hume's 
claim in the Treatise that 
'Tis seldom men heartily love what lies at a distance from them, and what no 
way redounds to their particular benefit; as 'tis no less rare to meet with 
persons, who can pardon another any opposition he makes to their 
interest, however justifiable that interest may be by the general rules of 
morality. Here we are contented with saying, that reason requires such an 
impartial conduct but that 'tis seldom we can bring ourselves to it: and that 
our passions do not readily follow the determinations of our judgment (T 
583; emphasis added). 
On this reading, the objective perspective is mistakenly thought to be 
equivalent to the perspective of reason, which dictates objectively and 
impartially without regard for the claims of self-interest. The difficulty is that 
it is not immediately clear how this perspective is to be achieved by any 
limited sentient individual, nor how it is even connected with the subjective 
perspective with which every individual is familiar. 
 Passage (B) from the Enquiry indicates that it is rather the stance of 
enlightened self-interest that Hume has in mind. There Hume is fulminating 
against the evils and misery of pure time preference, i.e. of preferring some 
satisfaction over another purely because of its greater temporal proximity to 
the agent. He is recommending that we detach ourselves from the 
satisfactions of the immediate present, and choose objects or courses of action 
with a view to our future happiness, or our happiness considered as a whole, 
over the entire course of our lives. We are to think of our overall, genuine 
rather than our immediate self-interest. But it is a far cry from this distance 
from some one time-slice of my life to the greater, quite dizzying distance 
from all time-slices of all lives that is necessary for judging any one such time-
slice from the transpersonal stance of strict impartiality.25 For in the Treatise, 
                                                
24
For example, Stephen Darwall (Impartial Reason (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1983), 60) takes Hume to be committed to this brand of distance when he 
maintains in the Treatise that "'Tis only when a character is considered in general without 
reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as 
denominates it morally good or evil." (T 472; emphasis added) Also see Marcia Baron, 
"Hume's Calm Passions," (M. A. Thesis, The University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, 1978). 
25In Chapter VII I have discussed Thomas Nagel’s early analysis of this concept in The 
Possibility of Altruism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970). But a more refined 
account that raises correspondingly more issues is to be found in his "Subjective and 
Objective," in Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 196-213. 
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Hume takes impartial judgment to be the opposite of self-interested judgment 
of any kind. Strictly impartial judgment then requires a distant view that is 
nevertheless not the view of any one self at all, neither immediate nor future, 
nor unified as a whole over time. It is difficult to say, within the Western 
Anglo-American analytic tradition, in what such a view might consist. 
 There is thus good reason why Hume may have opted, upon mature 
reflection, for the stance of enlightened self-interest described in the Enquiry. 
To be sure, it rules out strict impartiality by presupposing that our distant 
view is nevertheless always the view of one's self, hence that its appraisals of 
objects are conditioned accordingly. But it simultaneously makes room for a 
more limited, intermediate distance that at the same time satisfies the 
requirement of the objective perspective, i.e. that we transcend the distortions 
contingent on considerations of immediate self-interest to achieve 
judiciousness in our judgments. We find an account of this intermediate 
distance, and how it is achieved, in Hume's claim that 
[e]very man's interest is peculiar to himself, and the aversions and 
desires, which result from it, cannot be supposed to affect others in a like 
degree. General language, therefore, being formed for general use, must 
be moulded on some more general views, and must affix the epithets of 
praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments, which arise from the 
general interest of the community. ... Sympathy, we shall allow, is much 
fainter than our concern for ourselves, and sympathy with persons 
remote from us much fainter than that with persons near and contiguous; 
but for this very reason it is necessary for us, in our calm judgments and 
discourse concerning the characters of men, to neglect these differences, 
and render our sentiments more public and social. Besides, that we 
ourselves often change our situation in this particular, we every day meet 
with persons who are in a situation different from us, and who could 
never converse with us were we to remain constantly in that position and 
point of view, which is peculiar to ourselves. The intercourse of 
sentiments, therefore, in society and conversation, makes us form some 
general unalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of 
character and manners (E 186/228-9). 
 This passage enumerates three steps that permit us to move from the 
subjective to the objective perspective:  
 
                                                                                                     
Many of these are resolved in his yet more recent The View From Nowhere (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985). 
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(1) We discount the characteristics that distinguish between 
ourselves and others, and between persons near to us and those remote 
from us;  
(2) We note consciously the "intercourse of sentiments" consequent 
on our regularly and often changing our own positions and exchanging it 
for those of others in society with whom we must communicate;  
(3) We form a more generalized conception of the features common 
to both of our situations. 
 
 (1) enables us to overcome the limitations of our individual vantage 
points. (1) by itself, however, would not suffice for the detached, objective 
perspective, for it would, as already pointed out, leave us with no particular 
point of view at all from which to regard them. (2) then stipulates that 
alternate point of view: that of the other individuals collectively, with whom 
we interact – Rawls’s and Habermas’s “we-perspective.” By putting ourselves 
in these other situations, we gradually develop from a subjective, enclosed 
view of our concerns a more general one that encompasses the common 
features of all the perspectives of those with whom we have exchanged 
positions and sentiments, just as Habermas in particular recommends. This is 
step (3), the "general, unalterable standard" by which we then make 
normative judgments and which arise from the general interests of the 
community. Thus the "general interests" are those which remain invariant 
across exchange of positions and sentiments among individuals. Clearly these 
must include certain of the self-interests of any one of these individuals 
chosen at random. 
 Further evidence for this reading of the objective perspective as the stance 
of enlightened self-interest can be culled from Hume's discussion of the 
"common interest" in his treatment of justice and property in the Treatise. In 
discussing the origin of the convention to respect private property, he says of 
it, 
It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the 
members of the society express to one another ... I observe, that it will be 
for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he 
will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like 
interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of 
interest is mutually express'd, and is known to both, it produces a 
suitable resolution and behavior ... the sense of interest has become 
common to all our fellows, and gives us a confidence of the future 
regularity of their conduct. ... In like manner do gold and silver become 
the common measures of exchange, etc. (T 490; emphasis in text). 
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This description of how the conventions of private property, language, and 
money are established satisfies the three-step sequence for moving from the 
subjective to the objective perspective of the common or general interest, and 
thereby supports Hume's remarks in the Enquiry about the relation of 
language to the general interests of the community: I begin by observing the 
differences between my own position (as possessor of some good) and that of 
the other (as potential threat to my possession). I then discount those 
differences (step (1)). Next, I exchange our respective positions:  He, as 
possessor of goods, is as much threatened by my potential aggression as I was 
by his (step (2)). In step (3), we each recognize our common features as 
possessors of goods with an interest in protecting it, and it is the recognition 
of this common interest that then establishes the convention of conduct, i.e. 
respect for private property, which allows each of us to satisfy it. The same 
reasoning can be applied to the conventions of language or money.  
The general point is clear: Establishing the social conventions that make 
human society of any kind whatsoever possible requires moving from a 
narrow, subjective view of our own interests that distorts our appraisal of 
different states of affairs to a more objective perspective that regards those 
interests from the viewpoint of the interests shared by the community as a 
whole (E 186/229, fn.). This objective perspective enables one to appraise 
some state of affairs, but not with strict impartiality; for I have suggested that 
this is in any case metaphysically impossible on Hume’s view. Rather, it 
enables us to appraise it judiciously, in the sense that we can view the matter 
from the vantage point of the community's interests. And it is only this 
perspective that allows us to establish the conventions of behavior on which 
human society can be erected. 
 These remarks illuminate the second important point Hume makes in 
passage (B), i.e. that the subjective perspective is the "source of all 
dissoluteness and disorder, repentance and misery." The greater the 
uncorrected proximity of the objects of desire, the more we are victimized by 
the violent passions they produce, and the more unconsidered and disorderly 
are our actions in their pursuit. The subjective perspective is, then, the source 
of moral and personal chaos that undermines social order and the 
conventions that maintain it. It is a threat to the general interest that the 
objective perspective so clearly recognizes: 
'Tis certain, that self-love, when it acts at its liberty ... is the source of all 
injustice and violence; nor can a man ever correct those vices, without 
correcting and restraining the natural movements of that appetite (T 480). 
 Now we are in a better position to see how the calm passions provide a 
partial corrective to the subjective perspective. The social conventions that 
arise out of that recognition of the common or general interest that 
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characterizes the objective perspective are precisely those actions motivated 
by calm passions; Hume is quite explicit about this, not only in passage (B), 
but also in the Treatise, where he describe a calm passion as one which "has 
become a settled principle of action" to which "repeated custom and its own 
force have made everything yield" (T 419).26 The calm passions are those 
which motivate us to perform those habitual and customary actions, or 
conventions, in which most of social life consists. These are the "certain rules 
of conduct" formed by our affections on "a general prospect of their objects," 
and often mistakenly identified as the workings of reason. Passions originally 
became calm through repetition of the actions they motivate. Thus they are 
mistaken for the operations of reason, not only because they fail to disturb us 
emotionally, but also because they result in general rules of conduct under 
which repeated instances are subsumed.  
But it is in fact not reason that enjoins us to this customary conduct. 
Rather, it is the recognition of our genuine self-interest, i.e. of the ends we 
most desire to achieve. We repeatedly perform those actions because we 
recognize them as convention solutions to a coordination problem, i.e. how to 
behave so that common interests are maximized and individual interests are 
promoted. This is a problem because acting solely in the pursuit of immediate 
individual interest is to act from the subjective perspective, hence to be 
victimized by distorted and biased appraisals of where our genuine best 
interests actually lie. This bias is corrected by that recognition of the common 
interest that occurs as we move through the three-step sequence into the 
objective perspective. This recognition in turn enables us to formulate and act 
upon those rules of conduct that, "when [thus] coordinated by reflection and 
seconded by resolution, are able to control [the violent passions] in their most 
furious movements" (T 437-8), hence preserve the social order. 
 Now those who contend that Hume's introduction of what I have called 
the objective perspective commits him to ascribing a larger role to reason in 
motivating action than his explicit arguments suggest, may contend that this 
"steady, distant, reflective view" on which the workings of the calm passions 
are founded is not itself a passion but rather a function of the understanding, 
or reason. I see no reason to accept this contention. The analysis given in these 
pages suggests that the objective perspective is nothing more than a 
perception of others' interests, coupled with an absence of those emotional 
obstacles that usually prevent our recognizing the extent to which those 
interests coincide with our own. This absence of emotional obstacles does not 
imply the presence of intellectual cogitation, but rather the presence of 
                                                
26This is consistent with interpreting the prevalence of the calm over the violent 
passions as a natural virtue (T 418). 
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tranquil passions lulled into quiescence by repetition and habit. And we win 
recognition of our common interests not through rational reflection, but rather 
through having had many and varied social interests with others with whom 
we do, in fact, have much in common. 
 Thus the subject matter of what I have termed Hume's principles of 
stability are those actual rules of conduct in which the calm passions find 
expression, and which act as an antidote to the disruptive and distorting 
effects of the violent passions that normally characterize the subjective 
perspective. These principles are directly antithetical to the principles of 
variability, in that the latter enumerate the psychological laws by which social 
order is disrupted through the stimulation of the violent passions, while the 
former, if spelled out, enumerate the social rules by which it can be 
maintained. 
 This completes our discussion of Hume's principles of stability. In 
closing, it remains only to be reemphasized that for Hume, both principles of 
variability and principles of stability are uniform and necessary laws of 
human nature, for they are subject in exactly the same way to the causal 
determinants that condition any natural event. They are explicitly stated by 
Hume to be of a piece with – indeed, instances of – the operations of causal 
law. Next I fit this account into the argument that claims Hume to have in 
effect imposed rational constraints on ends. 
 
6. The Rationality of Final Ends 
 According to the argument introduced in Section 4, that these principles 
of stability are of a piece with causal law implies that they, too, are PIU 
principles that must be received by philosophy. Now Hume may not 
explicitly identify these principles as rational. In fact, we have seen that he 
repeatedly and explicitly denies rational status to the principles of stability. 
But perhaps these passages are to be collectively discounted, if it can be 
shown that Hume's principles governing the passions in fact satisfy all the 
conditions that rational principles must satisfy. For recall Hume's 
characterization of reason. He distinguished it into demonstrative and 
probabilistic. And his arguments regarding the status of causal connection, 
together with his taxonomical division of the faculties of reason, implied that 
the concern of probabilistic reasoning is causal connection. We now discover 
that the two kinds of principles describing the operations of the passions are a 
species of causal law. The inference is evident: The principles governing the 
passions conform to probabilistic rationality. And to the extent that "our 
actions have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances" 
(T 401), the ends they determine will be equally settled, uniform, and regular. 
Indeed, this inference finds confirmation on page 281 of the Treatise, where 
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Hume argues, first, that the same objects – power, riches, beauty, personal 
merit – give rise to the same passions in all nations; and second, that new 
objects adapt themselves to an already existing passion by partaking of some 
general quality shared by its other objects, to which the mind is already 
disposed. Hence the rational principles describing the ways in which the 
passions typically operate provide an equally rational set of constraints on the 
ends or intentional objects those passions typically take. It would seem that 
the PIU principles of the passions do provide a positive set of constraints on 
the range of ends it is rational for a human agent to adopt. 
 But this conclusion is mistaken. What is rational about the PIU principles 
of the passions, if anything, is the fact that they are, like other causal law, 
necessary, uniform, and general in their application. Moreover, like other 
causal law, they describe law-like and seemingly regular and predictable 
relations among given phenomena. It is the fact that they qualify as genuine 
principles which entitles us to think of them as rational. Similarly, for Hume, 
it is a certain kind of relation between abstract ideas that is rational, i.e. the 
inferentially correct and real one. In both cases, we are exercising our reason 
in so far as we investigate and determine the true – which is to say the 
uniform, universally valid, and "necessary" connections among given states of 
affairs. 
 One may want to argue that Hume's principles of stability are rational in 
a further sense as well: As effective social rules and conventions, they are 
rational means to the achievement of individual ends, in that they are the 
most efficient ways of achieving various states of affairs desired by 
individuals, consistent with satisfying the common interest in social order. 
This argument can be illustrated by Hume's treatments of the origin of justice 
and private property discussed above (respectively, Sections 2 and 5).  
 But in neither case can this be thought to imply that the states of affairs 
themselves to which the PIU principles apply are rational. That there is a 
logical and rational relation between the idea of being a bachelor and the idea 
of being an unmarried man does not suggest that either idea as such is 
rational. That there is a causal and probabilistically rational relation between 
the color of litmus paper and the acid solution in which it is dipped suggests 
the rationality neither of the color of the litmus paper nor of the relevant 
solution. And that there is a similar type of relation between the intensity of 
one's craving for a Black Forest Torte and its actual proximity, or between 
one's desire to retain one's own possessions and one's respect for those of 
others, suggests the rationality neither of the craving nor of the Torte nor of 
private property.  
The general point is clear: That there is a rationally discernible 
relation between the passions and the ends they try to achieve does not imply 
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the rationality of those ends any more than its does the rationality of the 
passions themselves. Hence Hume's principles of variability and stability do 
not delimit a range of identifiably rational ends. For the demand for 
identifiably rational final ends is not for principles governing ends that are 
rational in virtue of the rational status of the principles. The demand is for 
principles governing ends that confer rational status on the ends. The PIU 
principles of the violent and calm passions do not meet this demand. 
 This conclusion follows, indeed, from Hume's very characterization of 
the passions: 
[W]hat we commonly understand by passion is a violent and sensible 
emotion of mind, when any good or evil is presented, or any object, 
which, by the original formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an 
appetite (T 437). 
Hume's first point here is that when any object that is good, evil, or capable of 
causing in us a desire or aversion for it is presented to us, we then experience 
a "violent and sensible emotion of mind," or at least a more tranquil one that 
"cause[s] no disorder in the temper." His second point is that the range of 
objects capable of affecting us in this way is constrained only by our own 
capacity to so respond to it, i.e. by "the original formation of our faculties." 
 Two implications of Hume's claims follow immediately: First, the 
passions, both violent and calm, depend on the prior presentation of some 
object in order to be aroused. It is only if we are already conscious of the 
object as desirable or repellent that we are then incited to pursue or avoid it. 
Hence the passion follows rather than precedes adoption of the object as a 
positive or negative end. This summarizes and is underscored by Hume's 
earlier assertion that 
'Tis from the prospects of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity 
arises toward any object:  And ... these emotions extend themselves to the 
causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason 
and experience (T 414). 
This passage occurs as part of Hume's argument that reason can provide no 
motivation to action. But the temporal priority of perceiving the object as a 
source of pleasure or pain over the excitation of a motivating passion for or 
against it stands nevertheless. If we must perceive the object as desirable or 
undesirable before we are motivated to achieve or avoid it, then it must be a 
recognizable end for us, whether positive or negative, before we are moved to 
action on its behalf. But if the recognition of the object as a desirable end is 
presupposed by its exciting a violent or calm passion, it is not easy to see how 
the passions might originally determine any particular range of ends. Clearly, 
it would seem to be the other way around. 
Chapter XIV. Hume’s Metaethics           604 
 
 
 
 
© Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation Berlin 
  The second consequence of Hume's claim, and the conclusion of this 
chapter, is that on Hume’s own view as well as the Humean one, the only 
constraint on the range of objects that can be possible ends or objects of desire 
for us is our own motivational capacity. The Humean conception of the self 
permits us to adopt anything as an end that we can be moved to attain. This 
diminishes even further the plausibility of supposing that either the passions 
or the PIU principles that govern them might impose rational constraints on 
final ends. For Hume as well as for Humeans, such constraints can consist 
only in our natural capacity for desiring. And the counterintuitive examples 
of rationally permitted final ends enumerated throughout this volume – 
counting blades of grass, howling at the moon, and the like – strongly suggest 
that to argue for the rationality of this capacity as a rational constraint on 
what we can desire is implausible at best. Hence when Hume flamboyantly 
but categorically denies that reason can influence our final ends, we must take 
him at his word, with all the counterintuitive and methodologically 
exasperating implications to the itemization of which this volume has been 
devoted. The challenge is then to develop an alternative conception of the self, 
of motivation, and of rationality that avoid these implications. This is the 
positive, substantive challenge that I try to meet in Volume II. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter XV. Seven Dogmas of Humeanism 
 
 
In this volume I have reviewed and critiqued the evolution of the 
Humean conception of the self in mid- to late-twentieth century Anglo-
American moral philosophy through close attention to its use in the hands of 
several of its leading proponents, as they have developed its foundational 
notion of desire in response to certain basic dilemmas this conception 
generates. I have tried to track the ways in which the notion of desire has 
proliferated from the commonsense, prereflective concept of a desire, to that 
of desire as a theoretical construct, to that of desire as a dispositional 
response, to that of an unconscious desire, to that of a behaviorally revealed 
desire, to that of an internally coherent system of desires, to that of cardinally 
and then ordinally ranked desires, to the distinction between motivated and 
unmotivated desires, to that between first- and higher-order desires, to that 
between self-directed and other-directed desires, to that between object-
dependent, principle-dependent, and conception-dependent desires, to that 
between blindfolded and fully informed desires. And I have tried to show 
that none of these sophisticated epicyclic refinements of the fundamental 
notion of a desire solve or avoid the basic dilemmas this notion engenders. I 
have tried to suggest that no such future epicyclic variations can; that their 
solution requires a paradigm shift away from desire altogether, and toward 
reason as the primary foundational factor in both thought and action.  
In Volume II I try to show that solutions to the three problems listed in 
Chapter I.7.2.2 above, in addition to several others left so far untended, 
require dismantling and reconstructing within a broader, Kantian framework 
a constellation of familiar, reductive metaphysical dogmas, inherited from 
Positivism, which the Humean conception presupposes virtually without 
question. The influence of these dogmas extends far past the confines of 
Humean moral philosophy. Humean moral philosophy rather takes its cue 
from these more widespread, Positivist metaphysical doctrines that came to 
define late-twentieth century Anglo-American analytic philosophy in general. 
I find a great deal of significance in these doctrines – as I do in Humean moral 
philosophy itself; and so have no interest in doing away with them. However, 
it is in the nature of reductive doctrines of any kind to be inherently exclusive 
of views, assumptions, data and strategies that interfere with the reduction; 
and if there is one overarching theme of this project, it is that doctrinal and 
conceptual exclusion is exactly the wrong direction in which twenty-first 
century Anglo-American analytic moral philosophy ought to be moving. So 
my aim in Volume II is the less bellicose one of targeting, tempering, and 
situating the constructive kernels of these dogmas within a larger context of 
assumptions with which, shorn of their reductive and exclusionary 
aspirations, they might more or less peacefully co-exist. To that end, I close 
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this first, critical half of the discussion with a brief conceptual map that locates 
the Humean conception of the self within its network of Positivist 
metaphysical dogmas – dogmas which lend one another mutual support and 
enhance the prima facie credibility of the Humean conception in relation to 
them. And I offer a very brief preview of how I intend to temper them in the 
second, substantive half of this discussion. 
One such dogma that provides a rationale for the Humean position may 
be found in the epiphenomenalist view of the mind that regards mental contents 
as nonmaterial and so causally impotent by-products of physical processes, to 
the extent that they exist at all. If no mental contents have causal efficacy in 
behavior, then a fortiori thoughts, beliefs, deliberation, reflection and 
reasoning can have none. Reason as a source of moral motivation is ruled out 
by fiat. But I argue in Volume II, Chapter V that this inference could not 
provide support for the causal efficacy of desire without further argument to 
demonstrate that occurrent desires are or can be interpreted as exclusively 
physical, whereas occurrent thoughts and beliefs are exclusively mental. And 
I call into question whether it is possible to demonstrate this.  
A second, companion dogma is that of mind-body materialism, which 
claims that only third-personally observable physical matter exists. This is the 
metaphysical bedrock on which attempts to reduce desire to the exclusively 
physical rely. Again my aim is not to deny the existence or causal efficacy of 
observable physical matter, even though the concept of physical matter is 
starting to look increasingly primitive from the perspective of theoretical 
physics. It is rather to make explicit what most contemporary moral 
philosophy takes for granted, i.e. that first-personally observable mental states 
exist just as robustly and efficaciously. I undertake this task as well in Volume 
II’s Chapter V, along with a third with which it is intertwined, namely 
behaviorism, the view that there are no inner states – at least none worth 
scientific notice; and that only those expressed in overt behavior are of 
interest. This dogma has a particularly robust pedigree, in psychology as well 
as in mid-century Positivism.  
Conjointly these three dogmas bear a strong family resemblance to a 
fourth: what I describe in Volume II, Chapter V as the ideal of spontaneity 
and what neoclassical economics describes as the theory of revealed preference, 
i.e. that all inner states are revealed in overt physical behavior, whether verbal 
or nonverbal. In these cases as well, it is not the concentrated attention to 
physical behavior to which I object, but rather the doctrinal insistence that 
physical behavior is all there is. I argue that the anti-psychologistic 
constellation of epiphenomenalism, materialism and behaviorism was the 
expression of a reactive, mid-century aversion to psychological interiority 
consequent on the trauma of the second World War, which it is now time to 
re-evaluate. 
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A fifth dogma of Humeanism is the assumption that sentential propositions 
are the fundamental units of meaning, the intellective counterpart to the 
passional thesis targeted in this volume, that desire is the fundamental unit of 
motivation. If sentential propositions are the smallest units of meaning, then – 
unlike desire – the motivational efficacy of reason can reach no more deeply 
into the self than the motivational efficacy of sentences; and – unlike desire – 
can play no more atomistic, foundational or developmental role in the 
structure of the self. I argue against this assumption in Volume II, Chapter II. 
Obviously I do not reject the sentential proposition that sentential 
propositions have meaning. But I do reject the tacit assumption that they are 
the most basic units of meaning; and propose in Volume II, Chapters II and III 
a more fine-grained analysis of subsentential constituents to supplement it. 
Rethinking this fifth dogma is also necessary in order to show how reason can 
motivate action because if brain states are causally effective, and occurrent 
beliefs can be identified with brain states as mind-body materialism supposes, 
then occurrent beliefs can be causally effective after all. But not all occurrent 
beliefs can be formulated sententially because not all thoughts, ideas, images 
or associations are formulable in sentential terms. A more fine-grained 
analysis increases the chances of tracking observationally those intellective, 
non-passional mental events that occurrently precipitate action.  
Connected with this is a sixth dogma of Humeanism, the “is-ought” 
distinction that confines truth to the former, descriptive realm and relegates to 
the latter, prescriptive realm the expression of emotions and attitudes. If 
meaning is located in sentential propositions, and meaningful sentential 
propositions can refer only to physical states of affairs, then in the end, no 
verbally expressed act of human intellection that does not refer to a physical 
state of affairs can be meaningful. I argue against this dogma in Volume II, 
Chapters V and IX, that so-called prescriptive sentences – i.e. commands and 
imperatives – are in fact categorical declarative sentences of the ordinary kind 
that are descriptive and explanatory of ideal states of affairs; and so are 
syntactically and epistemically on a par with those sentences descriptive and 
explanatory of non-ideal physical realities. Again the aim is to supplement 
rather than replace the canonical assumption.   
These six dogmas interlock with those two models which conjoin to 
define explicitly the Humean conception of the self. Here the implication arrows 
point in both directions. The Humean conception accepts desire as the 
foundational element in both its model of motivation and its model of 
rationality. In order to extend its reach as an explanatory paradigm, it 
interprets desire behavioristically, as revealed preference theory requires. In 
so doing, it links expressions of desire exclusively with physical behavior, and 
so gives indirect support both to mind-body materialism and to 
epiphenomenalism. In rejecting the phenomenal and first-personal, it confines 
meaning to verbal behavior and the referents of language to physical states of 
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affairs, thus providing support both to the primacy of sentential propositions 
as the basic units of meaning, and to the is-ought distinction as confining 
meaning to the physically verifiable.  
Conversely, these six dogmas lend support to the Humean conception. 
Behaviorism implies an interpretation of desire of the sort that revealed 
preference theory supplies. Epiphenomenalism and mind-body materialism 
together underwrite the interpretation of such desires as exclusively physical, 
and the interpretation of rational judgments about ideal and therefore non-
verifiable states of affairs as both causally impotent and meaningless. This 
interpretation is given further credibility by the presupposition that sentential 
propositions that refer to physically verifiable states of affairs are the 
fundamental units of meaning.  
If only third-personally observable physical behavior exists, then first-
personal mental states do not. Rather, they are manifested in verbal and other 
physical behavior to the extent that they exist at all. If the mind is 
epiphenomenal and causally ineffectual, then verbal behavior that purports to 
express thoughts and beliefs in sentential propositions not only manifests 
epiphenomenal and causally ineffectual mental states of the agent, but also 
communicates them in an epiphenomenal and causally ineffectual manner. A 
fortiori, verbal behavior that purports to express rational thoughts and beliefs 
in sentential propositions that refer to ideal states of affairs manifests 
epiphenomenal and causally ineffectual states of the agent, communicates 
them epiphenomenally and ineffectually, and refers to nothing. Therefore 
reason is causally, i.e. motivationally ineffectual both first- and second-
personally.  
So not only are rational principles impotent to motivate our behavior 
first-personally. In addition, second-personal appeals to reason in others are 
impotent to motivate their behavior. Then in particular, the second-personal 
appeals to reason that form the foundation of philosophical practice in the 
Socratic metaethical tradition are in theory incapable of doing the job to which 
they purport to be committed. Hence philosophical practice itself as 
traditionally self-represented is without practical effect. Moreover, if all our 
actions seek to satisfy our desires, then maximizing the satisfaction of desire, 
i.e. utility, is our only final end, and this end is revealed in the physical 
behavior in which we engage. Then in particular, our physical behavior of, for 
example, analyzing, arguing, criticizing, theorizing and so on, maximizes our 
desires to do those things, and supplies some of the more innocuous reasons 
why we do philosophy. Similarly, physical behavior that maximizes the 
satisfaction of our desires to win, shine, show off, acquire power, or subjugate 
others supplies some of the more noxious ones.  The transpersonally rational 
ideal of gaining reflective consensus on a transpersonally justifiable ethics, 
politics or society has nothing to do with it. 
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Taken together, then, these seven reductive dogmas – the Humean 
conception and the six metaphysical dogmas with which it is interdependent 
– exclude by fiat the very possibility that anything other than desire might be 
conceptually or psychologically significant for moral theory; indeed, that any 
conative state of the agent other than desire might truly be said to exist. It 
thus makes the case for egocentric rationality by denying not only the 
philosophical legitimacy but also the metaphysical existence of the cognitive 
and behavioral capacities that constitute transpersonal rationality. Under the 
weight of these radically exclusionary and repressive dogmas, it is little 
wonder that Kantians seem at a disadvantage in making their case.  
These overly restrictive and reductive dogmas are examples of what I 
describe in Volume II, Chapter VII as pseudorationality. That is, they deny, 
dissociate or rationalize the exclusion of the very data of moral experience 
that are most in need of analysis and explanation, in order to preserve the 
illusion of rational intelligibility for those which remain. In Chapters VII, VIII, 
X, and XI respectively of Volume II, I offer four detailed test cases of 
pseudorationality, of increasing degrees of seriousness, realism and 
applicability to real-life circumstances, which illustrate the problems – for self-
knowledge, knowledge of others and of the world, and for a realistic and 
effective moral response to them – that attachment to the mere illusion of 
rational intelligibility can precipitate. The price of attachment to these seven 
reductive dogmas of Humeanism is to leave unresolved the pressing 
problems of moral motivation and rational justification with which most 
Socratic metaethicists, not only those who are Humean devotees, are 
justifiably preoccupied. I have tried to suggest – and in Volume II try to 
demonstrate – that if we want to resolve them, we must leave all of these 
dogmas behind. 
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Anonymous Praise from the Referees of Cambridge University Press 
for RATIONALITY AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE SELF, 
VOLUME II: A KANTIAN CONCEPTION 
 
 
 
There’s much about Piper’s manuscript that is interesting and good, since she 
is obviously extremely intelligent and knowledgeable as well as a very 
articulate and talented writer such that her manuscript has many significant 
strengths. … The manuscript’s greatest strength is that it articulates a Kantian 
conception of the self that is interesting and has not been developed in the 
literature… In particular, Piper argues that certain principles of rationality 
(with both horizontal and vertical consistency built into subsentential concept 
usage) are required in order for unified agency to be possible. She argues 
further that this conception of agency can be linked to Kant’s conception of 
self-consciousness in the Transcendental Deduction, contrasted with Humean 
desire-based conceptions, and formalized in such a way that it relates directly 
to “standard” versions of decision theory. She then illustrates how this theory 
of the self can make sense of a variety of phenomena in moral psychology. 
[A]nother strength of the manuscript is that it tackles an important issue, not a 
mere technicality, and does so without being overly narrow, as some projects 
in analytical philosophy can be. It is also well written and clearly organized.  
… {A] highly significant contribution …. Chapter III’s … main purpose … 
is to formulate a variable term decision calculus that modifies Savage’s in 
certain ways. … I cannot say that there are not formal problems with the 
calculus that is introduced here, but I didn’t see any.  
 
 
 
Adrian M. S. Piper is a brilliant philosopher and her book, Rationality and the 
Structure of the Self, is unquestionably a groundbreaking piece of philosophical 
writing. The book is breathtakingly original in its attempt to explain Kant. … 
Piper has pushed the argument farther and better and with more subtlety 
than anyone writing in the area. Here I am making direct reference to neo-
Kantians such as (in alphabetical order) Stephen Darwall, Barbara Herman, 
and Christine Korsgaard.  
… [If Piper’s] arguments do not succeed, then there will be none that do. 
Upon meeting years ago, at a conference, the now-retired Kurt Baier, I recall 
his speaking of the extraordinary heights of analytical abstraction and rigor 
that her work attained. Now that I have read this volume, I understand first-
hand what Kurt Baier meant. His words did not, and could not, have done 
justice to the sophistication of Piper’s work.  
… I very much appreciated Chapter I of the book where Professor Piper 
discusses the pursuit of philosophy. This lends an enormous power to the 
book. … [I]t gives the book a kind of real-life imprimatur. To my knowledge, 
no theoretical book on Kantian philosophy has ever contained a chapter that 
speaks to the travails of being in philosophy. …  
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Piper’s discussion of the Humean model in Chapter I is itself a model of 
clarity. … [her] Kantian theory of morality and the self … is theoretically 
subtle and elegant … magisterial … .  
… Piper has made the case for the theoretical pay-ff more thoroughly and 
powerfully and with more subtlety than anyone in recent times has done. To 
my mind, no one comes even close. Indeed, in comparison to Korsgaard’s 
argument in this regard, as given in her Tanner Lectures (for example), Piper’s 
argument is on an entirely different and higher plane in terms of its richness 
and majesty and thoroughness. At the theoretical level, insofar as any one has 
a claim to leaving no stone unturned, Piper most certainly does.  
… Chapter III, “The Concept of a Genuine Preference,” is surely a tour de 
force. … I read the chapter and was extremely impressed by it. …  
Piper’s argument on friendship and impartiality is one of the most one of 
the most powerful and, if you will, morally beautiful arguments in the book. 
No one has made more sense of Kantian moral philosophy and the subject of 
friendship than she has. The very idea that friendship requires strict 
impartiality is absolutely marvelous. It is so often the case that Kantians 
writing on the subject convey a “you-just-don’t-understand” attitude towards 
those, like Blum, who speak to the partiality of friendship. Piper is to be 
commended for finally, perhaps, getting us beyond that impasse. …  
Working through Professor Piper’s manuscript has been a most 
rewarding philosophical experience. I have learned so much at every step 
along the way. … I have been persuaded by much that Piper has written; and 
I have disagreed at very points. But in each every case the disagreement has 
been most instructive.  …  
Kantians will surely love the book, though each will have her or his 
difference with Piper’s argument. However, there is this: If at this point in 
time I were to recommend to a dyed-in-the-wool non-Kantian moral 
philosopher that she or he read one book on Kant’s moral philosophy, Adrian 
Piper’s Rationality and the Structure of the Self would be it. 
 
 
 
I would put RSS2 into a group of books/papers that began more or less with 
Thomas Nagel’s The Possibility of Altruism. … The idea in this tradition (and 
RSS2 follows this) is to appeal to Kant’s work to solve the contemporary 
problem of finding the right way to explain and justify ethical behavior; it is 
only secondarily intended to be exegesis of Kant’s texts. … The common 
target of these works is the ‘desire theory of action’…, which states that all 
actions can be traced back to desires. … [T]he contemporary source is David 
Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. [Piper] conceives this epic intellectual 
battle—correctly I think—as an argument between two competing pictures of 
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the self. Hume’s self is propelled by desires, with reason just helping out to 
calculate how to satisfy the most desires. For Kant, reason is not merely an 
instrument, but a faculty that itself produces content, something that can 
direct action from its own principles.   
[Piper]’s novel move in the project of appealing to Kant to provide 
justification for a non-desire based account of human action and so morality is 
to take Kant seriously when he says that it is one and the same reason that 
creates theories of the world and directs moral behavior. So she looks to the 
theory of cognition in the Critique of Pure Reason … for clues about his picture 
of the self in moral life. This approach has considerable plausibility because of 
the distinctive shape of Kant’s theory knowledge. … The crucial point for 
[Piper]’s purposes is that, if a would-be cognizer’s encounters with the world 
are scatty or if he lacks a concept of himself as an on-going acquirer of 
information, then he will lose or perhaps never develop any sense of self. … 
Neither Nagel nor Korsgaard looked to Kant’s own theories of cognition to 
buttress his rationalist approach to ethics …. O’Neill is closer to [Piper] in 
making some use of the views of [the first Critique], but she does not develop 
this line in great detail or in anything like the same way it is developed in 
RSS2.  
On this basis, I believe the project to be both important and original. … 
The writing and organization are excellent.  
The central theoretical apparatus of KSS2 is given in Chapter II, where 
AP introduces the notions of horizontal and vertical consistency. These are 
important, because she will argue that consistency is necessary to having a 
sufficient intellectual grasp on the world to be capable of agency. This result 
then has two crucial implications.  The first is that intellectual self-
preservation and so consistency are necessary conditions to being an agent at 
all.  So rather than reason being a potential source of action on a par with or 
competing with desire, an active reason that presses constantly for 
consistency is revealed as a necessary condition for desire or intention 
themselves (thus disposing of [the desire theory of action]).  The second 
implication is that morality arises from the effort of reason to be consistent 
and so to preserve the life of the self.  
I’m sympathetic to [Piper]’s claim that it makes sense to talk about 
subsentential consistency, so that the objects of one’s attitudes must be 
understood consistently (that is, it is not just that one’s attitudes or 
attributions to those objects must be understood consistently). …[S]he has a 
plausible view about Kant’s understanding of representations and judgment.  
…[H]er approach to the intentionality of preferences seems plausible. … 
[S]he makes good use of McClennen’s work on resolute choice to argue that 
any genuinely intentional action presupposes consistency. … [She] does a 
good job at characterizing how we might think about reason causing action. 
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Humeans will complain that she shifts the burden of proof to them to say why 
the intellect or reason cannot cause action, but that seems fair enough after 
two hundred years of the burden being given to the Kantians to show that it 
can. …  
Can reason ground morality? [Piper] makes an interesting move on this 
question and one that is deeply Kantian. She starts with Kant’s moral theory 
… as providing a description of a perfectly rational/moral agent. This is 
certainly the way Kant saw things. Others have noticed this in the past, but I 
think that [Piper] uses this recognition to much better effect. Once this ideal is 
in place, ordinary human behavior that falls long short of perfectly morality is 
explained in terms of stratagems for preserving the appearance of rational 
consistency (and so the life of the agent as such) in the face of recalcitrant 
data. There is an elegance here, as well as a strong Kantian strain, where 
reason is the hero of ethics and rationalization (or the misuse of reason) is the 
villain. Varieties of rationalizing are presented in chapters 7 and 8.  I think the 
discussion of self-deception is interesting and plausible. 
… The ms. is very long, 763 pp. + a 54 pp. bibliography by my count. Still, it is 
not a cumbersome read; the prose marches along in quite a compelling way. 
 
 
 
This is an important and ambitious project, right-headed in many important 
regards. … The author is clearly correct about several important points, 
central to the present study, including the following: Contemporary 
philosophical thought in matters moral remains deeply and pervasively 
influenced by often unacknowledged Humean assumptions that frame and 
guide philosophical accounts of moral matters. These Humean assumptions 
are far less plausible and justifiable than their adherent recognize. Rather than 
examining or justifying these Humean assumptions, they are more often 
enforced as a matter of professional orthodoxy. These Humean assumptions 
are subject to Kant’s incisive criticisms of Hume. Kant’s criticisms of Hume 
have not yet been adequately analysed, nor (accordingly) given their proper 
due among contemporary moral philosophers, including even the work of 
some self-proclaimed Kantian moral theorists, such as the late John Rawls. 
Kant’s criticisms of Hume pertaining to moral philosophy require and deserve 
the extended and detailed treatment the author gives them. Contemporary 
moral philosophers are committed, in theory and in practice, to high 
standards of rational justification, although these standards and both their 
theory and their practice cannot be accounted for on the basis of the basically 
Humean views advocated by a broad swath of contemporary, especially 
analytic moral philosophers.…  
[D]ecision theory has allowed philosophers to let their neo-Humean 
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presumptions run riot without critical examination. The author is right that 
decision theory both reflects and is central to the hegemony of neo-Humean 
views in moral philosophy, and that a critique of decision theory is thus a 
crucial part of her project. I find that the author makes judicious criticisms of 
contemporary decision theories and that these criticisms contribute 
significantly both to explaining and to justifying her Kantian alternative to 
neo-Humean decision theories. I also find the author’s discussion of these 
issues deft and concise …  
[T]he author’s project is bold, ambitious and very timely. A great virtue 
of the project is to link its topic directly with issues about our own 
philosophical ideals and practices. The links are genuine, though the 
discussion of these issues about the norms governing rational discourse, 
especially within philosophy, has been rather scarce, especially among 
philosophers. … The book promises to be a block-buster … The two 
contrasting accounts of Moore, by Hampshire and by Keynes, are important 
and illuminating. … The author’s discussion of various dialogical pathologies 
in the field only touches the tip of a very important iceberg. … the author is 
clearly in command of her issues, topics, and order of discussion. The 
discussion is all carefully and clearly formulated … The author rightly 
interprets Kant’s moral writings within the context of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, and is right that failure to do this has had wide-spread debilitating 
effects on ‘Kantian’ moral theory among analytic philosophers. … The 
author’s objection to Brandom’s inferentialist program is sound … Brandom’s 
inferentialism is fatally flawed for just the reason the author points out. 
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